Game-Theoretic Electric Vehicle Charging Management Resilient to Non-Ideal User Behavior

In this paper, an electric vehicle (EV) charging competition, among EV aggregators that perform coordinated EV charging, is explored while taking into consideration potential non-ideal actions of the aggregators. In the coordinated EV charging strategy presented in this paper, each aggregator determines EV charging start time and charging energy profiles to minimize overall EV charging energy cost by including consideration of the actions of the neighboring aggregators. The competitive interactions of the aggregators are modeled by developing a two-stage non-cooperative game among the aggregators. The game is then studied under prospect theory to examine the impacts of non-ideal actions of the aggregators in selecting EV charging start times according to subjectively evaluating their opponents' actions. It is shown that the noncooperative interactions among the aggregators lead to a subgame perfect E-Nash equilibrium when the game is played with either ideal, or non-ideal, actions of the aggregators. A case study presented demonstrates that the benefits of the coordinated EV charging strategy, in terms of energy cost savings and peakto-average ratio reductions, are significantly resilient to non-ideal actions of the aggregators.