Energy Co-Pricing in an Integrated Energy System for Promoting Electric Energy Substitution

The available main method for energy transition in the energy consumption side is the electric energy substitution. With respect to user-side energy transition, an energy co-pricing method for a park-level integrated energy system (IES) is addressed in this work. First, an energy co-pricing mechanism in the IES is introduced, with a park operator (PO) and user agents (UAs) included. A Stackelberg game model is next established with a PO and UAs involved, and a bi-level optimization formulation attained. The PO (the leader) sets prices of different kinds of energy products such as coal and electricity, with an objective to maximize its revenue of energy sales at the upper level, where penalty factors for non-electric energy consumption is added to the objective function of the PO. At the lower level, the UAs (the follower) could coordinate its coal-fired boiler and electric boiler to minimize its energy cost, given its heat demand satisfied. In this way, energy prices are attained and employed to provide the incentive for UAs to participate in electric energy substitution. The developed bi-level optimization problem is then transformed into a mixed integer liner programming problem with the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality condition and duality theory employed. Finally, case studies of a park-level IES with the electric load demand, residential heat load demand and industrial heat load demand included are carried out to demonstrate the proposed model.