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# **Physical-Layer Security in Mixed UOWC-RF Networks With Energy Harvesting Relay Against Multiple Eavesdroppers**

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**ABSTRACT** In this study, physical layer security (PLS) in a dual-hop underwater optical wireless communication (UOWC)-radio frequency (RF) network under the intruding attempts of multiple eavesdroppers via RF links is considered. An intermediate decode-and-forward (DF) relay node between an underwater source and a destination transforms the optical signal into an electrical form and forwards it to the destination node with the help of harvested energy by the relay from an integrated power beacon within the system. The source-to-relay link, i.e., a UOWC link, is assumed to follow a mixture of exponential generalized Gamma turbulence with pointing error impairments whereas all the remaining links, i.e., RF links, are assumed to undergo  $\kappa - \mu$  shadowed fading. Here, two eavesdropping scenarios are considered depending on the types of intruders, i.e., colluding (*Scenario-I*) and non-colluding (*Scenario-II*) eavesdropping operations. The analytical expressions of secrecy outage probability (SOP), probability of strictly positive secrecy capacity (SPSC), and effective secrecy throughput (EST) are derived for each scenario. Furthermore, the impacts of UOWC and RF channel parameters as well as detection techniques on secrecy capacity are demonstrated. A comparative study between two scenarios demonstrates that the collusion between the eavesdroppers imposes the most harmful threat on secrecy throughput but a better secrecy level can be attained by adopting diversity at the destination and power beacon nodes along with heterodyne detection rather than intensity modulation and direct detection technique. Finally, all the derived expressions are verified with the numerical results.

**INDEX TERMS** Effective secrecy throughput, underwater optical communication, secure outage probability, energy harvesting, colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers.

## **I. INTRODUCTION**

IRELESS communication technologies have been expanding at a rapid rate along with the diverse

needs for connectivity between individuals and machinetype devices. As the fifth generation (5G) of cellular networks is expanded over the world, researchers have

already begun contemplating and subsequently performing research for the beyond 5G (B5G) and the sixth generation (6G) communication networks [\[1\]](#page-15-0), [\[2\]](#page-15-1), [\[3\]](#page-15-2). Ubiquitous connectivity is one of the key features of B5G and 6G networks. To this end, non-terrestrial networks (NTNs) and underwater communication networks are regarded as new service domains. For underwater communication, an underwater cable was regarded as the only viable way for underwater communication. In general, the deployment and maintenance of wired underwater communication is not a realistic solution due to the cost and complexity of the system. To achieve network scalability and flexibility, underwater wireless communication has gathered more and more attention from academia and industries. Even though acoustic waves and radio frequency electromagnetic waves can have been investigated, they have limitations such as bandwidth, coverage, propagation delay, and hardware size. Alternatively, underwater optical wireless communication (UOWC) has been regarded as a promising technology due to the merits of sufficient bandwidth, high security, compact footprint, and low time latency. According to the researchers, one of the most important features of a 6G communication system will be the spectral and energy efficiencies [\[4\]](#page-15-3), [\[5\]](#page-15-4), [\[6\]](#page-15-5), [\[7\]](#page-15-6), [\[8\]](#page-15-7). Energy harvesting can play a vital role in achieving the energy efficiency feature in a wireless communication network and unravel a variety of problems that are impossible to solve by conventional battery-powered communication operations such as untethered mobility, monitoring in rural areas, and developed medical applications [\[7\]](#page-15-6), [\[9\]](#page-15-8).

### *A. BACKGROUND*

<span id="page-1-4"></span>Wireless communication terminals can harvest energy from radio frequency (RF) signals. The harvested power depends significantly on the changes in the number of RF sources and channel condition [\[10\]](#page-15-9). Energy harvesting schemes can be achieved by considering various possibilities (e.g., single/two-hop model, finite/infinite energy capacity, perfect/imperfect channel state information, etc.) and employing the optimal policy (e.g., offline or online optimal policy) [\[11\]](#page-15-10). Another scheme named energy cooperation save-then-transmit was proposed in  $[12]$  where the maximum throughput and outage probability (OP) were derived in a closed-form solution under additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channels with deterministic energy arrival rate and Rayleigh block fading channels with stochastic energy arrival rate. A general approximation framework was introduced in [\[13\]](#page-15-12) for real-life energy harvesting setups for both single and multiple users to provide an effective solution to the throughput and outage problems. A piece-wise linear approximation model was proposed in [\[14\]](#page-15-13) considering practical harvesting scenarios such as limited harvesting efficiency and sensitivity. This model is proclaimed to match the actual condition whereas the infinite sensitivity model (both linear and non-linear) deviates from reality. The 2D and 3D position of the energy harvesters plays a significant role in harvesting energy to different nodes of a wireless

<span id="page-1-7"></span><span id="page-1-6"></span>VOLUME 5, 2024 2885

<span id="page-1-0"></span>network. If we presume a system with concurrent energy transfer, the received and interference power follows the lognormal distribution while the harvested voltage exhibits the Rayleigh distribution [\[15\]](#page-15-14).

<span id="page-1-11"></span><span id="page-1-10"></span><span id="page-1-9"></span><span id="page-1-8"></span>Energy harvesting can also be boosted by using multiple antennas at the transmitter due to its non-linear characteristics, even if the channel state information (CSI) is unavailable at the transmitter  $[16]$ . Energy harvesting technology is frequently considered in mixed communication networks, e.g., RF/free-space optical (FSO) networks and RF/UOWC networks because it requires a large amount of energy to convert the signal from one form to another. In [\[17\]](#page-15-16), the authors analyzed the OP and diversity order of an FSO/RF network considering the physical limitations like pointing error, atmospheric turbulence, and saturation threshold of the energy harvester, whereas in  $[18]$ , the authors considered an RF/FSO network with a multi-antenna source that harvests energy from a relay and determined the OP of the system. The RF/UOWC is another popular model to explore underwater activities such as ocean surveillance and exploration, climate monitoring, etc.  $[19]$ . The researchers in [\[20\]](#page-15-19), [\[21\]](#page-15-20), [\[22\]](#page-15-21), [\[23\]](#page-15-22) considered an RF/UOWC network to evaluate the OP and bit error rate (BER) assuming different combinations of RF and UOWC channels. The application of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) as a source was considered in [\[24\]](#page-15-23) where the authors analyzed similar performance parameters (OP and BER) and also deduced the optimal altitude of the UAV for performance maximization. In another research, the authors assumed a RIS-assisted RF/UOWC network and derived the OP, BER, and average channel capacity of the system [\[25\]](#page-15-24).

<span id="page-1-20"></span><span id="page-1-19"></span><span id="page-1-18"></span><span id="page-1-17"></span><span id="page-1-16"></span><span id="page-1-15"></span><span id="page-1-14"></span><span id="page-1-13"></span><span id="page-1-12"></span><span id="page-1-5"></span><span id="page-1-3"></span><span id="page-1-2"></span><span id="page-1-1"></span>Another important feature of the 6G wireless communication model is data security and privacy [\[26\]](#page-16-0). Since the beginning of the wireless network, this issue has been thoroughly analyzed for RF communication systems. With the rise of mixed networks and advanced eavesdropping technologies, the physical layer security of these types of communication schemes is threatened and needs to be evaluated extensively [\[27\]](#page-16-1), [\[28\]](#page-16-2), [\[29\]](#page-16-3), [\[30\]](#page-16-4), [\[31\]](#page-16-5), [\[32\]](#page-16-6), [\[33\]](#page-16-7), [\[34\]](#page-16-8), [\[35\]](#page-16-9), [\[36\]](#page-16-10), [\[37\]](#page-16-11), [\[38\]](#page-16-12). In [37], authors analyzed the secrecy of a RF/FSO network considering a single eavesdropper trying to overhear information from the RF link. The authors in [\[38\]](#page-16-12) investigated the hybrid freespace optical and radio frequency (FSO/RF) communication system's physical layer secrecy (PLS) performance utilizing a modified selection combining scheme. The researchers in [\[39\]](#page-16-13) analyzed energy harvested RF/FSO network assuming the relaying protocol to be decode-and-forward (DF) with the simultaneous wireless information and power transfer (SWIPT) technology and revealed that security of the proposed network can be enhanced by lowering the power splitting fraction parameter. The effect of atmospheric turbulence and pointing error on the security of the RF/FSO model was analyzed in [\[40\]](#page-16-14), [\[41\]](#page-16-15). A multi-relay network was considered in [\[42\]](#page-16-16) with imperfect channel state information (CSI) and non-linear energy harvesters where the authors

<span id="page-2-2"></span>derived secure outage probability (SOP) to evaluate the system performance. The researchers concluded that further improvement in SOP is impossible if the saturation threshold is higher than a certain value. However, the secrecy performance of an FSO/RF system was investigated in [\[43\]](#page-16-17) considering an energy harvesting-dependent relay scheme. The authors of [\[44\]](#page-16-18) considered a mixed RF/UOWC model with a single antenna source and destination in the presence of a relay equipped with multiple antennas and derived the SOP performance of the system. In  $[45]$ ,  $[46]$ , the authors analyzed three main secrecy parameters i.e., SOP, average secrecy capacity (ASC), and strictly positive secrecy capacity (SPSC), assuming an RF/UOWC model where the underwater signal undergoes frequent underwater turbulence (UWT) due to the temperature gradient, bubble level, and salinity gradient of the ocean.

<span id="page-2-4"></span>The security of the wireless communication model also depends on the behavior of eavesdroppers, i.e., the types of eavesdropping operation. If there are multiple eavesdroppers in the system, they can work together to decode a message coming from the source. This scenario is known as colluding eavesdropping. On the other hand, eavesdroppers can try to decode confidential information independently without help from other eavesdroppers. This is known as a non-colluding eavesdropping scenario. It is evident that the former scenario is more threatening for wireless communication than the latter [\[47\]](#page-16-21). Keeping this in mind, many researchers have started to analyze the colluding eavesdropping scenario and how it can jeopardize our secure communication network. The authors in [\[48\]](#page-16-22), [\[49\]](#page-16-23) analyzed the SOP of a wireless network considering colluding eavesdroppers were present in the system. In  $[50]$ ,  $[51]$ , the authors analyzed the secrecy performance with an assumption of non-colluding eavesdroppers. To compare the detrimental effect caused by colluding and non-colluding eavesdroppers on the secure wireless network, the authors of [\[52\]](#page-16-26), [\[53\]](#page-16-27), [\[54\]](#page-16-28) considered both eavesdropping scenarios and concluded that the increasing number of eavesdroppers degrades the security of the system whereas colluding eavesdroppers have the most harmful effects.

## <span id="page-2-7"></span><span id="page-2-6"></span><span id="page-2-5"></span>*B. MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS*

Recently, researchers have made some excellent advancements in mixed communication systems. Despite their efforts, a few important considerations such as energy harvesting at the relay node along with the presence of multiple eavesdroppers (both colluding and non-colluding) in the system are not available in any literature and thus are considered an open problem. In this study, therefore, an energy harvesting relay-based mixed UOWC-RF network with multiple eavesdroppers has been analyzed assuming that the UOWC channel link follows a mixture exponential generalized Gamma (mEGG) fading model whereas the RF link undergoes  $\kappa - \mu$  shadowed fading channel. The proposed mEGG model is mostly favored by the researchers due to its capability to mathematically represent all the

<span id="page-2-10"></span><span id="page-2-9"></span><span id="page-2-8"></span><span id="page-2-1"></span>physical constraints such as air bubbles, UWT, water salinity, and temperature gradient [\[55\]](#page-16-29), [\[56\]](#page-16-30) along with being a generalized model that can be reduced to an EGG model as one of its special cases [\[57\]](#page-16-31). On the other hand, the  $\kappa - \mu$  shadowed fading model is another generalized model that represents a number of practical fading channels [\[58,](#page-16-32) Table I]. The goal of this study is to analyze the secrecy of such a system considering multiple eavesdroppers present in the system and trying to decode transmitted information individually or as a group as well as measure the impact of energy harvesting on data security. Although a few research has considered colluding and non-colluding eavesdropping operations [\[54\]](#page-16-28), [\[59\]](#page-16-33), [\[60\]](#page-16-34) and energy harvesting in mixed wireless optical-RF channels [\[39\]](#page-16-13), [\[57\]](#page-16-31), [\[61\]](#page-16-35), no study is available considering both of these scenarios. Thus, this study represents a novel system model and provides some unique results. The key contributions of this work are as follows:

- <span id="page-2-12"></span><span id="page-2-11"></span><span id="page-2-3"></span>• At first, we derive the cumulative density function (CDF) of the dual-hop signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) considering an energy-harvesting relay in a UOWC-RF network for both source-to-relay as well as eavesdroppers. Note that, unlike [\[39\]](#page-16-13), [\[57\]](#page-16-31), which only considered a single eavesdropper, the scenarios with multiple eavesdroppers (both colluding and non-colluding) are analyzed in this study. As our model represents a novel structure, the derived CDFs are also novel.
- The secrecy performance of the proposed network is demonstrated with respect to the secrecy outage probability (SOP), strictly positive secrecy capacity (SPSC), and effective secrecy throughput (EST) expressions for both eavesdropping conditions in the closed forms and further verified via Monte-Carlo (MC) simulations. To the best of the authors' knowledge, these expressions can be utilized to unify versatile classical existing models as given in [\[57\]](#page-16-31) and [\[58,](#page-16-32) Table I].
- Capitalizing on the derived expressions, noticeable impacts of air bubbles and temperature gradients-based UWTs for both salty and fresh water along with the energy harvesting parameters are demonstrated. Finally, the effects of two types of detection techniques, i.e., intensity modulation/direct detection (IM/DD) and heterodyne detection (HD) techniques, are also analyzed.

