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Prototype Cross Platform Oriented on Cybersecurity, Virtual Connectivity, Big Data and Artificial Intelligence Control

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ABSTRACT This article describes a prototype cross platform based on intelligent switching of Virtual Private Network (VPN) communications by means of artificial intelligence algorithms able to identify and classify attack risks in self-learning mode by analysing the traffic logs of the system. The platform is also suitable for disaster recovery, data migration and ensures virtualization of communications between nodes in case of risk detection. In order to test the models and evaluate the accuracy of the AI algorithms for risk detection and classification, a number of cyberattack scenario have been simulated. The proposed platform implements Cassandra Big Data system interfacing with supernodes enabling data migration, security and disaster recovery. By comparing the performance of different AI algorithms, the results show that a XGBoost-based algorithm is the most efficient and accurate method for cyberattacks prevention, showing a remarkable ability of classifying and identifying characteristic patterns of the most representative traffic log variables. The research work has been carried out within the framework of a research industry project.

INDEX TERMS Cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, big data, switching virtualization, data security.

I. INTRODUCTION

A research topic gaining popularity in recent years is the study of new cybersecurity prevention techniques and innovative encryption methodologies [1]. A particular communication system to protect a network from cyberattacks is based on the creation of Virtual Private Network (VPN) channels. VPNs can be automatically reconfigured [2], thus suggesting the idea to switch among them under cyberattack conditions through appropriate security procedures in self-configuration mode by means of cryptographic protocols. Specifically, the VPN channels must guarantee confidentiality, entity authentication, data integrity, authentication, secure access control, availability and minimal amount of security relevant configuration. The physical connection of the VPN channels is different from the logical one: in this direction the overlay network level can be distinguished from the physical network level [3]. Firewall and VPN gateway drop-in-router solutions can be embedded into VPN channels [4] allowing the secure management of network elements as routers, hubs and switches using encrypted tunnels. One of the most important

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aspects concerning the validation of a new cybersecurity model is the evaluation of network performance: the server throughput represents the transmission capacity and could provide important indications about the network loaded by safety elements [5]. Data [6] and database security [7] are the main issue of the industry research, especially when volume, velocity, variety and veracity of data can be satisfied as for big data systems capable of transferring structured and unstructured data [8]. The database threats have been classified in [9]. The platform design idea will therefore consist of a primary pre-classification of potential attacks, which can be traced and isolated also through the use of artificial intelligence. In this context, in [10] it has been analyzed a model to act primarily on the prevention of the attack adopting artificial intelligence (AI) thus raising the security level. AI can therefore act as an expert system capable of assessing different parameters and variables identifying the attacks in advance [11] and enabling network switching [12]. Recent investigations of AI application for intrusion detection, malware analysis, and spam detection [13]-[41] have shown that the cybersecurity by means of AI algorithms is a topic of continuous research interest. Different AI algorithms can be applied for identification and classification of traffic logs. Intrusion detection [46], [47] is typically performed by Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) [48]–[53] and deep learning algorithms [54], [55], [65], [66]. Moreover, if the platform is designed to handle Big Data, the storage system could be interfaced by supernodes, which are responsible for the management of the data flow. The use of supernodes [42]–[45] represents a further possibility of strengthening data security, by means of cryptographic techniques and controlling the system at different levels such as organization layer, distribution layer and access layer. A recent survey on the topic [63] found that modern industrial control systems based on big data analytics and cloud computing would become more secure by exploiting the recent advancements of machine learning algorithms.

Following the guideline of recent research in the field, the paper introduces an innovative approach based on the integration of AI methods in an automated system enabling secure VPN switching by predicting attacks, data managing, data cryptography, and data disaster recovery adopting big data systems. By comparing the performance of the most commonly used classification AI algorithms (e.g. tree-based technique and neural networks), the paper is devoted to find the most accurate algorithm to implement on the platform in order to ensure data security against cyberattacks. Different dataset and data flow simulations have been considered in order to simulate and to reply cyberattack phenomena [56]–[60], thus suggesting an approach to adopt for the experimentation.

The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. II the research industry project specifications are introduced, describing the design of the architecture of the cross platform. Sect. III describes the generated dataset of traffic logs and the preprocessing methods to standardize the dataset. In Sect. IV are discussed and tested different AI algorithms for identifying cyberattacks while in Sect. V are described the technique used for data encryption, data migration and disaster recovery. Finally, the platform testing is described in Sect VI while conclusions are drawn in Sect. VII.

