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On Secure Wireless Sensor Networks With Cooperative Energy Harvesting Relaying

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ABSTRACT In this paper, we investigate the physical layer security (PLS) of a wireless sensor network (WSN) that consists of a base station (BS), multiple sensor nodes (SNs), and multiple energy-limited relays (ERs) in the presence of a passive eavesdropper (EAV). We adopt a time-switching/power-splitting (TSPS) mechanism for information transmission. The communication protocol is divided into two phases. The purpose of the first phase is to decode information, and energy harvesting (EH) is performed in accordance with the TSPS protocol. The purpose of the second phase is to transmit information to multiple destinations using the amplify-and-forward (AF) technique. In this study, we introduce a multirelay cooperative scheme (MRCS) to improve the secrecy performance. We derive analytical expressions for the secrecy outage probability (SOP) of the MRCS and that of the noncooperative relay scheme (NCRS) by using the statistical characteristics of the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Specifically, we propose an optimal relay selection scheme to guarantee the security of the system for the MRCS. In addition, Monte Carlo simulation results are presented to confirm the accuracy of our analysis based on simulations of the secrecy performance under various system parameters, such as the positions and number of ERs, the EH time, and the EH efficiency coefficients. Finally, the simulation results show that the secrecy performance of our MRCS is higher than that of the NCRS and the traditional cooperative relay scheme (TCRS).

INDEX TERMS Energy harvesting, cooperative relay, time-switching/power-splitting, physical layer security.

I. INTRODUCTION

Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have attracted substantial attention in the research community over the last few years, driven by a wealth of theoretical and practical challenges as well as an increasing number of practical civilian applications [1]–[4]. WSN applications play important roles in everyday life, in manufacturing and in the military context, such as for weather monitoring, health care services, animal tracking, security and tactical surveillance, intrusion detection, and disaster management [5]. However, due to resource limitations,

WSNs have suffered from various issues related to reachability, energy consumption, and security [6].

Therefore, to improve the reachability of WSNs, forwarding nodes have been proposed and deployed [7]–[11] for realworld cases in which the distances between a BS and the SNs are greater than the transmission range [8]. In such a case, the BS and SNs cannot directly communicate with each other; this leads to a need for intermediate nodes that can act as relays. For example, R. Liu *et al*. investigated a WSN in which the SNs are located at predetermined locations to collect information about an infrastructure to be monitored on a large scale; hence, the SNs use relays to forward the collected physical information to the BS [9]. A. Vallimayil *et al*. described the characteristics of relays, various deployment

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methods, and the internal behaviors of relays in [WSNs.](#page-0-0) These authors concluded that the use of relay nodes has mainly been proposed for maximizing the reachability and ensuring the fault tolerance of networks [10].

Another important problem facing [WSNs](#page-0-0) is energy consumption due to the limited battery capacities of the [SNs](#page-0-0) [12]–[14]. Once the energy of an [SN](#page-0-0) is depleted, it can no longer fulfill its role in the network. Therefore, [EH](#page-0-0) techniques have promised to improve the lifetime of [WSNs](#page-0-0) [15]–[17]. [EH](#page-0-0) can be understood as a mechanism for generating energy from ambient surroundings (such as solar rays, thermoelectricity, [radio frequency \(RF\)](#page-0-0) waves, and other physical phenomena) and thus providing an uninterrupted power supply for [WSNs](#page-0-0) [18]–[20].

[RF](#page-0-0) [EH](#page-0-0) has recently emerged as a promising solution for prolonging the lifetime of [WSNs](#page-0-0) due to its constant energy production capabilities [21], [22]. An [SN](#page-0-0) can collect energy from ambient [RF](#page-0-0) signals to power its operations. [RF](#page-0-0) [EH](#page-0-0) is especially attractive for relay [WSNs](#page-0-0) that rely on [ERs](#page-0-0) to extend their coverage areas and improve their system performance [23]–[25]. For instance, A. Nasir *et al*. considered the application of [RF](#page-0-0) [EH](#page-0-0) in relay [WSNs](#page-0-0) based on two practical receiver architectures for [EH,](#page-0-0) namely, [time-switching-based](#page-0-0) [relaying \(TSR\)](#page-0-0) and [power-splitting-based relaying \(PSR\)](#page-0-0) [23]. S. Zhong *et al*. investigated the outage performance of an [EH](#page-0-0) relay network in which the [BS](#page-0-0) transmits information to the [SNs](#page-0-0) with the help of multiple [ERs](#page-0-0) by using the [AF](#page-0-0) technique. These authors concluded that the outage performance of the system can be improved by employing [EH](#page-0-0) [ERs](#page-0-0) [25].

The cooperative relay scheme (which we call the [TCRS\)](#page-0-0) is a multirelay technique that is traditionally used for wireless communications because of its promising gains in throughput and energy efficiency. The basic idea of this scheme is that when a [BS](#page-0-0) transmits a data signal to a [SN,](#page-0-0) an [ER](#page-0-0) acts in parallel to assist with the communication between the [BS](#page-0-0) and the [SN.](#page-0-0) Thus, the [SN](#page-0-0) receives two signals and combines them to improve its decoding performance by using [maximum ratio](#page-0-0) [combining \(MRC\)](#page-0-0) [26]–[28].

In addition, the security of the communication between the [SNs](#page-0-0) and [BS](#page-0-0) in a [WSN](#page-0-0) is also a key concern due to the broadcast nature of such communication. However, the [SNs](#page-0-0) in a [WSN](#page-0-0) are often incapable of employing traditional cryptographic techniques due to practical constraints such as limited energy resources and computing power [29]. To mitigate this problem, [PLS](#page-0-0) has emerged as one potential approach because of its low complexity and low computing requirements [3], [30]. [PLS](#page-0-0) was first exploited by C. E. Shannon [31] and later extended by A. D. Wyner [32], thereby establishing an information theory framework based on a classical model consisting of a source and a destination in the presence of an [EAV.](#page-0-0) For [PLS,](#page-0-0) the secrecy capacity is defined as the difference between the channel capacity of the primary link from the [BS](#page-0-0) to the destination and that of the eavesdropping link from the [BS](#page-0-0) to the [EAV](#page-0-0) [33]. For example, A. Mukherjee provided an overview of low-complexity [PLS](#page-0-0) schemes that are suitable for a [WSN](#page-0-0) by investigating two scenarios: uplink communications from the [SNs](#page-0-0) to the [BS](#page-0-0) and downlink communications from the [BS](#page-0-0) to the [SNs](#page-0-0) [34]. A. Soni *et al*. reviewed existing wireless attack approaches and wireless security techniques. Finally, these authors concluded that a wireless [PLS](#page-0-0) technique can provide satisfactory security for [WSNs](#page-0-0) [35]. However, the [PLS](#page-0-0) of [RF](#page-0-0) [EH](#page-0-0) [WSNs](#page-0-0) using cooperative [ERs](#page-0-0) has yet to be fully clarified in the literature.

Therefore, in this paper, we investigate the secrecy performance of [AF](#page-0-0) relaying in an [RF](#page-0-0) [EH](#page-0-0) [WSN](#page-0-0) with a passive [EAV](#page-0-0) over a Rayleigh fading channel. Accordingly, based on our security analysis, we also propose an effective protocol for cooperative relaying in which the signals from the [ERs](#page-0-0) are combined before being forwarded to the [SN](#page-0-0) to improve the secrecy performance. The main contributions of this paper are as follows:

- We investigate the communication protocol in an [EH](#page-0-0) [WSN](#page-0-0) with multiple [AF](#page-0-0) [ERs](#page-0-0) and multiple [SNs,](#page-0-0) in which the [ERs](#page-0-0) guarantee that all [SNs](#page-0-0) can receive signals from the [BS.](#page-0-0)
- We introduce a new [MRCS](#page-0-0) in which the signals from multiple [ERs](#page-0-0) are combined before being forwarded to an [SN](#page-0-0) to improve the [PLS.](#page-0-0)
- We derive analytical expressions for the [PLS](#page-0-0) in terms of the [SOP](#page-0-0) for the [NCRS](#page-0-0) and the [MRCS.](#page-0-0) Accordingly, we propose an optimal [ER](#page-0-0) selection algorithm to guarantee the security of the system for the [MRCS.](#page-0-0)

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In Section II, related work on the [PLS](#page-0-0) of cooperative [ERs](#page-0-0) is presented. In Section III, a system model, a communication protocol, and two communication schemes, i.e., the [NCRS](#page-0-0) and [MRCS,](#page-0-0) are introduced. In Section IV, the [SOPs](#page-0-0) of the two schemes are analyzed. In Section V, numerical results are presented and discussed. Finally, conclusions and future work are presented in Section VI.