#### *C. PAPER ORGANIZATION*

The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section  $\Pi$ describes the system model in detail while Section [III](#page-4-0) portrays the channel models. Expression of the performance measures, e.g., SOP, SPSC, and EST, are derived in Section [IV](#page-6-0) followed by numerical results discussed in Section [V.](#page-9-0) Finally, concluding remarks on the work are provided in Section [VI.](#page-14-0)

#### <span id="page-2-0"></span>**II. SYSTEM MODEL**

In Figure [1,](#page-3-0) an energy-harvested relay-based mixed UOWC-RF system is illustrated that consists of a single aperture



<span id="page-3-0"></span>**FIGURE 1. Proposed system model for physical layer security in mixed UOWC-RF networks with energy harvesting relay against multiple eavesdroppers.**

source node, which is denoted by  $S$ , (e.g., submarine), an energy-harvested relay node represented by *R* (e.g., a small unmanned boat or floating buoy) with a single receive aperture and a single transmit antenna, a destination node,  $D$ , (e.g., a large ship) having  $G_d$  antennas, a power beacon,  $\mathcal{B}$ , with  $G_b$  antennas, and multiple eavesdropper nodes,  $\mathcal{E}$ s, (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles) with  $G_e$  antennas. Herein, *S* connected to an underwater optics-based network transmits secret information, e.g., military information, to  $D$  in the RF network while  $E$  tries to decode the secret information by overhearing the illegitimate RF link. The UOWC link experiences mEGG turbulence with pointing error impairments, while all the RF links undergo  $\kappa - \mu$ shadowed fading channels. We take into consideration two scenarios that correspond to the two types of eavesdropping operation with multiple eavesdroppers, i.e., colluding and non-colluding [\[36\]](#page-16-10). In *scenario-I*, the colluding eavesdroppers combine and share their receptions utilizing the maximum ratio combining (MRC) technique in order to decode the private data wiretapped from *R*. In *scenario-II*, on the other hand, each non-colluding eavesdropper individually examines the wiretapped private data from *R*. Exploiting the broadcast nature of RF signals, any prototype in the RF system can serve as a power beacon in the proposed framework. Hence, the integration of a power beacon is possible without any additional cost. Because an optical network is unable to directly connect with an RF network, an energyharvesting relay needs to act as an intermediary to facilitate this communication. It is noteworthy that the decode-andforward (DF) protocol is utilized to process the received signals at  $R$  because it has the advantage of reducing the first hop's channel impacts on the received signals on the second hop. It is also noted that the proposed framework

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can be utilized in real-world scenarios such as monitoring biological and ecological processes in ocean environments, investigation of climate change, unmanned underwater vehicles used to control and maintain oil production facilities, etc.

The entire communication process, which we denote as *T*, can be divided into two time slots. In this scenario, the fraction of the block time during which the relay harvests energy from *B* is represented by  $\alpha$  ( $0 \le \alpha \le 1$ ). The remaining block time is then split into two equal parts, namely  $(1 - \alpha)T/2$ , for transmitting information from *S* to *R* and from *R* to *D*, respectively. In the first time slot, *S* transmits the confidential information to *R* through a legitimate UOWC link. At *R*, the instantaneous electrical signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) is expressed as

$$
\gamma_{sr} = \frac{\eta_{sr}^2 \eta_{sr}^2 I_{sr}^2}{\vartheta_{sr}^2},\tag{1}
$$

where  $\eta_{sr}$  represents an optical conversion ratio,  $\mathcal{T}_{sr}$  indicates a photoelectric conversion factor, *Isr* denotes an optical irradiance, and  $\vartheta_{sr}$  denotes an AWGN. Because  $\mathcal R$  harvests RF energy from  $\beta$ , the harvested energy at  $\beta$  is expressed as [\[62\]](#page-16-36)

$$
E_r = \eta_r P_b |\mathbf{h}_{br}|^2 \alpha T,\tag{2}
$$

<span id="page-3-1"></span>where  $P_b$  defines the transmit power at *B*,  $\mathbf{h}_{br} \in \mathbb{C}^{1 \times G_b}$  is the channel gain of  $\mathcal{B} - \mathcal{R}$  link, and an energy conversion efficiency is indicated by  $\eta_r(0 \leq \eta_r \leq 1)$ , which is mainly controlled by a harvesting circuitry.

In the second time slot,  $R$  firstly decodes the received optical signal and then transforms it into the RF signal. To facilitate the information transfer from  $R$  to  $D$ ,  $R$  utilizes all of the harvested energy with an output power of

$$
P_r = \eta_r P_b |\mathbf{h}_{br}|^2. \tag{3}
$$

The signals received at *D* is given as

$$
\mathbf{y}_d = \sqrt{P_r} \mathbf{h}_{rd} z + \mathbf{n}_d,\tag{4}
$$

where *z* represents the transmitted signal,  $\mathbf{h}_{rd} \in \mathbb{C}^{G_d \times 1}$  is the channel gain of  $R - D$  link, and an AWGN with a noise power,  $P_{dn}$ , is represented by  $\mathbf{n}_d \sim \mathcal{N}(0, P_{dn} \mathbf{I}_{G_d})$ . Here,  $\mathbf{I}_N$ is an  $N \times N$  identity matrix. We consider  $\mathcal E$  trying to wiretap the confidential information signals via an illicit  $\mathcal{R}-\mathcal{E}$  link. Hence, the received signals at *j*th eavesdropper in the second time slot are given as

$$
\mathbf{y}_{e,j} = \sqrt{P_r} \mathbf{h}_{re,j} z + \mathbf{n}_{e,j},\tag{5}
$$

where  $h_{re,i} \in \mathbb{C}^{G_e \times 1}$  is the channel gain of  $\mathcal{R} \rightarrow j\text{th}$  (*j* =  $1, 2, \ldots, \mathcal{N}_e$ ) link and the AWGN with zero mean and noise power,  $P_{en}$ , is represented by  $\mathbf{n}_{e,j} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, P_{en} \mathbf{I}_{G_e})$ . The instantaneous SNRs for the  $\mathcal{R} - \mathcal{D}$  and  $\mathcal{R} - \mathcal{E}$  links are, respectively, defined as

$$
\gamma_{rd} = \frac{P_r |\mathbf{h}_{rd}|^2}{P_{dn}} = \frac{\eta_r P_b}{P_{dn}} |\mathbf{h}_{br}|^2 |\mathbf{h}_{rd}|^2,
$$
\n(6)

$$
\gamma_{re,j} = \frac{P_r |\mathbf{h}_{re,j}|^2}{P_{en}} = \frac{\eta_r P_b}{P_{en}} |\mathbf{h}_{br}|^2 |\mathbf{h}_{re,j}|^2. \tag{7}
$$

## <span id="page-4-0"></span>**III. CHANNEL MODEL**

In this section, the channel modeling of UOWC ( $S - R$ ) and RF ( $\mathcal{R} - \mathcal{D}$ ,  $\mathcal{R} - \mathcal{E}$ ,  $\mathcal{B} - \mathcal{R}$ ) links are realized for further mathematical analysis.

## *A. PDF AND CDF OF SNR FOR S* **−** *R LINK* The PDF of  $\gamma_{sr}$  can be defined as [\[46,](#page-16-20) eq. (11)]

<span id="page-4-1"></span>
$$
f_{\gamma_{sr}}(\gamma) = \sum_{i=1}^{2} B_i \gamma^{-1} G_{1,2}^{2,0} \left( Z_i \gamma^{V_i} \middle| \frac{W_i}{S_i, K_i} \right),
$$
 (8)

where  $B_1 = \frac{\omega \xi^2}{\epsilon}$ ,  $B_2 = \frac{\xi^2 (1-\omega)}{\epsilon \Gamma(a)}$ ,  $Z_1 = \frac{1}{\zeta A_0 \psi_{\epsilon}^{1/\epsilon}}$ ,  $Z_2 =$ 1  $\frac{1}{A_0^c \sigma^c \psi_{\epsilon}^{c/\epsilon}}, V_1 = \frac{1}{\epsilon}, V_2 = \frac{c}{\epsilon}, W_1 = \xi^2 + 1, W_2 = \frac{\xi^2}{c} +$ 1,  $S_1 = 1$ ,  $S_2 = a$ ,  $K_1 = \xi^2$ ,  $K_2 = \frac{\xi^2}{c}$ ,  $\psi_1 = \Phi_{sr}$ ,  $\psi_2 = \frac{\Phi_{sr}}{2\omega \delta^2 + \sigma^2 (1-\omega) \frac{\Gamma(a+\frac{2}{c})}{\Gamma(a)}}$ , the average SNR of  $S - R$ link is indicated by  $\Phi_{sr}^{\sigma}$ ,  $S - R$  link's electrical SNR is defined by  $\psi_{\epsilon}$ , and  $\epsilon$  represents the detection technique (e.g.,  $\epsilon = 1$  indicates HD technique and  $\epsilon = 2$  implies IM/DD technique). The exponential distribution parameter is represented by  $U$ , three GG distributed constraints are symbolized by  $a$ ,  $\sigma$ , and  $c$ , the weight of the mixture is denoted by  $0 < \omega < 1$ , and the pointing error is indicated by ξ whereas  $A_0$  is a constant corresponding to ξ. The values

of  $\omega$ ,  $\ddot{\theta}$ ,  $a$ ,  $\sigma$ , and  $c$  are determined experimentally based on varying UWT (mild to severe) due to varying levels of air bubbles, temperature gradients, and water salinity. According to [\[55,](#page-16-29) Table I], increasing the temperature gradient and/or the level of air bubbles causes mild to severe UWT, which significantly raises the scintillation index. Reference [\[55,](#page-16-29) Table II] further displays several UWT scenarios in a thermally uniform UOWC network for fresh and salty waters. Therefore, the CDF of  $\gamma_{sr}$  is given as

<span id="page-4-2"></span>
$$
F_{\gamma_{sr}}(\gamma) = \int_0^{\gamma} f_{\gamma_{sr}}(\gamma) d\gamma.
$$
 (9)

Substituting [\(8\)](#page-4-1) into [\(9\),](#page-4-2)  $F_{\gamma_{sr}}(\gamma)$  is obtained finally as

<span id="page-4-4"></span>
$$
F_{\gamma_{sr}}(\gamma) = \sum_{i=1}^{2} Y_i G_{2,3}^{2,1} \left( Z_i \gamma^{V_i} \middle| \begin{array}{c} 1, W_i \\ S_i, K_i, 0 \end{array} \right), \tag{10}
$$

where  $Y_1 = \omega \xi^2$  and  $Y_2 = \frac{\xi^2 (1 - \omega)}{c \Gamma(a)}$ .

