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Cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ Fading Channels: Reliability and Security Analysis

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ABSTRACT In this paper, the cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading distribution is first introduced and mathematically characterized, which arises as a generalization of the cascaded Rayleigh, Weibull, and Nakagami- m fading distribution, by properly selecting fading parameters α and μ with specific values. In particular, the statistical characterization of the cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channels, namely, the probability density function and cumulative distribution function, are first studied. This set of new statistical results is applied to the modeling and analysis of the reliability and security performance of wireless communication systems over the cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channel. Regarding system reliability, the amount of fading, outage probability, average channel capacity, and the average symbol error probability with coherent and non-coherent demodulation schemes are derived with respect to the univariate Fox's H -function. In terms of security analysis, the secrecy outage probability \mathcal{P}_{out} , the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity \mathcal{P}_{nz} , and the average secrecy capacity are analyzed in the exact closed-form expressions which are derived in the presence of an active eavesdropper. In addition, an asymptotic analysis of all aforementioned metrics is carried out, in order to gain more insights of the effect of the key system parameters on the reliability and security. Tractable results are computed in terms of the Fox's H -function and later on are successfully validated through Monte-Carlo simulations.

INDEX TERMS Cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channels, Fox's H -function, reliability, secrecy analysis.

I. INTRODUCTION

The ever-increasing demand for highly reliable wireless communication systems has led to the prosperous of various accurate channel modeling in system design and evaluation. A comprehensive summary of all existing fading models includes (i) short-term fading: Rayleigh, Rician, Nakagami- m , and Weibull; (ii) long-term fading: Log-normal; (iii) composite fading: Rayleigh-lognormal; and (iv) cascaded fading [1]–[8]. In particular, the cascaded fading channel is mathematically based on the multiplicative modeling approach and happens over wireless communication links when 1) transmitter-and-receiver pairs experience rich scattering, but the existence of some keyholes or pinholes makes it still possible to keep the transmission; 2) the received signals are engendered by the product of a bunch of rays reflected via N statistically independent scatters.

A. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORKS

Along the years, the use of cascaded fading channels has shown applicability in the modeling of several scenarios such

as multi-hop cooperative communications [9], [10], mobile-to-mobile (M2M) transmission channel [7], [11], [12], dual-hop fading channels, radio-frequency identification (RFID) pinhole channels [13], and multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) keyhole communication systems [2], [10], [14].

Specifically, for M2M communication system, the double Rayleigh distribution was proposed to model it [7], [12], [15]. Later on, in [7] and [15], a vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication scenario was investigated by characterizing the wireless links, via the N *Nakagami- m distribution. As shown in [1], the N *Nakagami- m distribution is structured on the basis of the product of N independent, but not necessarily identical distributed Nakagami- m random variables (RVs). Its statistics, including the probability density function (PDF) and cumulative distribution function (CDF), were derived in [1] as closed-form expressions, in terms of Meijer's G -function. The derived first-order statistics are particularly beneficial when evaluating the performance of the aforementioned various wireless communication scenarios over cascaded Nakagami- m fading channels. In addition, it is noted

that the N *Nakagami- m distribution can be reduced to double Rayleigh by attributing $m_1 = m_2 = 1$, where m_1 and m_2 represent the fading parameters of the respective channels. However, when accounting for both short- and long-term fading effects, the N *Nakagami- m and N *Weibull distributions [4] cannot be adopted to model both fading impairments. As a consequence, the cascaded generalized K distribution [3], [5] was put forth to model the composite fading/shadowing channels due to the lack of closed-form expressions for the statistics of other distributions, like Suzuki [7], [16], [17].

More recently, Yacoub [18] proposed in the $\alpha - \mu$ (or, equivalently, generalized gamma) distribution to model the small scale variation of fading signal under line-of-sight conditions. It is physically described with two key fading parameters, i.e., non-linearity of the propagation medium α and the clustering of the multipath waves μ . This fading distribution has been examined applicable in vehicle communication [19] and on-body communication networks [20]. In addition, the $\alpha - \mu$ distribution encompasses as special cases of some well-known distributions, such as Rayleigh ($\alpha = 2, \mu = 1$), Weibull (α is the fading parameter, $\mu = 1$), and Nakagami- m ($\alpha = 2, \mu$ is the fading parameter) distribution, by setting appropriate fading parameters to specific values. Later on, the statistical characterization of the product of $\alpha - \mu$ variates, including its PDF and CDF, were investigated in [21]–[27], and the number of integers was extended from 2 to arbitrary N . The seminal results presented in [21] were given in terms of Fox's H -function. Since the Fox's H -function is an extremely general function, taking the shape of the Mellin-Barnes integral [28, eq. (1.2)]. It can also be extended to Meijer's G -function. However, the PDF and CDF of the product of $\alpha - \mu$ variates given in terms of hypergeometric functions is fairly complex in [23]; it renders its adoption in the performance analysis of wireless communication systems. Inspired from [21] and [23], the objective of this paper is to regenerate the cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ distribution in terms of Fox's H -function, due to its general form and feasible implementation in MATLAB, Mat hematica and Python.¹

B. CONTRIBUTIONS

Our analysis of cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channel in wireless networks will be performed in terms of reliability and security. It is noteworthy that apart from analyzing the popular average bit error ratio performance, plenty of research attention concerning the security issue is also gained when designing a secure and reliable communication system. The security issue is based on Wyner's wiretap model [32], where the legitimate links are endangered by the malicious eavesdroppers. In the existing technical works [33]–[36], the authors studied the

¹The implementation of the univariate, bivariate or multivariate Fox's H -function are reported in [2] and [29]–[31] at Mathematica, MATLAB or Python. More specifically, the univariate Fox's H -function is implemented at Mathematica in [2] and [29], and at MATLAB in [30], whereas the implementation of the bivariate Fox's H -function is given at MATLAB in [31].

security problem over $\alpha - \mu$ fading channels from the perspective of information theory, in which the secrecy outage probability, the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, and average secrecy capacity were characterized, respectively. However, no work in the open literature focused on cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channels.

To this end, this paper aims to provide a reliability and security analysis of communications systems over cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channels. The main contributions can be summarized as follows:

- The cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ distribution is first introduced. Its PDF and CDF are analyzed by first expressing the $\alpha - \mu$ distribution in terms of the Fox's H -function, and subsequently being derived by utilizing the property of the Fox's H -function distribution. In addition, other elementary statistics, including moments and moment-generating function (MGF), are also derived.
- The derived statistics are employed in the investigation of multi-hop relaying wireless systems with amplify-and-forward (AF) protocol over the cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channel. In particular:
 - In the absence of eavesdroppers, the reliability of point-to-point wireless systems is characterized. Specifically, the amount of fading (AoF), the outage probability, the average channel capacity and the average symbol error probability (ASEP) are evaluated in terms of the univariate Fox's H -function.
 - In the presence of eavesdroppers, the physical layer security is investigated, where the secrecy outage probability (SOP), the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity (PNZ), and the average secrecy capacity are characterized and closed-form expressions in terms of the bivariate and univariate Fox's H -functions, are obtained.
 - Asymptotic behavior of all the aforementioned metrics are analyzed to gain further insights on the effect of the key system parameters on the overall performance. In addition, numerical results are conducted to confirm our analysis for both scenarios, perfect agreements are observed to show the accuracy and feasibility of our analysis in the field of wireless communication systems.
- The useful insight provided in our paper lies in the essence of the cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channels, which can be reduced to several well-known cascaded fading channels, such as the cascaded Rayleigh, Weibull, Nakagami- m fading channels by fixing α and μ with special values, furthermore, the exact closed-form expression of the PDF and CDF of the cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ distribution makes it tractable to grasp the behavior of reliability and security analysis for multi-hop wireless communication systems.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the statistical characterization of cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channel is first performed. Section III demonstrates the application

of cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channels in modeling wireless communication systems, and performance metrics including the outage probability, average channel capacity and the average symbol error probability (ASEP) are analyzed respectively. In Section IV, the physical layer security of wireless communication systems over cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channels is investigated, and performance metrics including the secrecy outage probability, the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, and average secrecy capacity, are provided. Section V presents some illustrative numerical results along with insightful discussions. Concluding remarks and future works are outlined in Section VI.

Notations: $\Gamma(x)$ denotes the Gamma function [37, eq. (8.310.1)], $\Gamma(a, x)$ is the upper incomplete gamma function, $H_{p,q}^{m,n}[\cdot]$ is the univariate Fox's H -function [28, eq. (1.2)], $H_{p,q;p_1,q_1;p_2,q_2}^{0,n;m_1,n_1;m_2,n_2}$ is the bivariate Fox's H -function [28, eq. (2.56)]. $\text{erfc}(\cdot)$ is the complementary error function. $\mathcal{B}(x, y)$ is the Beta function [37, eq. (8.380.1)]. $\psi(\cdot)$ is the digamma function. $G_{p,q}^{m,n}[\cdot]$ is the Meijer's G -function [37, eq. (7.811.1)]. $\mathcal{M}[f(x), s]$ denotes the Mellin transform of $f(x)$ [38, eq. (8.2.5)], $\mathbb{E}(\cdot)$ and $\mathbb{V}(\cdot)$ mean expectation and variance, respectively. $\text{Res}[f(x), p]$ represents the residue of function $f(x)$ at pole $x = p$.

