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# Joint Resource Allocation and User Association for Heterogeneous Services in Multi-Access Edge Computing Networks

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**ABSTRACT** Multi-access edge computing (MEC) has emerged as a promising technique for low-latency services, in light of its proximity to users and embedded cloud computing capability. In order to improve the network efficiency and fairness, it is crucial and challenging to jointly optimize resource management and user association mechanism with the consideration of heterogeneous services and network conditions. Moreover, the existing studies always neglect the heterogeneities of services on the requirements of both computation capability and storage capability. To solve this issue, we derive a strategy to improve the overall delay-aware performance of heterogeneous services with the MEC capability of computation and storage and the choices of the users' association. Accordingly, a coalition-game-based algorithm is proposed to form user coalitions for association scheme and resource sharing policy. In particular, we mathematically present that the proposed algorithm is capable of convergence and optimality. The simulation results also show that our algorithm gets a good performance efficiently. Furthermore, it reduces the weighted sum of delays of users by average 27.8% and 82.1%, while continuously improving delay-aware fairness, compared with those of the priority-based assignment scheme and the nearest assignment scheme, respectively.

**INDEX TERMS** Multi-access edge computing, resource allocation, user association, coalition game.

# **I. INTRODUCTION**

In the evolvement and advancement to 5G, the prevalence of mobile devices promotes the growth of innovative applications and emerging requirements of services. Concerned with the demands of high computation capability as well as the high energy consumption of devices, cloud computing is envisioned as an effective technology in the past years, which is a central platform of resource management and network provisioning in the core network [1]. The pervasive construction of cloud computing not only support centralized control for resources and networking, but also exposes the problem of bursty traffic burdens on backhaul connections. On the other hand, more heterogeneous services, such as Internet of Things, augmented reality and multimedia, get prevalent for the variety of users' requirement [2]. These services have different requirements for network provisioning and Quality of Service (QoS), which may worsen 5G network degradation as for the explosive traffic data and intensive latency constraint [3], [4].

In light of the urgent challenges, Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC), outlined by ETSI [5], emerges as a representative paradigm for high data rate and low latency services. MEC is expected to provide a seamless cloud-tothing continuum with the high computation capability and large storage capability in proximity to users. It greatly reduces the distance for transmission and focuses essentially on local services to cater to high Quality of Experience (QoE) requirements for users. By leveraging resources effectively, the MEC-enabled network is a key structure for the prosperity of future application and the alleviation of network pressure to the core network [6], [7].

#### A. RELATED WORK

As one of the key technologies for future networks, MEC has attracted many attentions in academic and industry fields recently. Computing offloading is viewed as an effective way with the respect of battery energy limitation of mobile devices and latency requirement of services. To balance both network efficiency and user demand, different offloading mechanisms have been proposed in literature. For instance, in [8], a partial offloading scheme is proposed with time scheduling and channel allocation for energy efficiency. Muñoz *et al.* [9]

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analyze the tradeoff between energy consumption and latency for computing offloading, and then propose an offloading scheme for partial load offloading. In [10], to minimize the energy consumption of task offloading, an offloading decision is proposed for different applications in the multi-cell network. Some works also investigate computing resource allocation for MEC offloading issue. In [11], in the case of file compression, a joint resource allocation and partial offloading scheme is investigated in terms of the QoE perspective. In [12], considering computing resource constraint in MEC server, a load balancing mechanism is proposed for computing offloading to minimize the time consumption. Moreover, a multitude offloading architecture of MEC and cloud is designed for the delay requirement with resource provisioning and scheduling in [13] and [14], respectively.

On the other hand, caching in edge network is an imperative technology for future network revolution. The benefits of edge caching on QoE improvement and energy saving have been widely studied in past works. Based on video resolution and user demand, a proactive caching model is proposed with QoE provisioning and network status for delay minimization in [15]. Reference [16] also considers multiple video content characteristics and develops a corresponding optimal caching policy. In [17], a learning-based method achieves better prediction on caching decision while reducing network cost. Moreover, the multitude architecture of caching is proved as an influential way for network efficiency in accordance with users' behavior [18] and social relationships [19]. Peng *et al.* [20] also give evidence on the relationship between caching decision and network status, particularly network backhaul capability and edge caching size.

As heterogeneous services process simultaneously in MEC, it is necessary to integrate the distinct requirements for resources by multi-services and collaboratively manage resources with a cooperative purpose. Even though in [2] and [21], computing tasks and data requesting tasks are discussed together, the competition for MEC resources between different services is not clarified.

#### B. CONTRIBUTIONS

Similar with works in [2] and [21], two main heterogeneous services are considered working in process in a multi-cell network, that is, computing service and content delivery service. MEC is deployed in all small cells. In particular, computing service users intend to offload tasks to MEC with the respect of high computation capability, while content requested of content delivery service can be cached in MEC for short downloading delay. Users of both of the services take the storage space in MEC, while computing service users also make use of the computation resources. Therefore, there exists a problem to distribute resources to different services in the system. Moreover, in traditional work, users are associated with the nearest access points (APs), who may face the problem of inadequate resources in the overloaded MEC. Thus, a flexible user association scheme is necessary with densely deployed APs.

In this paper, a coalition game based algorithm is derived to optimize the delay-aware performance with the consideration of resource allocation and user association scheme. Coalition game is a mathematical tool utilized to predict the strategy of players with group interaction. Past works on resource allocation in wireless communication network show the effectiveness and efficiency of coalition game theory [22]–[24]. In this paper, coalition formation game is applied to solve the problem of resource management and users association in a multi-cell network, and a coalition structure that maximizes the network utility is exploited. Our contributions are summarized as follows.

- A strategy of resource allocation and users association is proposed to minimize the weighted sum of delays of the collaborative heterogeneous services in the MEC network, i.e. computing service and content delivery service. By taking the advantages of edge network, both storage and computation resources are modeled for allocation with the delay-aware network objective.
- The joint resource allocation and users association issue for heterogeneous services is formulated as a mixed integer nonlinear problem (MINLP). Then, we design a coalition game based algorithm to optimize the solution of resource allocation and users association. Theoretical analysis shows that our proposed algorithm can converge to a Nash-stable solution and achieve optimality.
- Finally, simulation results show that our proposed algorithm can reduce the weighted sum of delays compared with the other schemes. The proposed algorithm also outperforms in terms of users' fairness. Moreover, it is presented that our proposed algorithm gets good performance much efficiently than exhaustive search, which illustrates the practicality of the proposed algorithm.