*B. PDF AND CDF OF SNR FOR R* **−** *D LINK* The PDF of  $\gamma_{rd}$  is defined as [\[63,](#page-16-37) eq. (4)]

<span id="page-4-6"></span>
$$
f_{\gamma_{rd}}(\gamma) = \alpha_1 e^{-\Xi_2 \gamma} \gamma^{\mu_d - 1} {}_1F_1(m_d, \mu_d; \alpha_2 \gamma), \qquad (11)
$$

where

<span id="page-4-5"></span>
$$
\alpha_1 = \frac{(G_d\mu_d)^{G_d\mu_d}(G_d m_d)^{G_d m_d}(1 + \kappa_d)^{G_d\mu_d}}{\Gamma(G_d\mu_d)(\Phi_{rd})^{G_d\mu_d}(G_d\mu_d\kappa_d + G_d m_d)^{G_d m_d}},
$$
  
\n
$$
\Xi_2 = \frac{G_d\mu_d(1 + \kappa_d)}{\Phi_{rd}},
$$
  
\n
$$
\alpha_2 = \frac{G_d^2\mu_d^2\kappa_d(1 + \kappa_d)}{(G_d\mu_d\kappa_d + G_d m_d)\Phi_{rd}},
$$

the average SNR of  $\mathcal{R} - \mathcal{D}$  link is denoted by  $\Phi_{rd}$ ,  $G_d$ indicates the number of antennas of each user, the ratio of the powers of the dominant and scattered components, the number of clusters, and the Nakagami-*m* faded shadowing parameter are symbolized by  $\kappa_d$ ,  $\mu_d$ , and  $m_d$ , respectively. Here,  $_1F_1(.,.;.)$  represents the confluent hypergeometric function that can be expressed as  $_1F_1(l_4, l_5; l_6)$  =  $\frac{\Gamma(l_5)}{\Gamma(l_4)}$   $\sum_{i_1=0}^{\infty}$  $\frac{\Gamma(i_1+l_4) i_6'}{\Gamma(i_1+l_5) i_1!}$  [\[64,](#page-16-38) eq. (13)]. Finally,  $f_{\gamma rd}(\gamma)$  can be written as  $[63, eq. (5)]$  $[63, eq. (5)]$ 

<span id="page-4-7"></span>
$$
f_{\gamma_{rd}}(\gamma) = \sum_{e_1=0}^{\infty} \Xi_1 e^{-\Xi_2 \gamma} \gamma^{\Xi_3},
$$
 (12)

where  $\mathbf{E}_1 = \alpha_1 \alpha_3$ ,  $\alpha_3 = \frac{\Gamma(G_d \mu_d)}{\Gamma(G_d m_d)}$  $\frac{\Gamma(G_d m_d + e_1) \alpha_2^{e_1}}{\Gamma(G_d \mu_d + e_1) e_1!}$ , and  $\Xi_3 =$  $G_d\mu_d - 1 + e_1$ . Similar to [\(9\),](#page-4-2) utilizing the formula [\[65,](#page-16-39) eq. (3).351.1], the CDF of  $\gamma_{rd}$  is formulated as

<span id="page-4-8"></span>
$$
F_{\gamma_{rd}}(\gamma) = \sum_{e_1=0}^{\infty} \Xi_1 \left( \frac{\Xi_3!}{\Xi_2^{\Xi_3+1}} - \sum_{e_2=0}^{\Xi_3} \frac{\Xi_3!}{e_2! \Xi_2^{\Xi_3-e_2+1}} e^{-\Xi_2 \gamma} \gamma^{e_2} \right).
$$
\n(13)

*C. PDF AND CDF OF SNR FOR R* **−** *E LINK* The PDF of  $\gamma_{re,j}$  can be expressed as [\[63,](#page-16-37) eq. (5)]

<span id="page-4-3"></span>
$$
f_{\gamma_{re,j}}(\gamma) = \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \Xi_4 e^{-\Xi_5 \gamma} \gamma^{\Xi_6},\tag{14}
$$

where

<span id="page-5-0"></span>
$$
E_4 = \beta_1 \beta_3,
$$
  
\n
$$
E_5 = \frac{G_e \mu_e (1 + \kappa_e)}{\Phi_{re}},
$$
  
\n
$$
E_6 = G_e \mu_e - 1 + f_1,
$$
  
\n
$$
\beta_1 = \frac{(G_e \mu_e)^{G_e \mu_e} (G_e m_e)^{G_e m_e} (1 + \kappa_e)^{G_e \mu_e}}{\Gamma (G_e \mu_e)(\Phi_{re})^{G_e \mu_e} (G_e \mu_e \kappa_e + G_e m_e)^{G_e m_e}}
$$
  
\n
$$
\beta_2 = \frac{G_e^2 \mu_e^2 \kappa_e (1 + \kappa_e)}{(G_e \mu_e \kappa_e + G_e m_e) \Phi_{re}},
$$
  
\n
$$
\beta_3 = \frac{\Gamma (G_e \mu_e)}{\Gamma (G_e m_e)} \frac{\Gamma (G_e m_e + f_1) \beta_2^{f_1}}{\Gamma (G_e \mu_e + f_1) f_1},
$$

,

 $\Phi_{re}$  is the average SNR of  $\mathcal{R} - \mathcal{E}$  link,  $G_e$  indicates the number of antennas of each eavesdropper, and the fading and shadowing parameters regarding  $\mathcal{R} - \mathcal{E}$  link are indicated by  $\kappa_e$ ,  $\mu_e$ , and  $m_e$ . The CDF of  $\gamma_{re,j}$  can be derived from [\(14\)](#page-4-3) making use of [\[65,](#page-16-39) eq. (3).351.2] as

$$
F_{\gamma_{re,j}}(\gamma) = 1 - \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{p_1=0}^{\Xi_6} \frac{\Xi_6!}{p_1! \Xi_5^{\Xi_6 - p_1 + 1}} \Xi_4 e^{-\Xi_5 \gamma} \gamma^{p_1}.
$$
 (15)

1) SCENARIO-I

For the colluding eavesdroppers, we substitute  $\Phi_{re}$ ,  $G_e$ ,  $\mu_e$ , and  $m_e$  with  $\mathcal{N}_{el} \Phi_{re}$ ,  $\mathcal{N}_{el} G_e$ ,  $\mathcal{N}_{el} \mu_e$ , and  $\mathcal{N}_{el} m_e$ , respectively, based on the MRC technique  $[66]$ . Here,  $\mathcal{N}_{el}$  indicates the number of colluding eavesdroppers. For this scenario, the PDF of the instantaneous SNR of  $\mathcal{R} - \mathcal{E}$  link denoted by γ*re* is obtained as

<span id="page-5-7"></span><span id="page-5-5"></span>
$$
f_{\gamma_{re}}^I(\gamma) = \sum_{f_2=0}^{\infty} \widetilde{\Xi_4} e^{-\widetilde{\Xi_5}\gamma} \gamma^{\widetilde{\Xi_6}}, \tag{16}
$$

where

<span id="page-5-1"></span>
$$
\begin{split}\n\widetilde{\Xi}_{4} &= \widetilde{\beta}_{1}\widetilde{\beta}_{3}, \\
\widetilde{\Xi}_{5} &= \frac{\mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e}\mu_{e}(1+\kappa_{e})}{\mathcal{N}_{el}\Phi_{re}}, \\
\widetilde{\Xi}_{6} &= \mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e}\mu_{e} - 1 + f_{2}, \\
\widetilde{\beta}_{1} &= \frac{(\mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e}\mu_{e})^{\mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e}\mu_{e}}(\mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e}m_{e})^{\mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e}m_{e}}}{\Gamma(\mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e}\mu_{e})(\mathcal{N}_{el}\Phi_{re})^{\mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e}\mu_{e}}} \\
&\times \frac{(1+\kappa_{e})^{\mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e}\mu_{e}}}{(\mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e}\mu_{e}\kappa_{e} + \mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e}m_{e})^{\mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e}m_{e}}}, \\
\widetilde{\beta}_{2} &= \frac{(\mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e})^{2}\mu_{e}^{2}\kappa_{e}(1+\kappa_{e})}{(\mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e}\mu_{e}\kappa_{e} + \mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e}m_{e})\mathcal{N}_{el}\Phi_{re}}, \\
\widetilde{\beta}_{3} &= \frac{\Gamma(\mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e}\mu_{e})}{\Gamma(\mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e}m_{e})} \frac{\Gamma(\mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e}m_{e} + f_{2})(\widetilde{\beta}_{2})^{f_{2}}}{\Gamma(\mathcal{N}_{el}G_{e}\mu_{e} + f_{2})f_{2}!}.\n\end{split}
$$

## 2) SCENARIO-II

In the scenario of non-colluding eavesdroppers, the PDF of instantaneous SNR is obtained utilizing the *max* algorithm of order statistics as  $[54, eq. (4)]$  $[54, eq. (4)]$ 

$$
f_{\gamma_{re}}^{II}(\gamma) = \mathcal{N}_{eII} \bigg[ F_{\gamma_{re,J}}(\gamma) \bigg]^{\mathcal{N}_{eII}-1} f_{\gamma_{re,J}}(\gamma), \tag{17}
$$

where  $N_{eII}$  indicates the number of non-colluding eaves-droppers. Substituting [\(14\)](#page-4-3) and [\(15\)](#page-5-0) into [\(17\),](#page-5-1)  $f_{\gamma_{re}}^{II}(\gamma)$  is outlined as

<span id="page-5-2"></span>
$$
f_{\gamma_{re}}^{II}(\gamma)
$$
  
=  $\mathcal{N}_{eII} \bigg[ 1 - \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{p_4=0}^{\frac{\Xi_6}{2}} \frac{\Xi_6!}{p_4! \Xi_5^{\Xi_6 - p_4 + 1}} \Xi_4 e^{-\Xi_5 \gamma} \gamma^{p_4} \bigg]^{\mathcal{N}_{eII} - 1}$   

$$
\times \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \Xi_4 e^{-\Xi_5 \gamma} \gamma^{\Xi_6}.
$$
 (18)

Utilizing the binomial theorem  $[65, eq. (1)$  $[65, eq. (1)$ .111] and performing some mathematical manipulations, Eq. [\(18\)](#page-5-2) is formulated as

<span id="page-5-3"></span>
$$
f_{\gamma_{re}}^{II}(\gamma) = \mathcal{N}_{eII} \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \Xi_4 e^{-\Xi_5 \gamma} \gamma^{\Xi_6} \left[ \sum_{h_1=0}^{\mathcal{N}_{eII}-1} \binom{\mathcal{N}_{eII}-1}{h_1} (-1)^{h_1} \times \left( \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{p_4=0}^{\Xi_6} \frac{\Xi_6!}{p_4! \Xi_5^{E_6-p_4+1}} \Xi_4 e^{-\Xi_5 \gamma} \gamma^{p_4} \right)^{h_1} \right]
$$
  
=  $\mathcal{N}_{eII} \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \Xi_4 e^{-\Xi_5 \gamma} \gamma^{\Xi_6} \left[ \sum_{h_1=0}^{\mathcal{N}_{eII}-1} \binom{\mathcal{N}_{eII}-1}{h_1} (-1)^{h_1} \times \left( \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \Xi_4 e^{-\Xi_5 \gamma} \right)^{h_1} \left( \sum_{p_4=0}^{\Xi_6} \frac{\Xi_6!}{p_4!} \frac{\gamma^{p_4}}{\Xi_5^{E_6-p_4+1}} \right)^{h_1} \right]. (19)$ 

Since  $(\sum_{p_4=0}^{E_6} \frac{E_6!}{p_4!})$ γ *<sup>p</sup>*<sup>4</sup>  $\overline{\Xi_5^{E_6-p_4+1}}$  $)$ <sup>h<sub>1</sub></sup> portion of [\(19\)](#page-5-3) is normally difficult to solve, we use the multinomial theorem [\[67\]](#page-16-41) to it. Applying the multinomial theorem, we write  $(\sum_{p_4=0}^{E_6} \frac{E_6!}{p_4!})$ *p*4!  $\gamma^{p_4}$  $E_5^{\overline{E_6-p_4+1}}$  $)$ <sup>h<sub>1</sub></sup> portion as

<span id="page-5-8"></span><span id="page-5-4"></span>
$$
\left(\sum_{p_4=0}^{S_6} \frac{E_6!}{p_4!} \frac{\gamma^{p_4}}{E_5^{S_6-p_4+1}}\right)^{h_1}
$$
\n
$$
= \sum_{q_0+q_1+\ldots+q_{S_6}=h_1} {h_1 \choose q_0, q_1, \ldots, q_{S_6}}
$$
\n
$$
\times \prod_{p_4} \left(\frac{E_6!}{p_4! E_5^{S_6-p_4+1}}\right)^{q_{p_4}} \gamma^{\sum_{p_4} p_4 q_{p_4}}.
$$
\n(20)

Substituting  $(20)$  in  $(19)$  and performing some mathematical manipulations,  $f_{\gamma_{re}}^{II}(\gamma)$  is finally derived as

<span id="page-5-6"></span>
$$
f_{\gamma_{re}}^{II}(\gamma) = \mathcal{N}_{eII} \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{h_1=0}^{\mathcal{N}_{eII}-1} \sum_{q_0+q_1+\dots+q_{\Xi_6}=h_1} \prod_{p_4} {\mathcal{N}_{eII}-1 \choose h_1}
$$

$$
\times \binom{h_1}{q_0, q_1, \dots, q_{\Xi_6}} \left( \frac{\Xi_6!}{p_4! \Xi_5^{\Xi_6-p_4+1}} \right)^{q_{p_4}} \left( \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \Xi_4 \right)^{h_1}
$$

$$
\times (-1)^{h_1} \Xi_4 e^{-\gamma (\Xi_5 + \Xi_5 h_1)} \gamma^{\mathcal{X}_3}, \tag{21}
$$

where  $X_3 = \sum_{p_1} p_1 q_{p_1} + \Xi_6$ .