II. SYSTEM MODEL AND STATISTICAL CHARACTERIZATION

Let Z be the product of M , $M \geq 1$ independently $\alpha - \mu$ distributed random variables (RVs) having parameters (α_i, μ_i) , i.e., $Z = \prod_{i=1}^M R_i$, the PDF of R_i is given by [18]

$$\begin{aligned} f_{R_i}(r_i) &= \frac{\alpha_i \mu_i^{\mu_i} r_i^{\alpha_i \mu_i} - 1}{\Omega_i^{\alpha_i \mu_i} \Gamma(\mu_i)} \exp\left(-\mu_i \left(\frac{r_i}{\Omega_i}\right)^{\alpha_i}\right) \\ &= \tau_i H_{0,1}^{1,0} \left[\nu_i r_i \left| \begin{matrix} - \\ (\mu_i - \frac{1}{\alpha_i}, \frac{1}{\alpha_i}) \end{matrix} \right. \right], \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where $\tau_i = \frac{1}{\Omega_i \Gamma(\mu_i)}$, $\nu_i = \frac{1}{\Omega_i}$, $\Omega_i = \frac{\Gamma(\mu_i)}{\Gamma(\mu_i + \frac{2}{\alpha_i})}$, the last step holds by using [28, eq. (1.125)].

Theorem 1: The PDF of Z is given by

$$f_Z(z) = \mathcal{D}_M H_{0,M}^{M,0} \left[\mathcal{V}_M z \left| \begin{matrix} - \\ \epsilon_1, \dots, \epsilon_M \end{matrix} \right. \right], \quad (2)$$

where $\mathcal{D}_M = \prod_{i=1}^M \tau_i$, $\mathcal{V}_M = \prod_{i=1}^M \nu_i$, $\epsilon_i = (\mu_i - \frac{1}{\alpha_i}, \frac{1}{\alpha_i})$.

Proof: By using [39, eq. (3.12)], the proof is easily obtained. ■

A. SYSTEM MODEL

Suppose a wireless multi-hop amplify-and-forward relaying communication link, shown in Fig. 1, over cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channel. It is assumed that each hop undergoes the $\alpha - \mu$ fading with fading coefficient h_i , and h_i is characterized with fading parameters α_i and μ_i . The instantaneous received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the desired destination




FIGURE 1. Cascaded fading channels with N components.

is expressed as

$$\gamma = \prod_{i=1}^N \bar{\gamma} g_i, \quad (3)$$

where $\bar{\gamma}$ is the average power at the receiver side, $g_i = |h_i|^2$, and h_i is the fading coefficient, which follows independent and non-identically $\alpha - \mu$ distribution with parameters (α_i, μ_i) . It is assumed that all h_i are statistically independent, but not necessarily identically distributed. The PDF of g_i is defined in [34] and [36, eq. (2)] given by

$$\begin{aligned} f_g(g_i) &= \frac{\alpha_i g_i^{\frac{\alpha_i \mu_i}{2} - 1}}{2 \Omega_i^{\frac{\alpha_i \mu_i}{2}} \Gamma(\mu_i)} \exp\left[-\left(\frac{g_i}{\Omega_i}\right)^{\frac{\alpha_i}{2}}\right] \\ &\stackrel{(a)}{=} \kappa_i H_{0,1}^{1,0} \left[\lambda_i g_i \left| \begin{matrix} - \\ \Phi_i \end{matrix} \right. \right], \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

where $\Omega_i = \frac{\Gamma(\mu_i)}{\Gamma(\mu_i + \frac{2}{\alpha_i})}$, $\kappa_i = \frac{1}{\Omega_i \Gamma(\mu_i)}$, $\lambda_i = \frac{1}{\Omega_i}$, and $\Phi_i = (\mu_i - \frac{2}{\alpha_i}, \frac{2}{\alpha_i})$. Step (a) is derived by using [28, eq. (1.125)].

B. STATISTICAL CHARACTERIZATION

Theorem 2: The PDF and CDF of the instantaneous SNR defined in (3) can be expressed as

$$f_\gamma(\gamma) = \mathcal{K}_N H_{0,N}^{N,0} \left[\mathcal{C} \gamma \left| \begin{matrix} - \\ \Phi_1, \dots, \Phi_N \end{matrix} \right. \right], \quad (5a)$$

$$\begin{aligned} F_\gamma(\gamma) &= 1 - \frac{\mathcal{K}_N}{\mathcal{C}} H_{1,N+1}^{N+1,0} \left[\mathcal{C} \gamma \left| \begin{matrix} (1, 1) \\ (0, 1), \theta_1, \dots, \theta_N \end{matrix} \right. \right] \\ &= 1 - \bar{F}_\gamma(\gamma), \end{aligned} \quad (5b)$$

where $\mathcal{K}_N = \frac{\prod_{i=1}^N \kappa_i}{\gamma}$, $\mathcal{C} = \frac{\prod_{i=1}^N \lambda_i}{\gamma}$, $\theta_i = (\mu_i, \frac{2}{\alpha_i})$, and \bar{F}_γ is the complementary CDF (CCDF) of F_γ .

Proof: Let Z be the product of N mutually independent and non-identically random variables (RVs) g_1, g_2, \dots, g_N , that is

$$Z = \frac{\gamma}{\bar{\gamma}} = \prod_{i=1}^N g_i. \quad (6)$$

Since $\alpha - \mu$ distribution is a special case of the Fox's H -function distribution, by using the transformation property of Fox's H -function [39, eq. (3.12)] and $f_\gamma(\gamma) = \frac{1}{\bar{\gamma}} f_Z\left(\frac{\gamma}{\bar{\gamma}}\right)$, the proof for (5a) is easily obtained. Afterwards, by applying [39, eq. (3.7)], the CDF is subsequently achieved. ■

Remark 1: The PDF of the ratio of two instantaneous SNRs, $Y = \frac{\gamma_1}{\gamma_2}$, respectively defined in (3),




FIGURE 2. PDFs of $\gamma = \prod_{k=1}^N \bar{\gamma} g_k$ and the ratio of $\gamma = \frac{\gamma_1}{\gamma_2}$, where $\gamma_1 = \prod_{k=1}^{N_1} \bar{\gamma}_1 g_{1,i}$, $\gamma_2 = \prod_{i=1}^{N_2} \bar{\gamma}_2 g_{2,i}$, $g_k, g_{1,i}, g_{2,i}$ are implemented by using the WAFO toolbox [40] when $\bar{\gamma} = \bar{\gamma}_1 = 5$ dB and $\bar{\gamma}_2 = -5$ dB.

i.e., $\gamma_1 = \prod_{i=1}^{N_1} \bar{\gamma}_1 g_{1,i}$, and $\gamma_2 = \prod_{i=1}^{N_2} \bar{\gamma}_2 g_{2,i}$ is given by

$$f_{\frac{\gamma_1}{\gamma_2}}(y) = \frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_1} \mathcal{K}_{N_2}}{\mathcal{C}_{N_2}^2} H_{N_2, N_1}^{N_1, N_2} \left[\frac{\mathcal{C}_{N_1}}{\mathcal{C}_{N_2}} y \middle| \begin{matrix} \Theta_1, \dots, \Theta_{N_2} \\ \Phi_1, \dots, \Phi_{N_1} \end{matrix} \right], \quad (7)$$

where $\Theta_n = \left(1 - \mu_i - \frac{2}{\alpha_i}, \frac{2}{\alpha_i}\right)$, $n = 1, \dots, N_2$.

Proof: Using [39, eq. (3.14)], and after some simple mathematical manipulations, the proof is easily achieved. ■

As shown in Fig. 2, examples of PDFs for (5a) and (7) are plotted, one can observe that there is a perfect match between the Monte-Carlo simulation results and our analysis.

For the conveniences of the following performance analysis, the definition of Mellin transform for a continuous function $f(x)$ is recalled, which is given by

$$\mathcal{M}[f(x), s] = \int_0^\infty f(x) x^{s-1} dx. \quad (8)$$

Likewise, the Mellin transform for (5a) is straightforward given from [28, eq. (2.8)]

$$\mathcal{M}[f_\gamma(\gamma), s] = \frac{\mathcal{K}_N \prod_{i=1}^N \Gamma\left(\mu_i - \frac{2}{\alpha_i} + \frac{2}{\alpha_i} s\right)}{\mathcal{C}_N^s}. \quad (9)$$

C. MOMENTS AND MGF

The n -th moment of the instantaneous SNR can be derived from the following definition,

$$\mathbb{E}[\gamma^n] = \int_0^\infty x^n f_\gamma(x) dx, \quad (10)$$

it can be achieved by using the Mellin transform of the Fox's H -function [41, eq. (2.25.2.1)], and thus given by

$$\mathbb{E}[\gamma^n] = \frac{\mathcal{K}_N \prod_{i=1}^N \Gamma\left(\mu_i + \frac{2}{\alpha_i} n\right)}{\mathcal{C}_N^{n+1}}. \quad (11)$$

Likewise, the MGF of the received SNR γ , is defined by

$$\mathbb{M}_\gamma(-s) = \int_0^\infty \exp(-xs) f_\gamma(x) dx, \quad (12)$$

it can be derived by re-expressing the $\exp(\cdot)$ function through its Fox's H -function form [41], namely,

$$\exp(-x) = H_{0,1}^{1,0} \left[x \middle| \begin{matrix} - \\ (0, 1) \end{matrix} \right],$$

and then making use of the Mellin transform of the product of two Fox's H -functions [41, eq. (2.25.1.1)], yields

$$\mathbb{M}_\gamma(-s) = \frac{\mathcal{K}_N}{s} H_{1,N}^{N,1} \left[\frac{\mathcal{C}}{s} \middle| \begin{matrix} (0, 1) \\ \Phi_1, \dots, \Phi_N \end{matrix} \right]. \quad (13)$$

III. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OVER CASCADED $\alpha - \mu$ FADING CHANNELS

In this section, the objective is to evaluate the link performance, as shown in Fig. 1, when no eavesdropper is taken into account. The AoF, the outage probability, average channel capacity, and average symbol error probability are analyzed and derived in terms of the univariate Fox's H -function, respectively. In addition, their asymptotic behavior is given by using the residue approach given in [10, Sec. IV].