II. MAIN PROJECT SPECIFICATIONS AND SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE

The server used to test the AI attack-prevention algorithms implemented in the platform is made up of the elements reported in Table 1 [61].

The prototype multimedia platform used for experimentation is sketched in the system architecture shown in Fig. 1, made up of the following main elements (see Table 1):

- Access Switch Layer2+ 10/100/1000 Mbps / Core Switch Layer2+ 10/100/1000 Mbps: this is a networking hardware connecting each rack on a computer network by using a packet switching to receive and forward data at the network layer 3 of ISO/OSI standard model;
- IPS/IDS/FW/DNS: couple of firewalls installed after the access switch layer that operate in an exogen mode which purpose is to detect and prevent some intrusions or attacks from external clients;

TABLE 1. Elements of the server used for the experimentation.

Element	Function	
Access Switch Layer2+ 10/100/1000 Mbps / Core Switch Layer2+ 10/100/1000 Mbps	Hardware connecting racks using packet switching at network of layer 3 of ISO/OSI model	
IPS/IDS/FW/DNS	Exogen firewall	
Firewall	Endogen firewall	
Notification server	Diagnostic messaging	
Registration server	Storing of all events detecting anomalies	
Syslog Server	Logs generation and logs storage	
NAS Server	File-level computer data storage server	
VPN Server	VPN connection	
SIP Server	Session Initial Protocol (SIS) signaling protocol	
Antivirus	Detect and remove malware or any type of malicious item	
TMMS/APP	Manage Mobile Devices (MDM) and Mobile Apps (MAM)	
Chat Server	Managing chat services	
PhoneBook Server	Managing VOIP, chat and mail services	
Mail Server	Server managing mail services	
System SMS App Sw Server	Server managing SMS services	
System NMS App Sw Server	Managing the devices on the network	
SRV Front End Web App	Server dedicated for web applications of the system	
SRV Core Process	Elaboration and processing of services	
SRV Database	Database management	

- VPN Server: this component allows the connection of the rack to a computer network through a VPN, improving the security of the system;
- NAS Server: the Network Attached Storage (NAS) Server is a file-level computer data storage server connected to a computer network specialized in serving files either by its hardware, software or configuration;
- Antivirus: this component is a computer program used to prevent, detect and remove malware or any type of malicious item which escaped from the detection of the firewall.

These elements are integrated in the platform in order to ensure maximum security. The proposed hardware is suitable for AI and big data testing [61]. The cross platform integrates different functionalities expressed by the following specifications:

• Intelligent switching of VPN communications: an artificial intelligence engine will perform the intelligent and safe management of the communications of the VPN channels. The channel switching process is controlled by the AI engine constituting the control room able to evaluate the most secure channel. The AI engine decides on the switching modality based on self-learning models capable of assessing potential forms of attack on the

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FIGURE 1. Testing hardware used for the experimentation.

network; in addition, the engine maps, the attacks and the network anomalies managing the risk level, the disaster recovery backup by accessing supernodes, data migration between two big data systems proving data security, supernode management and the virtualization of communication between nodes through appropriate association rules;

- Big Data systems: two big data systems enabling the disaster recovery function are integrated into the platform system, following a data migration synchronization by a defined logic (migration from the external databases of each external node to the big data system);
- Virtualization of communications between nodes: the methods of interconnection between the grid connected nodes is designed using appropriate association rules; the dynamic assignment of VPNs and names of individual nodes increases the security level; all transferred data are encrypted thus improving cyber

security. The concept of virtual switching comes from the possibility to provide multiple security levels based on a pre-classification of the attacks and on a dynamic threats clustering considering different aspects such as IP analysis, data consistency analysis, linking traceability, tracing the path of the virtualized connection, etc.

In the project four VPN channels were configured over which the intelligent switching engine operates. In order to verify the virtualization features of the network, the connection is traced to detect the path followed by an IP packet to reach a known destination such as the google domain name system (8.8.8.8). Figure 2 shows the network tracing before the VPN configuration, while Fig. 3 shows the data packet tracing starting from one of the four VPN channels configured for the test.

