From Virtual Touch to Tesla Command: Unlocking Unauthenticated Control Chains From Smart Glasses for Vehicle Takeover

This paper studies vulnerabilities at the intersection of wearable devices and automated control systems. Particularly, we focus on exploiting smart glasses as an entry point and unveil the threats of taking over security-critical automated control chains without user verification or interaction. These vulnerabilities can be especially pertinent in scenarios where security mechanisms only depend on entry point security with minimal user verification (relying on complete trust over previous nodes in automated control chains). We have validated the effects of our attacks on real-world systems (e.g., Tesla vehicles) that are controlled by software and automation tools such as Apple Shortcuts or IFTTT. We show how our contactless, speaker-independent, and electromagnetic interference based attacks can control functionalities such as unlocking doors and initiating remote start of Tesla vehicles, even though the victim’s phone is in a lock-screen status. Our findings not only demonstrate the potential for unauthorized control over automated, connected systems but also highlight the urgent need for more robust security measures in the integration of wearable technology with broader automation frameworks.