A. AMOUNT OF FADING

The AoF is defined as the ratio of the variance to the square average SNR, and then using (11), we have

$$AF = \frac{\mathbb{V}(\gamma)}{\mathbb{E}^2(\gamma)} = \frac{\mathbb{E}(\gamma^2)}{\mathbb{E}(\gamma)^2} - 1 = \frac{\mathcal{C}_N \prod_{i=1}^N \Gamma\left(\mu_i + \frac{4}{\alpha_i}\right)}{\mathcal{K}_N \prod_{i=1}^N \Gamma\left(\mu_i + \frac{2}{\alpha_i}\right)^2} - 1. \quad (14)$$

B. OUTAGE PROBABILITY

The outage event happens when the output SNR falls below a given threshold γ_{th} , which can be expressed mathematically as

$$\mathcal{P}_{op}(\gamma_{th}) = Pr(\gamma < \gamma_{th}). \quad (15)$$

1) EXACT ANALYSIS

By applying (5b), the outage probability is given by

$$\mathcal{P}_{op}(\gamma_{th}) = 1 - \frac{\mathcal{K}_N}{\mathcal{C}} H_{1,N+1}^{N+1,0} \left[\mathcal{C} \gamma_{th} \middle| \begin{matrix} (1, 1) \\ (0, 1), \theta_1, \dots, \theta_N \end{matrix} \right]. \quad (16)$$

2) ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS

When $\frac{\gamma_{th}}{\mathcal{C}} \rightarrow \infty$, by using the residue approach, the asymptotic behavior of (16) is given by

$$\mathcal{P}_{op} \sim 1 - \frac{\mathcal{K}_N}{\mathcal{C}} \prod_{i=1}^N \Gamma(\mu_i). \quad (17)$$

Proof: See Appendix. A. ■

C. AVERAGE CHANNEL CAPACITY

The average channel capacity over fading channels is computed by averaging the instantaneous channel capacity

$$\bar{C} = \int_0^\infty \log_2(1 + \gamma) f_\gamma(\gamma) d\gamma. \quad (18)$$

1) EXACT ANALYSIS

Theorem 3: The average channel capacity over cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channels is given by

$$\bar{C} = \frac{\mathcal{K}_N}{C \ln(2)} H_{2,N+2}^{N+2,1} \left[C \left| \begin{matrix} (0, 1), (1, 1) \\ (0, 1), (0, 1), \theta_1, \dots, \theta_N \end{matrix} \right. \right]. \quad (19)$$

Proof: By applying the Parseval's relation for the Mellin transform on (18), we have

$$\bar{C} = \frac{1}{2\pi j} \int_{\mathcal{L}} \mathcal{M}[\log_2(1 + \gamma), 1 - s] \mathcal{M}[f(\gamma), s] ds, \quad (20)$$

where $j = \sqrt{-1}$, \mathcal{L} is the integration path from $v - j\infty$ to $v + j\infty$, v is a constant, and

$$\mathcal{M}[\log_2(1 + \gamma), 1 - s] = \frac{\Gamma(2-s)\Gamma(s-1)\Gamma(s-1)}{\ln(2)\Gamma(s)}, \quad (21a)$$

$$\mathcal{M}[f(\gamma), s] = \mathcal{K} \prod_{i=1}^N \Gamma\left(\mu_i - \frac{2}{\alpha_i} + \frac{2}{\alpha_i} s\right) C^{-s}. \quad (21b)$$

After plugging (21a) and (21b) into (20), leading to the following result

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{C} &= \frac{\mathcal{K}_N}{2 \ln(2) \pi i} \int_{\mathcal{L}} \frac{\Gamma(2-s)\Gamma(s-1)\Gamma(s-1)}{\Gamma(s)} \\ &\quad \times \prod_{i=1}^N \Gamma\left(\mu_i - \frac{2}{\alpha_i} + \frac{2}{\alpha_i} s\right) C^{-s} ds \\ &\stackrel{(b)}{=} \frac{\mathcal{K}_N}{\ln(2)} H_{2,N+2}^{N+2,1} \left[C \left| \begin{matrix} (-1, 1), (0, 1) \\ (-1, 1), (-1, 1), \Phi_1, \dots, \Phi_N \end{matrix} \right. \right], \end{aligned} \quad (22)$$

where step (b) is developed by applying the definition of univariate Fox's H -function, and subsequently using [28, eq. (1.60)], the proof is completed. ■

2) ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS

At high SNR regime, by using the residue approach [34, Sec. IV], (19) can be easily determined as

$$\bar{C} \sim \frac{\mathcal{K}_N \prod_{i=1}^N \Gamma(\mu_i)}{C \ln(2)} \left[\sum_{i=1}^N \frac{2}{\alpha_i} \psi(\mu_i) - \ln(C) \right]. \quad (23)$$

D. AVERAGE SYMBOL ERROR PROBABILITY (ASEP)

Apart from the aforementioned two metrics, the average symbol error probability is considered as another crucial criterion when designing reliable transmission system. It is defined as follows

$$\bar{P}_{se}^k = \int_0^\infty \mathcal{P}_{se}^k(\gamma) f_\gamma(\gamma) d\gamma, \quad (24)$$

TABLE 1. Values of a, b for different modulation schemes by using coherent demodulation where $\mathcal{P}_{se}^C = a \operatorname{erfc}(\sqrt{b\gamma})$.

Modulation Scheme	a	b
BPSK	$\frac{1}{2}$	1
BFSK	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
QPSK, 4-QAM	1	$\frac{1}{2}$
M-QAM ($M \geq 4$)	$\frac{2(\sqrt{M}-1)}{\sqrt{M}}$	$\frac{3}{2(M-1)}$

TABLE 2. Values of a, b for different modulation schemes by using non-coherent demodulation where $\mathcal{P}_{se}^N = a \exp(-b\gamma)$.

Modulation Scheme	a	b
BFSK	$\frac{1}{2}$	$\frac{1}{2}$
DBPSK	$\frac{1}{2}$	1

where $k \in \{C, N\}$, $\mathcal{P}_{se}(\gamma)$ is the conditional error probability with different generic expressions for coherent and non-coherent modulation schemes, which are listed in Tables. 1 and 2 [42], respectively.

1) EXACT ANALYSIS

Theorem 4: The average ASEP over cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channels by using coherent and non-coherent demodulation are respectively given by

- Coherent Demodulation

$$\bar{P}_{se}^C = \frac{a\mathcal{K}}{C\sqrt{\pi}} H_{2,N+1}^{N,2} \left[\frac{C}{b} \left| \begin{matrix} (1, 1), (\frac{1}{2}, 1) \\ \theta_1, \dots, \theta_N, (0, 1) \end{matrix} \right. \right], \quad (25)$$

- Non-coherent Demodulation

$$\bar{P}_{se}^N = \frac{a\mathcal{K}}{b} H_{1,N}^{N,1} \left[\frac{C}{b} \left| \begin{matrix} (0, 1) \\ \Phi_1, \dots, \Phi_N \end{matrix} \right. \right]. \quad (26)$$

Proof: Re-expressing \mathcal{P}_{se}^C in terms of the Fox's H -function [41, eq. (8.4.14.2)], we have

$$\mathcal{P}_{se}^C = a \operatorname{erfc}(\sqrt{b\gamma}) = \frac{a}{\sqrt{\pi}} H_{1,2}^{2,0} \left[b\gamma \left| \begin{matrix} (1, 1) \\ (0, 1), (\frac{1}{2}, 1) \end{matrix} \right. \right], \quad (27)$$

Next, applying the Parseval's relation for Mellin transform of (24), yields the following result

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{P}_{se}^C &= \int_0^\infty \mathcal{P}_{se}^C(\gamma) f_\gamma(\gamma) d\gamma \\ &= \frac{a}{2\pi^{\frac{3}{2}} i} \int_{\mathcal{L}} \mathcal{M}[\operatorname{erfc}(\sqrt{b\gamma}), 1 - s] \mathcal{M}[f_\gamma(\gamma), s] ds, \end{aligned} \quad (28)$$

where $\mathcal{M}[\operatorname{erfc}(\sqrt{b\gamma}), 1 - s]$ can be obtained from [41, eq. (8.4.14.2)] and is given by

$$\mathcal{M}[\operatorname{erfc}(\sqrt{b\gamma}), 1 - s] = \frac{\Gamma(1-s)\Gamma\left(\frac{3}{2}-s\right)}{\Gamma(2-s)} b^{-(1-s)}. \quad (29)$$

Subsequently, substituting (29) and (21b) into (28), and then applying the definition of Fox's H -function, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{p}_{se}^C &= \frac{a\mathcal{K}}{2b\pi^{\frac{3}{2}i}} \int_{\mathcal{L}} \frac{\Gamma(1-s)\Gamma\left(\frac{3}{2}-s\right)}{\Gamma(2-s)} \\ &\times \prod_{i=1}^N \Gamma\left(\mu_i - \frac{2}{\alpha_i} + \frac{2}{\alpha_i}s\right) \left(\frac{C}{b}\right)^{-s} ds \\ &= \frac{a\mathcal{K}}{b\sqrt{\pi}} H_{2,N+1}^{N,2} \left[\frac{C}{b} \middle| \begin{matrix} (0, 1), (-\frac{1}{2}, 1) \\ \Phi_1, \dots, \Phi_N, (-1, 1) \end{matrix} \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (30)$$

Finally, using the property of Fox's H -function [28, eq. (1.60)], the proof for (25) is accomplished.