When the network is virtualized (Fig. 3), the path of the packet transits from an additional IP address (192.168.73.1) at the beginning of the path due to virtualization of the

PS C:\Users\Utente> tracert 8.8.8.8						
12	ms		ms	<1	ms	192.168.70.1
12	ms	1	ms	<1	ms	192.168.70.1
77	ms	106	ms	143	ms	172.17.145.254
143	ms	123	ms	88	ms	172.17.145.236
70	ms	47	ms	38	ms	172.19.245.77
116	ms	124	ms	129	ms	etrunk14.milano50.mil.seabone.net [93.186.128.241]
67	ms	89	ms	123	ms	72.14.195.206
66	ms	41	ms	40	ms	108.170.245.81
38	ms	69	ms	65	ms	216.239.50.241
69	ms	59	ms	52	ms	dns.google [8.8.8.8]

FIGURE 2. Data Packet tracking before the creation of the virtualized network.

PS C:\Users\Utente> tracert 8.8.8.8					
1 mc	1 mc	1 mc	192 168 73 1		
2 mc	1 mc	1 mc	102 168 70 1		
2 1115	1 1115	100			
86 ms	99 ms	100 ms	1/2.1/.145.254		
134 ms	101 ms	97 ms	172.17.145.236		
42 ms	46 ms	41 ms	172.19.245.77		
156 ms	99 ms	101 ms	etrunk14.milano50.mil.seabone.net [93.186.128.241]		
127 ms	204 ms	117 ms	72.14.195.206		
45 ms	40 ms	52 ms	108.170.245.81		
*	366 ms	204 ms	216.239.50.241		
122 ms	37 ms	37 ms	dns.google [8.8.8.8]		

FIGURE 3. Tracking of the data packet after the creation of the virtualized network.

network. Fig. 4 shows the whole architecture of the digital cross platform described above.

The Unified Modeling Language (UML) diagram shown in Fig. 5 illustrates the main actors of the platform, i.e. the System and the User. The first one carries out all the backend activities of the prototype system including artificial intelligence data processing and the second one can access to the results shown in a management dashboard which can be referred to as control room.

The executive architecture of the full platform is sketched as a flow chart in Fig. 6. The artificial intelligence algorithm also includes the analysis of the number of attacks carried out in a limited period of time, evaluating if the connection requests are more than the average connection requests. Furthermore, the attack frequencies are saved in the database in order to evaluate a possible correlation between the attack and the time on which it occurs. The network management is performed by the virtualized control room which takes care of both the launch of the log classification script and the actions to be taken in the event of an attack: Backup, disaster recovery and switch of VPN communications. In addition, the backup system is managed by the control room enabling data transfer to big data systems through the function called "Data migration". Finally, the yellow boxes show the tasks related to the hashing of the learning model and the private key for network virtualization. Specifically, in the case of a high number of connections in short time or occuring at the same time in adjacent days, a random switching is carried out ensuring security. The virtualized network has been implemented through pfsense (open source software tool for firewall and routing functions).

III. ATTACK LOGS SYSTEM

In order to test the artificial intelligence algorithms a number of traffic logs in different conditions has been generated. The traffic logs are related to the following conditions:



FIGURE 4. Preliminary architecture of the digital cross platform oriented on virtual AI distribution network processes.

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FIGURE 5. UML diagram representing main system actors of the platform.

- Normal traffic: about 40,000 lines of traffic logs in non-attack conditions;
- Denial of Service (DoS) Attack Traffic: 31500 rows of traffic logs during a simulated Dos attack;
- Traffic with BruteForce attack: 500 lines of traffic logs during a simulated BruteForce attack;
- Traffic with Port Scanning attack: 500 lines of traffic logs during a simulated Port Scanning attack.

These attacks represent a set of possible attacks that can occur and allows to fully evaluate the response of the system and the accuracy of the algorithm. The analysis was focused on server-side attacks. Since the artificial intelligence engine is based on the continuous learning of traffic logs updated in real time, the model relies on the correct labelling of the training dataset. In Table 2 and in Fig. 7 are listed the set of features that can be shown in the traffic logs. The artificial intelligence engine is based on the processing of these features with the aim to identify and classify cyberattacks.