II. RELATED WORK

In this section, we briefly summarize the related work concerning the [PLS](#page-0-0) of relay [EH](#page-0-0) [WSNs.](#page-0-0)

To improve the security of large-scale wireless communications, several researchers have investigated [PLS](#page-0-0) for relay [WSNs](#page-0-0) [36]–[42]. For example, Q. Xu *et al*. investigated secure relay communications in a [WSN](#page-0-0) for which the system model consisted of a [BS](#page-0-0) and a [SN](#page-0-0) assisted by a relay under monitoring by multiple [EAVs.](#page-0-0) They considered two scenarios: one in which the relays and [EAVs](#page-0-0) were each equipped with a single antenna, and one in which each was equipped with multiple antennas. Finally, they derived an expression for the [SOP](#page-0-0) of [BS-SN](#page-0-0) transmission [36]. W. Li *et al*. addressed the [PLS](#page-0-0) issue for a [WSN](#page-0-0) in the presence of a passive [EAV](#page-0-0) with a multiantenna relay. They proposed two optimal power allocation strategies for use under powerconstrained and power-unconstrained conditions. Accordingly, they derived the [SOPs](#page-0-0) for [EAVs](#page-0-0) in different positions [37]. However, the studies discussed above focused only on simple systems with a single relay.

To extend the system model, Q. Y. Liau *et al*. investigated a [WSN](#page-0-0) consisting of a [BS,](#page-0-0) a [SN,](#page-0-0) an [EAV,](#page-0-0) and two relays. They proposed a two-path successive relaying secrecy protocol in which the relays operated alternately in a time-division mode to continuously forward signals from the [BS](#page-0-0) to the [SN.](#page-0-0) Accordingly, they derived the intercept probability to evaluate the security performance and concluded that relaying is a useful approach for improving wireless [PLS](#page-0-0) [40]. Y. Deng *et al*. proposed a relaying technique for a three-tier [WSN](#page-0-0) whose system model included multiple [SNs,](#page-0-0) access points, [BSs,](#page-0-0) and [EAVs.](#page-0-0) The access points were used as the relays to help transmit information from the [SNs](#page-0-0) to the [BSs.](#page-0-0) These authors derived compact expressions for the average secrecy rate to evaluate the [PLS](#page-0-0) of the system [39]. Notably, these works focused only on prespecified relays and did not analyze the impact of relay selection.

Building on previous work, M. Qian *et al*. studied the [PLS](#page-0-0) of a [WSN](#page-0-0) with multiple relays in the presence of an [EAV.](#page-0-0) These authors proposed two relay selection strategies: an exponential-complexity exhaustive search strategy and a linear-complexity relay ordering strategy, in which a partial set of relays is selected for forwarding the source signal to the [SN.](#page-0-0) They concluded that the proposed schemes significantly outperformed the conventional all-relay and best-relay strategies in terms of secrecy capacity [41]. However, [EH](#page-0-0) at the relays to further enhance the secrecy performance was not considered.

V. N. Vo *et al*. investigated [EH](#page-0-0) at the [ERs](#page-0-0) in a [WSN](#page-0-0) in the presence of [EAVs.](#page-0-0) Specifically, multiple [ERs](#page-0-0) were considered to be harvesting energy from multiple [power transfer sta](#page-0-0)[tions \(PTSs\)](#page-0-0) for forwarding signals to the [BS.](#page-0-0) These authors proposed a best-relay-and-best-jammer scheme to combat the multiple [EAVs.](#page-0-0) An expression for the [SOP](#page-0-0) was derived to analyze the security of the system. The results indicated that the proposed scheme outperformed both the best-relayand-random-jammer scheme and the random-relay-and-bestjammer scheme in terms of secrecy performance [42]. Nevertheless, this work did not consider cooperative relays for enhancing the secrecy performance of the system.

To address the limitations of the above works in particular, to consider cooperative [ERs](#page-0-0) with [EH,](#page-0-0) we investigate the [PLS](#page-0-0) in a relay [WSN](#page-0-0) in this paper. Here, the [ERs](#page-0-0) cooperate with each other to forward information in order to improve the security performance. To the best of our knowledge, no previous publications have studied this problem.

III. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODEL

A. SYSTEM MODEL

In this paper, an [RF](#page-0-0) [EH](#page-0-0) relay [WSN](#page-0-0) is considered, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The system model consists of a [BS,](#page-0-0) denoted by *S*; *M* [SNs,](#page-0-0) denoted by D_m , $m \in \{1, \ldots, M\}$; and *N* [ERs,](#page-0-0) denoted by R_n , $n \in \{1, \ldots, N\}$, in the presence of a passive [EAV,](#page-0-0) denoted by *E*. The [EAV](#page-0-0) attempts to extract information being sent from the [ERs](#page-0-0) to the [SNs.](#page-0-0) The [BS](#page-0-0) communicates with [ERs](#page-0-0) and [SNs](#page-0-0) via control messages [41], [51]. Each

FIGURE 1. System model of an [RF](#page-0-0) [EH](#page-0-0) relay [WSN.](#page-0-0)

TABLE 1. List of notations.

device is equipped with a single antenna and operates in half-duplex mode. The channel coefficients of the $S \rightarrow R_n$, $R_n \to D_m$, and $R_n \to E$ links are denoted by $h_{SR_n}, h_{R_nD_m}$, and h_{R_nE} , respectively. The distances of the $S \to R_n, R_n \to D_m$, and $R_n \rightarrow E$ links are denoted by d_{SR_n} , $d_{R_nD_m}$, and d_{R_nE} , respectively.

We assume that all channels are modeled as Rayleigh fading channels and that the channel coefficients are [RVs](#page-0-0) distributed following the Rayleigh model [43]. The corresponding [cumulative distribution function \(CDF\)](#page-0-0) and [probability](#page-0-0) [density function \(PDF\)](#page-0-0) of a channel are given as follows:

$$
F_{g_{XY}}(x) = 1 - e^{-\frac{x}{\Omega_{XY}}} \tag{1}
$$

and

$$
f_{\text{SXY}}(x) = \frac{1}{\Omega_{XY}} e^{-\frac{x}{\Omega_{XY}}},\tag{2}
$$

FIGURE 2. The [TSPS](#page-0-0) mechanism at the [ERs.](#page-0-0) A single time block T is used for both the information decoding and [EH](#page-0-0) phase and the information relaying phase.

where $g_{XY} = |h_{XY}|^2 / d_{XY}^{\sigma}$; the [RVs](#page-0-0) h_{XY} and d_{XY} refer to the channel coefficient and the distance from $X \rightarrow Y$, respectively; σ is the path loss factor; and $\Omega_{XY} = \mathbf{E} \left[|h_{XY}|^2 \right] / d_{XY}^{\sigma}$ is the mean channel gain, where **E**[·] denotes the expectation operation.

B. COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL

In the considered system, we apply the [TSPS](#page-0-0) protocol [24], where the communication protocol is divided into two phases, as illustrated in Fig. [2.](#page-3-0) First, the [ERs](#page-0-0) receive information from the [BS.](#page-0-0) Then, the selected [ERs](#page-0-0) send information to the selected [SN](#page-0-0) subject to eavesdropping by the [EAV.](#page-0-0) Accordingly, the communication protocol is described as follows:

• In the first phase, a [BS](#page-0-0) *S* transmits information to the [ERs](#page-0-0) in αT time, where *T* is a time block and α (0 < α < 1) is the proportion of the time block dedicated to $S \rightarrow R_n$ transmission. As described in [24], the transmit power of the [BS](#page-0-0) is split such that the received signal is split into two streams with [PSs](#page-0-0) of ρ_{R_n} and $1 - \rho_{R_n}$ for information decoding and [EH,](#page-0-0) respectively, where $0 <$ ρ_{R_n} < 1. Thus, the information received at the *n*-th [ER](#page-0-0) is written as follows:

$$
y_{SR_n}(t) = \sqrt{\frac{\rho_{R_n} P_0}{d_{SR_n}^{\sigma}}} h_{SR_n} x(t) + n_{R_n},
$$
 (3)

where P_0 is the transmit power of the [BS,](#page-0-0) $x(t)$ is a transmitted signal, and n_{R_n} is the [additive white Gaussian](#page-0-0) [noise \(AWGN\)](#page-0-0) at R_n , $n_{R_n} \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, N_0)$. The [EH](#page-0-0) at R_n is expressed as follows:

$$
\varepsilon_{R_n} = \frac{\eta \alpha \left(1 - \rho_{R_n}\right) P_0 |h_{SR_n}|^2 T}{d_{SR_n}^{\sigma}}, \tag{4}
$$

where η is the [EH](#page-0-0) efficiency coefficient, which depends on the rectification ($0 < \eta < 1$). Here, we assume that the [EH](#page-0-0) efficiency coefficient is the same for all [ERs](#page-0-0)[43].