Regarding the proof for (26), by providing the Mellin transform for the exponential function [41, eq.(8.4.3.1)] as follows,

$$\mathcal{M}[\exp(-b\gamma), 1-s] = \frac{\Gamma(1-s)}{b^{(1-s)}}, \quad (31)$$

and then following the same steps from (28) to (30), as such, the proof is achieved. ■

2) ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS

At high $\bar{\gamma}$ regime, the asymptotic behavior of (25) and (26) can be likely obtained as follows by following the same method as shown in Appendix. A [34]

- Coherent Demodulation

$$\bar{p}_{se}^C \sim \frac{a\mathcal{K}\left(\frac{C}{b}\right)^{\frac{\alpha_j\mu_j}{2}}}{\mu_j\sqrt{\pi C}} \Gamma\left(\frac{1+\alpha_j\mu_j}{2}\right) \prod_{i=1}^{N-1} \Gamma\left(\mu_i - \frac{\alpha_j}{\alpha_i}\mu_j\right), \quad (32)$$

- Non-coherent Demodulation

$$\bar{p}_{se}^N \sim \frac{a\mathcal{K}\left(\frac{C}{b}\right)^{\frac{\alpha_j\mu_j}{2}}}{\sqrt{\pi C}} \Gamma\left(\frac{\alpha_j\mu_j}{2}\right) \prod_{i=1}^{N-1} \Gamma\left(\mu_i - \frac{\alpha_j}{\alpha_i}\mu_j\right). \quad (33)$$

where $\alpha_j\mu_j = \min(\alpha_i\mu_i), i = 1, \dots, N$.

IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OVER CASCADED $\alpha - \mu$ FADING CHANNELS

In this section, the security issue over cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channels is analyzed from the information theoretical perspective. The classic Wyner's wiretap channel model is deployed, where a transmitter, named Alice, intends to communicate with the legitimate destination, Bob, whilst encountering a malicious wiretapper, Eve, over the cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channels, a possible system configuration is shown in Fig. 3. It is assumed that (i) all users are equipped with a single antenna; (ii) they have perfect knowledge of their channel state information (CSI); (iii) the main channel is independent of the wiretap channel.




FIGURE 3. Cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channels in the presence of an active eavesdropper.

A. SYSTEM MODEL

Suppose a wireless legitimate link, from Alice to Bob, undergoes the cascaded fading channels while in the presence of an active Eve, where the channel coefficients are modeled by independent α - μ distributions. The link between Alice and Bob is named as the main channel, whereas the one between Alice and Eve is called the wiretap channel. As a consequence, the instantaneous SNRs at Bob and Eve can be respectively expressed as

$$\gamma_B = \prod_{i=1}^{N_B} \bar{\gamma}_B g_{B,i}, \quad (34a)$$

$$\gamma_E = \prod_{j=1}^{N_E} \bar{\gamma}_E g_{E,j}, \quad (34b)$$

where $\bar{\gamma}_B = \frac{P}{\sigma_B}$ and $\bar{\gamma}_E = \frac{P}{\sigma_E}$, $g_{B,i} = |h_{B,i}|^2$, $g_{E,j} = |h_{E,j}|^2$, P , σ_B and σ_E are the transmission power at Alice, the noise power at Bob and Eve, respectively.

By deploying Theorem 2 on γ_B and γ_E , $f_B(\gamma_B)$ and $f_E(\gamma_E)$ are respectively given by

$$f_B(\gamma_B) = \mathcal{K}_{N_B} H_{0,N_B}^{N_B,0} \left[\mathcal{C}_{N_B} \gamma_B \middle| \begin{matrix} - \\ \Phi_1, \dots, \Phi_{N_B} \end{matrix} \right], \quad (35a)$$

$$f_E(\gamma_E) = \mathcal{K}_{N_E} H_{0,N_E}^{N_E,0} \left[\mathcal{C}_{N_E} \gamma_E \middle| \begin{matrix} - \\ \Theta_1, \dots, \Theta_{N_E} \end{matrix} \right], \quad (35b)$$

where

$$\left\{ \begin{aligned} \mathcal{K}_{N_B} &= \frac{\prod_{i=1}^{N_B} \kappa_{B,i}}{\bar{\gamma}_B} \\ \Phi_i &= \left(\mu_{B,i} - \frac{2}{\alpha_{B,i}}, \frac{2}{\alpha_{B,i}} \right) \quad i = 1, \dots, N_B, \\ \mathcal{C}_{N_B} &= \frac{\prod_{i=1}^{N_B} \lambda_{B,i}}{\bar{\gamma}_B}, \end{aligned} \right.$$

and

$$\left\{ \begin{aligned} \mathcal{K}_{N_E} &= \frac{\prod_{j=1}^{N_E} \kappa_{E,j}}{\bar{\gamma}_E} \\ \Theta_j &= \left(\mu_{E,j} - \frac{2}{\alpha_{E,j}}, \frac{2}{\alpha_{E,j}} \right) \quad j = 1, \dots, N_E. \\ \mathcal{C}_{N_E} &= \frac{\prod_{j=1}^{N_E} \lambda_{E,j}}{\bar{\gamma}_E}, \end{aligned} \right.$$

According to [43], the instantaneous secrecy capacity is mathematically defined as the difference of the instantaneous capacity of the main channel and wiretap channel, given as follows

$$C_s = \begin{cases} C_M - C_W, & \gamma_B > \gamma_E \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (36)$$

where $C_M = \log_2(1 + \gamma_B)$, $C_W = \log_2(1 + \gamma_E)$.

B. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY

The secrecy outage probability \mathcal{P}_{out} is defined as the probability with an instantaneous secrecy capacity, C_s , falling down the target secrecy rate R_t .

Revisiting (36), the secrecy outage probability \mathcal{P}_{out} for the Wyner's wiretap fading model is conceptually explained through two cases: (i) $C_s < R_s$ whilst positive secrecy capacity is guaranteed; (ii) $\mathcal{P}_{out}(R_s)$ definitely happens when the secrecy capacity is non-positive [44]. $\mathcal{P}_{out}(R_s)$ can thus be rewritten as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_{out}(R_t) &= \Pr(C_s < R_t) \\ &= \Pr(\gamma_B \leq R_s \gamma_E + R_s - 1) \\ &= \Pr(C_s < R_s | \gamma_B > \gamma_E) \Pr(\gamma_B > \gamma_E) + \Pr(\gamma_B < \gamma_E) \\ &= \int_0^\infty \int_{\gamma_E}^{\gamma_0} f_B(\gamma_B) f_E(\gamma_E) d\gamma_B d\gamma_E \\ &\quad + \int_0^\infty \int_0^{\gamma_E} f_B(\gamma_B) f_E(\gamma_E) d\gamma_B d\gamma_E \\ &= \int_0^\infty f_E(\gamma_E) \left[\int_0^{\gamma_0} - \int_0^{\gamma_E} \right] f_B(\gamma_B) d\gamma_B d\gamma_E \\ &\quad + \int_0^\infty \int_0^{\gamma_E} f_B(\gamma_B) f_E(\gamma_E) d\gamma_B d\gamma_E \\ &= \int_0^\infty F_B(\gamma_0) f_E(\gamma_E) d\gamma_E \\ &= 1 - \int_0^\infty \bar{F}_B(\gamma_0) f_E(\gamma_E) d\gamma_E, \end{aligned} \quad (37)$$

where $\gamma_0 = 2^{R_t} \gamma_E + 2^{R_t} - 1 = R_s \gamma_E + \mathcal{W}$, $R_s = 2^{R_t}$, $\mathcal{W} = 2^{R_t} - 1$, and with the help of (5b), we have

$$\bar{F}_B(\gamma_0) = \frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_B}}{\mathcal{C}_{N_B}} H_{1, N_B+1}^{N_B+1, 0} \left[\mathcal{C}_{N_B} \gamma_0 \mid \begin{matrix} (1, 1) \\ (0, 1), \theta_1, \dots, \theta_{N_B} \end{matrix} \right]. \quad (38)$$

1) EXACT ANALYSIS

Theorem 5: The secrecy outage probability over cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ wiretap fading channels, in the presence of non-colluding eavesdroppers, is given by (39), where $\bar{\Theta}_j = (1 - \mu_{E,j} + \frac{2}{\alpha_{E,j}}, \frac{2}{\alpha_{E,j}})$ and $\bar{\Phi}_i = (1 - \mu_{B,i}, \frac{2}{\alpha_{B,i}})$, which is shown at the bottom of the next page.

