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A High-Performance ECC Processor Over Curve448 Based on a Novel Variant of the Karatsuba Formula for Asymmetric Digit Multiplier

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ABSTRACT In this paper, we present a high-performance architecture for elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) over Curve448, which to the best of our knowledge, is the fastest implementation of ECC point multiplication over Curve448 to date. Firstly, we introduce a novel variant of the Karatsuba formula for asymmetric digit multiplier, suitable for typical DSP primitive with asymmetric input. It reduces the number of required DSPs compared to previous work and preserves the performance via full parallelization and pipelining. We then construct a 224-bit pipelined multiplier and interleaved fast reduction algorithm, yielding a total of 12 stages of pipelined modular multiplication with four stages of input delay. Additionally, we present an efficient Montgomery ladder scheduling with no additional register is required. The implementation on the Xilinx 7-series FPGA: Virtex-7, Kintex-7, Artix-7, and Zynq 7020 yields execution times of 0.12, 0.13, 0.24, and 0.24 ms, respectively. It increases the throughput by 242% compared to the best previous work on Zynq 7020 and by 858% compared to the best previous work on Virtex-7. Furthermore, the proposed architecture optimizes nearly 63% efficiency improvement in terms of Area \times Time tradeoff. Lastly, we extend our architecture with well-known side-channel protections such as scalar blinding, base-point randomization, and continuous randomization.

INDEX TERMS Elliptic-curves cryptography (ECC), curve448, high-speed multiplier, asymmetric Karatsuba, field-programmable gate array (FPGA).

I. INTRODUCTION

The performance of Public-Key Cryptography has become one of the main factors of interest in the recently emerging technologies such as the 5G System [1] and Blockchain [2]. At the same time, there is increasing demand to increase the security level against attacks that could compromise the overall performance. In particular, applications enabled on Internet of Things (IoT) devices suffer from performance degradation due to limited resources on the processing unit. Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) has been chosen as the

building block in the security protocol of those technologies among asymmetric cryptographic algorithms due to its smaller key size. The Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) [3] recommended Curve25519 [4] and Curve448 [5] for a high level of practical security with 128-bit and 224-bit security levels, respectively, along with inclusion in Transport Layer Security (TLS) standard 1.3 [6]. Afterward, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [7] also included these curves in their standard.

Curve448 is a conservatively designed elliptic curve with very competitive performance on a wide variety of platforms, leading to ECC construction issues and to advances in strong cryptanalysis and classical attacks [5]. Obviously, this

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research is being performed not only due to the wide use of high-performance ECC Processors over Curve448 but also to address the need for achieving a high-security and efficient ECC processor architecture as an imperative step for the emergence of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). We must acknowledge, with the invention of the Shor's factorization algorithm [8], that the current state of the cryptographic system will soon likely be compromised by quantum computing; likewise, the classic public key exchange algorithm will soon be replaced. Nevertheless, as long as PQC has not been fully implemented, hybrid mode ECC will still be used in order to sustain the compatibility of industry and government regulations. Since in the hybrid schemes, classic and PQC will work concurrently during the transition to PQC [9]. Classical cryptographic system will still be needed, even though PQC development has come a long way. Consequently, designing an ECC processor architecture with a high level of security, high speed, low latency, and high efficiency in every single processing step is crucial.

Generally, optimization can be done through algorithmic improvement to reduce the number of calculation steps for such expensive primitive operations such as finite field and group operations. Despite that, keeping a short critical delay path on hardware implementation is even more challenging due to being limited by technology, as it determines the maximum working frequency. Thus, critical delay requires more attention than software implementation.

A. PRIOR WORK

To the best of our knowledge, there are only a few published results on hardware implementations targeting ECC with a security level above 128 bits, particularly Curve448.

The first hardware implementation of Curve448 was investigated by Sasdrich and Güneysu [10]. Their design employed Schoolbook multiplication with interleaved reduction for the underlying modular multiplier. The implementation results on a Xilinx Zynq 7020 Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGA) archived a throughput of 1087 ECC point multiplication (ECPM) per second and consumed 1580 logic slices and 33 Digital Signal Processor (DSP) blocks. Their design also offered basic (vertical) side-channel protections, such as scalar blinding and base-point randomization. Furthermore, they extended their previous design with additional protection against horizontal attacks in [11] by adding a re-randomization countermeasure. This type of attack identifies side-channel leakage during a single trace of the ECPM routine. At the same time, they evaluated their countermeasure with scalar- and base-point-dependent leakage side-channel evaluations.

In [12], Shah *et al.* proposed the hardware design of Curve448 utilizing LookUp Table (LUT) only, which aims to be platform independent. They adopted the redundant-signed-digit (RSD) representation for arithmetic operations and the segmentation approach at the architectural level to reduce the required number of clock cycles for ECPM operations. Their implementation results targeting Virtex-7

achieved a throughput of 869 ECPM per second utilizing 50,143 LUTs.

The proposal by Niasar *et al.* [13] represents a very recent work hardware implementation of Curve448. They investigated three different implementation strategies (i.e., lightweight, area-time efficient, and high-performance architectures) targeting the Xilinx Zynq 7020 FPGA. Their high-performance architecture increased throughput by 12% by executing 1,219 ECPM per second and increased efficiency by 40% in terms of required clock cycles \times utilized area compared to the initial work in [10]. They achieved their speed-up by utilizing 81 DSPs for parallelization in the lowest level of Karatsuba computation. To the best of our knowledge, their high-performance variant is the state-of-the-art of Curve448 hardware implementation in terms of ECPM throughput.

The Karatsuba-Ofman formula [14], also known as Karatsuba formula, has been a widely used method of multiplying two n -bit arbitrary-precision numbers, which reduces the asymptotic complexity to $O(n^{1.585})$ bit operations compared to $O(n^2)$ bit operations for the Schoolbook method. However, the nature of its algorithm that uses recursion to construct higher precision numbers leads to the extra overhead of additions. In particular, implementing parallel Karatsuba in hardware is problematic in that it increases the critical delay path due to the addition tree, despite using parallel DSP blocks for digit multipliers at lower levels. Therefore, despite reducing the number of required DSP blocks, the overall operating frequency remains low, as shown in the implementation results in [13] and [15].