• In the second phase, the *n*-th [ER](#page-0-0) performs [AF](#page-0-0) transmission of the signal $y_{SR_n}(t)$ to the [SN](#page-0-0) D_m . Hence, the received signal at D_m is given by [44]

$$
y_{R_n D_m}(t) = \sqrt{\frac{P_{R_n}}{E|y_{S R_n}(t)|^2}} \frac{h_{R_n D_m}}{\sqrt{d_{R_n D_m}^{\sigma}}} y_{S R_n}(t) + n_{D_m}, \quad (5)
$$

where $n_{D_m} \sim \mathcal{CN}(0, N_0)$ is the [AWGN](#page-0-0) at D_m and the transmit power at R_n in the remaining time $(1 - \alpha)T$ is

$$
P_{R_n} = \frac{\eta \alpha \left(1 - \rho_{R_n}\right) P_0 |h_{SR_n}|^2}{\left(1 - \alpha\right) d_{SR_n}^{\sigma}}
$$

= $c \left(1 - \rho_{R_n}\right) P_0 g_{SR_n}$, (6)

$$
\Rightarrow c = \frac{\eta \alpha}{1 - \alpha} \text{ and } g_{SR_n} = \frac{|h_{SR_n}|^2}{d_{SR_n}^{\sigma}}.
$$

C. CHANNEL CAPACITY

 $where$

as follows:

Based on the communication protocol, the end-to-end [SNR](#page-0-0) at the *m*-th [SN](#page-0-0) D_m for the signal received via the *n*-th [ER](#page-0-0) R_n can be defined as follows:

$$
\gamma_{D_m} = \frac{\delta \rho_{R_n} P_0^2 g_{S R_n}^2 g_{R_n D_m}}{(\delta P_0 g_{S R_n} g_{R_n D_m} + \rho_{R_n} P_0 g_{S R_n}) N_0 + N_0^2},\tag{7}
$$

where $\delta = c \left(1 - \rho_{R_n}\right)$ and $g_{R_n D_m} = \frac{|h_{R_n D_m}|}{d\sigma}$ 2 $d_{R_nD_m}^{\sigma}$. Furthermore, the instantaneous legal channel capacity at D_m is expressed

$$
C_{D_m} = (1 - \alpha) \log_2 \left(1 + \gamma_{D_m} \right). \tag{8}
$$

Similar to (7) and (8) , the end-to-end [SNR](#page-0-0) and the instantaneous illegal channel capacity at *E* are given by

$$
\gamma_E = \frac{\delta \rho_{R_n} P_0^2 g_{SR_n}^2 g_{R_n E}}{(\delta P_0 g_{SR_n} g_{R_n E} + \rho_{R_n} P_0 g_{SR_n}) N_0 + N_0^2},
$$
(9)

$$
C_E = (1 - \alpha) \log_2 (1 + \gamma_E),
$$
(10)

where
$$
g_{R_nE} = \frac{|h_{R_nE}|^2}{d_{R_nE}^{\sigma}}
$$
.

D. SCHEDULING SCHEMES

In this subsection, we present two schemes for selecting the best [ER](#page-0-0) and cooperative [ERs](#page-0-0) to forward the information from the [BS](#page-0-0) to the [SN.](#page-0-0)

• *The noncooperative [ER](#page-0-0) scheme [\(NCRS\)](#page-0-0)*: The best [ER](#page-0-0) is selected from among the *N* [ERs](#page-0-0) to help the [BS](#page-0-0) send the signal to the [SN](#page-0-0) such that the best possible channel gain of the $S \to R_n$ link is achieved [45], [46], i.e.,

$$
|h_{SR^*}|^2 = \max_{n=1,\dots,N} \left\{ |h_{SR_n}|^2 \right\},\tag{11}
$$

where R^* is the best [ER.](#page-0-0) Accordingly, the [EH](#page-0-0) at R_n for the [NCRS](#page-0-0) can be expressed as follows:

$$
\varepsilon_{R^*}^{NCRS} = \frac{\eta \alpha (1 - \rho_{R^*}) P_0 |h_{SR^*}|^2 T}{d_{SR^*}^{\sigma}} \n= \eta \alpha (1 - \rho_{R^*}) P_0 g_{SR^*} T,
$$
\n(12)

where $g_{SR^*} = \frac{|h_{SR^*}|^2}{\sqrt{g}}$ *d* σ *SR*[∗] . Furthermore, the [CDF](#page-0-0) and [PDF](#page-0-0) of *gSR*[∗] are obtained as follows:

$$
F_{g_{SR^*}}(x) = \left(1 - e^{-\frac{x}{\Omega_{SR^*}}}\right)^N, \tag{13}
$$

$$
f_{\mathcal{S}SR^*}(x) = \frac{N}{\Omega_{SR^*}} e^{-\frac{1}{\Omega_{SR^*}}} \left(1 - e^{-\frac{x}{\Omega_{SR^*}}}\right)^{N-1}, \quad (14)
$$

where $\Omega_{SR^*} = \frac{\mathbf{E}\left[|h_{SR^*}|^2\right]}{d_{SR^*}^2}.$

• *The multirelay cooperative scheme [\(MRCS\)](#page-0-0)*: To improve the secrecy performance, we investigate the [MRCS,](#page-0-0) i.e., the scheme in which the signals from multiple [ERs](#page-0-0) are combined before being forwarded to D_m . Accordingly, the [CDF](#page-0-0) and [PDF](#page-0-0) of *gRD^m* can be obtained as follows [47]:

N

$$
F_{g_{RD_m}}(x) = \sum_{n=1}^{N} \prod_{\substack{j=1 \ j \neq n}}^{N} \frac{\Omega_{R_n D_m} F_{g_{R_n D_m}}(x)}{\Omega_{R_n D_m} - \Omega_{R_j D_m}},
$$
\nif

\n
$$
\Omega_{R_n D_n} \neq \Omega_{R_n D_n}.
$$
\n(15)

if
$$
\Omega_{R_n D_m} \neq \Omega_{R_j D_m}
$$
;\t\t(15)

$$
f_{g_{RDm}}(x) = \sum_{n=1}^{N} \prod_{\substack{j=1 \ j \neq n}}^{N} \frac{\Omega_{R_n D_m} f_{g_{R_n D_m}}(x)}{\Omega_{R_n D_m} - \Omega_{R_j D_m}},
$$

if $\Omega_{R_n D_m} \neq \Omega_{R_j D_m}$; (16)

where
$$
g_{RD_m} = \sum_{n=1}^{N} g_{R_n D_m}, \Omega_{R_n D_m} = \frac{\mathbf{E}\left[\left|h_{R_n D_m}\right|^2\right]}{d_{R_n D_m}^{\sigma}},
$$
 and

$$
\Omega_{R_j D_m} = \frac{\mathbf{E}\left[\left|h_{R_j D_m}\right|^2\right]}{d_{R_j D_m}^{\sigma}}.
$$

IV. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

In this section, we derive the expressions for the [SOPs](#page-0-0) of the two scheduling schemes (i.e., [NCRS](#page-0-0) and [MRCS\)](#page-0-0) to evaluate the secrecy performance of the considered system.

A. SECRECY CAPACITY

According to the definition of the secrecy capacity presented in [32], [48], the instantaneous secrecy capacity of a wireless transmission from *S* to D_m in the presence of a passive [EAV](#page-0-0) is defined as

$$
C_{SEC_{D_m}} = [C_{D_m} - C_E]^+
$$

=
$$
\begin{cases} (1 - \alpha) \log_2 \left(\frac{1 + \gamma_{D_m}}{1 + \gamma_E} \right), & \gamma_{D_m} > \gamma_E \\ 0, & \gamma_{D_m} \leq \gamma_E, \end{cases}
$$
 (17)

where $C_{SEC_{D_m}} \in \left\{ C_{SEC_{D_m}}^{NCRS}, C_{SEC_{D_m}}^{MRCS} \right\}$ o .

To guarantee that all [SNs](#page-0-0) can receive signals from the [BS,](#page-0-0) the selected [SN](#page-0-0) is chosen such that the secrecy capacity is the lowest, i.e.,

$$
C_{SEC} = \min_{m=1,\dots,M} \left\{ C_{SEC_{D_m}} \right\},\tag{18}
$$

where $C_{SEC} \in \left\{ C_{SEC}^{NCRS}, C_{SEC}^{MRCS} \right\}$.

