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Delta-Bench: Differential Benchmark for Static Analysis Security Testing Tools | IEEE Conference Publication | IEEE Xplore

Delta-Bench: Differential Benchmark for Static Analysis Security Testing Tools


Abstract:

Background: Static analysis security testing (SAST) tools may be evaluated using synthetic micro benchmarks and benchmarks based on real-world software. Aims: The aim of ...Show More

Abstract:

Background: Static analysis security testing (SAST) tools may be evaluated using synthetic micro benchmarks and benchmarks based on real-world software. Aims: The aim of this study is to address the limitations of the existing SAST tool benchmarks: lack of vulnerability realism, uncertain ground truth, and large amount of findings not related to analyzed vulnerability. Method: We propose Delta-Bench - a novel approach for the automatic construction of benchmarks for SAST tools based on differencing vulnerable and fixed versions in Free and Open Source (FOSS) repositories. To test our approach, we used 7 state of the art SAST tools against 70 revisions of four major versions of Apache Tomcat spanning 62 distinct Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) fixes and vulnerable files totalling over 100K lines of code as the source of ground truth vulnerabilities. Results: Our experiment allows us to draw interesting conclusions (e.g., tools perform differently due to the selected benchmark). Conclusions: Delta-Bench allows SAST tools to be automatically evaluated on the real-world historical vulnerabilities using only the findings that a tool produced for the analysed vulnerability.
Date of Conference: 09-10 November 2017
Date Added to IEEE Xplore: 11 December 2017
ISBN Information:
Conference Location: Toronto, ON, Canada

I. Introduction

Designing a benchmark with real-world software is a challenging task [1]. Therefore, existing approaches either insert bugs artificially [2], [3], or use historical bugs from the software repository of a project [4]. Artificial bug injection is often difficult to verify (see [2, p.2]), whilst historical vulnerabilities may represent only a subset of the ground truth.

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References

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