Proof: See Appendix. B. ■

Remark 2: The secrecy outage probability over cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ wiretap fading channels is lower bounded by

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_{out}^L &= 1 - \frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_B} \mathcal{K}_{N_E}}{\mathcal{C}_{N_B} \mathcal{C}_{N_E}} \\ &\quad \times H_{N_E+1, N_B+1}^{N_B+1, N_E} \left[\frac{R_s \mathcal{C}_{N_B}}{\mathcal{C}_{N_E}} \mid \begin{matrix} \bar{\Theta}_1, \dots, \bar{\Theta}_{N_E}, (1, 1) \\ (0, 1), \Phi_1, \dots, \Phi_{N_B} \end{matrix} \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (40)$$

Proof: As $\bar{\gamma}_E$ tends to ∞ , it physically means that the eavesdropper is super close to the transmitter, the \mathcal{P}_{out} is lower bounded by

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_{out} &= \Pr(\gamma_B \leq R_s \gamma_E + \mathcal{W}) \\ &\geq \underbrace{\Pr(\gamma_B \leq R_s \gamma_E)}_{\mathcal{P}_{out}^L} \\ &= 1 - \int_0^\infty \bar{F}_B(R_s \gamma_E) f_E(\gamma_E) d\gamma_E \\ &= 1 - \frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_B} \mathcal{K}_{N_E}}{\mathcal{C}_{N_B}} \int_0^\infty H_{0, N_E}^{N_E, 0} \left[\mathcal{C}_{N_E} \gamma_E \mid \begin{matrix} - \\ \Theta_1, \dots, \Theta_{N_E} \end{matrix} \right] \\ &\quad \times H_{1, N_B+1}^{N_B+1, 0} \left[\mathcal{C}_{N_B} R_s \gamma_E \mid \begin{matrix} (1, 1) \\ (0, 1), \Phi_1, \dots, \Phi_{N_B} \end{matrix} \right] d\gamma_E, \end{aligned} \quad (41)$$

subsequently, the proof is achieved by using the Mellin transform of the product of two Fox's H -function [41, eq.(2.25.1.1)]. ■

Remark 3: When $\alpha_{B,i} = 2$, and $\alpha_{E,j} = 2$, by using the transformation between Meijer's G -function and Fox's H -function [41, eq.(8.3.2.21)], the asymptotic analysis of (40) can be further simplified as follows in terms of the Meijer's G -function [37, eq. (7.811.1)],²

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_{out}^{Asy} &= 1 - \frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_B} \mathcal{K}_{N_E}}{\mathcal{C}_{N_B} \mathcal{C}_{N_E}} \\ &\quad \times G_{N_E+1, N_B+1}^{N_B+1, N_E} \left[\frac{R_s \mathcal{C}_{N_B}}{\mathcal{C}_{N_E}} \mid \begin{matrix} 1 - \mu_{E,1}, \dots, 1 - \mu_{E, N_E}, 1 \\ 0, \mu_{B,1}, \dots, \mu_{B, N_B} \end{matrix} \right]. \end{aligned} \quad (42)$$

2) ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS

By using the residue approach given in [10], the asymptotic behavior of \mathcal{P}_{out} is given in Table. 3.

Proof: See Appendix. C. ■

C. PROBABILITY OF NON-ZERO SECRECY CAPACITY

Recalling the secrecy capacity over Wyner's wiretap channel, a non-zero secrecy capacity event happens when C_s is positive on the condition that $\gamma_B > \gamma_E$. By deploying the math language, it can be thus expressed as follows

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_{nz} &= \Pr(C_s > 0) = \Pr(\gamma_B > \gamma_E) \\ &= \Pr\left(\frac{\gamma_E}{\gamma_B} < 1\right) = F_{\frac{\gamma_E}{\gamma_B}}(1). \end{aligned} \quad (46)$$

²The implementation of the Meijer's G -function is available in mathematical packages, like Matlab2017b, Maple and Mathematica [45].

TABLE 3. Asymptotic analysis of the \mathcal{P}_{out} .

Scenario	Asymptotic \mathcal{P}_{out}
$\bar{\gamma}_E \rightarrow \infty$	$1 - \frac{\mathcal{K}_{NB} \mathcal{K}_{NE}}{\mathcal{C}_{NB} \mathcal{C}_{NE}} \left[\frac{\prod_{i=1}^{N_B} \Gamma\left(\mu_{B,i} + \frac{\alpha_{E,k} \mu_{E,k}}{\alpha_{B,i}}\right) \prod_{j=1}^{N_E-1} \Gamma\left(\mu_{E,j} - \frac{\alpha_{E,k} \mu_{E,k}}{\alpha_{E,j}}\right)}{\mu_E} \left(\frac{\mathcal{C}_{NE}}{\mathcal{C}_{NB} R_s}\right)^{\frac{\alpha_{E,k} \mu_{E,k}}{2}} \right], \quad (43)$ <p>where $\alpha_{E,k} \mu_{E,k} = \min(\alpha_{E,1} \mu_{E,1}, \dots, \alpha_{E,j} \mu_{E,j}), j = 1, \dots, N_E$.</p>
$\bar{\gamma}_B \rightarrow \infty$	$\frac{\prod_{j=1}^{N_E} \Gamma\left(\mu_{E,j} + \frac{\alpha_{B,k} \mu_{B,k}}{\alpha_{E,j}}\right) \prod_{i=1}^{N_B-1} \Gamma\left(\mu_{B,i} - \frac{\alpha_{B,k} \mu_{B,k}}{\alpha_{B,i}}\right)}{\mu_{B,k}} \left(\frac{\mathcal{C}_{NB} R_s}{\mathcal{C}_{NE}}\right)^{\frac{\alpha_{B,k} \mu_{B,k}}{2}}, \quad (44)$ <p>where $\alpha_{B,k} \mu_{B,k} = \min(\alpha_{B,1} \mu_{B,1}, \dots, \alpha_{B,i} \mu_{B,i}), i = 1, \dots, N_B$.</p>
$\bar{\gamma}_E \rightarrow 0$	$1 - \frac{\mathcal{K}_{NB}}{\mathcal{C}_{NB}} H_{1, N_B+1}^{N_B+1, 0} \left[\frac{R_s \mathcal{C}_{NB}}{\mathcal{C}_{NE}} \mid \begin{matrix} (1, 1) \\ (0, 1), \theta_1, \dots, \theta_{N_B} \end{matrix} \right], \quad (45)$
$\bar{\gamma}_B \rightarrow 0$	1

1) EXACT ANALYSIS

Theorem 6: The probability of non-zero secrecy capacity over cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ wiretap fading channels is given by

$$\mathcal{P}_{nz} = 1 - \frac{\mathcal{K}_{NB} \mathcal{K}_{NE}}{\mathcal{C}_{NB} \mathcal{C}_{NE}} \times H_{N_B+1, N_E+1}^{N_E+1, N_B} \left[\frac{\mathcal{C}_{NE}}{\mathcal{C}_{NB}} \mid \begin{matrix} \bar{\Phi}_1, \dots, \bar{\Phi}_{N_B}, (1, 1) \\ (0, 1), \theta_1, \dots, \theta_{N_E} \end{matrix} \right], \quad (47)$$

where $\theta_j = \left(\mu_{E,j}, \frac{2}{\alpha_{E,j}}\right)$.

Proof: Recalling the Remark. 1, and subsequently applying [39, eq. (3.7)], the proof is completed. ■

Motivated by Remark 3, when $\alpha_{B,i} = 2$, and $\alpha_{E,j} = 2$, which means both the main and the wiretap channel undergo the Nakagami- m fading, the \mathcal{P}_{nz} is indeed over the cascaded Nakagami- m wiretap fading channels, and it is thus given by

$$\mathcal{P}_{nz} = 1 - \frac{\mathcal{K}_{NB} \mathcal{K}_{NE}}{\mathcal{C}_{NB} \mathcal{C}_{NE}} \times G_{N_B+1, N_E+1}^{N_E+1, N_B} \left[\frac{\mathcal{C}_{NE}}{\mathcal{C}_{NB}} \mid \begin{matrix} 1 - \mu_{B,1}, \dots, 1 - \mu_{B, N_B}, 1 \\ 0, \mu_{E,1}, \dots, \mu_{E, N_E} \end{matrix} \right]. \quad (48)$$

2) ASYMPTOTIC ANALYSIS

When $R_t = 0, R_s = 1$, in accordance with the definition of SOP and PNZ, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_{out} &= Pr(\gamma_E \leq R_s \gamma_B + R_s - 1) \\ &= 1 - \underbrace{Pr(\gamma_B \geq \gamma_E)}_{\mathcal{P}_{nz}}. \end{aligned} \quad (49)$$

Consequently, the asymptotic behavior of the PNZ can be easily derived by making some simple algebraic substitutions.