B. SECRECY PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

Similar to what was done in [39], [49], the [SOP](#page-0-0) is used to evaluate the secrecy performance of the [WSN.](#page-0-0) For the *m*-th

[SN,](#page-0-0) this metric is defined as the probability of the instantaneous secrecy capacity dropping below a target secrecy rate R_S , i.e.,

$$
\Theta_{D_m} = \Pr \left\{ C_{SEC_{D_m}} < R_S \right\},\tag{19}
$$

where $\Theta_{D_m} \in \left\{ \Theta_{D_m}^{NCRS}, \Theta_{D_m}^{MRCS} \right\}$ and Pr{·} is a probability function. By substituting [\(17\)](#page-4-0) into [\(19\)](#page-4-1), the [SOP](#page-0-0) for *D^m* can be rewritten as follows:

$$
\Theta_{D_m} = \Pr\left\{ (1 - \alpha) \log_2 \left(\frac{1 + \gamma_{D_m}}{1 + \gamma_E} \right) < R_S \right\}. \tag{20}
$$

Note that we perform our analysis for the high[-SNR](#page-0-0) regime because the signals from the [BS](#page-0-0) to the [ERs,](#page-0-0) from [SNs](#page-0-0)to other [SNs,](#page-0-0) and from the [SNs](#page-0-0) to the [EAVs](#page-0-0) are of much higher power than the background noise power, i.e., $\gamma_0 = \frac{P_0}{N}$ $\frac{1}{N_0} \rightarrow \infty$ [50], [51]. Thus, γ_{D_m} and γ_E can be approximated as

$$
\gamma_{D_m} \simeq \frac{\delta \rho_{R_n} \gamma_0 g_{SR_n} g_{R_n D_m}}{\delta g_{R_n D_m} + \rho_{R_n}}
$$

=
$$
\frac{\delta \rho_{R_n} \gamma_0 g_{SR_n}}{\chi_{SR_n}} \frac{g_{R_n D_m}}{\delta g_{R_n D_m} + \rho_{R_n}}
$$
,

$$
\gamma_E \simeq \frac{\delta \rho_{R_n} \gamma_0 g_{SR_n} g_{R_n E}}{\delta g_{R_n E} + \rho_{R_n}}
$$
 (21)

$$
= \underbrace{\delta \rho_{R_n} \gamma_0 g_{SR_n}}_{X_{SR_n}} \underbrace{\frac{g_{R_n E}}{\delta \gamma_{R_n E} + \rho_{R_n}}}_{Y_{R_n E}}.
$$
(22)

By substituting [\(21\)](#page-4-2) and [\(22\)](#page-4-2) into [\(20\)](#page-4-3), the [SOP](#page-0-0) for the *m*-th [SN](#page-0-0) Θ_{D_m} can be approximated as [51]

$$
\Theta_{D_m} = \Pr\left\{\frac{1 + X_{SR_n} Y_{R_n D_m}}{1 + X_{SR_n} Y_{R_n E}} < 2^{R_S/(1-\alpha)}\right\}
$$

\n
$$
= \Pr\left\{Y_{R_n D_m} < \frac{\theta}{X_{SR_n}} + (\theta + 1) Y_{R_n E}\right\}
$$

\n
$$
= \int_{0}^{\infty} f_{Y_{R_n E}}(z) \int_{0}^{\infty} f_{X_{SR_n}}(x) F_{Y_{R_n D_m}}(\varphi) dx dz
$$

\n
$$
\approx \int_{0}^{\nu_3} f_{Y_{R_n E}}(z) \int_{0}^{\infty} f_{X_{SR_n}}(x) F_{Y_{R_n D_m}}(\varphi) dx dz, (23)
$$

where $\varphi = \theta/x + (\theta + 1)z$ and $\theta = 2^{R_S/(1-\alpha)} - 1$. By setting $v_1 = \delta \rho_{R_n} \gamma_0$, the [CDF](#page-0-0) and [PDF](#page-0-0) of the [RV](#page-0-0) X_{SR_n} can be expressed as

$$
F_{X_{SR_n}}(x) = F_{g_{SR_n}}\left(\frac{x}{v_1}\right),\tag{24}
$$

$$
f_{X_{SR_n}}(x) = f_{SSR_n}\left(\frac{x}{v_1}\right). \tag{25}
$$

By applying probabilistic characteristics, the [CDF](#page-0-0) of $Y_{R_n\xi}$, $\xi \in \{D_m, E\}$, can be expressed as

$$
F_{Y_{Rn\xi}} = \Pr \left\{ Y_{Rn\xi} < x \right\} = \Pr \left\{ \frac{g_{Rn\xi}}{\delta g_{Rn\xi} + \rho_{Rn}} < x \right\}
$$

$$
= \Pr \left\{ g_{R_n \xi} (1 - \delta x) < x \rho_{R_n} \right\}
$$
\n
$$
= \begin{cases} 1, & x \ge \delta^{-1} \\ \Pr \left\{ g_{R_n \xi} < \frac{x \rho_{R_n}}{1 - \delta x} \right\}, & x < \delta^{-1}. \end{cases} \tag{26}
$$

After several calculation steps, the [CDF](#page-0-0) and [PDF](#page-0-0) of *YRn*^ξ are obtained as follows:

$$
F_{Y_{R_n\xi}}\left(x\right) = \begin{cases} 1, & x \ge \nu_3\\ 1 - e^{-\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_n\xi}}\frac{\nu_2 x}{\nu_3 - x}}, & x < \nu_3, \end{cases} \tag{27}
$$

$$
f_{Y_{Rn\xi}}\left(x\right) = \begin{cases} 0, & x \ge \nu_3\\ \frac{1}{\Omega_{Rn\xi}} \frac{\nu_2 \nu_3}{\left(\nu_3 - x\right)^2} e^{-\frac{1}{\Omega_{Rn\xi}} \frac{\nu_2 x}{\nu_3 - x}}, & x < \nu_3, \end{cases} \tag{28}
$$

where $v_2 = \rho_{R_n} \delta^{-1}$ and $v_3 = \delta^{-1}$.

Furthermore, the [SOP](#page-0-0) for the multiple [SNs](#page-0-0) is expressed as follows [39]:

$$
\Theta = \Pr\left\{C_{SEC} < R_S\right\},\tag{29}
$$

where $\Theta \in \{ \Theta^{NCRS}, \Theta^{MRCS} \}$. By substituting [\(18\)](#page-4-4) and [\(19\)](#page-4-1) into [\(29\)](#page-5-0), we can rewrite the [SOP](#page-0-0) of the considered system as

$$
\Theta = \Pr\left\{\min\left\{C_{SEC_{D_m}}\right\} < R_S\right\}
$$
\n
$$
= 1 - \prod_{m=1}^{M} \left(1 - \Pr\left\{C_{SEC_{D_m}} < R_S\right\}\right)
$$
\n
$$
= 1 - \prod_{m=1}^{M} \left(1 - \Theta_{D_m}\right). \tag{30}
$$

Next, the [SOPs](#page-0-0) for the [NCRS](#page-0-0) and [MRCS](#page-0-0) are given by the following two theorems.

Theorem 1: For the [NCRS,](#page-0-0) the [SOP](#page-0-0) of the m-th [SN](#page-0-0) is expressed by equation [\(31\)](#page-6-0)*, as shown at the top of the next page. Therefore, the [SOP](#page-0-0) of the considered system for the [NCRS](#page-0-0) is obtained as follows:*

$$
\Theta^{NCRS} = 1 - \prod_{m=1}^{M} \left(1 - \Theta_{D_m}^{NCRS} \right). \tag{32}
$$

Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.

Theorem 2: For the [MRCS,](#page-0-0) the [SOP](#page-0-0) of the m-th [SN](#page-0-0) is expressed by equation [\(33\)](#page-6-1) *(see the next page). Therefore, the [SOP](#page-0-0) of the considered system for the [MRCS](#page-0-0) is obtained as follows:*

$$
\Theta^{MRCS} = 1 - \prod_{m=1}^{M} \left(1 - \Theta_{D_m}^{MRCS} \right). \tag{34}
$$

Proof: The proof is given in Appendix B.

Algorithm 1 Algorithm for Determining γ_0^*

Data: Predetermined system parameters, array $\gamma_0 \in (0, \psi)$, security constraint ω **Result:** γ_0^* 1: Set the initial step: $i \leftarrow 1$; 2: Set the initial value: $\gamma_0^* \leftarrow 0$; 3: **for** (*i*; length(γ ₀); *i* + +) **do** 4: Calculate $\Theta^{(MRCS)}(i)$ in (34); 5: **if** $\Theta^{(MRCS)}(i) = \omega$ **then** 6: $\gamma_0^* = \gamma_0(i);$ 7: break; 8: **end if** 9: **if** $\Theta^{(MRCS)}(i) < \omega$ **then**

10:
$$
\gamma_0^* = \gamma_0(i-1);
$$

$$
11: \qquad \qquad \text{break};
$$

12: **end if**

13: **end for**

14: **return** γ_0^* ;

Algorithm 2 Algorithm for Determining *N* ∗

Data: Predetermined system parameters, array $N \in (1, \kappa)$, security constraint ω **Result:** *N* ∗

1: Set the initial step: $i \leftarrow 1$; 2: Set the initial value: $N^* \leftarrow 1$; 3: **for** $(i; \text{length}(N); i++)$ **do** 4: Calculate $\Theta^{(MRCS)}(i)$ in (34); 5: **if** $\Theta^{(MRCS)}(i) = \omega$ **then** 6: $N^* = N(i);$ 7: break; 8: **end if** 9: **if** $\Theta^{(MRCS)}(i) < \omega$ **then** 10: *N* $N^* = N(i - 1);$ 11: break; 12: **end if** 13: **end for** 14: **return** *N* ∗ ;

Based on the secrecy performance analysis, we predict that the end-to-end [SNRs](#page-0-0) at the [SN](#page-0-0) and [EAV](#page-0-0) will both include γ_0 (see [\(21\)](#page-4-2) and [\(22\)](#page-4-2)). Therefore, with the [NCRS,](#page-0-0) the [SOP](#page-0-0) will improve only negligibly with increasing γ_0 because both the numerator and denominator of the secrecy capacity expression given in [\(17\)](#page-4-0) will increase. In contrast, with the [MRCS,](#page-0-0) the [SOP](#page-0-0) will significantly decrease when γ_0 increases because the [SNR](#page-0-0) at the [SN](#page-0-0) will be the result of combining the signals from multiple [ERs,](#page-0-0) i.e., the numerator will be larger than the denominator in [\(17\)](#page-4-0). Thus, an optimal γ_0 value exists in the [MRCS](#page-0-0) such that the security of the considered system can be guaranteed.