#### C. ORGANIZATION

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system model and the problem formulation are presented in Section II. In Section III, a coalition game is introduced and a coalition based algorithm is proposed. Then, we give theoretical analysis on stability, optimality and convergence in Section IV. The performance of the proposed algorithm is shown in Section V. Finally, conclusions are given in Section VI.

#### **II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW AND MODELS**

In this section, we first deliver a system overview of the gametheoretic heterogeneous service collaboration in multi-cell network. Then, the problem of resource allocation and user association in MEC is formulated for further investigation.

#### A. SYSTEM OVERVIEW

The network framework of heterogeneous services with MEC is presented in Fig.1. There exist one macro base station (MBS) and a set of APs, denoted as  $K = \{1, 2, ..., K\}$ , in the network. MBS is the main controller of resource allocation and association decision between users and APs, which is



**FIGURE 1.** A multi-cell MEC network for heterogeneous service users. Coalitions are formed with the collaboration among users.

accessed to core network by backhaul link and connected with APs by wireline link. Each AP is equipped with a MEC server with computation and storage capability. It is assumed that the computation capability of MEC is denoted as *Fm*, measured in the number of CPU cycles per second [25], [26] and the storage capability is denoted as *M* bits. It is assumed that bandwidth resources are orthogonal among APs. The overall uplink and downlink bandwidth of a AP are denoted as *B u* and  $B^d$ , respectively. In this paper, we only analyze the intracell interference by the group of associated users. Fig.1 also depicts the coalitions formed by UEs with different APs, which we describe in details in the Section III.

In this paper, user equipments (UEs) are classified into two groups according to the two main heterogeneous services we investigate, i.e., computing service and content delivery service. UEs who requests computing service, denoted as Service 1 UEs in Fig.1, initialize computing tasks which can utilize device processor for computing. Otherwise, users can transmit computing tasks to APs in proximity for processing. On the other hand, the group of content requesting UEs, denoted as Service 2 UEs in Fig.1, derive content downloading requests from the core network server. If the desirable files are previously cached in MEC, UEs can downloading the file directly from MEC. Otherwise, they get the files from the core database. For simplicity, it is assumed that content requesting UEs request independent files. The two groups of UEs mentioned above are denoted as  $\mathcal{N}_0 = \{1, 2, ..., |\mathcal{N}_0|\}$ and  $\mathcal{N}_1 = \{1, 2, ..., |\mathcal{N}_1|\}$ , respectively.  $\mathcal{N} = \{\mathcal{N}_c | c = 0, 1\}$ denotes the overall group of UEs in the network, where  $c =$ {0, 1} denotes the classifications of the two heterogeneous services and  $|N|$  denotes the number of UEs of services.

#### B. OFFLOADING MODEL

The computing task from a computing service UE  $i \in \mathcal{N}_0$ is described as  $x_i^0 = \{b_i^0, w_i^0\}$ , where  $b_i^0$  denotes the input size of the computing task and  $w_i^0$  denotes the requirement of computing capability measured in CPU cycles [25], [26]. For the perspective of offloading strategy, the offloading decision

for UE *i* is denoted as  $\lambda_{ik}^0$ . Here,  $\lambda_{ik}^0 = 1$  if the computing task of UE *i* is offloaded to the MEC at AP *k* and 0 otherwise. It is assumed that each UE can only offload task to one AP. It is obviously that  $1 - \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \lambda_{ik}^0 = 1$  illustrates that the computing task is executed locally at device.

Then, we discuss the completion delay for computing service. For computing task executed locally, the completion delay is the same as computing delay, expressed as  $t_i^0 = \frac{w_i^0}{F_l}$ , where  $F_l$  denotes the computing capability of local device (in CPU cycles per second). On the other side, if  $\lambda_{ik}^0 = 1$ , the completion delay consists of uplink transmission delay and computing delay. The uplink transmission rate is denoted as

$$
r_{ik}^{u} = B^{u} \log_{2} \left( 1 + \frac{p_{i}^{u} G_{ik}^{u}}{\sum\limits_{j \in \{Z_{k}^{0} \backslash i\}} p_{j}^{u} G_{jk}^{u} + \sigma^{2}} \right), \tag{1}
$$

where  $p_i^u$  is the uplink transmission power,  $G_{ik}^u$  is the channel gain from UE *i* to AP *k* and  $\sigma^2$  is the noise power.  $Z_k^0$ denotes the set of computing service UEs offloaded to AP *k*. Then, the completion delay for offloaded computing task is described as  $t_i^0 = \frac{b_i^o}{r_{ik}^u} + \frac{w_i^o}{f_{ik}}$ . Here,  $f_{ik}$  is the computation capability allocated to UE *i* at AP *k*. In summary, the delay of the computing task for UE *i* with regard to offloading decision is given as follows.

$$
t_i^0 = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \lambda_{ik}^0 \left( \frac{b_i^0}{r_{ik}^u} + \frac{w_i^0}{f_{ik}} \right) + \left( 1 - \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \lambda_{ik}^0 \right) \frac{w_i^0}{F_l} \qquad (2)
$$

#### C. CACHING MODEL

In regard of content delivery service, a task of UE *i* is characterized by  $b_i^1$ , which denotes the size of the file requested in bits. The file can be either restored in remote core server, or be previously cached in any AP. This poses a problem for optimal caching allocation for UEs based on the limitation of storage resources. Let  $\lambda_{ik}^1$  denotes the caching decision from UE *i* to AP *k*. Specifically,  $\lambda_{ik}^1 = 1$  if desirable file of UE *i* is cached in AP *k* and 0 otherwise. Assume that a requesting file of any UE can only be cached in one AP. Therefore,  $1 - \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \lambda_{ik}^1 = 0$  means that the file for UE *i* is cached in core network.

