Loading [MathJax]/extensions/MathMenu.js
Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructures: Attack and Defense Modeling | IEEE Journals & Magazine | IEEE Xplore

Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructures: Attack and Defense Modeling


Abstract:

Disruption of electric power operations can be catastrophic on national security and the economy. Due to the complexity of widely dispersed assets and the interdependence...Show More

Abstract:

Disruption of electric power operations can be catastrophic on national security and the economy. Due to the complexity of widely dispersed assets and the interdependences among computer, communication, and power infrastructures, the requirement to meet security and quality compliance on operations is a challenging issue. In recent years, the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) established a cybersecurity standard that requires utilities' compliance on cybersecurity of control systems. This standard identifies several cyber-related vulnerabilities that exist in control systems and recommends several remedial actions (e.g., best practices). In this paper, a comprehensive survey on cybersecurity of critical infrastructures is reported. A supervisory control and data acquisition security framework with the following four major components is proposed: (1) real-time monitoring; (2) anomaly detection; (3) impact analysis; and (4) mitigation strategies. In addition, an attack-tree-based methodology for impact analysis is developed. The attack-tree formulation based on power system control networks is used to evaluate system-, scenario -, and leaf-level vulnerabilities by identifying the system's adversary objectives. The leaf vulnerability is fundamental to the methodology that involves port auditing or password strength evaluation. The measure of vulnerabilities in the power system control framework is determined based on existing cybersecurity conditions, and then, the vulnerability indices are evaluated.
Page(s): 853 - 865
Date of Publication: 03 June 2010

ISSN Information:

References is not available for this document.

I. Introduction

Critical infrastructures are complex physical and cyber-based systems that form the lifeline of a modern society, and their reliable and secure operation is of paramount importance to national security and economic vitality. In most sense, the cyber system forms the backbone of a nation's critical infrastructures, which means that a major security incident on cyber systems could have significant impacts on the reliable and safe operations of the physical systems that rely on it. The recent findings, as documented in government reports [1]–[7], indicate the growing threat of physical and cyber-based attacks in numbers and sophistication on electric grids and other critical infrastructure systems. The focus of this paper is the cybersecurity of an electric power infrastructure. The three modes of malicious attacks on power infrastructure are as follows: 1) attack upon the system; 2) attack by the system; and 3) attack through the system [8].