Therefore, we propose an algorithm for determining the optimal transmit power to guarantee the security of the system as follows: the value of γ_0 is divided into an array, and the values in this array are substituted into [\(34\)](#page-5-1) until the [SOP](#page-0-0) for

$$
\Theta_{D_m}^{NCRS} = 1 - \frac{Nv_2v_3}{\Omega_{SR^*}\Omega_{R_nEV1}} \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} \frac{(-1)^k (N-1)!}{k!(N-1-k)!} e^{\nu_2 \left(\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_nD_m}} + \frac{1}{\Omega_{R_nE}}\right)} 2 \sqrt{\frac{\Omega_{SR^*}v_1v_2v_3\theta}{\Omega_{R_nD_m}(k+1)}}
$$

\n
$$
\times \int_{0}^{v_3/(\theta+1)} e^{-\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_nE}} \frac{v_2v_3}{v_3 - z} - \frac{1}{\Omega_{SR^*}\Omega_{R_nD_m}} \frac{\Omega_{R_nD_m}(k+1)\theta + \Omega_{SR^*}v_1v_2v_3}{v_1[v_3 - (\theta + 1)z]}} K_1 \left(\frac{2\sqrt{(k+1)v_2v_3\theta/\Omega_{SR^*}\Omega_{R_nD_m}v_1}}{[v_3 - (\theta + 1)z]}\right) dz.
$$
 (31)

$$
\Theta_{D_{m}}^{MRCS} = e^{-\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_{n}E}}\frac{v_{2}[v_{3}/(\theta+1)]}{v_{3}-[v_{3}/(\theta+1)]}} + \frac{v_{2}v_{3}}{\Omega_{SR_{n}}\Omega_{R_{n}E}v_{1}} e^{\frac{v_{2}}{\Omega_{R_{n}E}}}\int_{0}^{v_{3}/(\theta+1)\theta/[v_{3}-(\theta+1)z]} \int_{0}^{e^{-\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_{n}E}}\frac{v_{2}v_{3}}{v_{3}-z}-\frac{1}{\Omega_{SR_{n}}}\frac{v_{1}}{v_{1}}}dx dz \n+ \sum_{i=1}^{N} \prod_{\substack{j=1 \ j \neq i}}^{N} \frac{\Omega_{R_{n}D_{m}}}{\Omega_{R_{n}D_{m}}-\Omega_{R_{j}D_{m}}}\frac{v_{2}v_{3}}{\Omega_{SR_{n}}\Omega_{R_{n}E}v_{1}} e^{\frac{v_{2}}{\Omega_{R_{n}E}}}\int_{0}^{v_{3}/(\theta+1)} \int_{\theta/[v_{3}-(\theta+1)z]}^{\infty} \frac{e^{-\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_{n}E}}\frac{v_{2}v_{3}}{v_{3}-z}-\frac{1}{\Omega_{SR_{n}}}\frac{v_{1}}{v_{1}}}dx dz \n- \sum_{i=1}^{N} \prod_{\substack{j=1 \ j \neq i}}^{N} \frac{\Omega_{R_{n}D_{m}}}{\Omega_{R_{n}D_{m}}-\Omega_{R_{j}D_{m}}}\frac{v_{2}v_{3}}{\Omega_{SR_{n}}\Omega_{R_{n}E}v_{1}} e^{v_{2}\left(\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_{n}E}}+\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_{n}D_{m}}}\right)}2\sqrt{\frac{\Omega_{SR_{n}}v_{1}v_{2}v_{3}\theta}{\Omega_{R_{n}D_{m}}}}\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_{n}D_{m}}}} \times \int_{0}^{v_{3}/(\theta+1)} \frac{e^{-\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_{n}E}}\frac{v_{2}v_{3}}{v_{1}}}dx} {v_{3}-(\theta+1)z]} K_{1}\left(\frac{2\sqrt{v_{2}v_{3}\theta/\Omega_{R_{n}D_{m}}\Omega_{SR_{n}}v_{1}}}{[v_{3}-(\theta+1)z]}\right) dz.
$$
\n(33)

the [MRCS](#page-0-0) satisfies the constraint $\Theta^{MRCS} < \omega$, where ω is the security constraint. The optimal transmit power algorithm is detailed in **Algorithm 1**.

The time complexity of **Algorithm 1** is exactly the time complexity of the ''for'' loop. First, in step 4, calculating $\Theta^{(MRCS)}(i)$ takes $O(n^2)$ time. Steps 5 to 12 take $O(n)$ time. Therefore, the "for" loop is computed in $O(\text{length}(\gamma_0)n^2)$ time, which is also the time complexity of **Algorithm 1**.

Similar to the approach of **Algorithm 1**, we also propose an algorithm for selecting the optimal number of [ERs](#page-0-0) for the [MRCS](#page-0-0) to reduce the implementation cost while still ensuring sufficient secrecy performance. The algorithm for selecting the optimal number of [ERs](#page-0-0) for the [MRCS](#page-0-0) is detailed in **Algorithm 2**.

C. THROUGHPUT ANALYSIS

In this subsection, the throughput is determined by evaluating the outage probability (OP) of the *m*-th SN, i.e., Φ_{D_m} , at a target information rate R_O (expressed in bits/sec/Hz), where $R_O = \log_2(1 + \phi)$ and ϕ is the threshold value of the [SNR](#page-0-0) for correct data detection at the [SN.](#page-0-0) Specifically, Φ_{D_m} is given by [23]

$$
\Phi_{D_m} = \Pr \left[\gamma_{D_m} < \phi \right]
$$
\n
$$
= \int\limits_{0}^{\phi \delta/\nu_1} f_{g_{SR_n}}(x) \, dx + \int\limits_{\phi \delta/\nu_1}^{\infty} f_{g_{SR_n}}(x) F_{g_{R_n D_m}}(\varsigma) \, dx, \quad (35)
$$

where $\Phi_{D_m} \in \left\{ \Phi_{D_m}^{NCRS}, \Phi_{D_m}^{MRCS} \right\}$, $C_{D_m} \in \left\{ C_{D_m}^{NCRS}, C_{D_m}^{MRCS} \right\}$, $\phi = 2^{R_O/(1-\alpha)} - 1$, and $\zeta = \frac{\phi \rho_{R_n}}{v_1 x - \phi \delta}$. Similarly, the selected 139218 VOLUME 7, 2019

[SN](#page-0-0) is chosen such that the channel capacity is the lowest, and we can rewrite the [OP](#page-0-0) of the considered system as

$$
\Phi = 1 - \prod_{m=1}^{M} (1 - \Phi_{D_m}), \tag{36}
$$

where $\Phi \in {\Phi^{NCRS}, \Phi^{MRCS}}$.

Theorem 3: For the [NCRS,](#page-0-0) the [OP](#page-0-0) of the m-th [SN](#page-0-0) is expressed by equation [\(37\)](#page-7-0) *(see the next page).*

Therefore, the [OP](#page-0-0) of the considered system for the [NCRS](#page-0-0) is obtained as follows:

$$
\Phi^{NCRS} = 1 - \prod_{m=1}^{M} \left(1 - \Phi_{D_m}^{NCRS} \right). \tag{38}
$$

Proof: The proof is given in Appendix C.

Theorem 4: For the [MRCS,](#page-0-0) the [OP](#page-0-0) of the m-th [SN](#page-0-0) is expressed by equation [\(39\)](#page-7-1) *(see the next page).*

Therefore, the [OP](#page-0-0) of the considered system for the [MRCS](#page-0-0) is obtained as follows:

$$
\Phi^{MRCS} = 1 - \prod_{m=1}^{M} \left(1 - \Phi_{D_m}^{MRCS} \right). \tag{40}
$$

Proof: The proof is given in Appendix D.