The delay for files cached in remote server consists of wireline delay from core network to APs and the wireless downloading delay. On the other hand, if the file is cached in AP, the delay is only the downlink transmission delay from a certain AP to the UE. The downlink transmission rate from AP *k* to UE *i* is denoted as

$$
r_{ik}^d = B^d \log_2 \left( 1 + \frac{\frac{p_k^d}{|Z_k^1|} G_{ik}^d}{\sum\limits_{j \in \{Z_k^1 \setminus i\}} \frac{p_k^d}{|Z_k^1|} G_{jk}^d + \sigma^2} \right), \tag{3}
$$

where  $p_k^d$  is the downlink transmission power of AP *k*,  $G_{ik}^d$ is the channel gain from AP *k* to UE *i* and  $Z_k^1$  denotes the

set of content delivery service UEs associated to AP *k*, with  $|Z_k^1|$  as the number of UEs in  $Z_k^1$ . Let  $r^b$  denotes the average transmission rate of wireline link. Then, the delay of the content delivery task of UE *i* in terms of caching allocation decision is expressed as follows.

$$
t_i^1 = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \lambda_{ik}^1 \left( \frac{b_i^1}{r_{ik}^d} \right) + \left( 1 - \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \lambda_{ik}^1 \right) \left( \frac{b_i^1}{r^b} + \frac{b_i^1}{r_{ik'}^d} \right) \tag{4}
$$

Here, we assume that UEs get the files from the nearest  $APk'$ if the requesting file is stored in core network and  $r_{ik}^d$  denotes the corresponding transmission speed.

#### D. PROBLEM FORMULATION

Both of the two services are deployed in the MEC network. Computing service UEs occupy both computation and storage resources in the associated APs. On the other hand, content delivery service UEs take the storage space if their requesting files are cached. Considering these two heterogeneous services together, there exists a challenge of resource allocation and association decision concerned with UEs. Let  $\omega_i^c$  denotes the delay sensitive coefficient of UE *i* for service class *c*, similar with that in [27]. Larger value of  $\omega_i^c$  illustrates the higher requirement of task delay. Thus, we formulate the weighted sum of delays of UEs shown as follows.

$$
WT = \sum_{c=0}^{1} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}_c} \omega_i^c t_i^c.
$$
 (5)

*WT* can illustrate the performance of QoE in terms of service requirements and individual pays. Then, the network objective is to find the feasible resource allocation on computation and storage resources in MEC and the association assignment  $\lambda = {\lambda_i^c, c = 0, 1, i \in \mathcal{N}_c}$  to minimize the value of *WT* . This problem can be formulated as

$$
\min_{\{\lambda_{ik}^c, j_{ik}\}} \sum_{c=0}^{1} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}_c} \omega_i^c t_i^c
$$
\n
$$
s.t. C1: \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \lambda_{ik}^c \le 1, \quad \forall i, c
$$
\n
$$
C2: \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}_0} \lambda_{ik}^0 f_{ik} \le F_m, \quad \forall k
$$
\n
$$
C3: \sum_{c=0}^{1} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}_c} \lambda_{ik}^c b_i^c \le M, \quad \forall k.
$$
\n(6)

Constraint C1 ensures that one UE can associated to one AP at most. Constraints C2-C3 guarantee the resource limitations in MEC. The problem in (6) is MINLP, which is NP-hard to solve.

#### **III. COALITION GAME APPROACH**

In this section, coalition game is utilized to model the association assignment between APs and UEs. Then, a coalition game based algorithm for resource allocation and association decision is proposed.

In light of the formulated problem to minimize the weighted sum of delays, a coalition game model is introduced as UEs have incentives to form coalitions in order to decrease the value of WT. There are  $K$  APs with MEC and  $|\mathcal{N}|$  UEs in the network, where UEs associated with the same AP share resources and form a coalition. Moreover, computing service UEs can execute locally while content files from content delivery service can be stored in core network, thus, we suppose that there are  $(K + N_0 + 1)$  coalitions formed by UEs in the network. Let  $F = \{F_1, ..., F_{K+N_0}, F_{K+N_0+1}\}\$  denotes the collection of coalitions, where  $F_x \cap F_y = \emptyset$ ,  $\forall F_x, F_y \in F$ , and  $\bigcup_{x=1}^{K+N_0+1} F_x = \mathcal{N}$ . The cardinality of *F* is the number of coalitions. In addition, for any  $F_x \in F$ ,  $x \in \{1, 2, ..., K\}$ , the coalition is composed of the set of UEs associated with AP *x*. For any  $F_x \in F$ ,  $x \in \{K+1, K+2, ..., K+N_0\}$ , the coalition is the local device UE *x* of computing service. For  $F_{K+N_0+1} \in F$ , the coalition is the set of UEs of content delivery service whose requesting files are cached in core network.

It can be observed that the larger the number of UEs associated with a certain AP of any service, the greater the transmission interference with less resources allocated individually. Processing locally for computing task or caching in remote server have no efforts to decrease *WT* as for larger completion delay. Therefore, there is no motivation for UEs to neither form a grand coalition nor complete tasks uncooperatively. This promotes the further investigation to explore the optimal coalition structure. In this paper, the optimal resource allocation and association assignment are modeled in a coalition formation game with transferable utility [24], [28], where UEs as game players, tend to form coalitions to improve the overall game utility. Then, we define the following coalition formation game with transferable utility.