Awaludin *et al.* [16] demonstrated a new way of using the Karatsuba formula for high-speed hardware parallel multiplier without the cost of increasing the critical delay path. The technique employs the combination of the Schoolbook method and the Karatsuba algorithm with a compressor circuit (i.e., carry-save-adder tree (CSAT)), despite requiring slightly more DSP blocks than the original Karatsuba method. Apparently, the presented equation is similar to the method discovered earlier by Khachatryan *et al.* [17], which was then formalized by [18], called the arbitrary degree variant of Karatsuba (ADK). The method was initially intended to avoid overflow during the accumulation of the partial products on a typical word-based processor (i.e., software implementation), which is technically implemented in an iterative way.

Apart from optimizing the cost of extra addition, the method employed by [16] does not leverage the full capability of DSP blocks (i.e., Xilinx DSP48E1), as they use a symmetric 16×16 -bit digit multiplier. Thus, the use of the Karatsuba formula with the asymmetric feature (sometimes called rectangular) of DSP blocks remains unexplored. To the best of our knowledge, Roy *et al.* [19] represents the most recent work that uses the full capability of asymmetric DSP blocks, which reduces the required DSP blocks in the Schoolbook method using the nonstandard tiling method. This method is also used by [20] to construct a 257-bit signed multiplier for the hardware implementation of PQC SIKE.

B. OUR CONTRIBUTIONS

The contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:

- 1) We present a novel variant of the Karatsuba formula for asymmetric digit multiplier, which reduces DSP block utilization while offering a high-speed multiplier through parallelization and pipelining. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work considering the full capability of DSP blocks with the Karatsuba algorithm. Furthermore, it can be generalized for broader use in a cryptographic algorithm that employs multiplication.
- 2) We then present a high-performance ECC processor architecture over Curve448 that to the best of our knowledge, outperforms the existing architecture in terms of execution time as well as Area \times Time efficiency.
- 3) For the underlying architecture, we propose a 12-stage pipelined modular multiplier with four stages of input delay, which is built from a five-stage 224-bit fully pipelined multiplier with an interleaved fast reduction over the modulus $p = 2^{448} - 2^{224} - 1$.
- 4) The presented five-stage 224-bit fully pipelined multiplier is constructed from a novel variant of Karatsuba in point 1. At the same time, the interleaved fast reduction is obtained by exploiting the Solinas prime with the golden ratio $\phi = 2^{224}$.
- 5) We provide an efficient Montgomery ladder scheduling algorithm without the requirement of an additional temporary register.
- 6) Lastly, the proposed architecture is extended with side-channel attack countermeasures such as scalar blinding, base-point randomization, and continuous randomization, which are expected to resist vertical and horizontal attacks.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II gives a brief introduction to Curve448 with the underlying group arithmetic and field arithmetic. Section III describes the proposed novel variant of the Karatsuba formula for asymmetric digit multiplier. Section IV presents the proposed hardware architecture of the ECC processor over Curve448. Then, in section VI, we present our hardware implementation results and compare them to those of the existing methods. Lastly, Section VII concludes the paper.

II. PRELIMINARIES

Ed448-Goldilocks is an elliptic curve over prime field $GF(p)$ with a 224-bit security level introduced by Hamburg [5], which is defined in untwisted Edwards form:

$$E_d : y^2 + x^2 = 1 + dx^2y^2 \pmod p \tag{1}$$

with $d = -39081$ and $p = 2^{448} - 2^{224} - 1$. The curve is birationally equivalent to the Montgomery curve defined in RFC 7748 [21] called Curve448, the term we will use for the rest of the paper. Curve448 satisfies the requirement of SafeCurves and is included in TLS standard 1.3 [6].

A. ECC GROUP LAW

Let k be a scalar, $P = (x_P, y_P)$ and $Q = (x_Q, y_Q)$ be two point represented in affine coordinates where $P, Q \in E$ and $x_P, y_P \in GF(p)$. An ECC point multiplication (ECPM), $Q = kP$, is a k -times additions of point P (i.e., $P + P + \dots + P$), which can be performed with group operation of point doubling (PD) and point addition (PA). Typically, the projective coordinate representation is used to avoid modular inversion during intermediate computation, where an affine point $P = (x_P, y_P)$ can be converted to projective point $P = (X, Y, Z)$ such that $x_P = X/Z$ and $y_P = Y/Z$.

The Montgomery ladder was introduced to perform ECPM over the Montgomery curve, which processes point point doubling and addition computation in a single step [22]. A single step of Montgomery ladder is computed with the following formula (taken from [4]):

$$\begin{aligned} X_{PD} &= (X_2 - Z_2)^2 (X_2 + Z_2)^2 \\ Z_{PD} &= \left((X_2 + Z_2)^2 - (X_2 - Z_2)^2 \right) \\ &\quad \times \left((X_2 + Z_2)^2 + a24 \left((X_2 + Z_2)^2 - (X_2 - Z_2)^2 \right) \right) \\ X_{PA} &= ((X_2 - Z_2)(X_3 + Z_3) + (X_2 + Z_2)(X_3 - Z_3))^2 \\ Z_{PA} &= ((X_2 - Z_2)(X_3 + Z_3) - (X_2 + Z_2)(X_3 - Z_3))^2 x_P \end{aligned} \tag{2}$$

where $Q_2 = 2P_2$ and $Q_3 = P_2 + P_3$ with $Q_2 = (X_{PD}, Z_{PD})$, $Q_3 = (X_{PA}, Z_{PA})$, $P_2 = (X_2, Z_2)$, and $P_3 = (X_3, Z_3)$. A constant value $a24 = 39081$ is used specifically for Curve448. Note that this formula needs only x -coordinate of base point P to perform ECPM. The formula requires ten modular multiplications and eight modular additions/subtractions.