Given that $(1 - \alpha)T$ is the effective communication time within the time block *T* (expressed in seconds), the throughput is given by [52], [53]

$$
\tau = (1 - \alpha) (1 - \Phi) R_O,
$$
\n(41)

where $\tau \in \{\tau^{NCRS}, \tau^{MRCS}\}.$

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$$
\Phi_{D_m}^{NCRS} = 1 - \frac{N}{\Omega_{SR^*}} \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} \frac{(-1)^k (N-1)!}{k! (N-1-k)!} e^{-\frac{(1+k)\phi\delta}{\nu_1 \Omega_{SR^*}}} 2 \sqrt{\frac{\Omega_{SR^*} \phi \rho_{R_n} \nu_1}{\Omega_{R_n D_m} (1+k)}} K_1 \left(2 \sqrt{\frac{\phi \rho_{R_n} (1+k)}{\Omega_{SR^*} \Omega_{R_n D_m} \nu_1}} \right).
$$
(37)

$$
\Phi_{D_m}^{MRCS} = \gamma \left(1, \frac{\phi \delta}{\Omega_{SR_n} v_1} \right) + \sum_{i=1}^{N} \prod_{\substack{j=1 \ j \neq i}}^{N} \frac{\Omega_{R_n D_m}}{\Omega_{R_n D_m} - \Omega_{R_j D_m}} \Gamma \left(1, \frac{\phi \delta}{\Omega_{SR_n} v_1} \right)
$$

$$
- \sum_{i=1}^{N} \prod_{\substack{j=1 \ j \neq i}}^{N} \frac{\Omega_{R_n D_m}}{\Omega_{R_n D_m} - \Omega_{R_j D_m}} \frac{1}{\Omega_{SR_n} v_1} e^{-\frac{\phi \delta}{\Omega_{SR_n} v_1}} 2 \sqrt{\frac{\Omega_{SR_n} \phi_{R_n v_1}}{\Omega_{R_n D_m}}} K_1 \left(2 \sqrt{\frac{\phi_{R_n}}{\Omega_{SR_n} \Omega_{R_n D_m} v_1}} \right). \quad (39)
$$

V. NUMERICAL RESULTS

This section presents and discusses numerical results obtained from Monte Carlo simulations. Specifically, the effects of various system parameters, such as γ_0 , the distance d_{SR} from the [BS](#page-0-0) to an [ER,](#page-0-0) the distance d_{RD} from an [ER](#page-0-0) to an [SN,](#page-0-0) the number of [ERs](#page-0-0) *N*, the number of [SNs](#page-0-0) *M*, the [EH](#page-0-0) time proportion α , the [EH](#page-0-0) efficiency coefficient η , and the [PS](#page-0-0) ρ , are discussed. The following system parameters are used for both analysis and simulation [47], [49]: $d_{SR} \in [0.5, 2.5]$, $d_{RD} \in [0.5, 5], d_{RE} = 2, R_S = 0.01, R_O = 0.5, \alpha \in$ [0.1, 0.9], $\eta \in [0.1, 0.9], \omega = 0.01, \rho_{R_n} = \rho \in [0.1, 0.9],$ $\gamma_0 \in [0, 30]$ (dB), $M \in [1, 10]$, and $N \in [1, 10]$. We evaluate and compare the security performance of the following three schemes:

- The noncooperative [ER](#page-0-0) scheme [\(NCRS\)](#page-0-0): The best ER is chosen from among multiple [ERs](#page-0-0) to forward the signal to the [SN](#page-0-0) [45], [46].
- The traditional cooperative relay scheme [\(TCRS\)](#page-0-0): The [BS](#page-0-0) cooperates with the best [ER](#page-0-0) to forward the signal to the [SN](#page-0-0) [54].
- The multirelay cooperative scheme [\(MRCS\)](#page-0-0): The [ERs](#page-0-0) cooperate to forward the signal to the [SN.](#page-0-0)

Fig. [3](#page-7-2) illustrates the impact of γ_0 on the [SOP.](#page-0-0) It can be seen that with increasing γ_0 , the [SOP](#page-0-0) decreases negligibly for the [NCRS](#page-0-0) but decreases very quickly for the [TCRS](#page-0-0) and [MRCS.](#page-0-0) This behavior can be explained as follows: The channel capacities from the [BS](#page-0-0) to the [SN](#page-0-0) and from the [BS](#page-0-0) to the [EAV](#page-0-0) are functions of γ_0 . In the [NCRS,](#page-0-0) the expressions for the channel capacities of the [BS-SN](#page-0-0) link and the [BS-EAV](#page-0-0) link each contain a single instance of γ_0 . In contrast, in the [TCRS](#page-0-0) and [MRCS,](#page-0-0) the channel capacity of the [BS-SN](#page-0-0) link is obtained from multiple channel capacities that are functions of γ_0 , while the channel capacity of the [BS-EAV](#page-0-0) link is still a single function of γ_0 . Therefore, the secrecy performances of the [MRCS](#page-0-0) and [TCRS](#page-0-0) are significantly improved.

Furthermore, when we set the secrecy constraint to 0.01 (i.e., set the probability of being monitored by the [EAV](#page-0-0) to 1%), the [MRCS](#page-0-0) can achieve secure transmission at $\gamma_0^* = 17.5$ (dB) (this value is found via **Algorithm 1**). Thus, we can conclude that the secrecy performance of the [MRCS](#page-0-0) is better

FIGURE 3. [SOP](#page-0-0) versus γ_0 (dB), with $N = M = 5$, $\alpha = 0.4$, $\rho = 0.6$, $\eta = 0.7$, and $R_{S} = 0.01$.

FIGURE 4. [SOP](#page-0-0) versus the number of [ERs](#page-0-0) N, with $M = 5$, $\gamma_0 = 10$ (dB), $\alpha = 0.4$, $\rho = 0.6$, $\eta = 0.7$, and $R_{\mathcal{S}} = 0.01$.

than those of both the [NCRS](#page-0-0) and the [TCRS,](#page-0-0) and this trend also holds for the remaining simulations.

Fig. [4](#page-7-3) shows the impact of the number of relays on the [SOP.](#page-0-0) We can see that as the number of [SNs](#page-0-0) increases, the secrecy

FIGURE 5. [SOP](#page-0-0) versus the number of [SNs](#page-0-0) *M*, with $N = 5$, $\gamma_0 = 10$ (dB), $\alpha = 0.4$, $\rho = 0.6$, $\eta = 0.7$, and $R_{\mathcal{S}} = 0.01$.

FIGURE 6. [SOP](#page-0-0) versus the [EH](#page-0-0) time proportion α , with $M = 5$, $\gamma_0 = 10$ (dB), $\rho = 0.6$, $\eta = 0.7$, and $R_S = 0.01$.

performance shows minimal improvement for the [NCRS](#page-0-0) but increases very quickly for the [TCRS](#page-0-0) and [MRCS.](#page-0-0) This is because in the [NCRS,](#page-0-0) only the best [ER](#page-0-0) is selected, while in both the [TCRS](#page-0-0) and [MRCS,](#page-0-0) multiple [ERs](#page-0-0) are selected to contribute to the combined information that will be forwarded to the [SN.](#page-0-0) Similar to Fig. [3,](#page-7-2) for the [MRCS,](#page-0-0) there exists an optimal number of [ERs](#page-0-0) that will guarantee the security of the considered system. Note that the optimal number of [ERs](#page-0-0) for the [MRCS,](#page-0-0) $N^* = 6$, is found via **Algorithm 2**.

Fig. [5](#page-8-0) depicts the impact of the number of [SNs](#page-0-0) on the [SOP.](#page-0-0) As the number of [SNs](#page-0-0) increases, the [SOPs](#page-0-0) of the three schemes also increase. This is because the diversity gain at the [SNs](#page-0-0) increases as the number of [SNs](#page-0-0) increases. Furthermore, the [ERs](#page-0-0) forward the signals to the worst [SN](#page-0-0) to guarantee the transmission of information to all [SNs.](#page-0-0) Thus, the probability of successful communication for all [SNs](#page-0-0) decreases with an increasing number of [SNs.](#page-0-0)

Fig. [6](#page-8-1) illustrates the impact of the [EH](#page-0-0) time proportion and the number of [ERs](#page-0-0) on the secrecy performance. The [SOP](#page-0-0) ini-

FIGURE 7. [SOP](#page-0-0) versus the [PS](#page-0-0) ρ , with $M = 5$, $\gamma_0 = 10$ (dB), $\alpha = 0.4$, $\eta = 0.7$, and $R_{\sf S} = 0.01$.

FIGURE 8. [SOP](#page-0-0) versus the [EH](#page-0-0) efficiency coefficient η , with $M = 5$, $\gamma_0 =$ 10 (dB), $\alpha = 0.4$, $\rho = 0.6$, and $R_S = 0.01$.

tially decreases as α increases, reaches an intermediate point, and then increases again. This result occurs because when the [EH](#page-0-0) time proportion is too small, the [ERs](#page-0-0) do not harvest a substantial amount of power; thus, the transmit power levels of the [ERs](#page-0-0) are not sufficient. On the other hand, when α is very large, the transmit power levels at the [ERs](#page-0-0) are quite high, allowing the [EAV](#page-0-0) to more easily capture the signal.