*Definition 1 (Coalition Game With Transferable Utility):* A coalition game with transferable utility for resource allocation of heterogeneous services is defined by a pair  $(N, Q)$ , where  $N$  is the set of players, and  $Q$  is the payoff function. For any coalition structure  $F$ ,  $Q(F)$  represents the network utility calculated with players cooperative structure *F*. Thus, the utility function of a partition  $F$  can be defined as

$$
Q(F) = WT_{ind} - WT,
$$
\n(7)

where *WTind* is the weighted sum of UEs' delays when all computing service UEs execute task processing locally and content delivery service UEs get the requesting files from the core network. Then,  $WT_{ind} = \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}_0} \omega_i^0$  $\frac{w_i^0}{F_l}$  +  $\sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}_1} \omega_i^1$  $\left(\frac{b_i^1}{r^b} + \frac{b_i^1}{r_{ik'}^d}\right)$  . In addition, the utility of a certain coalition  $F_x$  is defined as follows.

$$
Q(F_x) = WT_{ind, F_x} - \left(\sum_{i \in Z_x^0} \omega_i^0 t_i^0 + \sum_{i \in Z_x^1} \omega_i^1 t_i^1\right). \tag{8}
$$

Here,  $WT_{ind, F_x}$  is the weighted sum of delays for the set of UEs in coalition  $k$  if they are not supported by MEC,

i.e.,  $WT_{ind,F_x} = \sum_{i \in Z_x^0} \omega_i^0$  $\frac{w_i^0}{F_l} + \sum_{i \in \mathbb{Z}_x^1} \omega_i^1$  $\left(\frac{b_i^1}{r^b} + \frac{b_i^1}{r_{ik'}^d}\right)$  . For any  $F_x \in F$ , the value of  $Q(F_x)$  can be distributed to its members.

It is obvious that the greater payoff function is, the less *WT* defined in (5). Thus, the maximization of the utility  $Q(F)$ ,  $F \in \mathbb{F}$  is equal to the optimization problem in (6). Further, we define a coalition formation game for resource allocation and UE's association of heterogeneous services according to the basics in [29].

*Definition 2 (Coalition Formation Game for Resource Allocation of Services):* The coalition formation game for resource allocation and UEs' association of heterogeneous services is defined by  $(N, Q, F)$ , where *F* is the partition of all UEs and  $F \in \mathbb{F}$ . To be specific, the partition *F* is the collection of coalitions  $S = \{S_1, ..., S_L\}$  where *L* is the number of the coalitions with  $\bigcup_{l=1}^{L} S_l = \mathcal{N}$ .

# B. COALITION GAME BASED ALGORITHM

The essential ingredient of the coalition formation game is to design a well defined order to compare two partitions, and then set rules to enable players join or break their coalitions based on preference. Thus, we present the following preference relation for UEs.

*Definition 3 (Preference Relation):* The preference relation for any two partitions of the subset  $A \subseteq \mathcal{N}$  is defined as  $\triangleright$ .  $F \triangleright F'$  denotes that partition *F* is preferable than *F'* to the overall players of *A*. For any UE  $i \in \mathcal{N}$ , the preference relation is defined by  $\succ_i$ .  $F_x \succ_i F_y$  denotes that partition  $F_x$ is preferable than  $F_v$  for UE *i*.

In this paper, UEs decide to join or leave a coalition in accordance with the utility of the partition. In summary, the preference for two partition  $F$  and  $F'$  of UEs can be defined as follows:

$$
F \succ F' \Leftrightarrow Q(F) > Q(F').
$$
\n(9a)  
\n
$$
F_x \succ_i F_y \Leftrightarrow Q(F_x') + Q(F_y') > Q(F_x) + Q(F_y),
$$
\n
$$
F_x' = (F_x \cup \{i\}), \quad F_y' = (F_y \setminus \{i\}).
$$
\n(9b)

It is observed that  $F > F'$  is guaranteed by preference condition in (9b), where the new partition formed in (9b) is  $F' = (F \setminus \{F_x, F_y\}) \cup F'_x \cup F'_y$ . Furthermore, assume that the current partition of  $N$  is  $F = \{F_1, ..., F_{K+N_0}, F_{K+N_0+1}\},$ we define three operations for UEs of different services to join or leave the coalitions, shown as follows:

- *Merge Operation:* For computing service UE *i*, the merge operation starts only if its coalition is  $F_{K+i}$ , while UE *i* is able to join the new coalition  $F_k$ ,  $k \leq$ *K*. The preference is only influenced by the original coalition and new coalition. Thus, the merge operation is operated if  $F_k \succ_i F_{K+i}$ ,  $k \leq K$ . Similarly, for content delivery service UE *i*, the merge operation from its coalition  $F_{K+N_0+1}$  to new coalition  $F_k, k \leq K$  is operated if  $F_k \succ_i F_{K+N_0+1}, k \leq K$ .
- *Split Operation:* For computing service UE *i*, the split operation starts only when comparing its current

#### **Algorithm 1** Coalition Game Based Algorithm

- 1: **Initialization:** Develop a random partition *Fini*.
- 2: Let  $F_{cur} = F_{ini}$ . Set  $n = 2, T_n = T_0$ .
- 3: **while** not converges to Nash-stable **do**
- 4: Uniformly randomly choose user *i* and its coalition  $F_x$ .
- 5: //Merge and Split Operations
- 6: **if**  $i \in \mathcal{N}_0$  and  $F_x = F_{K+i}$  **then**
- 7: Uniformly randomly choose a new coalition  $F_y$ ,  $y \leq$ *K*.
- 8: **end if**
- 9: **if**  $i \in \mathcal{N}_0$  and  $F_x \neq F_{K+i}$  then
- 10: Let  $F_y = F_{K+i}$ .
- 11: **end if**
- 12: **if**  $i \in \mathcal{N}_1$  and  $F_x = F_{K+N_0+1}$  then
- 13: Uniformly randomly choose a new coalition  $F_y$ ,  $y \leq$ *K*.
- 14: **end if**
- 15: **if**  $i \in \mathcal{N}_1$  and  $F_x \neq F_{K+N_0+1}$  then
- 16: Let  $F_y = F_{K+N_0+1}$ .
- 17: **end if**
- 18: Let  $F' = (F \setminus \{F_x, F_y\}) \cup \{F_x \setminus \{i\}, F_y \cup \{i\}\}.$

.

19: **if**  $F' > F$  **then** 

$$
20: \qquad \text{Update } F_{cur} = F'
$$

21: **else**

- 22: **if**  $F > F'$  and  $\rho_{F,F'}(T_n) > rand$  **then**
- 23: Update  $F_{cur} = F'$ .
- 24: **end if**
- 25: **end if**
- 26: //Exchange Operation
- 27: Uniformly randomly choose two users *i*, *j* and their corresponding coalitions  $F_x$ ,  $F_y$ ,  $x$ ,  $y \le K$ .