B. FIELD ARITHMETIC

The name ‘‘Goldilocks’’ refers to the prime modulus of Curve448 that is defined as the Solinas trinomial prime with the golden ratio $\phi = 2^{224}$, which offers fast arithmetic in typical (i.e., 32-bit or 64-bit) machines. Moreover, with its golden ratio ϕ , it allows Karatsuba multiplication of two operands $A = (a_1\phi + a_0)$ and $B = (b_1\phi + b_0)$, $A, B \in GF(p)$, to be calculated efficiently as follows:

$$C = (a_1\phi + a_0)(b_1\phi + b_0) \tag{3}$$

$$\equiv (a_1b_1 + a_0b_0) + (a_1b_0 + a_0b_1 + a_0b_0)\phi \pmod p \tag{4}$$

$$= (a_1b_1 + a_0b_0) + ((a_0 + a_1)(b_0 + b_1) - a_0b_0)\phi \tag{5}$$

A modular inversion is required to convert back projective coordinate $Q = (X, Z)$ to affine coordinates representations $Q = (x_Q)$ at the end of ECPM operation. A constant time modular inversion can be implemented using Fermat’s Little Theorem (FLT) such that $Z^{-1} \equiv Z^{p-2} \pmod p$. Finally, the affine representation of the point Q is calculated as $x_Q = XZ^{-1}$, with Z^{-1} is computed using FLT.

III. NOVEL VARIANT OF KARATSUBA FORMULA FOR ASYMMETRIC DIGIT MULTIPLIER

Consider two n -bit arbitrary-precision numbers A and B represented in asymmetric radices α and β , where $\alpha \neq \beta$.

$$A = \sum_{i=0}^u a_i \alpha^i, \quad B = \sum_{j=0}^v b_j \beta^j \quad (6)$$

u and v are the degree of A and B , respectively. The product $C = AB$ is calculated as follows:

$$C = \sum_{i=0}^{u-1} a_i \alpha^i \sum_{j=0}^{v-1} b_j \beta^j = \sum_{i=0}^{u-1} \sum_{j=0}^{v-1} a_i \alpha^i b_j \beta^j \quad (7)$$

The Schoolbook algorithm multiplies u digit and v digit numbers by multiplying each digit of one input by each digit of the other, which takes $O(uv)$ digit multiplications in total. Clearly, it requires uv DSP blocks when performing full parallelization on digit multiplication.

A. PROPOSED ASYMMETRIC VARIANT

We investigate a novel variant of the Karatsuba formula for asymmetric digit multiplier, which later reduces the complexity as well as the number of required DSPs compared to other similar works (i.e., [16], [19], [23]).

We rewrite the Equation 7 as follows:

$$C = \sum_{i=0}^{u-1} \sum_{j=0}^{[*]ir-1} a_i \alpha^i b_j \beta^j + \sum_{k=0}^{u-1} \sum_{l=[*]kr}^{v-1} a_k \alpha^k b_l \beta^l \quad (8)$$

with radix ratio $r = \log(\alpha)/\log(\beta)$ and $\alpha > \beta$. For $\alpha^i \beta^j = \alpha^k \beta^l$, we obtain the following identity:

$$a_i \alpha^i b_j \beta^j + a_k \alpha^k b_l \beta^l = [(a_i - a_k) (b_j - b_l) + a_i b_l + a_k b_j] \alpha^i \beta^j \quad (9)$$

Equation 9 shows that two multiplications can be reduced into one multiplication for a condition where $\alpha^i \beta^j = \alpha^k \beta^l$. This is similar to the Karatsuba and Ofman [14] for $\alpha = \beta$ where it reduces four-digit multiplications to three-digit multiplications, as a generalization of our problem illustrated in Fig. 1.

The red points are digit multiplications that are calculated prior to other digit multiplications (black points). At the same time, the black points, which are connected by a line, are the two-digit multiplications that later can be reduced to one-digit multiplication. For higher precision, more black dot pairs can be obtained, which trims down more digit multipliers. In general, the Karatsuba formula can be applied when two-digit multiplications are connected via a diagonal line without being restricted by the used radix. This method works ideally on a radix with a power of two. In particular, if we let $\alpha = 2^{w_1}$ and $\beta = 2^{w_2}$, a greater reduction in complexity can be obtained when $GCD(w_1, w_2) \neq 1$.




FIGURE 1. Generalization of karatsuba algorithm with asymmetric digit multiplier.




FIGURE 2. Top-level architecture.

B. DESIGN RESTRICTION

The Equation 9 is optimal when $\log_2(\alpha)$ and $\log_2(\beta)$ divide n , otherwise, some digits cannot be applied with Karatsuba identity. For asymmetric radices $\alpha = 2^{24}$ and $\beta = 2^{16}$, we observe the perfect numbers that fully fit Karatsuba identity up to 521-bits length are 48, 96, 144, 192, 240, 288, 336, 384, 432, and 480.

IV. PROPOSED HARDWARE ARCHITECTURE

Fig. 2 depicts the proposed top-level architecture of Curve448. This is the typical architecture consisting of the control unit, modular multiplier module, and modular adder/subtractor module. In contrast to the architecture proposed in [13], which uses RAM to store the ladder variables, we use register files utilized from flip-flop (FF). This is because in a typical FPGA (i.e., Xilinx FPGA [24]), the availability of FF is higher than that of LUT cells (e.g., in Xilinx, a single slice consists of four LUTs and eight FFs). Therefore, with a design that has higher LUT cell utilization than FF, increasing FF utilization will not drastically increase the slice utilization. Moreover, utilizing FF instead of BRAM preserves the overall performance without introducing overhead on memory read/write access.

