Bidding Strategy of Thermal Units Participating in Real-Time Depth Peak Load Regulation Ancillary Service Market based on Stackelberg Game

With the development of the peak load regulation ancillary service market and the improvement of the rules, the role of thermal power unit changed from the passive participant in peak load regulation for duty to the active bidder. The power grid dispatching agency called the depth peak load regulation (DPLR) resources on demand according to the price. In order to research the optimal bidding strategy of thermal power units in the depth peak load regulation ancillary service market, a bi-Ievel model of multiple thermal power manufacturers and single market dispatching institution is established based on stackelberg game. The upper level is the bidding strategy of thermal power manufacturers, including the income and cost of thermal power manufacturers. The lower level is the optimal scheduling scheme of the market dispatching institution. The nonlinear bi-Ievel model is solved by the particle swarm optimization algorithm. The cases show the importance and validity of the proposed model.