28: Let 
$$
F' = \{F_{x} \setminus \{i\} \cup \{j\}, F_{y} \setminus \{j\} \cup \{i\}\}.
$$
  $(F \setminus \{F_{x}, F_{y}\})$   $\cup$ 

- 29: **if**  $F' > F$  **then**
- 30: Update  $F_{cur} = F'$ .
- 31: **else**
- 32: **if**  $F > F'$  and  $\rho_{F,F'}(T_n) > rand$  **then**
- 33: Update  $F_{cur} = F'$ .
- 34: **end if**
- 35: **end if**
- 36: Let  $n = n + 1$ ;  $T_n = \frac{T_0}{\log(n-1)}$ .
- 37: **end while**

coalition  $F_k$ ,  $k \leq K$  and new coalition  $F_{K+i}$ . The preference is only influenced by the original coalition and destination coalition. Thus, the split operation is operated if  $F_{K+i}$ <sup> $\succ$ </sup><sub>*i*</sub> $F_k$ ,  $k \leq K$ . Similarly, for content delivery service UE *i*, the split operation from its current coalition  $F_k, k \leq K$  to new coalition  $F_{K+N_0+1}$  is operated if  $F_{K+N_0+1} \rightarrow iF_k, k \leq K$ .

• *Exchange Operation:* Assume that any two UEs *i*, *j* ∈ N with their corresponding coalition  $F_x, F_y, x, y \leq K$ . A new partition of  $\hat{\mathcal{N}}$  is denoted as  $F' = (F \setminus \{F_x, F_y\}) \cup$  ${F_x \setminus \{i\} \cup \{j\}, F_y \setminus \{j\} \cup \{i\}}$ . The exchange operation is operated for UE *i* and *j* if  $F > F'$ .

Operations are only feasibly executed when constraints C1-C3 are satisfied. Moreover, there is a chance for carrying out the operations if the new partition is not preferred in each operation. Based on the method of simulated annealing, an acceptance probability for changing to new partition is designed as

$$
\rho_{F,F'}(T_n) = e^{\frac{Q(F') - Q(F)}{T_n}}, \qquad (10)
$$

where  $T_n = \frac{T_0}{\log(n-1)}$ .  $T_0$  is the initial temperature in simulated annealing, and *n* is the current number of iterations. The acceptance probability  $\rho_{F,F}(T_n)$  is designed for avoidance of the premature for convergence, which may turn out to be a local optimum for the optimization problem.

In each iteration, resource allocation of computation resources in APs are investigated after every operation. With deterministic association assignment  $\lambda$  after the execution of any operation, the optimization problem can be solved independently among APs, which is shown as follows.

$$
\min_{\{f_{ik}\}} \sum_{i \in F_k} \omega_i^0 \left( \frac{b_i^0}{r_{ik}^u} + \frac{w_i^0}{f_{ik}} \right)
$$
\n
$$
s.t. \sum_{i \in F_k} f_{ik} \le F_m \quad \forall k.
$$
\n(11)

The optimization of resource allocation is convex to  $f_k =$  ${f_{ik}, i \in F_k}, k \leq K$ . Therefore, it is feasibly solved by KKT conditions. The Lagrangian function can be presented as

$$
L(f_k, \lambda) = \sum_{i \in F_k} \omega_i^0 \left( \frac{b_i^0}{r_{ik}^u} + \frac{w_i^0}{f_{ik}} \right) + \lambda \left( \sum_{i \in F_k} f_{ik} - F_m \right), \quad (12)
$$

where  $\lambda$  is the variable of nonnegative Lagrangian multiplier. Then, the optimal  $\lambda$  and  $f_k$  must satisfy the following equalities:

$$
\frac{dL(f_k, \lambda)}{df_{ik}} = -\frac{\omega_i^0 w_i^0}{f_{ik}^2} + \lambda = 0 \tag{13}
$$

$$
\frac{dL(f_k, \lambda)}{d\lambda} = \sum_{i \in F_k} f_{ik} - F_m = 0.
$$
 (14)

Thus, the optimal solution of computation resource is shown as

$$
\lambda^* = \frac{\left(\sum_{i \in F_k} \sqrt{\omega_i^0 w_i^0}\right)^2}{F_m^2}
$$
\n(15)

$$
f_{ik}^* = \frac{F_m \sqrt{\omega_i^0 w_i^0}}{\sum\limits_{i \in F_k} \sqrt{\omega_i^0 w_i^0}}, \quad \forall k, i.
$$
 (16)

The coalition game based algorithm for resource allocation and association assignment with heterogeneous services is summarized in Algorithm 1. In each iteration, the system randomly chooses an UE *i* for merge or split operation. The information of its current coalition  $F_x$  and a new coalition  $F_y$ 

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is got as shown in Line 6-17, which are then compared with each other according to preference relation. If new partition after the operation are preferable, the operation is carried out. Otherwise, the operation is executed within an acceptance probability related to the number of iterations completed, shown in Line 19-25. Then, the system uniformly choose two UEs *i*, *j* with their corresponding coalitions  $F_x$  and  $F_y$ for exchange operation as shown in Line 27. Coalitions *F<sup>x</sup>* and  $F<sub>y</sub>$  exchange their member *i* and *j* to form a new partition  $F'$  in Line 28. If the new partition after exchanging is preferable, the exchange operation is carried out. Otherwise, it still works out within an acceptance probability, as shown in Line 29-35. The algorithm ends if converges to a Nash-stable solution or reaches the maximal number of iterations.

#### **IV. THEORETIC ANALYSIS**

In this section, the stability of the proposed algorithm is analyzed. Then, the optimality is presented based on Markov chain theory. Finally, the convergence of the proposed algorithm is given.

#### A. STABILITY

*Definition 4 (Nash-Stable Structure):* A coalition structure is Nash-stable if  $\forall i \in \mathcal{N}$ , no further operations are carried out.

*Theorem 1:* The final coalition structure *Ffin* in Algorithm 1 is Nash-stable.