Apart from performance and utilization considerations, the use of Block Random Access Memory (BRAM) introduces a new opportunity for attackers to extract secret scalar information by recovering information on the BRAM addressing pattern using Differential Power Analysis (DPA). Although it can be protected via address scrambling, such as the design proposed in [11], clearly, it consumes more area due to the utilization of logic cells. Furthermore, all the computation steps are one-way controlled by precise scheduling of Montgomery ladder without need handshake process such as valid/ready protocol.

A. MODULAR MULTIPLIER

We construct a 12-stage pipelined modular multiplier with four stages of input delay based on a 224-bit pipelined multiplier. We choose a 224-bit width multiplier because the prime number of Curve448 has a golden ratio $\phi = 2^{224}$, which later optimizes the reduction step as we propose the reduction algorithm for Curve448.

Fig. 3 shows the overall structure of our modular multiplication design. It consists of a 224-bit pipelined multiplier followed by two Ripple-Carry-Save Adders (RCSAs). An RCSA is actually a pair of adders, which in our case are carry-compact adders (CCAs) [25] that are used to limit the critical delay path of the ripple-carry-adder at some point, as shown in Fig. 4. The carry for the first half is not propagated; instead, it is saved and included as an input for another half in the next stage. This method is suitable for accumulator circuits. Additionally, the pipelined one-hot encoding is used with simple shift register to control the input-output signal between the stages. Note that the output valid and busy signal are not necessary in our design since we use a precise ladder scheduling, considering the restriction in modular multiplier module (i.e., requires four cycles input delay).




FIGURE 3. Proposed 12-stage pipelined (with four stages of input delay) modular multiplier.




FIGURE 4. Ripple-carry-save adder (RCSA). Technically, it limits the carry propagation to a predefined delay, which is the delay of a 224-bit Carry-compact-adder (CCA) in our case.

1) 224-BIT PIPELINED MULTIPLIER

The construction of the 224-bit pipelined multiplier based on Equation 9 is given in the Fig. 5. As shown in, all the red points represent a single-digit multiplication, while the two black points connected by a line represent a single-digit multiplications that are reduced from two-digit multiplications. Note that some lines may pass through multiple points, yet the relation should satisfy the Equation 9. There are some exceptions; when the point is already applied as a red point (i.e., due to the Karatsuba multiplication on the counterpart), it cannot be further reduced, even if it satisfies Equation 9. Thus, it remains as red point (including the counterpart) as in our case, as shown in points (8,2), (9,2), (8,5), (9,5), (8,2), and (9,2) in Fig. 5. Finally, we obtain less complexity, as it requires only 88 DSPs instead of 140 DSPs in the Schoolbook method or 105 DSPs in the nonstandard tiling method [19].

Fig. 6 shows the architecture of the 224-bit pipelined multiplier. The architecture contains five fully pipelined stages, which means it can process an input on each cycle. Our calculation steps of $C = AB$ are described as follows:




FIGURE 5. Construction of 224-bit multiplication with asymmetric digit multiplier ($\alpha = 2^{24}$ and $\beta = 2^{16}$). Note that since 224 does not divisible by 24, there will be unused bits at the most significant bit of the intermediate results.

- Stages 1 and 2: The parallel 16-bit ripple-carry adder (RCA) is used to compute $b_j - b_l$. The output of the 16-bit RCA is wired to 25×17 -bit signed




FIGURE 6. Proposed five-stage 224-bit fully pipelined multiplier.




FIGURE 7. Digital signal processing (DSP) utilization for (a) a three-stage 25×17 -bit signed multiply-accumulator with pre-adder and (b) a two-stage 24×16 -bit signed multiplier.

Multiply-Accumulate (MAC) modules, which also have a pre-adder input to compute $a_i - a_k$ before going to the multiplication stage. At the same time, parallel 24×16 -bit signed multiplier (MUL) modules are used to compute $a_i b_l$ and $a_k b_j$. Both the 25×17 -bit signed MAC with the pre-adder and 24×16 -bit signed MUL are utilized from DSP primitive with a three-stage and two-stage pipeline, respectively, to achieve maximum performance, as recommended in [26], which is shown in Fig. 7.

- Stage 3: The output of 24×16 -bit signed MUL available in this stage is then used by the 40-bit CCA to calculate $a_i b_l + a_k b_j$. The output 40-bit CCA is routed to the input accumulator of the MAC modules. Note that the output of 24×16 -bit signed MUL is also stored in registers, as it will be used in the compression stage (Stage 4).
- Stage 4: Before being processed by the carry-save-adder tree (CSAT), all intermediate values are grouped and aligned into 40-bit segments to reduce the number of

inputs in the CSAT as well as the depth of the tree. However, while the output of 24×16 -bit signed MUL is already in 40-bit width, the calculation of $(a_i - a_k)(b_j - b_l) + a_i b_l + a_k b_j$ obviously produces up to a 41-bit output width. We employ an alignment method similar to that used by [16] to handle the overflow bit (i.e., 41st bit). All intermediate values are compressed using homogeneous 3:2 compression to achieve balanced performance.

- Stage 5: In this stage, a final propagated addition of *sum* and *carry* from the output of the CSAT is performed using the CCA proposed in [25]. We obtained the optimal parameter CCA with $H = 3$ and $L = 30$ experimentally based on trial and error after synthesis and implementation in FPGA. Furthermore, the input and output of CCA are enclosed by registers to minimize the critical delay path.