*D. PDF AND CDF OF SNR FOR B* **−** *R LINK* The PDF of  $\gamma_{br}$  can be addressed as [\[63,](#page-16-37) eq. (5)]

<span id="page-6-3"></span>
$$
f_{\gamma_{br}}(\gamma) = \sum_{g_1=0}^{\infty} \Xi_7 e^{-\Xi_8 \gamma} \gamma^{\Xi_9},\tag{22}
$$

where

$$
\begin{aligned}\n\Xi_7 &= \lambda_1 \lambda_3, \\
\Xi_8 &= \frac{G_b \mu_b (1 + \kappa_b)}{\Phi_{br}}, \\
\Xi_9 &= G_b \mu_b - 1 + g_1, \\
\lambda_1 &= \frac{(G_b \mu_b)^{G_b \mu_b} (G_b m_b)^{G_b m_b} (1 + \kappa_b)^{G_b \mu_b}}{\Gamma(G_b \mu_b) (\Phi_{br})^{G_b \mu_b} (G_b \mu_b \kappa_b + G_b m_b)^{G_b m_b}}, \\
\lambda_2 &= \frac{G_b^2 \mu_b^2 \kappa_b (1 + \kappa_b)}{(G_b \mu_b \kappa_b + G_b m_b) \Phi_{br}}, \\
\lambda_3 &= \frac{\Gamma(G_b \mu_b)}{\Gamma(G_b m_b)} \frac{\Gamma(G_b m_b + g_1) \lambda_2^{g_1}}{\Gamma(G_b \mu_b + g_1) g_1!},\n\end{aligned}
$$

the average SNR of  $\mathcal{B} - \mathcal{R}$  link is defined by  $\Phi_{br}$ ,  $G_b$ indicates the number of antennas of the beacon, and similar to  $\mathcal{R} - \mathcal{D}$  link, the channel parameters corresponding to  $\mathcal{B} - \mathcal{R}$  link are denoted by  $\kappa_b$ ,  $\mu_b$ , and  $m_b$ . Therefore, the CDF of  $\gamma_{br}$  is expressed as

$$
F_{\gamma_{br}}(\gamma) = \sum_{g_1=0}^{\infty} \Xi_7 \left( \frac{\Xi_9!}{\Xi_8^{E_9+1}} - \sum_{g_2=0}^{\Xi_9} \frac{\Xi_9!}{g_2! \Xi_8^{E_9-g_2+1}} e^{-\Xi_8 \gamma} \gamma^{g_2} \right).
$$
\n(23)

### <span id="page-6-0"></span>**IV. PERFORMANCE METRICS**

SOP, SPSC, and EST are three key performance parameters that are frequently utilized to evaluate physical layer secrecy performance. This section demonstrates closed-form expressions for those performance metrics.

## *A. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY ANALYSIS*

For the first and second hops, the instantaneous secrecy capacities (SC) are defined, respectively, as

$$
C_{sr} = \frac{1}{2}\log_2(1+\gamma_{sr}),
$$
\n(24)

$$
C_{rd} = \left\{ \frac{1}{2} \left[ \log_2(1 + \gamma_{rd}) - \log_2(1 + \gamma_{re,j}) \right] \right\}^+, \quad (25)
$$

where  ${z}^+$  = max(*z*, 0). Furthermore, the well-known *maxflow min-cut* theory states that the system's instantaneous capability  $(C_m)$  is restricted by the nominal capacity of the two hops and it is defined as  $[68, eq. (14)]$  $[68, eq. (14)]$ 

<span id="page-6-9"></span>
$$
C_m = \min(C_{sr}, C_{rd}). \tag{26}
$$

The SOP is the probability of *Cm* falling below a target secrecy rate,  $R_s$  ( $R_s > 0$ ), expressed as

<span id="page-6-7"></span>
$$
SOP = Pr{C_m < R_s}
$$
  
= Pr{min(C\_{sr}, C\_{rd}) < R\_s}  
= 1 - Pr{min(C\_{sr}, C\_{rd}) \ge R\_s}  
= 1 - Pr{C\_{sr} \ge R\_s} Pr{C\_{rd} \ge R\_s}, (27)

where

<span id="page-6-1"></span>
$$
\Pr\{C_{sr} \ge R_s\} = 1 - \Pr\{C_{sr} < R_s\}
$$
\n
$$
= 1 - \Pr\left\{\frac{1}{2}\log_2(1 + \gamma_{sr}) < R_s\right\}
$$
\n
$$
= 1 - \Pr\{\gamma_{sr} < \theta - 1\}
$$
\n
$$
= 1 - F_{\gamma_{sr}}(\theta - 1), \tag{28}
$$

by defining  $\theta = 2^{2R_s}$ . Substituting [\(10\)](#page-4-4) into [\(28\),](#page-6-1) Pr{ $C_{sr} \ge$ *Rs*} is formulated as

<span id="page-6-5"></span>
$$
\Pr\{C_{sr} \ge R_s\} = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{2} Y_i G_{2,3}^{2,1} \bigg(Z_i (\theta - 1)^{V_i} \bigg| \frac{1}{S_i, K_i, 0} \bigg), (29)
$$

and

$$
Pr{C_{rd} \ge R_s}
$$
\n
$$
= Pr \left\{ \frac{1}{2} \left[ \log_2(\gamma_{rd} + 1) - \log_2(\gamma_{re,j} + 1) \right] \ge R_s \right\}
$$
\n
$$
= Pr \left\{ \gamma_{rd} \ge \theta \gamma_{re,j} (\theta - 1) \right\}
$$
\n
$$
= Pr \left\{ \frac{\eta_r P_b |\mathbf{h}_{br}|^2}{P_{dn}} \left( |\mathbf{h}_{rd}|^2 - \theta |\mathbf{h}_{re,j}|^2 \right) \ge \theta - 1 \right\}
$$
\n
$$
= Pr \left\{ |\mathbf{h}_{br}|^2 w \ge D_0 \right\},
$$
\n(30)

where  $D_0 = \frac{(\theta - 1)P_{dn}}{\eta_r P_b}$  and  $w = |\mathbf{h}_{rd}|^2 - \theta |\mathbf{h}_{re,j}|^2$ . Here, the term  $P_{dn}$  is set to 1. To hold the inequality  $|\mathbf{h}_{br}|^2 w \ge D_0$ , it has  $w > 0$ . Hence, we obtain

<span id="page-6-2"></span>
$$
\Pr\{C_{rd} \ge R_s\} = \Pr\left\{ |\mathbf{h}_{br}|^2 w \ge D_0, w > 0 \right\}
$$

$$
= \int_0^\infty \int_{\frac{D_0}{w}}^\infty f_{\gamma_{br}}(\gamma) f_w(w) \ d\gamma dw, \quad (31)
$$

where

$$
f_w(w) = \int_0^\infty f_{\gamma_{rd}}(w+x) \frac{1}{\theta} f_{\gamma_{ref}}\left(\frac{x}{\theta}\right) dx. \tag{32}
$$

#### 1) SCENARIO-I

In the scenario of colluding eavesdroppers,  $(31)$  is expressed as

<span id="page-6-4"></span>
$$
\Pr\left\{|\mathbf{h}_{br}|^2 w \ge D_0, w > 0\right\} = \int_0^\infty \int_{\frac{D_0}{w}}^\infty f_{\gamma_{br}}(\gamma) f_w^I(w) \times d\gamma dw,\tag{33}
$$

where

<span id="page-6-8"></span>
$$
f_w^I(w) = \int_0^\infty f_{\gamma_{rd}}(w+x) \frac{1}{\theta} f_{\gamma_{re}}^I\left(\frac{x}{\theta}\right) dx. \tag{34}
$$

Placing  $(22)$ ,  $(12)$ , and  $(16)$  into  $(33)$ , Eq.  $(33)$  is finally derived as

<span id="page-6-6"></span>
$$
\Pr\left\{|\mathbf{h}_{br}|^{2}w \ge D_{0}, w > 0\right\}
$$
\n
$$
= \sum_{e_{1}=0}^{\infty} \sum_{f_{2}=0}^{\infty} \sum_{g_{1}=0}^{\infty} \sum_{t_{1}=0}^{g_{3}} \sum_{t_{2}=0}^{g_{9}} \binom{g_{3}}{t_{1}} \left(g_{2} + \frac{\widetilde{g}_{5}}{\theta}\right)^{-(\widetilde{g}_{6}+t_{1}+1)}
$$
\n
$$
\times \frac{(\widetilde{g}_{6}+t_{1})! \chi_{2}}{\theta^{\widetilde{g}_{6}+1}} \frac{g_{9}! D_{0}^{t_{2}}}{t_{2}! \widetilde{g}_{8}^{g_{9}-t_{2}+1}} \left(\frac{g_{8} D_{0}}{\widetilde{g}_{2}}\right)^{\frac{g_{3}-t_{1}-t_{2}+1}{2}}
$$

$$
\times (\Xi_2 \Xi_8 D_0)^{-\frac{(\Xi_3 + t_1 + t_2 + 1)}{2}} \times G_{0,2}^{2,0} \left( \Xi_2 \Xi_8 D_0 \Big|_{\Xi_3 + 1, t_1 + t_2} \right).
$$
\n(35)

*Proof:* See Appendix A.

Now, substituting  $(29)$  and  $(35)$  into  $(27)$ , we finally obtain the SOP expression for Scenario-I that is presented in  $(36)$ , shown at the bottom of the page.

<span id="page-7-5"></span>*Asymptotic Analysis:* In the case of scenario-I, a tight asymptotic expression of SOP at high SNR can be obtained by means of using  $[69, \text{ eq. } (2.9.1)]$  $[69, \text{ eq. } (2.9.1)]$  and  $[69, \text{ eq. } (1.8.4)]$  as demonstrated in  $(37)$ , shown at the bottom of the page, where  $b_{j_1} = (\Xi_3 + 1, t_1 + t_2), \, \alpha_{k_1} = \beta_{j_1} = 1$  for the values of  $k_1 =$  $1, \ldots, p_1; j_1 = 1, \ldots, m_1, a_{k_2} = (1, W_i), b_{j_2} = (S_i, K_i, 0),$ and  $\alpha_{k_2} = \beta_{j_2} = 1$  for the values of  $k_2 = 1, \ldots, p_2$ ;  $j_2 =$  $1, \ldots, m_2.$ 

#### 2) SCENARIO-II

In the scenario with non-colluding eavesdroppers, Eq. [\(31\)](#page-6-2) is expressed as

<span id="page-7-2"></span>
$$
\Pr\left\{|\mathbf{h}_{br}|^2 w \ge D_0, w > 0\right\} = \int_0^\infty \int_{\frac{D_0}{w}}^\infty f_{\gamma_{br}}(\gamma) f_w^H(w) \times d\gamma dw, \tag{38}
$$

where

<span id="page-7-4"></span>
$$
f_w^H(w) = \int_0^\infty f_{\gamma_{rd}}(w+x) \frac{1}{\theta} f_{\gamma_{re}}^H\left(\frac{x}{\theta}\right) dx. \tag{39}
$$

Substituting [\(22\),](#page-6-3) [\(12\),](#page-4-5) and [\(21\)](#page-5-6) into [\(38\),](#page-7-2) Eq. [\(38\)](#page-7-2) is finally derived as shown in  $(40)$ , shown at the bottom of the page, where  $\mathcal{X}_5 = \Xi_1 \Xi_4 \Xi_7$ .

