CaFA: Cost-aware, Feasible Attacks With Database Constraints Against Neural Tabular Classifiers | IEEE Conference Publication | IEEE Xplore

CaFA: Cost-aware, Feasible Attacks With Database Constraints Against Neural Tabular Classifiers


Abstract:

This work presents CaFA, a system for Cost-aware Feasible Attacks for assessing the robustness of neural tabular classifiers against adversarial examples realizable in th...Show More

Abstract:

This work presents CaFA, a system for Cost-aware Feasible Attacks for assessing the robustness of neural tabular classifiers against adversarial examples realizable in the problem space, while minimizing adversaries’ effort. To this end, CaFA leverages TabPGD—an algorithm we set forth to generate adversarial perturbations suitable for tabular data— and incorporates integrity constraints automatically mined by state-of-the-art database methods. After producing adversarial examples in the feature space via TabPGD, CaFA projects them on the mined constraints, leading, in turn, to better attack realizability. We tested CaFA with three datasets and two architectures and found, among others, that the constraints we use are of higher quality (measured via soundness and completeness) than ones employed in prior work. Moreover, CaFA achieves higher feasible success rates—i.e., it generates adversarial examples that are often misclassified while satisfying constraints—than prior attacks while simultaneously perturbing few features with lower magnitudes, thus saving effort and improving inconspicuousness. We open-source CaFA,1 hoping it will serve as a generic system enabling machine-learning engineers to assess their models’ robustness against realizable attacks, thus advancing deployed models’ trustworthiness.
Date of Conference: 19-23 May 2024
Date Added to IEEE Xplore: 05 September 2024
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Conference Location: San Francisco, CA, USA

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1. Introduction

Evasion attacks producing adversarial examples— slightly but strategically manipulated variants of benign samples inducing misclassifications—have emerged as a technically deep challenge posing risk to safety- and security-critical deployments of machine learning (ML) [6]. For example, adversaries may inconspicuously manipulate their appearance to circumvent face-recognition systems [15], [41], [42]. As another example, attackers may introduce seemingly innocuous stickers to traffic signs, leading traffic-sign recognition models to err [20]. Such adversarial examples have also become the de facto means for assessing ML models’ robustness (i.e., ability to withstand inference-time attacks) in adversarial settings [6], [38]. Nowadays, numerous critical applications employ ML models on tabular data, including for medical diagnosis, malware detection, fraud detection, and credit scoring [7]. Still, adversarial examples against such models remain underexplored.

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