Countering Eavesdroppers With Meta- Learning-Based Cooperative Ambient Backscatter Communications

This article introduces a novel lightweight framework using ambient backscattering communications to counter eavesdroppers. In particular, our framework divides an original message into two parts. The first part, i.e., the active-transmit message, is transmitted by the transmitter using conventional RF signals. Simultaneously, the second part, i.e., the backscatter message, is transmitted by an ambient backscatter tag that backscatters upon the active signals emitted by the transmitter. Notably, the backscatter tag does not generate its own signal, making it difficult for an eavesdropper to detect the backscattered signals unless they have prior knowledge of the system. Here, we assume that without decoding/knowing the backscatter message, the eavesdropper is unable to decode the original message. Even in scenarios where the eavesdropper can capture both messages, reconstructing the original message is a complex task without understanding the intricacies of the message-splitting mechanism. A challenge in our proposed framework is to effectively decode the backscattered signals at the receiver, often accomplished using the maximum likelihood (MLK) approach. However, such a method may require a complex mathematical model together with perfect channel state information (CSI). To address this issue, we develop a novel deep meta-learning-based signal detector that can not only effectively decode the weak backscattered signals without requiring perfect CSI but also quickly adapt to a new wireless environment with very little knowledge. Simulation results show that our proposed learning approach, without requiring perfect CSI and complex mathematical model, can achieve a bit error ratio close to that of the MLK-based approach. They also clearly show the efficiency of the proposed approach in dealing with eavesdropping attacks and the lack of training data for deep learning models in practical scenarios.

I. Introduction

Given the broadcast nature of the wireless medium, there exists a potential for illegal tapping of any wireless channel, thereby posing a significant risk to the confidentiality of transmitted information, such as personal details or business secrets. Consequently, ensuring privacy and security in wireless communication systems has consistently emerged as a paramount challenge. Among security threats in wireless communications, the eavesdropping attack is one of the most common types of wireless attacks. To perform the attack, the eavesdropper usually stays close to the victim system to “wiretap” the legitimate wireless channel and acquire exchanged information. Since the eavesdropper operates passively without introducing noise or altering transmit signals, detecting and preventing eavesdropping attacks are usually challenging.