*Proof:* See Appendix B.

Finally, placing [\(29\)](#page-6-5) and [\(40\)](#page-7-2) into [\(27\),](#page-6-7) we obtain the SOP formula for scenario-II which is expressed in [\(41\),](#page-8-0) shown at the bottom of the next page.

*Asymptotic Analysis:* In the case of scenario-II, following the similar procedure as utilized for scenario-I, a tight asymptotic expression of SOP at high SNR can be obtained as presented in  $(42)$ , shown at the bottom of the page, where  $b_{j3} = (\Xi_3 + 1, t_3 + t_4)$ , and  $\alpha_{k_3} = \beta_{j_3} = 1$  for the values of  $k_3 = 1, \ldots, p_3; j_3 = 1, \ldots, m_3.$ 

#### *B. STRICTLY POSITIVE SECRECY CAPACITY ANALYSIS*

The probability of SPSC refers to the probability when  $C_m > 0$ . SPSC is a significant aspect of the system's secrecy transmission. Although analytical representation of the probability of SPSC can be simply generated from the SOP formulation, its physical significance is different from SOP. Hence, it can be defined as [\[70,](#page-17-2) eq. (48)]

<span id="page-7-6"></span><span id="page-7-3"></span>
$$
SPSC = Pr{C_m > 0}
$$
  
= Pr{min(C<sub>sr</sub>, C<sub>rd</sub>) > 0}  
= Pr{C<sub>sr</sub> > 0} Pr{C<sub>rd</sub> > 0}, (43)

<span id="page-7-0"></span>
$$
SOP^{I} = 1 - \left[ \sum_{e_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{f_2=0}^{\infty} \sum_{g_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{t_1=0}^{g_3} \sum_{t_2=0}^{g_4} \binom{g_3}{t_1} \left( g_2 + \frac{\widetilde{g}_5}{\theta} \right)^{-(\widetilde{g}_6+t_1+1)} \frac{(\widetilde{g}_6+t_1)! \mathcal{X}_2}{\theta \widetilde{g}_6+t_1} \frac{g_9! D_0^{t_2}}{t_2! \widetilde{g}_9^{g_9-t_2+1}} \left( \frac{g_8 D_0}{g_2} \right)^{\frac{g_3-t_1-t_2+1}{2}} \times (\widetilde{g}_2 \widetilde{g}_8 D_0)^{-\frac{(g_3+t_1+t_2+1)}{2}} G_{0,2}^{2,0} \left( g_2 g_8 D_0 \right) \frac{1}{g_3+1, t_1+t_2} \right] \left[ 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{2} Y_i G_{2,3}^{2,1} \left( Z_i (\theta - 1)^{V_i} \right) \frac{1}{S_i, K_i, 0} \right) \right] (36)
$$

<span id="page-7-1"></span>
$$
SOP_{(\infty)}^{I} = 1 - \left[ \sum_{e_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{f_2=0}^{\infty} \sum_{g_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{t_1=0}^{g_3} \sum_{t_2=0}^{g_3} \sum_{j_1=1}^{g_2} \binom{g_3}{t_1} \left( g_2 + \frac{\widetilde{g}_5}{\theta} \right)^{-(\widetilde{g}_6+t_1+1)} \frac{(\widetilde{g}_6+t_1)!\mathcal{X}_2}{\theta^{\widetilde{g}_6+1}} \frac{g_9!D_0^{t_2}}{t_2!g_8^{t_3}} \left( \frac{g_8D_0}{g_2} \right)^{\frac{g_3-t_1-t_2+1}{2}} \times (\widetilde{g}_2 g_8D_0)^{-(\frac{g_3+t_1+t_2+1}{2})} (\widetilde{g}_2 g_8D_0)^{\frac{b_{j_1}}{\beta_{j_1}}} \prod_{k_1=1;k_1\neq j_1}^{m_1=2} \Gamma\left(b_{k_1}-b_{j_1}\frac{\beta_{k_1}}{\beta_{j_1}}\right) \left[ 1 - \sum_{i=1}^2 \sum_{j_2=1}^{m_2=2} Y_i \frac{1}{\beta_{j_2}} \left( z_i(\theta-1)^{V_i} \right)^{\frac{b_{j_2}}{\beta_{j_2}}} \right] \times \frac{\prod_{k_2=1;k_2\neq j_2}^{m_2=2} \Gamma\left(b_{k_2}-b_{j_2}\frac{\beta_{k_2}}{\beta_{j_2}}\right) \prod_{k_2=1}^{n_2=1} \Gamma\left(1-a_{k_2}+b_{j_2}\frac{\alpha_{k_2}}{\beta_{j_2}}\right)}{\prod_{k_2=m_2+1}^{n_2=2} \Gamma\left(a_{k_2}-b_{j_2}\frac{\alpha_{k_2}}{\beta_{j_2}}\right) \prod_{k_2=m_2+1}^{q_2=3} \Gamma\left(1-b_{k_2}+b_{j_2}\frac{\beta_{k_2}}{\beta_{j_2}}\right)} \tag{37}
$$

$$
\Pr\left\{|\mathbf{h}_{br}|^{2}w \geq D_{0}, w > 0\right\} = \mathcal{N}_{ell} \sum_{e_{1}=0}^{\infty} \sum_{f_{1}=0}^{\infty} \sum_{g_{1}=0}^{\infty} \sum_{h_{1}=0}^{N_{ell}-1} \sum_{f_{3}=0}^{E_{3}} \sum_{t_{4}=0}^{E_{9}} \sum_{q_{0}+q_{1}+...+q_{\overline{e}_{6}}=h_{1}}^{E_{1}} \prod_{p_{4}} \binom{\mathcal{N}_{ell}-1}{h_{1}} \binom{\overline{E}_{3}}{f_{3}} \binom{h_{1}}{q_{0}, q_{1},..., q_{\overline{E}_{6}}}
$$

$$
\times \left(\frac{\overline{E}_{6}!}{p_{4}! \overline{E}_{5}^{\overline{E}_{6}-p_{4}+1}}\right)^{q_{p_{4}}} \left(\sum_{f_{1}=0}^{\infty} \overline{E}_{4}\right)^{h_{1}} \left(\overline{E}_{2} + \frac{\overline{E}_{5}h_{1}}{\theta} + \frac{\overline{E}_{5}}{\theta}\right)^{-(\mathcal{X}_{4}+1)} (-1)^{h_{1}} \frac{\mathcal{X}_{4}! \mathcal{X}_{5}}{\theta \mathcal{X}_{3}+1} \frac{\overline{E}_{9}! D_{0}^{t_{4}}}{t_{4}! \overline{E}_{8}^{\overline{E}_{9}-t_{4}+1}}
$$

$$
\times \left(\frac{\overline{E}_{8}D_{0}}{\overline{E}_{2}}\right)^{\frac{\overline{E}_{3}-r_{3}-t_{4}+1}{2}} (\overline{E}_{2} \overline{E}_{8} D_{0})^{-\frac{(\overline{E}_{3}+r_{3}+t_{4}+1)}{2}} G_{0,2}^{2,0} \left(\overline{E}_{2} \overline{E}_{8} D_{0}\right) \frac{\overline{E}_{3}+1}{\overline{E}_{3}+1, t_{3}+t_{4}} \tag{40}
$$

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where

<span id="page-8-4"></span>
$$
Pr{C_{sr} > 0} = Pr{\frac{1}{2}log_2(1 + \gamma_{sr}) > 0}
$$
  
= Pr{ $\gamma_{sr} > 0$ } = 1, (44)

and

<span id="page-8-2"></span>
$$
Pr{C_{rd} > 0} = Pr \left\{ \frac{1}{2} [\log_2(1 + \gamma_{rd}) - \log_2(1 + \gamma_{re,j})] > 0 \right\}
$$
  
= 1 - Pr{ $\gamma_{rd} \le \gamma_{re,j}$ }  
= 1 - Pr{ $|\mathbf{h}_{rd}|^2 \le |\mathbf{h}_{re,j}|^2$ }  
= 1 -  $\int_0^\infty \int_0^v f_{\gamma_{rd}}(u) f_{\gamma_{re,j}}(v) du dv.$  (45)

1) SCENARIO-I

For the scenario of colluding eavesdroppers, [\(45\)](#page-8-2) is expressed as

<span id="page-8-3"></span>
$$
\Pr\{C_{rd} > 0\} = 1 - \int_0^\infty \int_0^v f_{\gamma_{rd}}(u) f_{\gamma_{re}}^I(v) du dv. \tag{46}
$$

Placing  $(12)$  and  $(16)$  into  $(46)$ , Eq.  $(46)$  is formulated as

<span id="page-8-5"></span>
$$
\Pr{C_{rd} > 0}
$$
\n
$$
= 1 - \left[ \sum_{e_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{f_2=0}^{\infty} \mathcal{X}_1 \left( \frac{\Xi_3! \widetilde{\Xi}_6!}{\Xi_2^{E_3+1}} \widetilde{\Xi}_5^{-(\widetilde{\Xi}_6+1)} - \sum_{t_5=0}^{\Xi_3} \frac{\Xi_3!}{t_5!} \right. \right. \times \frac{(\widetilde{\Xi}_6 + t_5)!}{\Xi_2^{E_3-t_5+1}} (\Xi_2 + \widetilde{\Xi}_5)^{-(\widetilde{\Xi}_6+t_5+1)} \Bigg) \Bigg].
$$
\n(47)

where  $\mathcal{X}_1 = \Xi_1 \widetilde{\Xi_4}$ .

*Proof:* See Appendix C.

Placing [\(44\)](#page-8-4) and [\(47\)](#page-8-5) into [\(43\),](#page-7-3) The formula of SPSC for the scenario-I is expressed as

<span id="page-8-8"></span>
$$
SPSC^{I} = 1 - \left[ \sum_{e_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{f_2=0}^{\infty} \mathcal{X}_1 \left( \frac{\Xi_3! \overline{\Xi}_6!}{\Xi_2^{\Xi_3+1}} \overline{\Xi}_5^{-(\overline{\Xi}_6+1)} - \sum_{t_5=0}^{\Xi_3} \frac{\Xi_3!}{t_5!} \right. \right. \\ \times \left. \frac{(\overline{\Xi}_6 + t_5)!}{\Xi_2^{\Xi_3-t_5+1}} (\Xi_2 + \overline{\Xi}_5)^{-(\overline{\Xi}_6+t_5+1)} \right) \right]. \tag{48}
$$

#### 2) SCENARIO-II

In the scenario of non-colluding eavesdroppers,  $Pr{C_{rd} > 0}$ is expressed as

<span id="page-8-6"></span>
$$
\Pr \{C_{rd} > 0\} = 1 - \int_0^\infty \int_0^v f_{\gamma_{rd}}(u) f_{\gamma_{re}}^H(v) du dv. \quad (49)
$$

Substituting  $(12)$  and  $(21)$  into  $(49)$ , following the similar formulation procedure as utilized for scenario-I with some mathematical manipulations and simplifications,  $Pr{C_{rd} > 0}$ is derived as

<span id="page-8-7"></span>
$$
Pr{C_{rd} > 0}
$$
\n
$$
= 1 - \left[ \mathcal{N}_{ell} \sum_{e_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{f_1=0}^{N_{ell}-1} \sum_{h_1=0}^{h_1-1} \sum_{q_0+q_1+\dots+q_{\Xi_6}=h_1} \prod_{p_4} {N_{ell}-1 \choose h_1} \right]
$$
\n
$$
\times \left( \frac{h_1}{q_0, q_1, \dots, q_{\Xi_6}} \right) \left( \frac{\Xi_6!}{p_4! \Xi_5^{\Xi_6-p_4+1}} \right)^{q_{p_4}} \left( \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \Xi_4 \right)^{h_1} (-1)^{h_1}
$$