D. AVERAGE SECRECY CAPACITY

Theorem 7: The average secrecy capacity over cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ wiretap fading channels is given by (50), shown at the bottom of next page, where $D_i = \left(1 - \mu_{B,i}, \frac{2}{\alpha_{B,i}}, \frac{2}{\alpha_{B,i}}\right), E_j = \left(1 - \mu_{E,j}, \frac{2}{\alpha_{E,j}}, \frac{2}{\alpha_{E,j}}\right), \phi_i = \left(\mu_{B,i}, \frac{2}{\alpha_{B,i}}\right), H_{p,q}^{m,n; m_1, n_1; m_2, n_2}[\cdot]$ and $H_{p,q}^{m,n}[\cdot]$ are the bivariate and univariate Fox's H -function [28, Eqs. (1.2) and (2.56)], respectively.

Proof: See Appendix. D. ■

V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

In this section, we confirm the accuracy of our analytical derivations demonstrated in Sections III and IV, in comparison with Monte-Carlo simulation results.³ For the conciseness of illustrations, the curves only with markers are the Monte-Carlo simulation outcomes, whereas the ones denoted with lines are used to depict our analytical results.

A. RELIABILITY ANALYSIS OVER CASCADED $\alpha - \mu$ FADING CHANNELS

Considering the system configuration shown in Fig. 1, in Figs. 4-6, we plot the outage probability, the average channel capacity and the ASEP with coherent demodulation scheme over cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channels, respectively. Those figures reveal that our derivations given by (16), (19) and (25) are in perfect match with simulation outcomes, which are particularly validated for several spe-

³ It is worthy to mention that (i) the $\alpha - \mu$ fading channel is implemented by using the WAFO toolbox [40]; (ii) the implementation of the Fox's H -function is computationally practicable, the numerical evaluation of univariate and bivariate Fox's H -function of (39) and (40) for MATLAB implementations are based on the method proposed in [30, Table. II] and [31, Appendix. A], respectively.

$$\mathcal{P}_{out}(R_s) = 1 - \frac{\mathcal{K}_{NB} \mathcal{K}_{NE} \mathcal{W}}{\mathcal{C}_{NB} R_s} H_{1, 0; 1, N_E; 0, N_B}^{0, 1; 1, N_E; 0, N_B} \left[\frac{R_s}{\mathcal{C}_{NE} \mathcal{W}}, \frac{1}{\mathcal{C}_{NB} \mathcal{W}} \mid \begin{matrix} (2, 1, 1) \\ - \end{matrix} \mid \begin{matrix} \bar{\Theta}_1, \dots, \bar{\Theta}_{N_E} \\ (1, 1) \end{matrix} \mid \begin{matrix} \bar{\Phi}_1, \dots, \bar{\Phi}_{N_B} \\ (0, 1) \end{matrix} \right], \quad (39)$$




FIGURE 4. \mathcal{P}_{op} versus $\gamma_{th}/\bar{\gamma}$ over cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ wiretap fading channels for selected values of N .




FIGURE 6. The ASEP $\bar{\mathcal{P}}_{se}^C$ over cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channels.




FIGURE 5. Average channel capacity \bar{C} over cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channels.




FIGURE 7. \mathcal{P}_{out} versus $\bar{\gamma}_B$ over cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ wiretap fading channels when $\bar{\gamma}_E = 6$ dB, $R_s = 0.5$, $\alpha_B = 4$, $\mu_B = 2$, $\alpha_E = 2$, and $\mu_E = 3$.

cific cases, such as Rayleigh, Nakagami- m , and Weibull, respectively.

To terminate the reliability analysis over cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ fading channels, one can perceive the following conclusions from the three figures (i) the performance metrics physically demonstrate worse trend with the increase of N , outstand-

ingly, it is caused by the fact that the multiplication of several successive fading makes it less likely to transmit the desired messages successfully; (ii) for a given fading scenario, reliable communication can be assured only by increasing the transmitting power.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \bar{C}_s = & \underbrace{\frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_B} \mathcal{K}_{N_E}}{\ln(2) \mathcal{C}_{N_B} \mathcal{C}_{N_E}} H_{N_B, 0; 2, 2; 1, N_E+1}^{0, N_B; 1, 2; N_E, 1} \left[\frac{1}{\mathcal{C}_{N_B}}, \frac{\mathcal{C}_{N_E}}{\mathcal{C}_{N_B}} \middle| D_1, \dots, D_{N_B} \begin{array}{c} (1, 1), (1, 1) \\ - \\ (1, 1), (0, 1) \end{array} \middle| \begin{array}{c} (1, 1) \\ \theta_1, \dots, \theta_{N_E}, (0, 1) \end{array} \right]}_{\mathcal{I}_1} \\
 & + \underbrace{\frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_B} \mathcal{K}_{N_E}}{\ln(2) \mathcal{C}_{N_B} \mathcal{C}_{N_E}} H_{N_E, 0; 2, 2; 1, N_B+1}^{0, N_E; 1, 2; N_B, 1} \left[\frac{1}{\mathcal{C}_{N_E}}, \frac{\mathcal{C}_{N_B}}{\mathcal{C}_{N_E}} \middle| E_1, \dots, E_{N_E} \begin{array}{c} (1, 1), (1, 1) \\ - \\ (1, 1), (0, 1) \end{array} \middle| \begin{array}{c} (1, 1) \\ \phi_1, \dots, \phi_{N_B}, (1, 1) \end{array} \right]}_{\mathcal{I}_2} \\
 & + \underbrace{\frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_E}}{\ln(2) \mathcal{C}_{N_E}} H_{2+N_E, 2}^{1, 2+N_E} \left[\frac{1}{\mathcal{C}_{N_E}} \middle| (1, 1), (1, 1), \left(1 - \mu_{E, l}, \frac{2}{\alpha_{E, l}}\right), \dots, \left(1 - \mu_{E, N_E}, \frac{2}{\alpha_{E, N_E}}\right) \right]}_{\mathcal{I}_3}. \tag{50}
 \end{aligned}$$




FIGURE 8. \mathcal{P}_{out} versus $\bar{\gamma}_B$ over cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ wiretap fading channels when $N_B = N_E = 2$, $R_s = 0.5$, $\alpha_B = 4$, $\mu_B = 3$, $\alpha_E = 2$, and $\mu_E = 2$.




FIGURE 9. \mathcal{P}_{nz} versus $\bar{\gamma}_B$ over cascaded $\alpha - \mu$ wiretap fading channels when $\bar{\gamma}_E = 5$ dB, $\alpha_B = 3$, $\mu_B = 2$, $\alpha_E = 2$, and $\mu_E = 2$.

B. SECRECY ANALYSIS OVER CASCADED α - μ WIRETAP FADING CHANNELS

In the presence of an active eavesdropper, the secrecy outage probability, the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, and the average secrecy capacity are presented in this subsection. Fig. 7 plots the secrecy outage probability \mathcal{P}_{out} against the average transmitted power $\bar{\gamma}_B$ when fixing N_B and N_E for selected values. From this figure, it is observed that \mathcal{P}_{out} decreases with the increase of $\bar{\gamma}_B$, which is due to a better secrecy capacity which can be achieved with the increase of $\bar{\gamma}_B$. In addition, the secrecy outage probability is, as expected, strongly influenced by the value of N_B and N_E , namely, the number of relays or keyholes. Naturally, this phenomenon can be explained via the fact that more keyholes mean much severer propagation on the legitimate signals.

Additionally, as shown in Fig. 8, our derived asymptotic expression, the \mathcal{P}_{out}^{Asy} given in (40), closely approximates the exact secrecy outage probability \mathcal{P}_{out} , in particular, the gap between them is becoming smaller as $\bar{\gamma}_E$ increases.




FIGURE 10. \bar{C}_s versus $\bar{\gamma}_B$ for selected N_B when $\alpha_B = 3$, $\alpha_E = 4$, $\mu_B = 2$, $\mu_E = 3$, and $\bar{\gamma}_E = 5$ dB.




FIGURE 11. \bar{C}_s versus $\bar{\gamma}_B$ for selected N_E when $\alpha_B = 3$, $\alpha_E = 4$, $\mu_B = 2$, $\mu_E = 3$, and $\bar{\gamma}_E = 5$ dB.

In Fig. 9, we compare our analytical \mathcal{P}_{nz} given in (47) with Monte-Carlo simulation results. On the contrary with \mathcal{P}_{out} , positive secrecy capacity can be surely guaranteed with a higher probability as $\bar{\gamma}_B$ increases.

In Figs. 10 and 11, the average secrecy capacity against $\bar{\gamma}_B$ is presented for two case: (i) selected values of N_B ; (ii) selected values of N_E ; An obvious conclusion can be summarized from Figs. 10 and 11 that: the average secrecy capacity is improved with the increase of N_E and degraded with the increase of N_B . This is due to the fact, i.e., the bigger N_B (or N_E), the worse quality of the received SNR of Bob (or Eve).

Overall, interesting observations drawn from Figs. 7 and 9 can be summarized as follows (i) our analytical results given by (39), (47), and (50) are successfully verified by Monte-Carlo simulation outcomes; (ii) no matter for the \mathcal{P}_{out} or \mathcal{P}_{nz} , the number of keyholes or relays is of great significance with the system security performance.

VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper, the notion of $N * (\alpha - \mu)$ cascaded fading channels was introduced, together with its statistics characteristics. As stated in the context, it can be respectively reduced to the cascaded Rayleigh, Weibull, Nakagami- m fading channels by attributing α and μ to specific values.

Based on such a general channel model, we further investigated one wireless multi-hop AF relaying link when considering two scenarios: in the absence and presence of an active eavesdropper. Regarding the former scenario, the outage probability, average channel capacity and the ASEP were deduced with closed-form expressions, which were derived in terms of the Fox's H -function. When it comes to the latter case, we studied such a digital communication system from the information theoretical perspective. The secrecy metrics, including the secrecy outage probability, the probability of non-zero secrecy capacity, and average secrecy capacity were evaluated, which were correspondingly given with respect to the bivariate and univariate Fox's H -function. In addition, the asymptotic analysis of the secrecy outage probability was also derived and therefore compared with the exact expression. Subsequently, our analytical mathematical representations for both cases were further successfully verified via the Monte-Carlo simulation outcomes.

As readily observed from our work, it is so far limited to the investigations of digital wireless communication systems under the assumptions of independent $N * (\alpha - \mu)$ fading channels, generally speaking, one possible future research direction may be the extension of our results to the correlated cascaded $N * (\alpha - \mu)$ fading channels.

**APPENDIX A
PROOF FOR ASYMPTOTIC \mathcal{P}_{op}**

Rewrite (16) in terms of the Fox's H -function, we have

$$\mathcal{P}_{op} = 1 - \frac{\mathcal{K}_N}{2\pi C_j} \int_{\mathcal{L}} \frac{\Gamma(s) \prod_{k=1}^N \Gamma\left(\mu_k + \frac{2}{\alpha_k} s\right)}{\underbrace{\Gamma(1+s) (\mathcal{K}_N \gamma_{th})^s}_{\varepsilon(s)}} ds. \quad (51)$$

According to [10], expansions of the univariate and bivariate Fox's H -functions can be derived by evaluating the residue of the corresponding integrands at the closest poles to the contour, namely, the minimum pole on the right for large Fox's H -function arguments and the maximum pole on the left for small ones.

When $\mathcal{K}_N \gamma_{th} \rightarrow \infty$, then applying the residue method given in [10, Sec. IV], one can obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_{op} &\approx 1 - \frac{\mathcal{K}_N}{C} \text{Res}[\varepsilon(s), 0] \\ &= 1 - \lim_{s \rightarrow 0} s u(s) = 1 - \frac{\mathcal{K}_N}{C} \prod_{k=1}^N \Gamma(\mu_k). \quad (52) \end{aligned}$$

**APPENDIX B
PROOF FOR THEOREM 5**

Revisiting (37) and using the Parseval's relation for Mellin transform [38, eq. (8.3.23)], we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{I} &= \int_0^\infty \bar{F}_B(\gamma_0) f_E(\gamma_E) d\gamma_E \\ &= \frac{1}{2\pi j} \int_{\mathcal{L}_1} \mathcal{M}[\bar{F}_B(\gamma_0), 1-s] \mathcal{M}[f_E(\gamma_E), s] ds. \quad (53) \end{aligned}$$

where \mathcal{L}_1 is the integration path from $v - j\infty$ to $v + j\infty$, and v is a constant [38] Then by introducing the definition of univariate Fox's H -function, $\mathcal{M}[\bar{F}_B(\gamma_0), 1-s]$ can be rewritten as

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathcal{M}[\bar{F}_B(\gamma_0), 1-s] \\ &= \int_0^\infty \gamma_E^{-s} F_B(\gamma_0) d\gamma_E \\ &\stackrel{(c)}{=} \frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_B}}{2\mathcal{C}_{N_B} \pi j} \int_{\mathcal{L}_2} \frac{\Gamma(\xi) \prod_{i=1}^{N_B} \Gamma(\mu_{B,i} + \frac{2}{\alpha_{B,i}} \xi)}{\Gamma(1+\xi) \mathcal{C}_{N_B}^\xi} \int_0^\infty \frac{\gamma_E^{-s}}{\gamma_0^\xi} d\gamma_E d\xi, \quad (54) \end{aligned}$$

where step (c) is developed by interchanging the order of two integrals.

The inner integral in (54) can be further written as

$$\begin{aligned} \int_0^\infty \gamma_E^{-s} \gamma_0^{-\xi} d\gamma_E &\stackrel{(d)}{=} \mathcal{W}^{-\xi} \int_0^\infty \frac{\gamma_E^{-s}}{\left(1 + \frac{R_s}{\mathcal{W}} \gamma_E\right)^\xi} d\gamma_E \\ &\stackrel{(e)}{=} \mathcal{W}^{-\xi} \mathcal{B}(1-s, \xi + s - 1) \left(\frac{R_s}{\mathcal{W}}\right)^{s-1} \\ &\stackrel{(f)}{=} \mathcal{W}^{-\xi} \frac{\Gamma(1-s) \Gamma(\xi + s - 1)}{\Gamma(\xi)} \left(\frac{R_s}{\mathcal{W}}\right)^{s-1}, \quad (55) \end{aligned}$$

where step (d) is developed by representing $\gamma_0 = R_s \gamma_E + \mathcal{W}$, step (e) is obtained from [37, eq. (3.194.3)], and step (f) is further simplified in a closed-form by deploying the property $\mathcal{B}(x, y) = \frac{\Gamma(x)\Gamma(y)}{\Gamma(x+y)}$ [37, eq. (8.384.1)].

Next, plugging (55) into (54), yields the following result

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathcal{M}[\bar{F}_B(\gamma_0), 1-s] \\ &= \frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_B}}{2\mathcal{C}_{N_B} \pi j} \left(\frac{R_s}{\mathcal{W}}\right)^{s-1} \Gamma(1-s) \\ &\quad \times \int_{\mathcal{L}} \frac{\Gamma(\xi + s - 1) \prod_{i=1}^{N_B} \Gamma(\mu_{B,i} + \frac{2}{\alpha_{B,i}} \xi)}{\Gamma(1+\xi)} (\lambda_B \mathcal{W})^{-\xi} d\xi \\ &\stackrel{(g)}{=} \frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_B} \Gamma(1-s) R_s^{s-1}}{\mathcal{C}_{N_B} \mathcal{W}^{s-1}} \\ &\quad \times H_{1, N_B+1}^{N_B+1, 0} \left[\mathcal{C}_{N_B} \mathcal{W} \left| \begin{matrix} (1, 1) \\ (s-1, 1), \theta_1, \dots, \theta_{N_B} \end{matrix} \right. \right], \quad (56) \end{aligned}$$

where step (g) is directly achieved from the definition of Fox's H -function.

Subsequently, substituting (56) and $\mathcal{M}[f_E(\gamma_E), s]$ into (53), where $\mathcal{M}[f_E(\gamma_E), s]$ is given by [46, eq. (5)]

$$\mathcal{M}[f_E(\gamma_E), s] = C_{N_E} \frac{\prod_{i=1}^{N_E} \Gamma\left(\mu_{E,i} - \frac{2}{\alpha_{E,i}} + \frac{2}{\alpha_{E,i}}s\right)}{C_{N_E}^s}, \quad (57)$$

results in the following result

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{I} = & -\frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_B} \mathcal{K}_{N_E} \mathcal{W}}{4C_{N_B} R_s \pi^2} \int_{\mathcal{L}_1} \int_{\mathcal{L}_2} \frac{\Gamma(\xi + s - 1) \prod_{i=1}^{N_B} \Gamma(\mu_{B,i} + \frac{2}{\alpha_{B,i}} \xi)}{\Gamma(1 + \xi) (C_{N_B} \mathcal{W})^\xi} \\ & \times \Gamma(1 - s) \prod_{i=1}^{N_E} \Gamma\left(\mu_{E,i} - \frac{2}{\alpha_{E,i}} + \frac{2}{\alpha_{E,i}}s\right) \left(\frac{R_s}{C_{N_E} \mathcal{W}}\right)^s d\xi ds. \end{aligned} \quad (58)$$

Finally, plugging (58) in (37) and subsequently applying the bivariate Fox's H -function [28, eq. (2.57)], the proof is eventually achieved.

