A Knapsack Methodology for Hardware-based DMR Protection against Soft Errors in Superscalar Out-of-Order Processors

High-performance superscalar processors have been adopted to satisfy the rising demand for processing applications of ever-growing complexity. This extra complexity, added to the increasing vulnerability of transistors due to technology scaling, poses a great challenge since these effects have also been proven to affect ground-level safety-critical applications. To increase microarchitectural resilience, designers may adopt Dual Modular Redundancy (DMR), which offers full fault detection. However, given that DMR incurs in high area and energy overheads, we propose a design-time methodology aiming to achieve the best tradeoff between resilience and area overhead, decreasing DMR costs and maintaining acceptable detection levels for such a complex design. This is done by adopting the Knapsack Problem (KSP) as a heuristic to identify the optimal micro-architectural structures that should be duplicated to achieve target resilience with the smallest possible area overhead. By injecting over 800k faults in 12 significant micro-architectural structures of different versions of the complex Berkeley Out-of-Order Machine (BOOM) superscalar processor modeled with RTL accuracy, we compare this optimal strategy against a greedy one, showing that 90% of vulnerability reduction may be achieved with 50.6% and 107.8% area overheads for the optimal and greedy strategies, respectively.