

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Invariant Set-Based DC Microgrid Decentralized Actuator Fault-Tolerant Control

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ABSTRACT Faults and system failure components are primarily two causes of unstable or deteriorating control performance of power system. In this study, we present a novel approach to the decentralized restoration of large DC microgrids using fault-tolerant control (FTC). The microgrid achieves decentralization by partitioning into several smaller grids. Each independent grid views the actions of the other grids as an external disturbance. The malfunction of the controller is represented in the input matrix as a norm-bounded uncertainty. The disturbance impact is diminished due to the proposed invariant-set approach. The proposed control can address simultaneous failures in actuators with random placement and degradation levels. In a passive FTC system, when the defect cannot be detected (or the fault may not have been clearly addressed), the proposed technique is utilized. After the fault has occurred, it can be viewed as an uncertainty in system dynamics. The controller that stabilizes the system is obtained by solving iteratively bilinear matrix inequalities as linear matrix inequalities. In addition, this study presents and discusses positive outcomes of applying this method to a system of six interconnected DC microgrids in the event of multiple fault types. The proposed control successfully stabilizes the severe case of simultaneous actuator faults.

INDEX TERMS DC microgrid (MG), decentralized control, fault-tolerant control, invariant ellipsoid, robust tracker.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. BRIEF SURVEY

The different components in the classical control theory are assumed to be reliably operated. This is not a practical assumption as any component in the system may fail or be mal-operated at any time. Maintaining system stability and performance as well as fault determination are the main roles of the control system. To provide maintenance as well as to avoid faults, a monitoring and diagnostic approach is required. Power systems stabilization under random line failure or unreliable operation is given [1], [2]. These can be

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defined as fault-tolerant control systems (FTCs) [3], [4]. The basic assembly of FTCS is shown in Figure 1.

The two main types of fault-tolerant control system can be classified as active and passive control system [3], [4], [5], [6], [7]. In the active fault-tolerant control (AFTC), different kinds of faults can be managed which leads to perfect system execution. The fault detection and isolation (FDI) module, which is a reconfiguration system and an adjustable controller in itself, is responsive to the outcome that is sought. AFTC and FDI are crucial in identifying and isolating defective elements to increase adaptation in defective conditions [7]. Passive fault tolerant control (PFTC) is faster than AFTCS because it lacks an FDI unit and is computationally simpler than AFTCS.




FIGURE 1. Basic architecture of FTCs.

Although passive FTC systems are less sophisticated, they are cautious to account for “worst case” fault consequences [8]. Passive FTC has been designed using variety of methods. Among those techniques are sliding mode control (SMC) method [8], H_∞ [9], linear quadratic control [3], fuzzy logic control [10], Lyapunov-based control [11], and control allocation [12]. Such passive FTC systems are typically less complex and are common due to their design simplicity and use [13].

Following is a summary of the many fault compensation strategies utilized in active FTC design:

Active FTC system’s techniques are based on real-time fault isolation and detection. Switching-Based active FTC, according to the fault kind and severity, the system switches between a collection of preconfigured candidate controllers that make up the active FTC controller. Reference [14] describes an active FTC method that addresses the dwell time among switches. By resolving linear matrix inequality, the system stability is ensured.

The design methods of AFTC require the least amount of delay and the highest level of FDI data. To find errors, an adaptive neural network (NN) technique is used [15]. A nonlinear observer was introduced and integrated with a NN based on the observer’s nonlinear model, while its gains were updated using an extended Kalman filter (EKF). A wavelet-based active FTC system for a multi-agent leader-following system was developed in [16].

AFTC systems’ disadvantages can be classified as follows:

(1) delayed detection and isolation. As faults are detected after their occurrence, the controller is reconstructed to compensate for the fault. The controller can then be precisely designed to the system with the fault dynamics.

(2) the resulting AFTC controller is more complex than PFTC.

(3) fault detection is a difficult problem and cannot assure a precise detection in presence of external disturbances.

Through extensive implementation of the Microgrids (MGs) power in distribution networks, a reduction in pollution, minimizing the transmission system losses, improving the system reliability, and enhancing stability can be obtained [17]. The MG can be operated in an isolated mode or connected to the utility grid. MGs can be classified as direct current DC, alternating current AC, or hybrid DC/AC. Because of the fundamental advantages of the Direct Current (DC) system in terms of compatibility with power generation

sources, modern loads, and storage devices, DC MG has become popular over Alternate Current (AC) system. Due to the above reasons, the research work in this article concentrates on faults that may occur in DC MG. The control of the voltage, frequency, active and reactive power are the main challenges related to the MGs. Operating modes of MG can be islanded or grid-connected. The MG faults could be faults in the actuators, sensors, communication system, and in the plant itself.