The main processed parameters indicated in Table 2 are:

- Tracker: unique ID for the firewall rule applied;
- Interface: interface used by the firewall that activates the log;
- reason_entry: reason why the rule was activated;
- action_taken: action performed by the firewall for the rule;
- direction_traffic: direction of traffic-entry / exit;

Feature Name	Туре	Possible Values	
rule number	int	Generic	
subrule_number	int	Generic	
anchor	text	Generic	
tracker	int	Generic	
interface	text	ovpns3 igb1 igb0 em0	
reason_entry	text	typically 'match'	
action_taken	Boolean	Pass Block	
direction_traffic	Boolean	in out	
ip_version	int	4 6	
Type of Service (ToS)	hex	0x0	
Time to live (TTL)	int	Generic	
id	int	Generic	
Offset	int	Generic	
Flag	text	DF MF none Reserved	
Protocol_ID	int	6 17 1 (More used)	
Protocol text	text	tcp udp icmp (More used)	
Length	int	Generic	
Source IP	ip_address	From 0.0.0.0 to 255.255.255	
Destination IP	ip-address	From 0.0.0.0 to 255.255.255	
Source Port	int	From 0 to 65535	
Destination Port	int	From 0 to 65535	
Data Length	int	Generic	
TCP flag	char	S A F R P U E W none(udp)	
Sequence Number	int	Generic	
ACK	int	Generic	
Window	int	Generic	
URG	data	Generic	
Options	data	mss;sackOK;TS;nop;wscale	
Delta Time	float	Generic	
Count_log_5s	int	Generic	

TABLE 2. List of logs features selected for classification.

- ip_version: communication protocol: IPv4 or IPv6;
- TTL: package validity time;
- Id: package ID:
- Offset: offset of a particular fragment relative to the beginning of the original IP packet (the first fragment has as offset the value 0);
- Flag: control of protocol and fragmentation of datagrams;
- proto_text: IP protocol;
- length: length in bytes of the packet;
- source_IP: source IP from which the logged traffic started;
- source_port: source port number;
- dest_port: destination port number;
- data_length: length of the payload;
- TCP_flag: flag that identifies the action to organize communication and data processing;
- sequence_num: the sequential number indicates the first byte of the attached payload or is sent during the establishment and / or removal of the connection. It serves at





FIGURE 6. Executive architecture of the cybersecurity platform.

16:17:19 filterlog:	78,,,1584436856,ovpns3,match,pass,in,4,0x0,,128,25399,0,DF,6,tcp,52,192.168.71.2,192.168.0.2,58148,389,0,5,3496339916,,64240,,mss;nop;vscale;nop;nop;sackOK,Normal
16:17:19 filterlog:	78,,,1584436856,ovpns3,match,pass,in,4,0x0,,128,1442,0,DF,6,tcp,52,192.168.71.2,192.168.1.255,58149,1688,0,5,4093869198,,64240,,mss;nop;wscale;nop;nop;sackOK,Normal
16:17:29 filterlog:	78,,,1584436856,ovpns3,match,pass,in,4,0x0,,128,11355,0,none,17,udp,107,192.168.71.2,192.168.0.25,54777,161,87,,,,,,Normal
16:17:34 filterlog:	78,,,1584436856,ovpns3,match,pass,in,4,0x0,,,128,35680,0,none,17,udp,60,192.168.71.2,208.67.222.222,61999,53,40,,,,,,Normal
16:17:34 filterlog:	78,,,1584436856,ovpns3,match,pass,in,4,0x0,,128,13404,0,DF,6,tcp,52,192.168.71.2,216.58.205.68,58150,443,0,5,4104912632,,64240,,mss;nop;wscale;nop;nop;sackOK,Normal
16:17:38 filterlog:	78,,,1584436856,ovpns3,match,pass,in,4,0x0,,128,35682,0,none,17,udp,61,192.168.71.2,208.67.222.222,65374,53,41,,,,,,Normal
16:17:38 filterlog:	78,,,1584436856,ovpns3,match,pass,in,4,0x0,,128,42563,0,DF,6,tcp,52,192.168.71.2,216.58.209.35,58151,443,0,5,671060499,,64240,,mss;nop;wscale;nop;nop;sackOK,Normal
16:17:38 filterlog:	78,,,1584436856,ovpns3,match,pass,in,4,0x0,,128,35684,0,none,17,udp,77,192.168.71.2,208.67.222.222,58207,53,57,,,,,,Normal

FIGURE 7. Example of processed dataset.

the same time to validate and to order (after the transfer) the segments of the data package;

- window: number of bytes that the recipient is able to receive;
- options: requests for activation of TCP functions not included in the general header (Maximum Segment Size-MSS, Window Scaling-WSCALE, Selective Acknowledgments-SACK, No Option-NOP, Timestamps-TS).