*Proof:* In every iteration of Algorithm 1, the partition is either reformed to a new structure or stays the same. Since the number of coalition is  $K + N_0 + 1$ , the maximal number of coalition structures is finite. Thus, after a certain number of operation with merging, splitting and exchanging, the change of partition is terminated and converged to the a final structure. If the final partition *Ffin* of Algorithm 1 is not Nash-stable, there exists  $i \in \mathcal{N}$  with its coalition  $F_x$ , and  $F_y \in F_{fin}, F_y \neq F_x$  such that  $F_y$  is preferred to *i* than  $F_x$ , or there exist  $i, j \in \mathcal{N}$  with their corresponding coalitions  $F_x$  and  $F_y$  such that  $Q(F') > Q(F_{fin})$ where  $F' = \{F_{fin} \setminus \{F_x, F_y\} \cup \{F_x \setminus \{i\} \cup \{j\}, F_y \setminus \{j\} \cup \{i\}\}.$ According to the definition of operations, one of merging, splitting and exchanging operations is made definitely. This is contrary to the definition that *Ffin* is the final partition. Therefore, the final partition *Ffin* obtained by Algorithm 1 is a Nash-stable coalition structure.

#### B. OPTIMALITY

*Theorem 2:* The solution obtained by Algorithm 1 converges to optimality with increasing number of operations.

*Proof:* The process of evolvement of the partition of UEs can be seen as a Markov chain in terms of parameter *Tn*. Then, we first prove that the Markov chain  $\{F(T_n)\}$  is ergodic. Denote the current partition and new partition as  $F$  and  $F'$ , respectively. Referring to Algorithm 1, when  $F'$  is preferred rather than *F*, that is,  $Q(F') > Q(F)$ , the transition of partition is accepted with probability 1. Whereas, the partition changes to the worse one with a probability  $\rho_{F,F}(T_n)$ . Obviously, the probability of transiting to  $F'$  that is worse than  $F$  is

reduced as  $|Q(F') - Q(F)|$  increases. Thus, the probability of transition of the partition in the *nth* phase is expressed as follows.

$$
\rho_{F,F'}(T_n) = \begin{cases} 1 & Q(F) < Q(F') \\ \frac{Q(F') - Q(F)}{T_n} & Q(F) \ge Q(F'). \end{cases}
$$
(17)

Then, we can obtain that

$$
\lim_{T_n \to 0} \rho_{F,F'}(T_n) = \begin{cases} 1 & Q(F) < Q(F') \\ 1 & Q(F) = Q(F') \\ 0 & Q(F) > Q(F'). \end{cases} \tag{18}
$$

This implies that the proposed algorithm is less permissive as *T<sup>n</sup>* reaches 0. We define

$$
\underline{\rho_{F,F'}}(T_n) = \inf_{F \in \mathbb{F}, F' \in N(F)} \rho_{F,F'}(T_n),\tag{19}
$$

where  $N(F)$  is the set of neighbors of *F*. According to (17),  $\rho_{F,F}(T_n)$  can be expressed as

$$
\frac{\rho_{F,F'}(T_n) = \inf_{\substack{F,F' \in \mathbb{F} \\ F' \neq F}} \rho_{F,F'}(T_n)}{\inf_{\substack{F', F' \in \mathbb{F} \\ F, F' \in \mathbb{F}}} e^{\frac{Q(F') - Q(F)}{T_n}} \ge e^{-\frac{\Delta}{T_n}} \qquad (20)
$$
\n
$$
\frac{Q(F) > Q(F')}{Q(F) > Q(F')}
$$

where  $\Delta = \sup\{Q(F) - Q(F'), F' \in N(F)\}\)$ . Since  $\Delta$  is a constant in the process, we can set  $T_0 \leq G\Delta$ , where *G* is a relatively large constant. Moreover, as  $T_n = \frac{T_0}{\log(n-1)}$ , the cooling schedule  ${T_n}_{n>0}$  in simulated annealing satisfies

$$
T_n \le \frac{T_0}{\log(n)}.\tag{21}
$$

Thus, we can have

$$
\sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \left( \frac{\rho_{F,F'}(T_{nG}) \right)^G \ge \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} e^{\frac{-G\Delta}{T_n}}
$$

$$
\ge \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} e^{\frac{G\Delta}{T_0} \log \frac{1}{nG}}
$$

$$
\ge \sum_{n=1}^{\infty} \frac{1}{nG} = \infty.
$$
 (22)

Based on [30, Ch. 7, Th. 8.1],  $\{F(T_n)\}$  is weakly ergodic. Furthermore, in view of Theorem 8.2 of Chapter 6 in [30],  ${F(T_n)}$  is strongly ergodic. Also,  ${F(T_n)}$  is irreducible, thus, the stationary distribution exists and is unique, which is equal to the limiting probability as *n* sufficiently large of Algorithm 1. Denote the stationary distribution of  ${F(T_n)}$ as  $\pi(F)$ , thus, the stationary distribution is shown as

$$
\pi(F) = \frac{e^{Q(F)/T_n}}{\sum_{F' \in \mathbb{F}} e^{Q(F')/T_n}}
$$
\n(23)

In the next step, we verify that the limiting probability vector, which is the same as the stationary distribution, pulls all its mass on the set of global maxima of the utility function  $Q(\cdot)$ , which equally reaches the set of minima of the original

$$
H = \{ X \in \mathbb{F}; Q(X) \ge Q(Y), \forall Y \in \mathbb{F} \}. \tag{24}
$$

Define the maxima of transferable utility of coalition game as  $m = \max_{X \in \mathbb{F}} Q(X)$ . By dividing the numerator and denominator of  $\pi(F)$  in (23) by  $e^{-\frac{m}{T_n}}$ , then, we can rewrite the stationary distribution as

$$
\pi(F) = \frac{e^{-\frac{m - Q(F)}{T_n}}}{\sum_{F' \in \mathbb{F}} -\frac{m - Q(F')}{T_n}} \\
= \frac{e^{-\frac{m - Q(F)}{T_n}}}{|H| + \sum_{F' \in \mathbb{F}, F' \notin H} -\frac{m - Q(F')}{T_n}}.\n\tag{25}
$$

As the number of operations *n* increases,  $T_n \to 0$ . Thus, we get

$$
\lim_{T_n \to 0} e^{-\frac{m - Q(F')}{T_n}} = \begin{cases} 1 & F' \in H \\ 0 & F' \notin H. \end{cases}
$$
 (26)

Then, the stationary distribution when  $T_n \to 0$  is equal to

$$
\lim_{T_n \to 0} \pi(F) = \begin{cases} \frac{1}{|H|} & F \in H \\ 0 & F \notin H. \end{cases}
$$
 (27)

This shows that the steady state converges to the global maxima of the coalition game with probability 1. As the maxima of coalition game is equal to the minima of the original problem in (6), Algorithm 1 is verified to converge to the set of global optimum, which minimize the weighted sum of delays of UEs in the network.