<span id="page-8-0"></span>
$$
SOP^{II} = 1 - \left[ \mathcal{N}_{ell} \sum_{e_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{g_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{h_1=0}^{N_{ell}-1} \sum_{f_3=0}^{E_3} \sum_{t_4=0}^{E_9} \sum_{q_0+q_1+\dots+q_{E_6}=h_1}^{\infty} \prod_{p_4} \binom{\mathcal{N}_{ell}-1}{h_1} \binom{E_3}{f_3} \binom{h_1}{q_0, q_1, \dots, q_{E_6}} \right] \times \left( \frac{E_6!}{p_4! E_5^{E_6-p_4+1}} \right)^{q_{p_4}} \left( \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} E_4 \right)^{h_1} \left( E_2 + \frac{E_5 h_1}{\theta} + \frac{E_5}{\theta} \right)^{-(\mathcal{X}_4+1)} (-1)^{h_1} \frac{\mathcal{X}_4! \mathcal{X}_5}{\theta^{2\mathcal{X}_3+1}} \frac{E_9! D_0^{t_4}}{t_4! E_8^{E_9-r_4+1}} \left( \frac{E_8 D_0}{E_2} \right)^{\frac{E_3-t_3-t_4+1}{2}}
$$
  
×  $(E_2 E_8 D_0)^{-\frac{(E_3+t_3+t_4+1)}{2}} G_{0,2}^{2,0} \left( E_2 E_8 D_0 \Big|_{E_3+1, t_3+t_4} \right) \left[ 1 - \sum_{i=1}^2 Y_i G_{2,3}^{2,1} \left( Z_i (\theta - 1)^{V_i} \Big| \frac{1}{S_i, K_i, 0} \right) \right] \tag{41}$ 

<span id="page-8-1"></span>
$$
SOP_{(\infty)}^{II} = 1 - \left[ \mathcal{N}_{ell} \sum_{e_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{g_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{h_1=0}^{N_{ell}-1} \sum_{f_3=0}^{g_3} \sum_{t_4=0}^{g_3} \sum_{j_3=1}^{\infty} \sum_{q_0+q_1+\ldots+q_{g_6}=h_1}^{\infty} \prod_{p_4} \binom{N_{ell}-1}{h_1} \binom{g_3}{f_3} \binom{h_1}{q_0, q_1, \ldots, q_{g_6}} \right] \times \left( \frac{g_6!}{p_4! g_5^{\frac{g_6}{5} - p_4 + 1}} \right)^{q_{p_4}} \left( \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \prod_{f_1=0}^{h_1} \binom{g_2}{g_1} + \frac{g_5}{g_1} \right)^{-(X_4+1)} (-1)^{h_1} \frac{\mathcal{X}_4! \mathcal{X}_5}{\theta^{\mathcal{X}_3+1}} \frac{g_9! D_4^{l_4}}{t_4! g_8^{\frac{g_3}{5} - r_4 + 1}} \left( \frac{g_8 D_0}{g_2} \right)^{\frac{g_3 - r_3 - r_4 + 1}{2}}
$$
  

$$
\times (\sum_2 \sum_8 D_0)^{-\frac{(g_3 + r_3 + r_4 + 1)}{2}} (\sum_2 \sum_8 D_0)^{\frac{h_3}{h_3}} \prod_{k_3=1}^{m_3=2} \prod_{k_3 \neq j_3}^{m_3=2} \Gamma \left( b_{k_3} - b_{j_3} \frac{b_{k_3}}{\beta_{j_3}} \right) \prod_{i=1}^{n_2=2} \sum_{j_2=1}^{n_2=2} Y_i \frac{1}{\beta_{j_2}} \left( Z_i(\theta - 1)^{V_i} \right)^{\frac{h_2}{\beta_{j_2}}}
$$
  

$$
\times \frac{\prod_{k_2=1; k_2 \neq j_2}^{m_2=2} \Gamma \left( b_{k_2} - b_{j_2} \frac{a_{k_2}}{\beta_{j_2}} \right) \prod_{
$$

$$
\times \mathcal{X}_6 \left( \frac{\Xi_3! \mathcal{X}_3!}{\Xi_2^{2s+1}} (\Xi_5 + \Xi_5 h_1)^{-(\mathcal{X}_3+1)} - \sum_{t_6=0}^{\Xi_3} \frac{\Xi_3! \mathcal{X}_7!}{t_6! \Xi_2^{2s-t_6+1}} \times (\Xi_2 + \Xi_5 h_1 + \Xi_5)^{-(\mathcal{X}_7+1)} \right), \tag{50}
$$

where  $\mathcal{X}_6 = \Xi_1 \Xi_4$  and  $\mathcal{X}_7 = \mathcal{X}_3 + t_6$ . Substituting [\(44\)](#page-8-4) and [\(50\)](#page-8-7) into [\(43\),](#page-7-3) we can finally demonstrate the formula of SPSC for scenario-II as presented in  $(51)$ , shown at the bottom of the page.

#### *C. EFFECTIVE SECRECY THROUGHPUT ANALYSIS*

Another secrecy performance metric is EST, which assures confidential average throughput measurements. EST is calculated by multiplying the target secrecy rate with the probability of successful data transmission that is defined as

$$
EST = Rs(1 - SOP).
$$
 (52)

#### 1) SCENARIO-I

For colluding eavesdroppers, the formula of EST is expressed as

<span id="page-9-2"></span>
$$
ESTI = Rs(1 - SOPI).
$$
 (53)

2) SCENARIO-II

For non-colluding eavesdroppers, the formula of EST is expressed as

<span id="page-9-3"></span>
$$
ESTH = Rs(1 - SOPH). \t(54)
$$

#### <span id="page-9-0"></span>**V. NUMERICAL RESULTS**

Selected simulation results due to mixed UOWC-RF model with the considered two different eavesdropping scenarios (colluding and non-colluding) are demonstrated and analyzed in this section, utilizing the obtained closed-form expressions of [\(36\),](#page-7-0) [\(37\),](#page-7-1) [\(41\),](#page-8-0) [\(42\),](#page-8-1) [\(48\),](#page-8-8) [\(51\),](#page-9-1) [\(53\),](#page-9-2) and [\(54\).](#page-9-3) In the simulation analysis, the impacts of detection techniques, various UWT scenarios, pointing error, fading and shadowing severity, number of diversity branches, number of eavesdroppers, energy conversion efficiency, power of power beacon, target secrecy rate, and average SNR values on secrecy performance are investigated. Similar to [\[71\]](#page-17-3), we assume that the RF links have the following parameters:  $G_d = G_b = G_e = 2$ ,  $\kappa_d = \kappa_b = \kappa_e = 1$ ,  $\mu_d = \mu_b = \mu_e = 1$ ,  $m_d = m_b = m_e = 2$ ,  $\eta_r = 0.7$ ,  $P_b = 20$  dB, and  $R_s = 0.05$ bits/sec/Hz, unless specified otherwise. On the other hand,



<span id="page-9-4"></span>**FIGURE 2.** The SOP<sup>*I*</sup> versus  $\Phi_{sr}$  for selected values of *h*, *l*, and  $\epsilon$  with  $\mathcal{N}_{el} = 1$ ,  $\Phi_{rd} = 15$  dB,  $\Phi_{br} = 1$ , and  $\Phi_{re} = 0$  dB.

the values of *h* and *l* utilized in the first hop (UOWC link) are set according to [\[55\]](#page-16-29) and inherited from Table 1 and Table 2. Unless otherwise mentioned, We also assume that the UOWC link has the following parameters:  $h = 2.4$ ,  $l =$ 0.05,  $\epsilon = 1$  (HD technique) or  $\epsilon = 2$  (IM/DD technique),  $A_0 = 1$ , and  $\xi = 0.8$ . Note that Figs. [2](#page-9-4)[-5](#page-10-0) and Figs. [7](#page-11-0)[-15](#page-13-0) are illustrated for scenario-I (colluding eavesdropping mode) whereas Figs. [6](#page-11-1) and [14](#page-13-1) are depicted for scenario-II (noncolluding eavesdropping mode). Moreover, a fair comparison between colluding and non-colluding eavesdropping attacks is also presented in Figs. [16](#page-13-2) and [17](#page-14-1) in terms of EST and SOP analysis, respectively. In addressing the computational complexity inherent in the infinite series, we employ a strategic approach by truncating them to the first 25 terms. The Monte-Carlo (MC) simulated results, with  $10^8$  channel realizations and the analytical results, are utilized to generate all the graphs. Furthermore, the validity of our developed expressions is confirmed by the excellent match between theoretical and simulated results.

#### *A. IMPACT OF UOWC LINK PARAMETERS*

<span id="page-9-5"></span>To assess the severity level of different turbulence (i.e., air bubbles level and temperature gradients) conditions, SOP*<sup>I</sup>* is plotted as a function of  $\Phi_{sr}$  in Fig. [2.](#page-9-4) It can be observed that secrecy performance decreases as the values of *h* and *l* increase. This is because an increase in the level of air bubbles and/or temperature gradient adversely affects the

<span id="page-9-1"></span>
$$
SPSC^{II} = 1 - \left[ \mathcal{N}_{ell} \sum_{e_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{h_1=0}^{N_{ell}-1} \sum_{q_0+q_1+\dots+q_{\tilde{c}_6}=h_1} \prod_{p_4} {N_{ell}-1 \choose h_1} {h_1 \choose q_0, q_1, \dots, q_{\tilde{c}_6}} \right] \left( \frac{\Xi_6!}{p_4! \Xi_5^{\Xi_6-p_4+1}} \right)^{q_{p_4}} \left( \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \Xi_4 \right)^{h_1} \times (-1)^{h_1} \mathcal{X}_6 \left( \frac{\Xi_3! \mathcal{X}_3!}{\Xi_2^{\Xi_3+1}} (\Xi_5 + \Xi_5 h_1)^{-(\mathcal{X}_3+1)} - \sum_{t_6=0}^{\Xi_3} \frac{\Xi_3! \mathcal{X}_7!}{t_6! \Xi_2^{\Xi_3-t_6+1}} (\Xi_2 + \Xi_5 h_1 + \Xi_5)^{-(\mathcal{X}_7+1)} \right) \right]
$$
(51)



<span id="page-10-1"></span>**FIGURE 3.** The SOP<sup>*I*</sup> versus  $\Phi_{br}$  for selected values of *h* for both salty and fresh **water with**  $\epsilon = 1$ ,  $\mathcal{N}_{el} = 1$ ,  $\Phi_{sr} = 20$  dB,  $\Phi_{rd} = 10$  dB, and  $\Phi_{re} = -10$  dB.

scintillation index, which has a negative effect on the SOP performance. Therefore, it can be observed that utilizing the HD technique instead of the IM/DD technique significantly improves secrecy performance. This is as expected since the HD technique, relative to the IM/DD technique, can more easily overcome the impacts of turbulence conditions as testified in [\[46\]](#page-16-20). As noticed from the figure, the analytical results perfectly match with the MC simulation (denoted by markers). Additionally, it is demonstrated that SOP declines as  $\Phi_{sr}$  increases proving that increasing  $\Phi_{sr}$  enhances the secrecy performance.

In Fig. [3,](#page-10-1)  $SOP<sup>I</sup>$  performance is analyzed graphically concerning  $\Phi_{br}$  under uniform temperature conditions and varying air bubbles levels due to the UOWC link.

It is possible to conclude that secrecy performance increases as the turbulence severity decreases. Water salinity also has an impact on secrecy performance though it is not as significant as the UWT scenarios. Increased value of  $\Phi_{hr}$ results in a considerable decline of SOP. This is because as  $\Phi_{br}$  increases, the strength of  $\mathcal{B} - \mathcal{R}$  link improves, leading to a better SOP performance. However, a secrecy outage floor is observed in the figure after a certain value of  $\Phi_{br}$ . This is due to the fact that the secrecy performance is influenced by the worse hop in the mixed UOWC-RF model implying the secrecy capacity is affected by the second hop in such a situation, which is not enhanced.

Fig. [4](#page-10-2) depicts  $SOP<sup>I</sup>$  against  $P<sub>b</sub>$  under varying values of *Rs* to address the influence of pointing errors in the UOWC link.

As expected, the higher value of  $\xi$  (i.e.,  $\xi$ =6.7) exhibits a better SOP performance than that of lower  $\xi$  (i.e.,  $\xi$ =0.8). This is due to the fact that smaller  $\xi$  produces larger pointing errors in the receiver, which significantly distorts the signal that is received. As a result, the signal strength of  $S - R$  link deteriorates and the system's secrecy performance weakens.



