




Key Distribution Mechanism in Secure ADS-B Networks

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Need for ADS-B





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ADS-B Modes of Operation




Figure 1—ADS–B System Overview


www.faa.gov/nextgen/implementation/programs/adsb/media/ADSB In ARC Report with transmittal letter.pdf



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ADS-B MODE S Packet Format





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Motivation

- Lack of Integrity & Authentication
- Secure ADS-B using HMAC
- <u>Challenge:</u>
 - Design appropriate key distribution mechanisms for the HMAC algorithm taking into consideration the nature of the airspace



- ADS-B Attack Taxonomy
- Secure ADS-B Framework
- Key Distribution of HMAC Keys
 - Key Distribution in Ideal Conditions
 - Key Distribution in Unforeseen Conditions
- Protocol Verification
- Main Contributions





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ADS-B Taxonomy

- Classification Criteria:
 - Difficulty of implementation of the attack
 - Location of the radio device used for the attack


• Categories:

- Medium-level attacks
- Advanced-level attacks
- Expert-level attacks





ADS-B Test Bed







Radio and Radar Lab at GMU



http://radio.vse.gmu.edu/





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


10

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High-level view







Pseudo-code of Secure ADS-B Receiver

```
1
        ADSBReceiver receiver = new ADSBReceiver();
2
        Map<String, Queue> bucket = new HashMap<String, Queue>();
3
        String icao = null;
4
        Queue queue = null;
5
        String computedHMAC=null, receivedHMAC=null;
6
7
        While(receiver.hasNewMessage())
8
        {
        String message = receive.getMessage();
9
        String icao = message.getICAO();
10
11
        if (!bucket.containsKey(icao))
12
13
        {
14
            queue = new Queue();
15
        }
16
        else
17
        {
18
            queue = bucket.get(icao);
19
        }
20
        queue.enque(message);
21
        bucket.put(icao,queue);
22
        if(queue.size()>6)
23
        {
24
            String packets = extractPackets(queue);
25
            String portions = extractHMAC(packets);
26
            receivedHMAC = concatHMAC(portions);
27
            String payloads = extractLongPayload(packets);
28
            computedHMAC = computeHMAC(payloads, key);
29
            if(computedHMAC.equals(receivedHMAC)
30
            {
            processMessages(bucket, icao);
31
32
33
        }
34 }
```





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14

- Protocol Verification
- Main Contributions






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Scenario





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
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
Scenario 1





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Scenario 2



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Initial Key Distribution

Aircraft	{Aircraft, FlightPath}SymKey	-	SourceATC
SourceATC	nc1, sid1, ps1	-	DestATC
DestATC	nc3, sid3, ps3		SourceATC
DestATC	CERT(DestATC)		SourceATC
SourceATC	{pms1}pk(DestATC)	-	DestATC
SourceATC	{msg1, hash(msg1)}ms1		DestATC
DestATC	{msg2, hash(msg2)}ms1	-	SourceATC
SourceATC	{Aircraft, FlightPath}ms1	-	DestATC
DestATC	{key2}ms1	-	SourceATC

Handshake between SourceATC and DestATC to exchange key to be used by aircraft using master key




Handshake between SourceATC and TransitATC to exchange key to be used by aircraft using master key

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Key Exchange in Unforeseen Conditions



Aircraft changes flight path due to bad weather in the destination. Therefore, it needs to negotiate new key with the new destination

Aircraft changes flight path due to bad weather in the one of the transit zones. Therefore, it needs to negotiate new key with the new transit zone

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Main Contributions

- We proposed an approach based on HMAC to secure ADS-B by providing authenticity and integrity
- We described the key distribution scheme in:
 Ideal conditions
 - Unforeseen conditions
- Key exchange protocol verification using Scyther tool



The end

• Thank you very much !!

• Questions ?!



25