Due to the different nature of these features (e.g., categorical, quantitative), the preprocessing phase included the standardization of the features using the widely known techniques *StandardScaler* and *OneHotEncoding* (see Appendix). For example, the categorical feature 'interface' can take the values 'igb1' or 'vpn'. Thus, by applying the one hot encoding the features 'interface' is replaced by two features named 'interface_igb1' and 'interface_vpn' that can take the binary values 0 or 1. In some cases, the presence of some unspecified





FIGURE 8. Statistical distribution of the log features indicating attacks.

or missing values (such as Not a Number data, NaN) might occurr. In these circumstances we chose to insert the average value of the feature computed on a subset of data showing the same values for the other features.

An initial rough analysis of the traffic logs generated during cyberattacks revealed that the frequency with which transactions are written in the traffic log files is much more related to the presence of the attack than other features. In fact, when the attack starts, the log file is updated much more frequently. Moreover, in order to improve the cyberattacks identification accuracy, two new features were computed by processing the traffic logs:

- Delta Time: the time elapsed between a log and its next;
- Number of logs shown in a specific time interval (10 seconds).



FIGURE 9. Cross correlation of the features.

The listed features have a different relative weight for attack classification purposes. The AI engine allows to classify whether the attack is present or not. Therefore, the classification can assume a binary form.

In order to assess the importance of the values of these features and their role to identify the presence of an attack, a statistical analysis has been carried out about the distribution of the values of each feature in the attack and non-attack conditions.

In Fig. 8 (a)-(n) is shown the statistical distributions of some variables in order to evaluate the value distribution of values feature in the attack and non-attack conditions.

From Fig. 8 it is possible to visually evaluate which parameters are the most representative in case of attack or not. For example, Fig. 8 (n) shows that the 'direction_traffic' parameter is not useful for classification since it is distributed in a similar way between attack and non-attack cases (the distribution of data is the same in both classes). The same consideration applies to the 'data_length', 'delta', 'dest_port' and 'id' parameters shown in Fig. 8 (c), Fig. 8 (d), Fig. 8 (e) and Fig. 8 (m), respectively. On the contrary, the distribution of the 'action_taken', 'count_log_5s', 'window', 'TTL', 'source_port', 'interface_vpn' and 'interface_igb1' parameters shown in Fig. 8 (a), Fig. 8 (b), Fig. 8 (f), Fig. 8 (g), Fig. 8 (h), Fig. 8 (i), and Fig. 8 (l) respectively, indicates that these values are fundamental for classification.



FIGURE 10. Correlation matrix of the features.

To assess in detail the relative distribution of the various classes and any cross-correlation, Fig. 9 shows the distribution of data of five representative variables ('action_taken', 'count_log_5s', 'length', 'TTL', 'source port') in the two classes: attack (Class 1, orange dots) and not attack (Class 0, blue dots). It can be noticed that the data are distributed differently in the two classes, proving that they are useful variables for classification.



FIGURE 11. XGBoost decisional tree structure.



FIGURE 12. Weight importance estimated during the decision tree model construction.



FIGURE 13. Cover importance estimated during the decision tree model construction.

By taking into account all the features, it is possible to calculate the correlation matrix by highlighting similar characteristic trends between variables. Fig. 10 allows to quantify the correlations between the variables used to detect an attack by taking into account all the features in the log



FIGURE 14. Gain importance estimated during the decision tree model construction.

files and the information about the related class (attack and non-attack). The correlation matrix is fundamental for classification, since the algorithm must take into account the cross correlations between all the input features. Blue (white) rectangles in Fig. 10 show high (low) correlation between the corresponding features.

IV. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE MODEL

In order to select the best AI algorithm to adopt for attack detection and classification, different algorithms have been tested. We select 6 state-of-the-art, commonly used machine learning algorithms for classification purposes. Each model has been created and tested starting from the comparison between the data provided by the model and the real data. The classification performance results are shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3. Performance of the classificator model.