#### C. CONVERGENCE

In each iteration of Algorithm 1, one UE is chose such that the utilities of the current associated coalition and another chose coalition are calculated. Then, a merging or splitting operation is performed with the probability in (17). Similarly, exchanging decision is made based on the coalitions of the two randomly chose users. Consequently, there are almost two operations in each iteration. The fast convergence performance of the proposed algorithm is shown in Figure 10 and section V.F, which show the efficiency of the proposed algorithm.

#### **V. SIMULATION RESULTS**

In this section, we evaluate the simulation results of the proposed Coalition Game Based Algorithm, referred as *CGBA*, for resource allocation and association assignment of heterogeneous services. We consider a network with area size  $200 \times 200$ . There exist  $|\mathcal{K}| = 10$  APs and  $|\mathcal{N}| = 50$  UEs, which are uniformly randomly distributed in this area. The group of UEs for two services are divided by the parameter user ratio  $\alpha = 0.5, 0 \le \alpha \le 1, |\mathcal{N}_0| = |\alpha|\mathcal{N}|$ , and  $|\mathcal{N}_1| = \frac{\Gamma(1-\alpha)}{\mathcal{N}|}$ . Here,  $\alpha = 0.5$ . The size of the input  $b_i^0$ has uniform distribution within the range [10, 100] Mbits, and the computation requirement  $w_i^0 = 2000 \times b_i^0$  for computing



**FIGURE 2.** Performance of the weighted sum of delays with increasing number of UEs in terms of CGBA and the optimal solution.



**FIGURE 3.** Performance of the weighted sum of delays with increasing number of APs in terms of CGBA and the optimal solution.

service UEs. The size of the file  $b_i^1$  is uniformly distributed within the range [100, 500] Mbits. The transmission power of UEs and APs are  $p_i^u = 20$  dBm and  $p_k^d = 30$  dBm, respectively. The noise power is  $\sigma^2 = 2.0 \times 10^{-11}$  W. The computation capability and storage capability in each AP are  $F_m = 5 \times 10^9$  CPU cycles/s and  $M = 2$  GB, respectively. The local computation capability is  $F_l = 0.5 \times 10^9$  CPU cycles/s. We set  $\omega_i^c = 1, \forall c, i$ .

# A. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WITH OPTIMAL **SOLUTION**

In this section, we present that our proposed CGBA gets the solution of the weighted sum of delays close to the optimum. The optimal solution is generated by exhaustive search for optimal solution of resource allocation and association assignment. The complexity of optimality search is  $O((K+1)^{|\mathcal{N}|})$ , which exponentially increases with the number of APs and UEs. We firstly set  $K = 5$  and vary  $|\mathcal{N}|$ from 1 to 7. The performance comparison of the weighted sum of delays between CGBA and the optimal solution is shown in Fig.2. Then, we evaluate the performance with  $|\mathcal{N}| = 8$  and the number of APs ranging from 1 to 7, as shown in Fig.3. From these two figures, it is observed that the performance of CGBA is almost the same to the optimal solution. Further, we calculate the average deviation from

CGBA to the optimum in the cases of these two figures. The average deviation is defined as  $D = \frac{1}{7} \sum_{n=1}^{7}$ *x*=1  $WT^{CGBA}(x) – WT^{OP}(x)$  $\frac{f(x)-W1 - f(x)}{W T^{OP}(x)},$ where  $WT^{CGBA}(x)$  and  $WT^{OP}(x)$  denotes the weighted sum of delays of all UEs by CGBA and exhaustive search with different parameter *x*, respectively. Here, *x* denotes either the number of UEs in Figure 2 or the number of APs in Figure 3. In consequence, the average deviation  $D = 15.9\%$  with different number of UEs and  $D = 2.0\%$  with different number of APs.

# B. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON WITH OTHER SCHEMES In this section, the performance of the proposed CGBA is evaluated and compared with the following schemes:

- 1) PRiority ASsignment (PRAS), which is a modified version of the scheme in our former work in [31]. For all UEs, their priorities are the same as the task delay without MEC. UEs are able to choose their best APs for assignment based on the priorities, for example, the best choice for UE *i* to associate with is  $k^*$  =  $\argmin_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \omega_i^c t_i^c$ ,  $\forall c$ . Resource allocation is optimized each time an UE is assigned to a certain AP.
- 2) NEarest ASsignment (NEAS), where UEs associate with their corresponding nearest APs in a random order. If the AP is overloaded without extra resources, following UEs will either compute locally or get files from the core network.
- 3) WithOut MEC (WOMEC), where computing service UEs execute locally, and content delivery UEs get the desirable files from the core network.

Fig.4 presents the comparison of CGBA to the other schemes mentioned above in terms of the weighted sum of delays of UEs. It can be observed that CGBA, PRAS and NEAS all make efforts to reduce the weighted sum of delays *WT* with increasing amount of computing resources in MEC. Our proposed CGBA outperforms compared with the other scheme with much lower value of *WT* and continuous decreasing trend. Moreover, Fig.5 investigates the results of the weighted sum of delays with increasing number of UEs for CGBA and the other schemes. The proposed CGBA achieves the lowest value of *WT* under different number of UEs in the network. In addition, *WT* of CGBA increases slowly compared to those of the other schemes, which means that with larger number of UEs, our proposed algorithm makes more impacts on task delay reduction compared to PRAS, NEAS and WOMEC. Specifically, CGBA reduces the weighted sum of delays with average 27.8%, 82.1% and 85.5% to those of PRAS, NEAS, WOMEC, respectively.