APPENDIX C

PROOF FOR ASYMPTOTIC \mathcal{P}_{out}

In the case of $\bar{\gamma}_E \rightarrow \infty$, we have $\frac{R_s}{C_{N_E} \mathcal{W}} \rightarrow \infty$. The bivariate Fox's H -function is evaluated at the highest poles on the left of \mathcal{L}_1 , i.e., $s = 1 - \xi$, by using the residue approach [10], therefore, it leads to the following result,

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{1}{2\pi j} \int_{\mathcal{L}_1} \Gamma(\xi + s - 1) \Gamma(1 - s) \\ & \times \underbrace{\prod_{i=1}^{N_E} \Gamma\left(\mu_{E,i} - \frac{2}{\alpha_{E,i}} + \frac{2}{\alpha_{E,i}}s\right) \left(\frac{R_s}{C_{N_E} \mathcal{W}}\right)^s}_{\psi(s)} ds \\ & \approx \text{Res}[\psi(s), 1 - \xi] = \lim_{s \rightarrow 1 - \xi} (s + \xi - 1) \psi(s) \\ & = \Gamma(\xi) \prod_{i=1}^{N_E} \Gamma\left(\mu_{E,i} - \frac{2}{\alpha_{E,i}} \xi\right) \left(\frac{R_s}{C_{N_E} \mathcal{W}}\right)^{1 - \xi}. \end{aligned} \quad (59)$$

Therefore, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}_{out} & \approx 1 - \frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_B} \mathcal{K}_{N_E}}{2\pi C_{N_B} C_{N_E} j} \\ & \times \int_{\mathcal{L}_2} \frac{\Gamma(\xi) \prod_{i=1}^{N_E} \Gamma\left(\mu_{E,i} - \frac{2}{\alpha_{E,i}} \xi\right) \prod_{i=1}^{N_B} \Gamma\left(\mu_{B,i} + \frac{2}{\alpha_{B,i}} \xi\right)}{\underbrace{\Gamma(1 + \xi) \left(\frac{C_{N_B} R_s}{C_{N_E}}\right)^\xi}_{\tau(\xi)}} d\xi, \end{aligned} \quad (60)$$

continuation (60) can be successively and asymptotically simplified as (10) by computing the highest pole on the right of the contour \mathcal{L}_2 , namely $\xi = \frac{\alpha_{E,k} \mu_{E,k}}{2}$, where $\alpha_{E,k} \mu_{E,k} = \min(\alpha_{E,1} \mu_{E,1}, \dots, \alpha_{E,j} \mu_{E,j}), j = 1, \dots, N_E$.

$$\mathcal{P}_{out} \approx 1 - \frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_B} \mathcal{K}_{N_E}}{C_{N_B} C_{N_E}} \text{Res}\left[\tau(\xi), \frac{\alpha_{E,k} \mu_{E,k}}{2}\right], \quad (61)$$

then making some simple manipulations, the proof for (43) is achieved.

Following the same methodology, the proof for the case, $\bar{\gamma}_B \rightarrow \infty$, can be similarly achieved by first computing (58) at the highest pole of \mathcal{L}_2 at $\xi = 1 - s$, and subsequently evaluating the obtained result at the poles of \mathcal{L}_1 , i.e., $s = 0$ and $s = \frac{\alpha_{B,k} \mu_{B,k}}{2}$, where $\alpha_{B,k} \mu_{B,k} = \min(\alpha_{B,1} \mu_{B,1}, \dots, \alpha_{B,i} \mu_{B,i}), i = 1, \dots, N_B$, respectively.

When $\bar{\gamma}_E \rightarrow 0$, the asymptotic \mathcal{P}_{out} is computed at the pole of \mathcal{L}_1 , i.e., $s = 1$. For the case $\bar{\gamma}_B \rightarrow 0$, no pole exists on the right of the contour \mathcal{L}_2 , \mathcal{I} is directly equal to 1.

APPENDIX D

PROOF FOR THEOREM 7

For the ease of deriving the average secrecy capacity, the CDFs of γ_B and γ_E can be equivalently rewritten as follows

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{I}_1 & = \frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_B} \mathcal{K}_{N_E}}{\ln(2) C_{N_E}} \int_0^\infty H_{2,2}^{1,2} \left[\gamma_B \left| \begin{matrix} (1, 1) \\ (1, 1), (0, 1) \end{matrix} \right. \right] H_{0,N_B}^{N_B,0} \left[C_{N_B} \gamma_B \left| \begin{matrix} - \\ \Phi_1, \dots, \Phi_{N_B} \end{matrix} \right. \right] H_{1,N_E+1}^{N_E,1} \left[C_{N_E} \gamma_B \left| \begin{matrix} (1, 1) \\ \theta_1, \dots, \theta_{N_E} \end{matrix} \right. \right] d\gamma_B \\ & = \frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_B} \mathcal{K}_{N_E}}{2\pi j \ln(2) C_{N_E}} \int_{\mathcal{L}_1} \frac{\prod_{l=1}^{N_E} \Gamma\left(\mu_{E,l} - \frac{2s}{\alpha_{E,l}}\right) \Gamma(s)}{\Gamma(1 + s) C_{N_E}^{-s}} \underbrace{\int_0^\infty \gamma_B^s H_{2,2}^{1,2} \left[\gamma_B \left| \begin{matrix} (1, 1), (1, 1) \\ (1, 1), (0, 1) \end{matrix} \right. \right] H_{0,N_B}^{N_B,0} \left[C_{N_B} \gamma \left| \begin{matrix} - \\ \Phi_1, \dots, \Phi_{N_B} \end{matrix} \right. \right] d\gamma_B}_{U} ds, \end{aligned} \quad (69)$$

$$\mathcal{I}_1 = -\frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_B} \mathcal{K}_{N_E}}{4\pi^2 \ln(2) C_{N_B} C_{N_E}} \int_{\mathcal{L}_1} \int_{\mathcal{L}_2} \prod_{i=1}^{N_B} \Gamma\left(m_{B,i} + \frac{2s}{\alpha_{B,i}} + \frac{2t}{\alpha_{B,i}}\right) \frac{\prod_{l=1}^{N_E} \Gamma\left(\mu_{E,l} - \frac{2s}{\alpha_{E,l}}\right) \Gamma(s) \Gamma(1 - t) \Gamma^2(t)}{\Gamma(1 + s) \Gamma(1 + t) C_{N_B}^t} \left(\frac{C_{N_E}}{C_{N_B}}\right)^s dt ds, \quad (71)$$

by using [39, eq. (3.9)]

$$F_B(\gamma_B) = \frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_B}}{\mathcal{C}_{N_B}} H_{1, N_B+1}^{N_B, 1} \left[\mathcal{C}_{N_B} \gamma \left| \begin{matrix} (1, 1) \\ \phi_1, \dots, \phi_{N_B}, (0, 1) \end{matrix} \right. \right], \quad (62a)$$

$$F_E(\gamma_E) = \frac{\mathcal{K}_{N_E}}{\mathcal{C}_{N_E}} H_{1, N_E+1}^{N_E, 1} \left[\mathcal{C}_{N_E} \gamma \left| \begin{matrix} (1, 1) \\ \theta_1, \dots, \theta_{N_E}, (0, 1) \end{matrix} \right. \right], \quad (62b)$$

Recalling the result given in [35], the ASC given in (36) can be further mathematically expressed as

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{C}_s &= \int_0^\infty \int_0^\infty C_s(\gamma_B, \gamma_E) f_{\gamma_B}(\gamma_B) f_{\gamma_E}(\gamma_E) d\gamma_B d\gamma_E \\ &= \mathcal{I}_1 + \mathcal{I}_2 - \mathcal{I}_3, \end{aligned} \quad (63)$$

where

$$\mathcal{I}_1 = \int_0^\infty \log_2(1 + \gamma_B) f_B(\gamma_B) F_E(\gamma_B) d\gamma_B, \quad (64)$$

$$\mathcal{I}_2 = \int_0^\infty \log_2(1 + \gamma_E) f_E(\gamma_E) F_B(\gamma_E) d\gamma_E, \quad (65)$$

$$\mathcal{I}_3 = \int_0^\infty \log_2(1 + \gamma_E) f_E(\gamma_E) d\gamma_E. \quad (66)$$

Next, re-expressing the logarithm function in terms of the Meijer's G -function [41], i.e.,

$$\log_2(1 + x) = \frac{1}{\ln 2} G_{2,2}^{1,2} \left[x \left| \begin{matrix} (1, 1) \\ (1, 0) \end{matrix} \right. \right], \quad (67)$$

and then using [41, Eq. (8.3.2.21)]

$$H_{p,q}^{m,n} \left[x \left| \begin{matrix} (a_p, 1) \\ (b_q, 1) \end{matrix} \right. \right] = G_{p,q}^{m,n} \left[x \left| \begin{matrix} (a_p) \\ (b_q) \end{matrix} \right. \right], \quad (68)$$

\mathcal{I}_1 can be rewritten in (69), as shown at the bottom of the page, where \mathcal{L}_1 is a certain contour separating the poles of $\prod_{l=1}^{N_E} \Gamma(\mu_{E,l} - s)$ from the poles of $\Gamma(s)$. The inner integral U can be directly developed by using the Mellin transform for the product of two Fox's H -functions [41, eq. (2.25.1.1)] as follows

$$U = \mathcal{C}_{N_B}^{s+1} H_{2+N_B, 2}^{1, 2+N_B} \left[\frac{1}{\mathcal{C}_{N_B}} \left| \begin{matrix} (1, 1), (1, 1), \omega_1, \dots, \omega_{N_B} \\ (1, 1), (0, 1) \end{matrix} \right. \right], \quad (70)$$

where $\omega_i = (1 - \mu_{B,i} - \frac{2s}{\alpha_{B,i}}, \frac{2}{\alpha_{B,i}})$, subsequently, rewriting (70) in terms of the definition of Fox's H -function, then substituting the obtained result into (69), leads to the result given in (71), as shown at the bottom of the page, where \mathcal{L}_2 is another contour, next recognizing the definition of bivariate Fox's H -functions [28], the proof for \mathcal{I}_1 is accomplished.

Similarly, following the same methodology, the proof for \mathcal{I}_2 is achieved.

With the help of [41, eq. (2.25.1.1)], the proof for \mathcal{I}_3 can be similarly obtained.


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