Optimal Emission Reduction Investment Sharing of Shipping Companies and Ports Based on The Sharpley Value Method

It is not difficult to find that low-carbon investment in China’s shipping industry is an important way to slow down China’s carbon emissions. Emissions reduction investments have a huge impact on shipping companies and ports. Under such circumstances, it is necessary and urgent to research shipping companies’ and port’ coordinated emission reduction strategies. From the perspective of game theory, we study the optimal emission reduction investment of shipping enterprises under the background of dual carbon targets. From the perspective of the shipping companies and ports alliance, the overall optimal emission reduction input under the coordination of port and shipping is studied, and the optimal emission reduction input of the alliance is studied by constructing the Nash equilibrium game model. Then, based on the Shapley value method, the allocation study of port and shipping emission reduction input costs is carried out to determine shipping enterprises’ optimal emission reduction input. By setting different competitive strategies, and different emission reduction. Like efforts, government carbon taxes, and port berthing fees, we have the following conclusions: Cooperation with ports can improve the benefits of both parties compared with non-cooperation, and the benefits of emission reduction brought by both parties are greater than those of a single party.