Fig. [7](#page-8-2) presents the impact of the [PS](#page-0-0) ρ and the number of [ERs](#page-0-0) on the [SOP.](#page-0-0) Similar to Fig. [6,](#page-8-1) the [SOP](#page-0-0) decreases to a certain point and then increases as ρ increases. This is because the [ERs](#page-0-0) do not have sufficient power to decode the information when ρ is small, whereas when ρ is large, the transmit power of the [ERs](#page-0-0) is not sufficient to forward the signal to the [SN.](#page-0-0)

Fig. [8](#page-8-3) shows the impact of the [EH](#page-0-0) efficiency coefficient η and the number of [ERs](#page-0-0) on the [SOP.](#page-0-0) As the [EH](#page-0-0) efficiency coefficient of the [ERs](#page-0-0)increases, the [SOP](#page-0-0) will decrease for the [TCRS](#page-0-0) and [MRCS,](#page-0-0) i.e., the secrecy performance will improve. This is because higher η values indicate that more energy is

FIGURE 9. [SOP](#page-0-0) versus the distance d_{SR} from S to R, with $N = 5$, $\alpha = 0.4$ (dB), $\rho = 0.6$, $\eta = 0.7$, and $R_S = 0.01$.

FIGURE 10. [SOP](#page-0-0) versus the distance d_{RD} from R to D, with $N = 5$, $\alpha = 0.4$ (dB), $\rho = 0.6$, $\eta = 0.7$, and $R_S = 0.01$.

being harvested at the [ERs,](#page-0-0) which causes the [BS-SN](#page-0-0) channel capacities to increase for the [TCRS](#page-0-0) and [MRCS.](#page-0-0)

In Figs. [9](#page-9-0) and [10,](#page-9-1) we investigate the impacts on the [SOP](#page-0-0) of the distance d_{SR} from the [BS](#page-0-0) to an [ER](#page-0-0) and of the distance d_{RD} from an [ER](#page-0-0) to an [SN.](#page-0-0) The [SOP](#page-0-0) increases as either *dSR* or *dRD* increases. This is because when the [ER](#page-0-0) is farther from the [BS](#page-0-0) or the [SN](#page-0-0) is farther from the [ER,](#page-0-0) the channel conditions become poorer due to the higher path loss, causing the [SN](#page-0-0) to have difficulty detecting the signal. Furthermore, as seen in Fig. [10,](#page-9-1) the [SOP](#page-0-0) reaches 1 as *dRD* increases (i.e., the system experiences an outage) under the [NCRS,](#page-0-0) while it remains small under the [TCRS](#page-0-0) and [MRCS.](#page-0-0) Thus, it is concluded that both the [TCRS](#page-0-0) and [MRCS](#page-0-0) can be used in the case of longdistance transmission from the [ERs](#page-0-0) to the [SNs;](#page-0-0) however, the secrecy performance of the [MRCS](#page-0-0) is better than that of the [TCRS](#page-0-0) in this case.

Fig. [11](#page-9-2) shows the impact of γ_0 on the [OP](#page-0-0) of the *m*-th [SN.](#page-0-0) As shown, an increase in γ_0 leads to a decrease in the [OP.](#page-0-0) The reason for this result is that the higher the transmit power is,

FIGURE 11. [OP](#page-0-0) versus γ_0 (dB), with $N = 6$, $M = 5$, $\alpha = 0.4$, $\rho = 0.6$, $\eta = 0.7$ and $R_{\Omega} = 0.5$.

FIGURE 12. Throughput τ versus γ_0 (dB), with $N = 6$, $M = 5$, $\alpha = 0.4$, $\rho = 0.6$, $\eta = 0.7$, and $R_{\Omega} = 0.5$.

the more energy is harvested; thus, the [SNs](#page-0-0) can more easily decode the signal. Furthermore, the [OP](#page-0-0) under the [MRCS](#page-0-0) is lower than those under the other schemes. This is because in the [MRCS,](#page-0-0) information from multiple [ERs](#page-0-0) is combined before being forwarded to the [SN.](#page-0-0)

Fig. [12](#page-9-3) depicts the impact of γ_0 on the throughput. Similarly, the throughput under the [MRCS](#page-0-0) is better than those under the other schemes. The throughput gradually improves with increasing γ_0 and becomes stable when γ_0 is sufficiently large. This result occurs because the throughput is related to the [SNR.](#page-0-0) As a consequence of the increase in the [SNR,](#page-0-0) the [OP](#page-0-0) will decrease, and thus, the throughput will be higher.

VI. CONCLUSION

The secrecy performance in terms of the [SOP](#page-0-0) of an [RF](#page-0-0) [EH](#page-0-0) relay [WSN](#page-0-0) in the presence of a passive [EAV](#page-0-0) is studied in this paper. We investigate a communication protocol that is divided into two phases: one for information decoding and [EH](#page-0-0) and one for information relaying. The [MRCS](#page-0-0) is investigated to improve the secrecy performance. Accordingly,

$$
\Theta_{D_m} = \int\limits_{0}^{v_3/(\theta+1)} f_{Y_{R_nE}}(z) \int\limits_{0}^{\infty} f_{X_{SR_n}}(x) F_{Y_{R_nD_m}} \left[\frac{\theta}{x} + (\theta+1) z \right] dx dz + \int\limits_{v_3/(\theta+1)}^{v_3} f_{Y_{R_nE}}(z) \int\limits_{0}^{\infty} f_{X_{SR_n}}(x) dx dz \tag{42}
$$

$$
\Theta_{D_m}^{NCRS} = F_{Y_{R_nE}}(v_3) - F_{Y_{R_nE}}[v_3/(\theta+1)] + \int_{0}^{v_3/(\theta+1)} f_{Y_{R_nE}}(z) \int_{0}^{\theta/[v_3-(\theta+1)z]} f_{X_{SR^*}}(x) dx dz + \int_{0}^{v_3/(\theta+1)} f_{Y_{R_nE}}(z) \int_{\theta/[v_3-(\theta+1)z]}^{\infty} f_{X_{SR^*}}(x) \left(1 - e^{-\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_n D_m}} \frac{v_2[\frac{\theta}{x} + (\theta+1)z]}{v_3 - [\frac{\theta}{x} + (\theta+1)z]}}\right) dx dz
$$
(43)

$$
\Theta_{D_m}^{NCRS} = 1 - \frac{Nv_2v_3}{\Omega_{SR^*}\Omega_{Rn}ev_1} \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} \frac{(-1)^k (N-1)!}{k!(N-1-k)!} e^{v_2 \left(\frac{1}{\Omega_{Rn}D_m} + \frac{1}{\Omega_{Rn}E}\right)} \times \int_{0}^{v_3/(\theta+1)} \int_{\theta/[v_3 - (\theta+1)z]}^{\infty} \frac{e^{-\frac{1}{\Omega_{Rn}E} \frac{v_2v_3}{v_3 - z} - \frac{1}{\Omega_{SR^*}} \frac{(k+1)x}{v_1} - \frac{v_2v_3x}{\Omega_{Rn}D_m} \frac{1}{[v_3 - (\theta+1)z]x - \theta}} dx dz \tag{44}
$$

$$
\Theta_{D_m}^{NCRS} = 1 - \frac{Nv_2v_3}{\Omega_{SR^*}\Omega_{R_nE}v_1} \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} \frac{(-1)^k (N-1)!}{k!(N-1-k)!} e^{\nu_2 \left(\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_nD_m}} + \frac{1}{\Omega_{R_nE}}\right)} \times \int_{0}^{v_3/(\theta+1)} e^{-\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_nE}} \frac{v_2v_3}{v_3 - z} - \frac{v_2v_3}{\Omega_{SR^*}\Omega_{R_nD_m}} \frac{\Omega_{R_nD_m}(k+1)\theta + \Omega_{SR^*}v_1v_2v_3}{v_1[v_3 - (\theta+1)z]}} \int_{0}^{\infty} e^{-\frac{1}{\Omega_{SR^*}} \frac{(k+1)v}{v_1[v_3 - (\theta+1)z]}} - \frac{1}{\Omega_{R_nD_m}} \frac{v_2v_3\theta}{v_1[v_3 - (\theta+1)z]} dydz \quad (45)
$$

$$
\Theta_{D_m}^{MRCS} = F_{Y_{R_nE}}(v_3) - F_{Y_{R_nE}}(v_3/(\theta + 1)) + \int_{0}^{v_3/(\theta + 1)} f_{Y_{R_nE}}(z) \int_{0}^{\theta/[v_3 - (\theta + 1)z]} f_{X_{SR_n}}(x) dx dz + \sum_{i=1}^{N} \prod_{\substack{j=1 \ j \neq i}}^{N} \frac{\Omega_{R_nD_m}}{\Omega_{R_nD_m} - \Omega_{R_jD_m}} \int_{0}^{v_3/(\theta + 1)} f_{Y_{R_nE}}(z) \int_{\theta/[v_3 - (\theta + 1)z]}^{\infty} f_{X_{SR_n}}(x) \left(1 - e^{-\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_nD_m}} \frac{v_2[\frac{\theta}{x} + (\theta + 1)z]}{v_3 - [\frac{\theta}{x} + (\theta + 1)z]}}\right) dx dz
$$
(46)

the [SOP](#page-0-0) under the [MRCS](#page-0-0) is compared with that under the [NCRS.](#page-0-0) To guarantee the security of the system, two algorithms for determining the optimal γ_0 and selecting the optimal [ERs](#page-0-0) are proposed. We also present numerical results obtained from Monte Carlo simulations. We find that the secrecy performance of the [MRCS](#page-0-0) is superior to that of either the [NCRS](#page-0-0) or the [TCRS.](#page-0-0) The numerical results indicate that the secrecy performance of the [MRCS](#page-0-0) is improved by increasing either the number of relays or the [EH](#page-0-0) efficiency coefficient or by decreasing either the distance from the [BS](#page-0-0) to the [ERs](#page-0-0) or the distance from the [ERs](#page-0-0) to the [SNs.](#page-0-0) In future work, we will investigate the issue of imperfect [channel](#page-0-0) [state information \(CSI\);](#page-0-0) furthermore, we aim to explore the practical adoption of [nonorthogonal multiple access](#page-0-0)