2) FAST REDUCTION OVER $p = 2^{448} - 2^{224} - 1$

We propose the fast reduction technique interleaving with the intermediate output from the 224-bit pipelined multiplier, which is given in Algorithm 1. The multiplication of A and B , which each have a 448-bit width, can be decomposed into four 224-bit multiplications. Note that we do not take the Karatsuba approach (i.e., Equation 5) recommended by [5], since it does not give an advantage in our reduction step; rather, we use Equation 4, which take the additional cost of one clock cycle on the pipelined multiplier. We perform partial reduction for three intermediate results in advance (i.e., $z_4 = 2^{224}(z_1 + z_2 + z_3) \bmod p$), while the second term (i.e., $z_0 + z_3 \bmod p$) is accumulated with the first reduction step result and we perform the second reduction accordingly (i.e., $C = z_0 + z_3 + z_4 \bmod p$). This technique relies on the following property:

$$(a + b) \bmod p = (a + (b \bmod p)) \bmod p \quad (10)$$

Considering the advantage of the Goldilocks modulus $p = 2^{448} - 2^{224} - 1$ and the fact that $2^{448} \equiv 2^{224} + 1 \bmod p$, the reduction of $z_4 = 2^{224}T \bmod p$, where $T = z_1 + z_2 + z_3$, can be performed efficiently, as mentioned in Step 13

of Algorithm 1. Referring to the structure of the RCSA, the actual addition is performed only in the second adder (i.e., 226-bit CCA). Accordingly, the reduction of $C = G \bmod p$, where $G = z_0 + z_3 + z_4$ yields 3 bits of overflow, can be performed efficiently with the RCSA as mentioned in steps 18–20 of Algorithm 1. Note that the final reduction might produce a carry at the first adder of the RCSA, as this carry needs to be propagated to the second adder at the final step.

Algorithm 1 Proposed Interleaved Fast Reduction for $p = 2^{448} - 2^{224} - 1$ Modulus

```

Require: Integer  $A, B$  satisfying  $0 \leq A, B < p$ 
Ensure:  $C = A \cdot B \bmod p$ 
1:  $a_0 \leftarrow A_{[223:0]}$ 
2:  $a_1 \leftarrow A_{[447:224]}$ 
3:  $b_0 \leftarrow B_{[223:0]}$ 
4:  $b_1 \leftarrow B_{[447:224]}$ 
5:  $z_1 \leftarrow a_0 \cdot b_1$ 
6:  $z_2 \leftarrow a_1 \cdot b_0$ 
7:  $z_3 \leftarrow a_1 \cdot b_1$ 
8:  $z_0 \leftarrow a_0 \cdot b_0$ 
9:  $T \leftarrow z_1 + z_2 + z_3$ 
10:  $t_0 \leftarrow T_{[223:0]}$ 
11:  $t_1 \leftarrow T_{[449:224]}$ 
12:  $t_2 \leftarrow T_{[449:448]}$ 
13:  $z_4 \leftarrow (t_0 + t_1 + t_2) \parallel t_1_{[223:0]}$ 
14:  $G \leftarrow z_3 + z_0 + z_4$ 
15:  $g_0 \leftarrow G_{[223:0]}$ 
16:  $g_1 \leftarrow G_{[447:224]}$ 
17:  $g_2 \leftarrow G_{[450:448]}$ 
18:  $U \leftarrow g_0 + g_2$ 
19:  $V \leftarrow g_1 + g_2$ 
20:  $C \leftarrow (V + U_{[224]}) \parallel U_{[243:0]}$ 
21: return  $C$ 
    
```

224-bit pipelined multiplications

interleaved fast reduction

The precise scheduling of modular multiplication is presented in Fig. 8. The first four stages are used to calculate $z_1, z_2, z_3,$ and z_0 . In these stages, the input A and B are held in the input register, placing the modular multiplier core in a busy state and causing input delay for four cycles. Stages 7 and 8 perform the first accumulation $z_1 + z_2 + z_3$, followed by addition $t_0 + t_1 + t_2$ in Stage 9 using A1. At the same time, Stages 8 to 10 perform the second accumulation $z_3 + z_0 + z_4$, followed by two parallel additions $g_0 + g_2$ and $g_1 + g_2$ in Stage 10 using A2. Lastly, the output product is available in Stage 12. Therefore, the modular multiplication takes 12 cycles, pipelined with four stages of input delay.

B. MODULAR ADDER/SUBTRACTOR

A unified modular adder/subtractor is utilized from a single CCA, which calculates $C = A \pm B \pm p$, as shown in Fig. 9. The calculation takes two steps: it first calculates $r1 = A \pm B$ and then calculates $s = r1 \pm p$ with op to

Algorithm 2 Fermat-Based Inversion for Curve448 ($p = 2^{448} - 2^{224} - 1$)

```

Require: Integer  $z$  satisfying  $0 < z < p$ 
Ensure: Modular inverse  $z^{-1} \equiv z^{p-2} \bmod p$ 
1:  $u \leftarrow z^{2^1} \cdot z$ 
2:  $u \leftarrow u^{2^1} \cdot z$ 
3:  $u \leftarrow u^{2^3} \cdot u$ 
4:  $u \leftarrow u^{2^6} \cdot u$ 
5:  $u \leftarrow u^{2^1} \cdot z$ 
6:  $u \leftarrow u^{2^{13}} \cdot u$ 
7:  $u \leftarrow u^{2^1} \cdot z$ 
8:  $u \leftarrow u^{2^{27}} \cdot u$ 
9:  $u \leftarrow u^{2^1} \cdot z$ 
10:  $u \leftarrow u^{2^{55}} \cdot u$ 
11:  $u \leftarrow u^{2^1} \cdot z$ 
12:  $v \leftarrow u^{2^{111}} \cdot u$ 
13:  $u \leftarrow v^{2^1} \cdot z$ 
14:  $u \leftarrow u^{2^{223}} \cdot v$ 
15:  $u \leftarrow u^{2^2} \cdot z$ 
16: return  $u$ 
    
```

$z^{(2^2-1)}$
 $z^{(2^3-1)}$
 $z^{(2^6-1)}$
 $z^{(2^{12}-1)}$
 $z^{(2^{13}-1)}$
 $z^{(2^{26}-1)}$
 $z^{(2^{27}-1)}$
 $z^{(2^{54}-1)}$
 $z^{(2^{55}-1)}$
 $z^{(2^{110}-1)}$
 $z^{(2^{111}-1)}$
 $z^{(2^{222}-1)}$
 $z^{(2^{223}-1)}$
 $z^{(2^{446}-2^{222}-1)}$
 $z^{(2^{448}-2^{224}-3)}$




FIGURE 8. Modular multiplication calculation steps. $M, A1,$ and $A2$ are a 224-bit multiplier, first RCSA, and second RCSA, respectively.

control the sign of $\pm B$ and $\pm p$ using masking. The output C is selected between $r1$ and s depending on the value of sel , which is the XOR value of $cout$ of the first step and op . Basically, it detects whether the first step calculation produces a carry/borrow. While the sign of $\pm b$ is converted with two's complement, the sign of $\pm p$ is rather than more efficient due to the special form of its prime number. With the value of $2^{448} - 2^{224} - 1$, we can construct its value with the following signal instead of masking (written in Verilog syntax):

```

{223{op}}, ~op, {223{op}}, 1'b1}
    
```




FIGURE 9. Proposed modular adder/subtractor module.