Algorithm	MSE	Accuracy	AUC
XGBoost	0.001	99.9	0.999
Random Forest	0.0012	99.88	0.999
Convolutional Neural Network	0.0102	99.65	0.998
Logistic Regression	0.0033	99.66	0.997
Nearest Neighbors	0.0047	99.53	0.997
Support Vector Machine	0.0034	99.65	0.997

Table 3 shows that all the tested algorithms reach a very high accuracy, i.e. around 99.7%, and an average quadratic error, Mean Squared Error (MSE) of the order of $10^{-3} - 10^{-2}$ and an AUC score (area under the receiver operating characteristic curve) very close to the unit value. The XGBoost (eXtreme Gradient Boosting) algorithm based on decision trees appears to be the most accurate among those tested. Importantly, our results show that tree-based algorithms (XGBoost and Random Forest) are the most accurate algorithms. This result is consistent with the common belief and recent studies which show that XGBoost algorithms outperform neural network algorithms in handling



FIGURE 15. Importance of the features in the construction of the decision tree calculated using the SHAP library.

heterogeneous and independent feature in a dataset for classification purposes [65], [66].

The decision tree structure is shown in Fig. 11. The structure of the tree might suggest that the most important variable could be identified as the one related to the initial split of the three, i.e. 'count_log_5s'. Generally, the most representative feature can be identified as the one having the highest weight and influence on the classification algorithm, since it indicates the variable that allows to efficiently build up the tree, thus making the classification process faster by adopting a path across the tree with the fewest number of steps.

Importantly, the use of tree-based algorithm allows to evaluate the importance of the features in the classification process along the branches of the decision tree. The importance of each feature has been computed with different metrics:

- Weight: the number of times a feature is used to move from one branch to another in the decision tree;
- Cover: the number of times a feature is used to move from one branch to another in the decision tree weighed by the number of training data that cross the bifurcations;
- Gain: the average reduction of the training loss when the feature considered is used for creating branches.

These three metrics can be adopted to evaluate the importance of the features in determining whether a cyberattack is ongoing or not. The plots of the importance of the different features using the three metrics are shown in Fig. 12, Fig. 13 and Fig. 14.

The plots show different results, due to the different adopted metric to compute feature importance. This result appears unexpected at a first glance since the different metrics does not univocally identify the most important feature in the classification process. A better way to evaluate the importance of the features is provided by the SHAP Python library [64]. This library allows to estimate the most important feature in a consistent way. According to this metric, the most important feature is defined as that feature whose importance never decreases if we change the data model by modifying the dependency between variables. Figure 15 shows the result of the SHAP algorithm to infer the feature importance. It can be noticed that the 'interface_igb1' plays a fundamental role in the construction of the decision tree, thus representing the most important feature for identifying and classifying cyberattacks.

As regards the Convolutional Neural Network (CNN) model, several network architectures have been built in order to establish the best combination of layers that would minimize the loss function, i.e. the mean squared error. Four convolutive network architectures have been built by adopting different types of (hidden) layers, such as Dropout and Pooling. Figure 16 shows the accuracy and loss function for the four different CNN architecture with increasing training epochs.

We observe that the accuracy and loss functions reach very promising values, comparable with the values reached by other adopted algorithms (see Table 3).

In addition, tests were carried out by training the model with a modified data set by removing the source-IP and tracking feature. The tests show that the accuracy achieved by the model is sufficient and can be used for the classification of cyberattacks. This is due to the fact that the removed variables are among the least representative for the classification (see Fig. 11 - 15) and consequently have less influence on the classification process.

Once the best AI algorithm has been selected, the creation of the model consisted of the following phases:



FIGURE 16. Accuracy and loss function varying epochs for the training and validation test of the CNN network.

- pre-processing phase aimed at obtaining a homogeneous form for all the data;
- model creation phase, consisting of application of the XGBoost algorithm for the classification and subsequent validation of the pre-processed data.

The output of the classifier is used to switch the VPN communication on a different available node. Moreover, as previously discussed, the pre-processing activity allowed to evaluate the cross correlation between variables and, through clustering techniques by figuring out the association rules between variables useful for improving the accuracy of the classifier. Furthermore, the pre-classification phase of the attacks and, more generally, the data pre-processing are able to identify association rules on the basis of the temporal recurrence of the attacks. These rules are used for the activation of random switching modes in order to guarantee additional security to the system, after verifying the availability of the nodes. The conditions for random switching are:

- high number of attacks in a limited time compared to daily average;
- high number of connection requests compared to daily average;

• request for connection at the same time of an attack occurred in the previous days.

