Resilient Distributed Secondary Control for Bidirectional Interlinking Converters in Hybrid AC/DC Microgrids Against FDI Attacks

In this article, we investigate the resilient distributed secondary control problems of the ac bus frequency and ac main bus voltage regulation, along with active/ reactive power sharing among bidirectional interlinking converters (BICs) under false data injection (FDI) attacks in hybrid ac/dc microgrids (MGs). To solve these problems, the distributed iterative observers are first proposed, which incorporate the dynamic characteristics of the previous observation into the present FDI attack observation to achieve the accurate observation of the ac bus frequency and ac main bus voltage, as well as active power, reactive power, and injected FDI attacks of each BIC. Afterward, based on the average FDI attack estimation, a resilient distributed secondary controller is introduced to eliminate the impact of FDI attacks on BICs, achieving accurate recovery of ac bus frequency and ac main bus voltage, as well as the sharing of active/reactive power among BICs under FDI attacks. Compared with existing resilient control strategies in hybrid ac/dc MGs under FDI attacks, the proposed resilient control strategy can enable hybrid ac/dc MGs to exhibit better transient performance during FDI attack injection and disappearance. Finally, the efficacy of the proposed observers and controller is confirmed through a real-time controller-hardware-in-the-loop experiment in OPAL-RT.