Therefore, it takes two cycles to complete a single modular addition/subtraction. The critical path of this module is defined by the CCA circuit with optimal parameters $H = 3$ and $L = 30$ obtained experimentally on FPGA.

C. MODULAR INVERSE

A modular inversion is required to transform back from projective coordinates to affine coordinates at the end of the ECPM operation. A fully constant time modular inversion can be performed based on Fermat’s Little Theorem (FLT). Let $p = 2^{448} - 2^{224} - 1$ be the prime of Curve448; then, the modular inverse of z^{-1} can be calculated as $z^{-1} \equiv z^{2^{448}-2^{224}-3} \pmod{p}$. The modular inversion calculation via exponentiation can be performed with a total of 462 modular multiplications, as given in Algorithm 2, which can be utilized from the modular multiplier module. Therefore, no additional module for inversion is employed.

D. EFFICIENT MONTGOMERY LADDER SCHEDULING

The scheduling of the Montgomery ladder algorithm, Equation 2, is given in Fig. 10. The gray line in the multiplier indicates the busy signal of the 224-bit pipelined multiplier modules, where a single modular multiplication takes four 224-bit multiplications, as mentioned previously. It shows that the 224-bit pipelined modular multiplier module is nearly busy, which yields high usage efficiency for the pipelined architecture. It takes 52 cycles to perform a single Montgomery ladder step. Furthermore, with the pipelined architecture of the modular multiplier, no temporary register in addition to input registers (i.e., $x_p, X_2, Z_2, X_3,$ and Z_3) is required.

The Montgomery ladder in Equation 2 requires conditional swap such that:

$$(X_2, Z_2, X_3, Z_3) = (X_{2+b}, Z_{2+b}, X_{3-b}, Z_{3-b}) \quad (11)$$

with b respect to the most two significant bit values of scalar on each iteration, assuming the scalar register is shifted left.

Constant-time conditional swap can be implemented easily on hardware since the update of $X_2, Z_2, X_3,$ and Z_3 naturally are performed in parallel.

V. SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACK COUNTERMEASURES

In this section, we extend our proposed architecture with side-channel attack protection for both vertical (classical) and horizontal attacks by incorporating several well-known methods from the literature.

A. SECURE AGAINST VERTICAL SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACK

Our proposed architecture, presented in section IV, is naturally resistant to timing attacks and simple power analysis due to inherently resistant algorithms (i.e., Montgomery Ladder and FLT). To provide protection against Differential Power Analysis (DPA), additional methods such as base-point randomization and scalar blinding have to be implemented [27]. Enabling these countermeasures provides protection against vertical side-channel attacks, in which the attacker tries to observe multiple runs of ECPM operation.

1) BASE-POINT RANDOMIZATION

Point randomization can be achieved by multiplying a random value $\lambda \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^{448}} \setminus \{0\}$ to the projective point $P = (X, Z)$ such that $P = (\lambda X, \lambda Z)$. The output of ECPM is not changed in this respect, which can be proven as follows:

$$x_p = \frac{X}{Z} = \frac{\lambda X}{\lambda Z} \quad (12)$$

Base-point randomization provides different point representations corresponding to the entropy given by the random value λ to prevent any information extraction using statistical analysis. In particular, this process initializes the z -coordinate with λ and uses a modular multiplication to update the x -coordinate accordingly. Hence, this countermeasure can be integrated easily by using an additional multiplication call during the initialization phase of the ECPM operation.

2) SCALAR BLINDING

Scalar blinding can be achieved by adding multiple group order $\#E$ to scalar k such that $k_r = k + r \cdot \#E$ where r is a random value. The correctness of this approach can be proven as follows:

$$k_r P = (k + r \cdot \#E)P = kP + rO = kP \quad (13)$$

Note that the multiplication of point P and group order $\#E$ results a point at infinity O . The computation removes the correlation between the Montgomery ladder swap function and the corresponding bit in scalar k . For ECC with special prime field (i.e., Solinas prime), it is recommended to provide sufficient larger blinding factors r as investigated in [27], which is at least half of the field size. Thus, the blinding factor r with 224-bit length builds k_r with 672-bit length. The latency of ECPM is increased accordingly.




FIGURE 10. Pipelined montgomery ladder scheduling of curve448. The total latency is 52 clock cycles, without the requirement of an additional temporary register. The constant a_{24} is equal to 39081.

B. SECURE AGAINST HORIZONTAL SIDE-CHANNEL ATTACK

The horizontal side-channel attack is another type of attack in which the attacker observes leakage within a single run of ECPM operation. Continuous point randomization for each Montgomery ladder within a single ECPM operation can be applied sequentially to prevent horizontal attacks. It requires two more modular multiplications applied on intermediates output (i.e., λX_{PA} and λZ_{PA}) to re-randomized Montgomery ladder computation.

Hence, enabling horizontal attack protection with a continuous point randomization will increase Montgomery ladder time and total latency. In particular, the Montgomery scheduling in Fig. 10 is enlarged to 64 cycles. We assume that the random number is provided externally with sufficient throughput.