If these conditions occur, the system checks the availability of the nodes by means of a query and, if necessary, switches the VPN communication on that node. In other words, the engine exploits the classification ability of the XGBoost algorithm to switch the VPN communications and, in order to further increase the security of the platform, adopt the previously mentioned rules for random switching among the available nodes. Finally, the intelligence engine implements the 'selflearning' methodology in order to generate an updated classifier and ensure continuous learning from the most recent log data.

V. MODEL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND DATA SECURITY

In order to further protect the platform against cyberattacks, the AI model was encrypted by means of the SHA-512 hashing algorithm. The Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) algorithm was used to access the VPN, which generates a pair of keys (public, private) managing the authentication service. Additionally, to further increase security, the private key is subjected to Hash SHA-512 hashing algorithm.



FIGURE 17. Cassandra platform.

둘 RazorSQL - C:\Users\mario fumai\AppData\Roaming\RazorSQL\logs\import_error_log.txt - 🗇 🗙						
File Edit Search DB Tools Connections SQL Results Tools	i <u>o</u> de <u>V</u> iew <u>W</u> indow <u>H</u> elp					
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Cluster Clust	<pre>iStatement: 1 error = java.sql.SQLException: com.datastax.driver.core.exceptions.Syn Host: localhost Database: spacertron</pre>	<pre>taxError: line 0:-1 no viable alterna taxError: line 0:-1 no viable alterna</pre>				
indirizzo varchar	16 "COALCE STRUTTURA" INTEGER,					
posti_degenza_ord int posti_degenza_pag int	33/1/3906586 Ln. 6 Col. 1 Lines. 221 INSERT WRITABLE Vin windows-1252 Delimiter;					
D post_dh int	© Statement					
□ posti_ds int						
posti_tot int	id anno codice_azienda codice_comune codice_regione codice_st	uttura codice_tipo_struttura con				
□ sigla_provincia varchar	1 1999abb0-bb09-11ea-83fc-b311e3138/be 2010 302 1/029 30 301/b 1765b0d0 b60a 11aa 83fc b311a3138/be 2010 302 1/029 30 301/b	5.1 BRESCIA				
□ tipo_azienda int	2 1730000-5002-1162-531-53156768 2010 575 16065 30 30151	5.1 POPULANTE				
□ tipo_disciplina varchar	19732200000110a000010010010010002100410010010000000000	5.1 MILANO				
• Views	0405040.b003-1102.93fr.b3103137762 2010 300 15140 30 30032	3.2 DAVIA				
🖶 🖾 system	5 10(c155)-b609-11e9-scho-c10098brd90 2010 968 15077 30 30058					
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🖲 🗀 system_traces	0 015f4350-b60a-11ea-acbc-c1d0a98bd909 2010 311 108033 30 30107	5.1 MONZA				
	1 f7ff0a30-b609-11ea-83fr-b311a313876e 2010 301 160224 30 30146	5.1 BERGAMO				
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FIGURE 18. RazorSQL platform.

In the event an attack is detected, the control room switches the VPN communications to an available channel that is considered more secure. At the same time, the control room run a script that allows data to be saved and the system to be completely closed to internet traffic. These operations are included in the disaster recovery and data migration systems. In order to manage the storage of the platform, two Big Data Cassandra nodes were configured. Cassandra is one of the most used non-relational database management system distributed with an open source license and it is optimized for the management of large amounts of data. This technology exhibits good computational costs in writing operations [62] compared to other management systems. Specifically, two servers have been configured on the cloud provider of

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FIGURE 19. Dashboard showing the status of the VPN channels.

"Digital Ocean". Figure 17 shows the platform dashboard with the configuration of the nodes.

On each individual server, the Ubuntu Server version 18.04 LTS and the Cassandra latest stable release (version 3.11) was installed, configuring the cluster between the two nodes and testing synchronization. The "Keyspace" configuration has been performed on the first node and replicated on the second one. The database management was performed by a compatible Client Desktop on the "Windows" operating system called "RazorSQL" (see Fig. 18).

The characteristics of the configured Cassandra environment is replicated on both nodes. The peculiarity of this Big Data management system is the constant synchronization between the nodes that are continuously mirrored between the nodes, always guaranteeing the constant data availability in the event of a failure of one of the two nodes. Moreover, independent benchmark analyses and testing of various NoSQL platforms have been performed in recent years, identifying Apache Cassandra as the best platform in terms of scalability and the management of big data and production-level workloads [67].

