I. Introduction
Security and privacy have been widely recognized as the main issues in cellular networks, which are vulnerable to false base station (FBS) attacks. As shown in Fig. 1, FBS attackers often capture the system information (SI) by lurking around the legitimate base station (called as gNB in 5G), and then replay or broadcast fake SI to user equipments (UEs) with a high transmit power. This actions forces UEs to initiate radio resource control (RRC) setup requests and be associated with the attackers [2], [3]. Once camped with FBS, UE is suffered a series of issues incurred by the attacks, such as eavesdropping, identity theft, and location tracking [4], [5]. In China alone, the total number of FBS activities exceeded 10,000 times in 2019, and 546 times involving 61 illegal and criminal cases in 2020 [6], [7]. From Jan. 2021 to Dec. 2022, over 19,139 monitoring personnel were deployed, collectively conducting surveillance for a total time exceeding 252,180.8 hours to detect FBSs [8], [9]. Recently, the proposed mutual authentications has shown a good potential to address FBS issues in most scenarios [10]. However, it is not a fully covered solution since SI would also be maliciously exploited by FBS without any protection in initial access. Therefore, protecting SI from FBS attacks has become an open issue and drawn much attention from both industry and academia.
The diagram of FBS attack.