VI. HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION RESULT AND COMPARISON

A. COMPARISON OF PROPOSED MULTIPLIER WITH EXISTING METHODS

Figure 11 shows the complexity comparison of the proposed multiplier with existing related methods for different operand widths. By setting up $\alpha = 2^{24}$ and $\beta = 2^{16}$, our methods required the least number of digit multipliers in any operand width compared to existing methods in the literature. We can infer from the graph that more higher operand width yields likely more efficient utilization relative to the Schoolbook method. This is due to the fact that in higher operand width, multiple Karatsuba identities can be applied easily due to the wider range of numbers. Also, it can be overlapped, sharing MUL resources (i.e., the red point around the diagonal in Figure 5).

From a hardware perspective, particularly when parallelization at the digit multiplier level is used, a Schoolbook multiplication method offers a simple construction, leading to a shorter critical delay path when configured correctly [23]. However, it requires u -by- v digit multipliers, which are not negligible for hardware with limited resources. The notable algorithm such as Karatsuba algorithm [14] or Toom-cook

algorithm [28] reduces the complexity (i.e., digit multipliers) in exchange for several additions. However, the original construction of these methods often requires pre-addition chain, which from a hardware perspective may result in longer delay propagation (e.g., [15], [13]). Furthermore, the asymmetric property of the digit multiplier even makes it more difficult to adapt the algorithms.

The work in [29] and [30] have shown that, although a Schoolbook multiplication algorithm is used, a manually crafted multiplier (with asymmetric digit multiplier) yields better performance than the multipliers generated by the Xilinx CORE Generator tool. Their work, however, considers a small size multiplier (up to 128-bit size) due to the fact that their implementation only considers combinational circuits, which limits the critical delay path. For many applications, the sequential circuit is essential to keep the balanced performance for the entire system. Moreover, the multiplier circuit may be extended and combined with other processes, such as modular reduction.

Dinechin and Pasca [31] and Roy *et al.* in [19] proposed the technique to reduce the number of DSP utilization by constructing the digit multiplier with a non-standard tiling technique. Their implementations require a fewer number of DSP blocks compared to standard tiling generated from the Schoolbook multiplication algorithm. Accordingly, [20] and [32] use this technique for their multiplier construction of the SIKE accelerator and Diffie-Hellman key exchange based on the Kummer surface, respectively. Compared to the non-standard tiling technique, our work requires less DSP utilization (e.g., for 256-bit multiplier, we achieve 31% more efficient than their work). In another word, we may increase the performance of [20] and [32] by only changing their multiplier circuit with ours. Furthermore, the proposed multiplier construction can be generalized for broader use in a cryptographic algorithm that employs multiplication.

B. HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION RESULT

The proposed design has been described by SystemVerilog HDL. Synthesizing, mapping, placing, and routing were carried out using Xilinx Vivado 2020.1, targeting four

TABLE 1. Performance comparison of the proposed high-performance ECC processor over curve448 with existing literatures.

Design	Platform	SCA*	Slices	DSP	BRAM	Latency [CCs]	Max. Freq [MHz]	Total Time [ms]	Throughput [OP/s]	Area×Time** [$\times 10^{-3}$]	DSP×Time [$\times 10^{-3}$]
[10]	Zynq 7020	(-)	1,580	33	14	328,286	357	0.92	1,087	4,490	30.36
		(+)	1,648	35	14	473,926	335	1.41	709	7,259	49.35
[11]	Zynq 7020	(+)	1,985	33	14	499,344	341	1.46	685	7,716	48.18
		(++)	2,056	33	14	547,728	341	1.61	621	8,623	53.13
[12]	Virtex-7	(-)	50,143 (LUT)	0	0	372,742	325	1.15	870	14,416***	0
[13]	Zynq 7020	(-)	4,354	81	0	77,702	95	0.82	1,220	10,212	66.42
		(++)	4,424	81	0	133,254	95	1.40	714	17,534	113.40
This work	Zynq 7020	(-)	6,946	88	0	30,469	128	0.24	4,167	3,779	21.12
		(++)	6,984	88	0	49,735	126	0.39	2,564	6,156	34.32
	Artix-7	(-)	6,826	88	0	30,469	127	0.24	4,167	3,750	21.12
		(++)	6,934	88	0	49,735	125	0.40	2,500	6,294	35.20
	Kintex-7	(-)	7,210	88	0	30,469	237	0.13	7,692	2,081	11.44
		(++)	7,269	88	0	49,735	230	0.22	4,545	3,535	19.36
	Virtex-7	(-)	7,521	88	0	30,469	250	0.12	8,333	1,959	10.56
		(++)	7,666	88	0	49,735	245	0.20	5,000	3,293	17.60

* (-): no protection, (+): scalar blinding and point randomization countermeasures, (++): scalar blinding and point re-randomization countermeasures
 ** Area = Slices + DSPs×100. *** Area = LUTs/4 (Assume 1 Slice contains 4 LUTs as mentioned in specification [24])




FIGURE 11. Comparison of required digit multipliers for different operand widths with existing methods.

modern devices (Xilinx Virtex-7 [XC7VX690T], Kintex-7 [XC7K325T], Artix-7 [XC7A100T], and Zynq 7020 [XC7Z020] FPGA) for a more comprehensive evaluation with other related works. The correctness of implementation was verified by using the testbench with reference to the test vector provided in RFC 7748 [21].

The result of our ECC processor implementation, as well as those of several related papers over Curve448, are presented in Table 1. We achieve the lowest latency among the proposals targeting Xilinx Zynq 7020 FPGA with 0.24 and 0.39 ms for the unprotected and protected designs, respectively. Additionally, we provide the implementation results on various

TABLE 2. Performance analysis of proposed ECC processor in comparison with state-of-the-art on Zynq 7020 FPGA.