VI. PLATFORM TESTING

The development of the system involved the creation of dashboards for displaying the results of the artificial intelligence algorithms and for testing the prototype system.

These dashboards allow to view the configuration of the VPN channels, information on any switching between the channels and the disaster recovery and data migration operations.

The dashboard (shown in Fig. 19) consists of a single screen showing:

- status of the VPN channels;
- summary of system logs with specification of the activation/deactivation of the VPN channels and activation of the disaster recovery and data migration;

• summary of the performance of the AI algorithm used for traffic log classification.

Through these dashboards it is possible to monitor the status of the connections, the history of the detected attacks and the consequent operations carried out such as intelligent switching between channels, disaster recovery and data migration. In addition, it is possible to view the accuracy of the network model used through the graphs of the loss function (MSE) and the accuracy graphs.

VII. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

The results are related to an industrial project enabling a platform managing an intelligent virtualized network capable of controlling the traffic of data packets and assessing the presence of cyberattacks. Our results show that XGBoost algorithm is the most accurate algorithm in identifying and classifying cyberattacks. The development and testing allowed also to create a platform capable of carrying out disaster recovery and data migration operations in order to avoid data loss, make the system less vulnerable to further attacks and guarantee the availability of data. The risks associated with the security of the platform can be divided into different types related to the different behavior of the classification model implemented in the project:

- data not sufficient for a correct model training or not well distributed or missing: the model is unable to perform an accurate classification of the log data if the statistics about attacks are not significant; this case can occur in cases where the pre-trained model is no longer accurate in classification and, therefore, must be retrained with the most recent data which may, in some cases, be insufficient to guarantee a good accuracy;
- incorrect or incomplete data: if some data are not complete, they cannot be processed by the algorithm thus significant data is lost affecting classification accuracy;

• rare events: occurrence of an event not present in the training period that might generate a false positive or a false negative.

Therefore, the classification of the traffic logs needs to be interpreted considering the risks associated with the statistical significance of the data. In order to overcome this problem, a good approach would be to train the model iteratively with new logs data, thus ensuring an accurate classification performance of new potential type of attacks.

APPENDIX

The machine learning libraries used in this work are imported with the following Python script:

import numpy as np import pandas as pd import seaborn as sns import shap import xgboost as xgb from sklearn.model_selection import train_test_split from sklearn.linear_model import LogisticRegression from sklearn.ensemble import RandomForestClassifier from sklearn.neighbors import KNeighborsClassifier from sklearn.neighbors import KNeighborsClassifier from sklearn.metrics import mean_squared_error from sklearn.metrics import accuracy_score from sklearn.metrics import log loss

FIGURE 20. Python code snippet containing the imported libraries.

def ohe(train, categories): all_data = train for column in all_data.select_dtypes(include=[np.object]).columns: cat = all_data[column].unique() train[column] = pd.Categorical(train[column].astype('category'), categories = cat)

for cat in categories: dfDum = pd.get_dummies(all_data[cat], prefix=cat) all data =

pd.concat([all_data,dfDum.reindex(sorted(dfDum.columns),axis=1)], axis=1)

all_data = all_data.drop(cat, axis=1) train_idx = check_col(train) train = all_data[all_data.index.isin(train_idx)] return train

def standardScale(train, categories):
 scaler = StandardScaler()
 train[categories] =
 scaler.fit_transform(train[categories])
 return train

FIGURE 21. Python code snippet containing methods for the standardization procedure: ohe (*OneHotEncoding*) and standardScale (*StandardScaler*).

Both the categorical and the quantitative features, during the classifier preprocessing phase, were organized so as to have all the features on the same scale. The quantitative features have been standardized through the *Standard-Scaler* module implemented in the Python *scikit-learn* library. On the other hand, the One Hot Encoding (OHE) technique (also present in the *scikit-learn* library) was used to standardize the categorical features. The *One Hot Encoding* technique allows to transform each categorical feature containing *n* possible categories within it into *n* binary features, each of which representing a category. Standardization and One Hot Encoding is achieved by the methods shown in Fig. 21.

In this way it is possible to standardize all the quantities in order to allow more effective training of the artificial intelligence algorithm.

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