Select All
1.
J. Eisenhauer, P. Donnelly, M. Ellis and M. OBrien, Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the Energy Sector, Jan. 2006.
2.
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) Systems, Oct. 2004, [online] Available: http://www.ncs.gov/library/tech_bulletins/2004/tib_04-1.pdf.
3.
Critical infrastructure protection report, May 2005, [online] Available: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05434.pdf.
4.
Challenges and Efforts to Secure Control Systems, Mar. 2004, [online] Available: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04354.pdf.
5.
M. R. Permann and K. Rohde, Cyber Assessment Methods for SCADA Security, NC, Research Triangle Park:Instrum. Soc. Amer., [online] Available: http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/Cyber_Assessment_Methods_for_SCADA_Security_Mays_ISA_Paper.pdf.
6.
R. E. Carlson, J. E. Dagle, S. A. Shamsuddin and R. P. Evans, A Summary of Control System Security Standards Activities in the Energy Sector, DC:U.S. Dept. Energy, Office Electricity Delivery Energy Reliab., Nat. SCADA Test Bed (NSTB), Oct. 2005, [online] Available: http://www.oe.energy.gov/DocumentsandMedia/Control_System_Security_Standards_Activities.pdf.
7.
Information Security: Technologies to Secure Federal Systems, Mar. 2004.
8.
M. Amin, "Security challenges for the electricity infrastructure", Computer, vol. 35, no. 4, pp. 8-10, Apr. 2002.
9.
J. D. McDonald, Power Substations Engineering, FL, Boca Raton:CRC Press, May 2007.
10.
J. Salmeron, K. Wood and R. Baldick, "Analysis of electric grid security under terrorist threat", IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 905-912, May 2004.
11.
R. A. Leon, V. Vittal and G. Manimaran, "Application of sensor network for secure electric energy infrastructure", IEEE Trans. Power Del., vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 1021-1028, Apr. 2007.
12.
A. G. Bruce and R. Lee, "A framework for the specification of SCADA data links", IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 560-564, Feb. 1994.
13.
R. L. Krutz, Securing SCADA Systems, NJ, Hoboken:Wiley, Nov. 2005.
14.
Q. Liu, J.-N. Hwang and C.-C. Liu, "Communication infrastructure for wide area protection of power systems", Proc. Power Syst. Commun. Infrastructures Future, 2002-Sep.
15.
C.-L. Su, C.-N. Lu and T.-Y. Hsiao, "Simulation study of Internet based inter control center data exchange for complete network modeling", IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 1177-1183, Nov. 2002.
16.
K. Schneider, C.-C. Liu and J.-P. Paul, "Assessment of interactions between power and telecommunications infrastructures", IEEE Trans. Power Syst., vol. 21, no. 3, pp. 1123-1130, Aug. 2006.
17.
T. Mander, F. Nabhani, L. Wang and R. Cheung, "Data object based security for DNP3 over TCP/IP for increased utility commercial aspects security", Proc. IEEE Power Eng. Soc. Gen. Meeting, pp. 1-8, 2007-Jun.-2428.
18.
M. Adamiak and W. Premerlani, "The role of utility communications in a deregulated environment", Proc. 32nd HICSS, vol. Track3, pp. 3026, 1999.
19.
M. Amin and B. F. Wollenberg, "Toward a smart grid: Power delivery for the 21st century", IEEE Power Energy Mag., vol. 3, no. 5, pp. 34-41, Sep./Oct. 2005.
20.
F. F. Wu, K. Moslehi and A. Bose, "Power system control centers: Past present and future", Proc. IEEE, vol. 93, no. 11, pp. 1890-1908, Nov. 2005.
21.
Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for Electric Power Infrastructure, Sep. 2002.
22.
C.-W. Ten, C.-C. Liu and G. Manimaran, "Vulnerability assessment of cybersecurity for SCADA systems using attack trees", Proc. IEEE Power Eng. Soc. Gen. Meeting, pp. 1-8, 2007-Jun.-2428.
23.
T. D. Nelson, "Mitigations for security vulnerabilities found in control system networks", Proc. 16th Annu. Joint ISA POWID/EPRI Controls Instrum. Conf., pp. 1-12, 2006.
24.
C.-W. Ten, G. Manimaran and C.-C. Liu, "Cybersecurity for electric power control and automation systems", Proc. eNetworks Cyberengineering Workshop IEEE-SMC, pp. 29-34, 2007-Oct.-710.
25.
M. Naedele, D. Dzung and M. Stanimirov, "Network security for substation automation systems" in SAFECOMP, Germany, Berlin:Springer-Verlag, pp. 25-34, 2001.
26.
T. S. Sidhu and Y. Yin, "Modeling and simulation for performance evaluation of IEC61850-based substation communication systems", IEEE Trans. Power Del., vol. 22, no. 3, pp. 1482-1489, Jul. 2007.
27.
P. Baybutt, "Cybersecurity risk analysis for process control systems using rings of protection analysis (ROPA)", Process Safety Progr., vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 284-290, Dec. 2004.
28.
N. Ye, J. Giordano and J. Feldman, "A process control approach to cyber attack detection", Commun. ACM, vol. 44, no. 8, pp. 76-82, Aug. 2001.
29.
J.-W. Park and J.-M. Lee, "Transmission modeling and simulation for Internet-based control", Proc. IEEE 27th IECON, pp. 165-169, 2001-Nov.
30.
A. Miller, "Trends in process control systems security", IEEE Secur. Privacy, vol. 3, no. 5, pp. 57-60, Sep. 2005.
Contact IEEE to Subscribe

References

References is not available for this document.