# C. FAIRNESS COMPARISON OF CGBA WITH OTHER SCHEMES

In this section, the fairness of resource allocation for UEs in the network is further discussed. The performance of fairness is an ignorable issue to evaluate the optimization of resource allocation [32], since all UE expect better QoE performance.



**FIGURE 4.** Performance on the weighted sum of delays of UEs of CGBA in the comparison with the other schemes with different amount of resources in MEC.



**FIGURE 5.** Performance on the weighted sum of delays of UEs of CGBA in the comparison with the other schemes with different number of UEs.

As we optimize the delay-aware performance of UEs, the task delay is a main concern for UEs. Therefore, we evaluate the fairness performance in terms of task delay. Similar with in [33] and [34], we adopt the fairness index denoted as

$$
FI = \frac{\left(\sum_{c=0}^{1} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{N}_c} t_i^c\right)^2}{|\mathcal{N}| \sum_c \sum_i \left(t_i^c\right)^2}.
$$
 (28)

*FI* locates in the range (0, 1], and higher value of *F* indicates better performance of fairness.

In Fig.6, we evaluate the results of fairness index *FI* with different amount of computation resources in terms of CGBA and the other schemes for comparison. It is observed that as the amount of resources increases, NEAS has worse performance of fairness, and PRAS cannot always make impacts on the improvement of fairness. It is because that NEAS neglects the feasible resources at the accessible APs beyond the nearest one, and for PRAS, the UEs with higher priorities are given more resources than those with lower priorities. On the other hand, CGBA gets higher fairness index as *F<sup>m</sup>* increases. The increment of *F<sup>m</sup>* increases the computing capability of all accessible APs besides the nearest one. Since



**FIGURE 6.** Fairness performance of CGBA versus different amount of computation resources in comparison to the other schemes.



**FIGURE 7.** Fairness performance of CGBA versus different number of UEs in comparison to the other schemes.

CGBA has a flexible and optimal user association scheme, users are allocated more sufficient resources as *F<sup>m</sup>* increases, which increases the users' fairness index *FI*.

Fig.7 depicts the fairness index with increasing number of UEs. The larger number of UEs, the higher load in the network. It is shown that NEAS worsens the fairness performance when changing the number of UEs due to its fixed association scheme. CGBA and PRAS are shown to increase the fairness index with increasing number of UEs. Moreover, our proposed CGBA gets the largest fairness index compared with the other. Both of the figures indicates that our proposed algorithm achieves good delay-aware performance with the fair resource allocation mechanism in accordance with the results in Fig.4 and Fig.5.

## D. RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR HETEROGENEOUS **SERVICES**

As mentioned before, computing service and content delivery service compete on storage resources in MEC, and this pose the problem for storage resource allocation in the network. In this section, we investigate the resource allocated to heterogeneous services concerned with delay sensitive coefficients and user distribution. Fig.8 presents the resource allocation ratio allocated to computing service versus the difference of



**FIGURE 8.** Storage resource allocation ratio of computing service in terms of different user ratio α.



**FIGURE 9.** The performance on the weighted sum of delays in terms of different  $|\mathcal{N}|$  versus different  $|\mathcal{K}|$ .

delay sensitive coefficients of two services. Here, we assume that  $\omega^0 = \omega_i^0$ ,  $\forall i \in \mathcal{N}_0$ ,  $\omega^1 = \omega_i^1$ ,  $\forall i \in \mathcal{N}_0$ . The vertical axis is calculated as  $\frac{M^0}{M^0+M^1}$ , where  $M^0$  and  $M^1$  denote the sum of storage resources allocated to computing service and content delivery service, respectively. It is shown that as the number of computing service UEs increases, the storage allocated to this service increases even with a lower delay sensitive coefficient. This is reasonable according to the pursuit of *WT* minimization.

# E. CGBA's PERFORMANCE UNDER DIFFERENT  $|\mathcal{N}|$  AND  $|\mathcal{K}|$

In this section, the performance on the weighted sum of delay in terms of different number of UEs  $|\mathcal{N}|$  corresponding to varying number of APs  $|\mathcal{K}|$  is analysed. In this experiment, we assume that the total amount of computation capability, storage resources and bandwidth resources are fixed. With varying number of APs, the resources are equally divided to each AP. For example, assume that the total amount of computation, storage and bandwidth resources are 60 GCPU cycles/s, 25 GB and 20 MHz, respectively. The performance with these parameters are shown in Fig.9. It is observed that if the number of UEs is 10, increasing the number of APs from 5 to 40 cannot reduce the weighted sum of delay. However,



**FIGURE 10.** The performance of CGBA with the number of iterations. CGBA can converge in a small number of iterations.

when increasing  $|\mathcal{N}|$ , there is a best choice on  $|\mathcal{K}|$  for the minima of WT, for example, 15 if  $|\mathcal{N}| = 30$  and 25 if  $|\mathcal{N}| = 30$ . This demonstrates that the distribution of APs with regard to the number of UEs is a significant issue for network performance, which we may study in the future work.

### F. CONVERGENCE RATE EVALUATION

In this section, the convergence rate of the proposed CGBA is evaluated, as shown in Fig.10. It is shown that with the number of UEs increasing from 10 to 30, our proposed algorithm can still converge within at most 200 iterations. As a reference, the complexity of exhaustive search is  $O(11^{30})$  if  $\mathcal{N} = 30$ , which is much larger than the number of iterations of the proposed CGBA for convergence. This further demonstrates the theoretical analysis in Section IV.

#### **VI. CONCLUSION**

In this paper, we investigate the issue of resource allocation when heterogeneous services work collaboratively in the MEC network. Then, we formulate an optimization problem of resource allocation to minimize the weighted sum of users' delays in accordance with association assignment. As the optimization problem is NP hard, a coalition game based algorithm is proposed to efficiently optimize the assignment vector and further resource management. Both theoretical analysis and numerical results show that the proposed algorithm converges to be Nash-stable fast. Further, simulation results also present the superior performance of QoE and fairness compared with other schemes. In the future, we may further take the distribution of APs into the optimization problem under the conditions of UEs, or exploit resource management in a multitude MEC architecture.

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