**FIGURE 4.** The SOP<sup>*I*</sup> versus  $P_b$  (dB) for selected values of  $\xi$  and  $R_s$  with  $\epsilon = 1$ ,  $\mathcal{N}_{el} = 1, \Phi_{sr} = 20$  dB,  $\Phi_{rd} = 30$  dB,  $\Phi_{br} = 1$  dB, and  $\Phi_{re} = -10$  dB.

<span id="page-10-2"></span>

<span id="page-10-0"></span>**FIGURE 5.** The SOP<sup>*I*</sup> versus  $\Phi_{sr}$  for selected values of  $m_d$ ,  $m_b$ , and  $P_b$  with  $\epsilon = 2$ ,  $\xi \to \infty$ ,  $m_e = 2$ ,  $\mathcal{N}_{el} = 2$ ,  $\Phi_{rd} = 15$  dB,  $\Phi_{br} = 1$  dB, and  $\Phi_{re} = 0$  dB.

In a similar context, it is realized that the SOP value falls significantly with decreasing  $R_s$ . This is because  $C_{sr}$ must be greater than  $R_s$  to achieve secure networking over the UOWC-RF link. However, increasing  $R_s$  increases the probability that  $C_{sr}$  will fall below  $R_s$  thereby raising the SOP value and as a result deteriorating the secrecy performance.

## *B. IMPACT OF RF LINK PARAMETERS*

The performance analysis of SOP*<sup>I</sup>* has been elucidated in Fig. [5](#page-10-0) to analyze the impacts of shadowing severity and beacon's power for the considered UOWC-RF mixed model.

It is noticed that  $SOP<sup>I</sup>$  increases as the value of  $m_d$  and *mb* decreases. It is due to the fact that lowering the values of *md* and *mb* reflects a stronger shadowing impact on the legitimate channel; hence the secrecy performance behaves inversely. Similarly, it is observed that SOP performance is greatly improved with increasing  $P_b$  from  $-12$  dB to 20 dB.



<span id="page-11-1"></span>**FIGURE 6.** The SPSC<sup>*II*</sup> versus  $\Phi_{rd}$  for selected values of  $\Phi_{re}$  and  $m_e$  with  $\mathcal{N}_{ell} = 2$ ,  $G_d = G_e = 2$ ,  $\kappa_d = \kappa_e = 1$ ,  $\mu_d = \mu_e = 1$ , and  $m_d = 2$ .

This increase enhances the possibility of improved energy harvesting at the relay with higher transmission capacity. However, as  $\Phi_{sr}$  increases, the SOP value declines noticeably demonstrating that increasing the value of  $\Phi_{sr}$  improves secrecy performance. It is also observed that in high SNR, the asymptotic expression demonstrated in [\(37\),](#page-7-1) converges quite fast to the exact result proving this asymptotic approximation to be tight enough.

In Fig. [6,](#page-11-1) SPSC<sup>II</sup> is plotted against  $\Phi_{rd}$  demonstrating the effects of the shadowing parameter of the eavesdropper channel.

It can be observed that the lower the value of  $m_e$ , the better the SOP performance. This is because the SNR values of  $\mathcal{R} - \mathcal{E}$  link improve with the  $m_e$  as the impact of shadowing is reduced while all other parameters remain constant. It is also realized that reducing the value of  $\Phi_{re}$  provides better secrecy performance of the system. On the other hand, Fig. [7](#page-11-0) demonstrates the  $EST<sup>I</sup>$  of the UOWC-RF mixed system for selected values of  $\mathcal{N}_{eI}$  under various turbulence conditions to address the impact of colluding eavesdroppers and UWT severity.

Increasing the number of eavesdroppers decreases the secrecy performance, as noticed in the figure. It is expected since the probability of information leakage is enhanced drastically with the increase in eavesdroppers. Furthermore, the results of this figure reveal that EST improves with an increase in  $R_s$  to a specific threshold ( $R_s = 1.55$  bits/sec/Hz) and subsequently declines with a further rise in  $R<sub>s</sub>$  as shown in TABLE [1.](#page-12-0) This is because when  $R_s$  is lower, it is possible to achieve the desired secrecy performance with fewer resources. However, as *Rs* increases, greater resources are needed to counter the increased security risks, leading to decreased EST performance. In summary, the graph along with TABLE [1](#page-12-0) illustrate stronger security measures offer diminishing returns in terms of EST performance.



**FIGURE 7.** The EST<sup>*I*</sup> versus  $R_s$  for selected values of  $\mathcal{N}_{el}$  with  $\epsilon = 1$ ,  $\Phi_{sr} = 15$  dB,  $\Phi_{rd} = 25$  dB,  $\Phi_{br} = 1$  dB, and  $\Phi_{re} = 0$  dB.

<span id="page-11-0"></span>

<span id="page-11-2"></span>**FIGURE 8.** The SOP<sup>*I*</sup> versus  $P_b$  for selected values of  $G_d$  and  $\Phi_{re}$  with  $\epsilon = 2$ ,  $G_b = G_e = 2$ ,  $\mathcal{N}_{el} = 1$ ,  $\Phi_{sr} = 15$  dB,  $\Phi_{rd} = 25$  dB, and  $\Phi_{br} = 1$  dB.

The influence of  $G_d$  and  $G_b$  on secrecy performance is investigated in Figs. [8-](#page-11-2)[10.](#page-12-1) Under both scenarios, it is observed that the proposed model exhibits better secrecy as the values of  $G_d$  and  $G_b$  increase. In other words, having more antennas at the destination and power-beacon is beneficial to strengthen the secrecy behavior. This is owing to the fact that implementing antenna diversity at the *D* and *B* ensures reliable communication, which leads to improved security. More importantly, an increase in  $G_b$  increases the probability of exploiting more energy from the power-beacon to *R*. On the other hand, it can be demonstrated that the higher value of  $P_b$  ensures a good reception with a higher probability at *D*. Note that when  $P_b > -15$  dB, all such curves flatten out due to the dominance of the system's first hop. It is also inspected in Fig. [9](#page-12-2) that the asymptotic results tightly approximate with the closed form results. The theoretical and simulation results of SOP*<sup>I</sup>* are compared in

<span id="page-12-0"></span>

$R_s$ (bits/sec/Hz)	1.1	1.15	1.2	1.25	1.3	1.35	1.4	1.45	1.5	1.55	1.6	1.65	1.7
$\mathcal{N}_{eI}=3$ (Sim)	0.74785	0.76471	0.77969	0.79272	0.80373	0.81264	0.81937	0.82383	0.82593	0.82558	0.82268	0.81710	0.80876
$\mathcal{N}_{eI}=7$ (Sim)	0.67581	0.68993	0.70215	0.71239	0.72057	0.72660	0.73038	0.73183	0.73083	0.72730	0.72114	0.71224	0.70051
$\mathcal{N}_{eI}=9$ (Sim)	0.51565	0.52592	0.53466	0.54181	0.54728	0.55100	0.55291	0.55291	0.55094	0.54692	0.54076	0.53242	0.52181
$\mathcal{N}_{eI}=11$ (Sim)	0.30500	0.31078	0.31561	0.31945	0.32224	0.32394	0.32451	0.32389	0.32204	0.31891	0.31447	0.30868	0.30151

**TABLE 1.** The EST<sup>*I*</sup> versus  $R_s$  for selected values of  $\mathcal{N}_{el}$ .



**FIGURE 9.** The SOP<sup>*I*</sup> versus  $\Phi_{sr}$  for selected values of  $G_d$  with  $\epsilon = 2$ ,  $\xi \to \infty$ ,  $G_b = G_e = 2$ ,  $\mathcal{N}_{el} = 2$ ,  $\Phi_{rd} = 15$  dB,  $\Phi_{br} = 1$  dB, and  $\Phi_{re} = 0$  dB.

<span id="page-12-2"></span>

<span id="page-12-1"></span>**FIGURE 10.** The EST<sup>*I*</sup> versus  $P_b$  for selected values of  $G_b$  with  $\epsilon = 2$ ,  $G_d = G_e = 2$ ,  $m_d = m_e = 2$ ,  $m_b = 15$ ,  $\mathcal{N}_{el} = 2$ ,  $\Phi_{sr} = 15$  dB,  $\Phi_{rd} = 25$  dB,  $\Phi_{br} = 1$  dB, and  $\Phi_{re} = 0$  dB.

Fig. [11](#page-12-3) to analyze the impact of *Ge* on secrecy performance. A clear decrease in the SOP performance is noticed with the increase of  $G_e$ . This is because when  $G_e$  increases, more confidential information is susceptible to the eavesdroppers thereby increasing the chances of eavesdropping.



**FIGURE 11.** The SOP<sup>*I*</sup> versus  $\Phi_{br}$  for selected values of  $P_b$  and  $G_e$  with  $\epsilon = 2$ ,  $G_d = G_b = 2$ ,  $\mathcal{N}_{el} = 2$ ,  $\Phi_{sr} = 20$  dB,  $\Phi_{rd} = 10$  dB, and  $\Phi_{re} = -10$  dB.

<span id="page-12-3"></span>

<span id="page-12-4"></span>**FIGURE 12.** The SPSC<sup>*I*</sup> versus  $\Phi_{rd}$  for selected values of  $\Phi_{re}$ ,  $\kappa_d$ , and  $\kappa_e$  with  $G_d = G_e = 2$ ,  $\mu_d = \mu_e = 1$ ,  $m_d = m_e = 2$ , and  $\mathcal{N}_{el} = 1$ .

The effect of various fading conditions on secrecy performance is investigated in Figs. [12](#page-12-4)[-15,](#page-13-0) which are graphically represented in terms of the probability of SPSC and EST analysis. The results in Fig. [12](#page-12-4) reveal that the probability of  $SPSC<sup>I</sup>$  greatly improves as the combination of



**FIGURE 13.** The EST<sup>*I*</sup> versus  $\Phi_{rd}$  for selected values of  $\Phi_{re}$ ,  $\kappa_d$ , and  $\kappa_e$  with  $\epsilon = 1$ ,  $\mathcal{N}_{el} = 1, \kappa_b = 1, \Phi_{sr} = 15 \text{ dB}, \text{and } \Phi_{br} = 1 \text{ dB}.$ 

<span id="page-13-3"></span>

<span id="page-13-1"></span>FIGURE 14. The SPSC<sup>*II*</sup>  $\Phi_{rd}$  for selected values of  $\Phi_{re}$ ,  $\mu_d$ , and  $\mu_e$  with  $G_d = G_e = 2$ ,  $K_d = K_e = 1$ ,  $m_d = m_e = 4$ , and  $\mathcal{N}_{ell} = 2$ .

 $\kappa_d$  and  $\kappa_e$  increases. Therefore, it is observed from figure [13](#page-13-3) that the value of EST becomes higher while the value of  $\kappa$ is increased. This indicates that communication between *R* to *D* can be established more securely due to the increased fading severity. This is expected since the SNR of *R*−*D* link is dependent on fading parameters as demonstrated in [\(48\).](#page-8-8) Similar outcomes are also observed while comparing the results in Fig. [14-](#page-13-1)[15](#page-13-0) since a good reception is obtained at *D* as the levels of  $\mu_d$  and  $\mu_e$  increase.