Operations	Clock Cycles	
	Niasar et al. [13] @95 MHz	Our Work @128 MHz
1 x Modular Addition	7	2
1 x Modular Subtraction	7	2
1 x Modular Multiplication	15	12
10 x Modular Multiplication	150	48
1 x Modular Inverse	6,917	5,544
Montgomery Ladder Step	158	52
Single ECC Point Multiplication	77,702	30,469
Total Latency [ms]	0.82	0.24

devices for future reference, such as Artix-7, Kintex-7, and Virtex-7, achieving latency of 0.24, 0.13, and 0.12 ms for the unprotected design, and 0.40, 0.22, and 0.20 ms for the protected design, respectively. For the unprotected design, our fastest implementation (Virtex-7) requires 7,521 slices, while Kintex-7, Artix-7, and Zynq 7020 utilize 7,210, 6,826, and 6,946 slices, respectively. On all four platforms, we utilize 88 DSPs and no BRAM. As can be inferred from the table, our architecture yields the highest efficiency in terms of Area × Time and DSP × Time tradeoff compared to other existing architectures.

To the best of our knowledge, the method by Niasar et al. [13] represents the state-of-the-art high-performance hardware implementation of Curve448. They

provide three different designs (i.e., lightweight, area-time efficient, and high-performance); in particular, we compare our proposed design with their high-performance variant. Our proposed design increases the throughput by 242% for the unprotected design and by 259% for the protected design. Their approach is based on the refined Karatsuba formula by Bernstein [33], employing five levels of Karatsuba computation and parallel multiplication using 81 DSP cores. However, the multilevel Karatsuba approach yields a longer addition tree that increases the critical path delay, limiting their operating frequency to 95 MHz, which is lower than our design.

Table 2 provides the detailed performance analysis with a comparison to their design. The latency of our architecture outperforms the state-of-the-art in all underlying field arithmetic and ECC group operations. The significant latency improvement is mainly due to a pipelined modular multiplier, which is constructed from a 224-bit fully pipelined multiplier and proposed fast reduction over $p = 2^{448} - 2^{224} - 1$. Thanks to the novel variant of the Karatsuba formula, we can enable the parallelization at the digit multiplication level without causing large delay propagation caused by additions in the recursion tree while offering relatively low DSP block utilization. Although a single modular multiplication operation does not give significant latency improvement (i.e., 12 cycles compared to 15 cycles), employing multiple operations (i.e., 10 modular multiplications as in Equation 2) results in a significant latency improvement due to pipelining compared to their design (i.e., 52 cycles compared to 158 cycles). Furthermore, all the stages in the 224-bit multiplier are nearly busy during the Montgomery ladder operation with the utilization of $\frac{48}{52} \times 100 \simeq 92\%$, making the use of the pipeline architecture in the highest efficiency. On the other hand, the modular inversion via FLT consumes almost 18% of the total latency and is considered an inefficient method in our design. This is because the exponentiation $z^{2^{448} - 2^{224} - 3} \bmod p$ requires 462 consecutive modular multiplications rather than parallelization through the pipelining architecture.

In terms of area, their design has lower slices utilization (i.e., 4,354 slices for the unprotected design and 4,424 slices for the protected design). However, in terms of Area \times Time tradeoff, our design is 63% more efficient for both the unprotected and protected designs. It turns out that the cost of higher utilization is well absorbed by the latency improvement. Note that we use the same assumption as they do where the area is equivalent to slices + DSPs, while each DSP is assumed to be equivalent to 100 slices.

It is worth mentioning that the first hardware implementation of Curve448 was carried out by Sasdrich and Géneysu [10], who later proposed the protected architecture by considering side-channel attack countermeasures [11]. They demonstrated an evaluation to detect scalar- and base-point-dependable leakage on hardware with side-channel protections (i.e., scalar blinding and point randomization) and proved that their methods are secure against side-channel attacks. Thanks to their results, we also include side-channel

protections (i.e., scalar blinding, base-point randomization, and continuous point randomization) in our protected design, yet we present a 313% speed-up compared to their results on the same target device (i.e., Zynq 7020).

Shah *et al.* [12] proposed a LUT-based implementation targeting Virtex-7, employing the RSD technique for the arithmetic operations. Their proposed designs aimed to be platform independent by using LUTs only, consuming 50,143 LUTs with a throughput of 870 ECPM operations per second, yet our design is 858% faster than their design.

VII. CONCLUSION

In this paper, we proposed a high-performance ECC processor over Curve448 that outperformed all the previous results in terms of execution time. The implementation on the Xilinx 7-series FPGA Virtex-7, Kintex-7, Artix-7, and Zynq 7020 yielded execution times of 0.12, 0.13, 0.24, and 0.24 ms, respectively. The speed was obtained by utilizing a novel variant of the Karatsuba for asymmetric digit multiplier, constructing a high-throughput 224-bit fully pipelined multiplier. The method combined Schoolbook long and Karatsuba multiplication, allowing its digit multiplication to be performed in parallel while leveraging the full capability of asymmetric DSP blocks. It is worth mentioning that the algorithm even works on arbitrary degrees, which means it can be generalized for wider use in a cryptographic algorithm that requires multiplication. In sequence, the interleaved fast reduction over $2^{448} - 2^{224} - 1$ was presented, yields a high throughput 12-stage modular multiplier with four stages of input delay. Furthermore, we also proposed certain components to maximize the speed gain and the overall performance, such as employing a low-latency modular adder/subtractor as well as efficient scheduling of the Montgomery ladder. Finally, the proposed architecture was extended with both vertical and horizontal side-channel protection through well-known countermeasures such as scalar blinding, base-point randomization, and continuous randomization.

A. FUTURE WORKS

PQC has garnered a lot of interest in the literature because of the emergence of quantum computers, which some argue could endanger the current classical cryptosystem. Among the final round finalists in the NIST PQC standardization process, the SIKE protocol has the smallest public key sizes among the encryption and KEM candidates. It is worth revisiting the work of [20] and replacing its multiplier, which was constructed with nonstandard tiling multiplication, with the proposed multiplier based on an asymmetric variant of the Karatsuba formula.


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
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