I. Introduction
Designing interventions by a central planner in order to modify the outcomes of a network game and steer them towards a socially desirable objective is a fundamental problem in many multi-agent systems. Applications in socio-technical systems are countless, ranging from pricing and toll design in transportation and energy networks to viral marketing in social networks. The optimal intervention design problem for network games is known to be challenging since an intervention on a single individual or on a group of them has direct and indirect effects on all the others. Such spill-over effects depend both on the geometry of the network and on the type of influence mechanisms that individuals’ actions have on their neighbors’ utilities (e.g., strategic complements vs strategic substitutes) [1], [2], [3]. Especially over the past two decades, a large body of literature has in particular highlighted the role of network centrality measures in order to determine the network nodes that the intervention should target in order to optimize its effect [4], [5], [6].