## *C. COMPARISON OF COLLUDING AND NON-COLLUDING EAVESDROPPERS ATTACK*

Fig. [16](#page-13-2) demonstrates the EST analysis to compare the secrecy performance of colluding and non-colluding eavesdropping modes under numerous UWT conditions in thermally uniform freshwater. Since the non-colluding



 $10<sup>c</sup>$ 

FIGURE 15. The EST<sup>I</sup>  $\Phi_{rd}$  for selected values of  $\Phi_{ro}$ ,  $\mu_d$ , and  $\mu_e$  with  $\epsilon = 1$ ,  $\mathcal{N}_{el} = 2$ ,  $\mu_b = 1, \Phi_{sr} = 15 \text{ dB}, \text{and } \Phi_{br} = 1 \text{ dB}.$ 

 $10$ 

<span id="page-13-0"></span>

<span id="page-13-2"></span>**FIGURE 16.** The EST versus  $\Phi_{rd}$  for selected values of *h* for fresh water with  $\epsilon = 2$ ,  $\mathcal{N}_{el} = \mathcal{N}_{ell} = 2$ ,  $\Phi_{sr} = 15$  dB,  $\Phi_{br} = 1$  dB, and  $\Phi_{re} = 0$  dB.

eavesdroppers obtain a greater EST value than the colluding mode, it can be inferred that the colluding eavesdropping scenario is more severe than that of the non-colluding scenario. In other words, due to the colluding scenario, eavesdropper's capabilities are improved, which leads to poorer secrecy performance. The reason for this is that while colluding eavesdroppers collaborate and corroborate their opinions to decode sensitive information, non-colluding eavesdroppers explore the confidential message independently. Furthermore, EST is greater in the presence of weaker UWT relative to stronger UWT conditions. The reason is the same as it was in Fig. [3.](#page-10-1)

The SOP vs  $\Phi_{rd}$  is illustrated in Fig. [17,](#page-14-1) which exhibits the impact of energy conversion efficiency  $(\eta_r)$ . It can be concluded that an increase in  $\eta_r$  triggers a noticeable improvement in SOP performance. This is predictable since



<span id="page-14-1"></span>**FIGURE 17.** The SOP versus  $\Phi_{rd}$  for selected values of  $\eta_r$  with  $\epsilon = 1$ ,  $\mathcal{N}_{el} = \mathcal{N}_{ell} = 2$ ,  $\Phi_{sr} = 15$  dB,  $\Phi_{br} = 1$ , and  $\Phi_{re} = 0$  dB.

more harvested energy can be utilized due to the reliable information transfer in the second time slot. Moreover, it is observed that secrecy performance degrades significantly in the scenario of colluding eavesdroppers relative to the non-colluding eavesdroppers scenario.

#### <span id="page-14-0"></span>**VI. CONCLUSION**

In this study, the secrecy performance of UOWC-RF mixed networks including an energy harvesting relay against multiple eavesdroppers which operate in colluding (*Scenario-I*) and non-colluding (*Scenario-II*) manners is analyzed. We derive the closed-form expressions of SOP, probability of SPSC and EST, and then validate them via computer simulations. Numerical results reveal that whereas the secrecy performance is drastically influenced by UWT (based on air bubble level, temperature gradient, and water salinity), and pointing errors, the HD technique can guarantee a better secrecy throughput as opposed to the IM/DD technique. Besides, the secrecy performance is always dominated by the worse hop but it can be significantly enhanced by exploiting diversity at the power beacon and/or the destination along with increasing the power of the power beacon to facilitate more harvested energy at the relay. Finally, a comparative analysis between the two scenarios concludes that the attacks led by colluding eavesdroppers are more detrimental than that of non-colluding eavesdroppers, and preventing such collusion between the eavesdroppers must be given topmost priority by the design engineers while designing secure communication system networks.

## **APPENDIX**

*A. APPENDIX A*

Substituting (12) and (16) into (34), 
$$
f_w^I(w)
$$
 is expressed as

<span id="page-14-2"></span>
$$
f_w^I(w) = \int_0^\infty \sum_{e_1=0}^\infty \Xi_1 e^{-\Xi_2(w+x)} (w+x)^{\Xi_3} \frac{1}{\theta} \sum_{f_2=0}^\infty \widetilde{\Xi_4}
$$

$$
\times e^{-\widetilde{\Xi_5}(\frac{x}{\theta})} \left(\frac{x}{\theta}\right)^{\widetilde{\Xi_6}} dx.
$$
 (55)

Applying the binomial theorem to  $(w + x)^{\mathbb{E}_3}$  term, utilizing the formula  $[65, eq. (3).351.3]$  $[65, eq. (3).351.3]$  along with some mathematical manipulations and simplifications, [\(55\)](#page-14-2) is derived as

<span id="page-14-3"></span>
$$
f_w^I(w) = \sum_{e_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{f_2=0}^{\infty} \sum_{t_1=0}^{E_3} {\binom{E_3}{t_1}} \frac{\mathcal{X}_1}{\theta^{\frac{E}{E_6+1}}} e^{-\Sigma_2 w} w^{\Sigma_3-t_1}
$$
  
\n
$$
\times \int_0^{\infty} e^{-(\Sigma_2 + \frac{\widetilde{E}_5}{\theta})x} x^{\frac{E_6}{E_6+t_1}} dx
$$
  
\n
$$
= \sum_{e_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{f_2=0}^{\infty} \sum_{t_1=0}^{E_3} {\binom{E_3}{t_1}} {\left(\Sigma_2 + \frac{\widetilde{E}_5}{\theta}\right)}^{-(\widetilde{E}_6+t_1+1)}
$$
  
\n
$$
\times \frac{(\widetilde{E}_6 + t_1)! \mathcal{X}_1}{\theta^{\frac{E_6}{E_6+1}}} e^{-\Sigma_2 w} w^{\Sigma_3-t_1}, \tag{56}
$$

where  $\mathcal{X}_1 = \Sigma_1 \Sigma_4$ . Now, substituting [\(22\)](#page-6-3) and [\(56\)](#page-14-3) into  $(33)$ , utilizing the formula  $[65, eq. (3).351.2]$  $[65, eq. (3).351.2]$ , and performing some mathematical manipulations and simplifications,  $Pr{(|\mathbf{h}_{br}|^2 w \ge D_0, w > 0}$  is formulated as

<span id="page-14-4"></span>
$$
\Pr\left\{ |\mathbf{h}_{br}|^{2} w \ge D_{0}, w > 0 \right\}
$$
\n
$$
= \sum_{e_{1}=0}^{\infty} \sum_{f_{2}=0}^{\infty} \sum_{g_{1}=0}^{\infty} \sum_{t_{1}=0}^{\infty} { \left(\frac{\Xi_{3}}{t_{1}}\right) \left(\Xi_{2} + \frac{\widetilde{\Xi}_{5}}{\theta}\right)^{-(\widetilde{\Xi}_{6}+t_{1}+1)}} \times \frac{(\widetilde{\Xi}_{6}+t_{1})! \mathcal{X}_{2}}{\theta^{\widetilde{\Xi}_{6}+1}} \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\Xi_{2}w} w^{\Xi_{3}-t_{1}} dw \int_{\frac{D_{0}}{w}}^{\infty} e^{-\Xi_{8}y} \gamma^{\Xi_{9}} d\gamma
$$
\n
$$
= \sum_{e_{1}=0}^{\infty} \sum_{f_{2}=0}^{\infty} \sum_{g_{1}=0}^{\infty} \sum_{t_{1}=0}^{\infty} \sum_{t_{2}=0}^{\infty} { \left(\frac{\Xi_{3}}{t_{1}}\right) \left(\Xi_{2} + \frac{\widetilde{\Xi}_{5}}{\theta}\right)^{-(\widetilde{\Xi}_{6}+t_{1}+1)}} \times \frac{(\widetilde{\Xi}_{6}+t_{1})! \mathcal{X}_{2}}{\theta^{\widetilde{\Xi}_{6}+1}} \sum_{t_{2}:\Xi_{8}^{\Xi_{9}-t_{2}+1}}^{\infty} \int_{0}^{\infty} { \left(\frac{D_{0}}{w}\right)^{t_{2}}} \times e^{-\Xi_{2}w - \frac{\Xi_{8}D_{0}}{w}w^{\Xi_{3}-t_{1}} dw}, \tag{57}
$$

where  $\mathcal{X}_2 = \mathcal{X}_1 \Xi_7$ . Applying [\[65,](#page-16-39) eq. (3).471.9] and [\[72,](#page-17-4) eq. (07).34.03.0605.01] after performing some mathematical simplifications, [\(57\)](#page-14-4) is finally implemented as shown in [\(35\).](#page-6-6)

#### *B. APPENDIX B*

Substituting [\(12\)](#page-4-5) and [\(21\)](#page-5-6) into [\(39\),](#page-7-4)  $f_w^H(w)$  is expressed as

$$
f_w^H(w) = \int_0^\infty \sum_{e_1=0}^\infty \Xi_1 e^{-\Xi_2(w+x)} (w+x)^{\Xi_3} \frac{1}{\theta} \mathcal{N}_{ell}
$$
  
\n
$$
\times \sum_{f_1=0}^\infty \sum_{h_1=0}^\infty \sum_{q_0+q_1+\dots+q_{\Xi_6}=h_1} \prod_{p_4} \binom{\mathcal{N}_{ell}-1}{\mathcal{N}_{ell}-1}
$$
  
\n
$$
\times h_1 \binom{h_1}{q_0, q_1, \dots, q_{\Xi_6}} \left( \frac{\Xi_6!}{p_4! \Xi_5^{\Xi_6-p_4+1}} \right)^{q_{p_4}} \left( \sum_{f_1=0}^\infty \Xi_4 \right)^{h_1}
$$
  
\n
$$
\times (-1)^{h_1} \Xi_4 e^{-\frac{x}{\theta} (\Xi_5 + \Xi_5 h_1)} \left( \frac{x}{\theta} \right)^{\chi_3} dx.
$$
 (58)

Now, according to the similar formulation procedure as utilized for scenario-I with some mathematical simplifications,  $f_w^{\text{II}}(w)$  is finally derived as follows:

<span id="page-15-25"></span>
$$
f_w^H(w) = \mathcal{N}_{eH} \sum_{e_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{h_1=0}^{N_{eH}-1} \sum_{q_0+q_1+\dots+q_{\Xi_6}=h_1}^{\infty} \sum_{t_3=0}^{\Xi_3} \prod_{p_4}
$$
  
\n
$$
\times \left(\frac{N_{eH}-1}{h_1}\right) \left(\frac{\Xi_3}{t_3}\right) \left(\frac{h_1}{q_0, q_1, \dots, q_{\Xi_6}}\right)
$$
  
\n
$$
\times \left(\frac{\Xi_6!}{p_4! \Xi_5^{\Xi_6-p_4+1}}\right)^{q_{p_4}} \left(\sum_{f_1=0}^{\infty} \Xi_4\right)^{h_1} (-1)^{h_1} \frac{\mathcal{X}_4!}{\theta^{\mathcal{X}_3+1}}
$$
  
\n
$$
\times \left(\Xi_2 + \frac{\Xi_5 h_1}{\theta} + \frac{\Xi_5}{\theta}\right)^{-(\mathcal{X}_4+1)} \Xi_1 \Xi_4 e^{-\Xi_2 w} w^{\Xi_3-t_1}, \tag{59}
$$

where  $\mathcal{X}_4 = \mathcal{X}_3 + t_3$ .

Substituting  $(22)$  and  $(59)$  into  $(38)$  and implementing the similar approach as utilized for scenario-I along with some algebraic manipulations and simplifications,  $Pr{|\mathbf{h}_{br}|^2 w \geq 0}$  $D_0$ ,  $w > 0$ } is obtained as in [\(40\)](#page-7-2) and the proof is completed.

#### *C. APPENDIX C*

Substituting  $(12)$  and  $(16)$  into  $(46)$ , utilizing the identity [\[65,](#page-16-39) eq. (3).351.1], and performing some mathematical manipulations and simplifications,  $Pr{C_{rd} > 0}$  is formed as

$$
\Pr{C_{rd} > 0}
$$
\n
$$
= 1 - \left[ \sum_{e_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{f_2=0}^{\infty} \mathcal{X}_1 \left( \int_0^{\infty} e^{-\widetilde{\Sigma}_5 v} v^{\widetilde{\Sigma}_6} dv \int_0^v e^{-\Sigma_2 u} u^{\Sigma_3} du \right) \right]
$$
\n
$$
= 1 - \left[ \sum_{e_1=0}^{\infty} \sum_{f_2=0}^{\infty} \mathcal{X}_1 \left( \int_0^{\infty} \frac{\Sigma_3!}{\Sigma_2^{\Sigma_3+1}} e^{-\widetilde{\Sigma}_5 v} v^{\widetilde{\Sigma}_6} dv - \int_0^{\infty} \sum_{f_5=0}^{\Sigma_3} \frac{\Sigma_3!}{f_5! \Sigma_2^{\Sigma_3-f_5+1}} e^{-(\Sigma_2+\widetilde{\Sigma}_5) v} v^{\widetilde{\Sigma}_6+f_5} dv \right) \right], \quad (60)
$$

Now, applying the formula [\[65,](#page-16-39) eq. (3).351.3], Pr{*Crd* > 0} is finally derived as shown in  $(47)$  and hence the proof is concluded.

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