[\(NOMA\)](#page-0-0) to further enhance the system performance in a resource-constrained [EH](#page-0-0) [WSN](#page-0-0) [55]–[57] as well as to improve the [PLS](#page-0-0) in a multihop scenario with multiple [EAVs.](#page-0-0) Additionally, various metrics, e.g., the packet loss, transmission delay, and effective capacity can be further investigated [11], [58], [59].

APPENDIX A PROOF OF THEOREM 1

By applying the characteristics of integrals and performing some mathematical manipulations in [\(23\)](#page-4-5), the [SOP](#page-0-0) for the *m*-th [SN](#page-0-0) is rewritten as shown in [\(42\)](#page-10-0), as shown at the top of this page. Next, by substituting [\(27\)](#page-5-2) into [\(42\)](#page-10-0), the integral $\Theta_{D_m}^{NCRS}$ is formulated as shown in [\(43\)](#page-10-1), as shown at the top

$$
\Theta_{D_m}^{MRCS} = e^{-\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_n E}} \frac{v_2[v_3/(\theta+1)]}{v_3 - [v_3/(\theta+1)]}} + \frac{v_2 v_3}{\Omega_{S R_n} \Omega_{R_n E} v_1} e^{\frac{v_2}{\Omega_{R_n E}}} \int_{0}^{v_3/(\theta+1)} \int_{0}^{\theta+1/2} \frac{e^{-\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_n E}} \frac{v_2 v_3}{v_3 - z} - \frac{1}{\Omega_{S R_n} v_1}}}{(v_3 - z)^2} dx dz
$$

+
$$
\sum_{i=1}^{N} \prod_{\substack{j=1 \ j \neq i}}^{N} \frac{\Omega_{R_n D_m}}{\Omega_{R_n D_m} - \Omega_{R_j D_m}} \frac{v_2 v_3}{\Omega_{S R_n} \Omega_{R_n E} v_1} e^{\frac{v_2}{\Omega_{R_n E}}} \int_{0}^{v_3/(\theta+1)} \int_{\theta/[v_3 - (\theta+1)z]}^{\theta} \frac{e^{-\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_n E}} \frac{v_2 v_3}{v_3 - z} - \frac{1}{\Omega_{S R_n} v_1}}}{(v_3 - z)^2} dx dz
$$

-
$$
\sum_{i=1}^{N} \prod_{\substack{j=1 \ j \neq i}}^{N} \frac{\Omega_{R_n D_m}}{\Omega_{R_n D_m} - \Omega_{R_j D_m}} \frac{v_2 v_3}{\Omega_{S R_n} \Omega_{R_n E} v_1} e^{v_2 \left(\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_n E}} + \frac{1}{\Omega_{R_n D_m}}\right)}
$$

$$
\times \int_{0}^{v_3/(\theta+1)} \int_{\theta/[v_3 - (\theta+1)z]}^{\theta} \frac{e^{-\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_n E}} \frac{v_2 v_3}{v_3 - z} - \frac{1}{\Omega_{S R_n} \nu_1} \frac{x}{v_1} - \frac{1}{\Omega_{R_n D_m}} \frac{v_2 v_3 x}{v_3 - (\theta + (\theta+1) z x)}}}{(v_3 - z)^2} dx dz
$$
(47)

$$
\Phi_{D_m}^{NCRS} = 1 - \frac{N}{\Omega_{SR^*}} \sum_{k=0}^{N-1} \frac{(-1)^k (N-1)!}{k! (N-1-k)!} \int_{\frac{\phi\delta}{\nu_1}}^{\infty} e^{-\frac{(1+k)x}{\Omega_{SR^*}} - \frac{1}{\Omega_{Rn}D_m} \frac{\theta_{PR_n}}{\nu_1 x - \phi\delta}} dx
$$
(48)

$$
\Phi_{D_m}^{MRCS} = \int_0^{\phi \delta/\nu_1} \frac{1}{\Omega_{SR_n}} e^{-\frac{x}{\Omega_{SR_n}}} dx + \sum_{i=1}^N \prod_{\substack{j=1 \ j \neq i}}^N \frac{\Omega_{R_n D_m}}{\Omega_{R_n D_m} - \Omega_{R_j D_m}} \int_0^{\infty} \frac{1}{\Omega_{SR_n}} e^{-\frac{x}{\Omega_{SR_n}}} dx \n- \sum_{i=1}^N \prod_{\substack{j=1 \ j \neq i}}^N \frac{\Omega_{R_n D_m}}{\Omega_{R_n D_m} - \Omega_{R_j D_m}} \int_0^{\infty} \frac{1}{\Omega_{SR_n}} e^{-\frac{x}{\Omega_{SR_n}}} e^{-\frac{x}{\Omega_{SR_n}}} e^{-\frac{1}{\Omega_{R_n D_m}} \frac{\phi_{PR_n}}{\psi_1 x - \phi \delta}} dx \quad (49)
$$

of this page. Then, by applying formula (1.111) in [60] and substituting [\(14\)](#page-3-3), [\(25\)](#page-4-6), and [\(28\)](#page-5-2) into [\(43\)](#page-10-1), $\Theta_{D_m}^{NCRS}$ can be rewritten as the function presented in [\(44\)](#page-10-2), as shown at the top of the previous page.

Let us set $y = (v_3 - (\theta + 1)z)x - \theta$; then, after a few steps of calculation, we arrive at the expression for $\Theta_{D_m}^{NCRS}$ shown in [\(45\)](#page-10-3), as shown at the top of the previous page. Finally, $\Theta_{D_m}^{NCRS}$ is obtained from [\(31\)](#page-6-0), where $K_v(x)$ is a *v*-order modified Bessel function of the second kind, Eq. (3.471.9) in [60]. The proof is complete.

APPENDIX B PROOF OF THEOREM 2

Similar to what is shown in **Appendix A**, by substituting [\(15\)](#page-4-7) and [\(27\)](#page-5-2) into [\(42\)](#page-10-0), the [SOP](#page-0-0) for the *m*-th [SN](#page-0-0) under the [MRCS,](#page-0-0) denoted by $\Theta_{D_m}^{MRCS}$, is rewritten as shown in [\(46\)](#page-10-4), as shown at the top of the previous page. Then, we substitute [\(25\)](#page-4-6) and [\(28\)](#page-5-2) into [\(46\)](#page-10-4) to formulate the integral expression for $\Theta_{D_m}^{MRCS}$ shown in [\(47\)](#page-11-0), as shown at the top of this page. Finally, let us set $y = (v_3 - (\theta + 1)z)x - \theta$ in *A*; then, after several steps of calculation, $\Theta_{D_m}^{MRCS}$ is rewritten as shown in [\(33\)](#page-6-1). The proof is complete.

APPENDIX C PROOF OF THEOREM 3

By substituting the [PDF](#page-0-0) of *gSR*[∗] given in [\(14\)](#page-3-3) and the [CDF](#page-0-0) of $g_{R_nD_m}$ given in [\(1\)](#page-2-0) into [\(35\)](#page-6-2), the [OP](#page-0-0) for the *m*-th [SN](#page-0-0) is rewritten as shown in [\(48\)](#page-11-1), as shown at the top of this page. The integral is then solved using Eq. (3.471.9) in [60]. The proof is complete.

APPENDIX D

PROOF OF THEOREM 4

Similar to what is shown in **Appendix C**, by substituting the [PDF](#page-0-0) of g_{SR_n} given in [\(2\)](#page-2-1) and the [CDF](#page-0-0) of g_{RD_m} given in [\(15\)](#page-4-7) into [\(35\)](#page-6-2), the [OP](#page-0-0) for the *m*-th [SN](#page-0-0) under the [MRCS,](#page-0-0) denoted by $\Phi_{D_m}^{MRCS}$, is rewritten as shown in [\(49\)](#page-11-2), as shown at the top of this page. Finally, the integrals from left to right are solved using Eq. (3.351.1), Eq. (3.351.2) and Eq. (3.471.9) in [60], respectively. The proof is complete.

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