Evaluation of Secure OpenID-Based RAAA User Authentication Protocol for Preventing Specific Web Attacks in Web Apps

Identity management (IdM) plays a significant role in managing user identities (IDs). However, IdM is challenging to handle the rapidly rising numerous kinds of Web-based applications nowadays. The OpenID 2.0 communication protocol is an improved solution for managing a user's IDs based on the OpenID URL identity. OpenID URL identity is not very much secure in specific Web-based attacks; for instance, session hijacking and phishing attacks often occur. The earlier OpenID-based methods secure OpenID URL identity with single, double, and triple authentication schemes. But Identity Provider (IdP) side is still not secure in Web attacks: if an attacker steals the IdP-side legal user information, then existing OpenID-based security techniques are unreliable. The anticipated OpenID Reverse Authentication Authorizing and Accounting (RAAA) user authentication-based protocol secured OpenID URL identity by providing two beneficial fields Secret Alphanumeric String (SAS) and Special Innovative PIN (SIP) that utilize in testing website both sides in reverse and cost-effective way. In this experiment, IdP and Relying Party (RP), both sides are being used secretly. Therefore, experimental websites also test to check the proposed triple authentication protocol. In this paper, we have compared our RAAA user authentication protocol with already available SSO protocol methods. The tested websites and comparative results represent that the anticipated design protocol is very much secure and reliable solution. The advanced cryptographic Single-Sign-On (SSO) secure protocol reduces the higher-level session hijacking and phishing attacks risk in an OpenID-based environment. We suggest future SSO protocol methods will be needed more in terms of the authorized user's identity authentication in Web-based applications.