To achieve various control objectives in DC MGs, there are many approaches for using three-level hierarchical structure which are primary control, secondary control, and tertiary control. The primary, secondary and tertiary control are responsible for the regulation of voltage, restoration of voltage, and power management respectively [18], [19].

The MGs can also be categorized in terms of communication, where, the primary factor in control is communication. Three methods—distinguished by the degree of communication—are used to achieve the fundamental control [20], and they are as follows:

Centralized, decentralized and distribution control

Distributed generators are regulated by a central controller in this control scheme. Digital Communication Links (DCLs) are used to collect, process, and send data from the DC MG’s units back to the controller. The central control system’s beating heart is communication. The robust observability and controllability of the entire system are one of this scheme’s benefits. The system’s single point of failure, as well as its decreased reliability, adaptability, and scalability, are only a few of its many drawbacks. A common illustration of a centralized control technique is the main/secondary control system.

There is no communication link in this system. The distributed generators are managed by independent controllers through their local variables. The fact that it does not require any communication linkages between the various system elements makes it the most reliable control approach. Decentralized control, however, has some performance limitations.

The advantages of both centralized and decentralized control techniques are combined in this control system. Each unit’s controller only uses the few available DCLs to exchange data with its immediate neighbors. In light of these goals, state of charge, voltage restoration, current sharing, and proportional load power sharing can easily be performed.

B. PAPER CONTRIBUTION

The method introduced in this paper addresses the decentralization restriction by offering a sophisticated method of adding actuator malfunction into the passive FTC framework. A robust fault-tolerant control for linear discrete-time systems is the focus of this manuscript. Moreover, it applies an ellipsoidal bound to a robust invariant set. The most important thing is to keep the system’s state within the robust invariant feasible set which is a collection of states that ensures the

stability of the suggested control technique. Minimizing the invariant ellipsoid volume improves the system’s performance by attenuating the disturbance consequence.

The main contributions of this study are:

1. The invariant ellipsoid approach is used for introducing robustness against external disturbances and fault uncertainty.
2. The development of robust invariant set is based on quadratic boundedness.
3. Unlike the active FTC approach which requires fault detection and two-components control, the proposed control is a simple proportional feedback state and easy to implement.
4. The proposed control can also handle simultaneous actuator faults (extremely uncommon in practice).

C. PAPER ORGANIZATION

The following is how the paper is set up: A general outline of the suggested structure is presented in Section II. In Section III, passive fault tolerant control is introduced. It describes the fault-tolerant mechanism and the robust control technique. The resilient invariant-ellipsoid set notion and its derivation are presented in Section IV. Section V presents the suggested effective robust control for linear systems. The six-connected DC microgrid system is an example given in the final part as an illustration.

Notation: The term “matrix transposition” is denoted by the superscript (·)′ throughout the text, while R^n stands for the n-dimensional Euclidean space and $R^{n \times m}$ refers to the collection of all $n \times m$ real matrices. Vectors are designated by small letters, scalars by small Greek letters, and matrices by capital letters. A symmetric $P \in R^{n \times m}$, $P > (<)0$ indicates that it is a positive (negative) definite. A symmetric matrix $\begin{bmatrix} Q & R \\ R' & P \end{bmatrix}$ is denoted by $\begin{bmatrix} Q & R \\ * & P \end{bmatrix}$. Likewise, $(M + N + *)$ means that $(M + N + M' + N')$. Lastly, 0 and I represent the zero matrices and the identity matrix, respectively.

Fact 1 [4]: For any real matrices Γ, Δ, E with suitable dimensions and $\Delta' \Delta \leq I$, this means that:

$$\Gamma \Delta E + * \leq \varepsilon \Gamma \Gamma' + \varepsilon^{-1} E' E, \forall \varepsilon > 0$$

Fact 2 [4] (Schur Complement): This fact is used to transform a nonlinear matrix inequality to a linear one.

Given constant matrices W_1, W_2, W_3 where $W_1 = W_1'$, and $0 < W_2 = W_2'$. Then

$$W_1 + W_3' W_2^{-1} W_3 < 0 \Leftrightarrow \begin{bmatrix} W_1 & \bullet \\ W_3 & -W_2 \end{bmatrix} < 0$$

II. PROBLEM FORMULATION

Consider a large system that has been linearized with a Taylor expansion around an operating point. A discrete linear state space representation of the linearized system with a sampling period T_s is given by

$$x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + Bu(k), \quad y(k) = Cx(k) \quad (1)$$

where $A \in R^{n \times n}$, $B \in R^{n \times m}$, $C \in R^{l \times n}$. Assuming all the states are available for state-feedback control, $C=I$.

The number of outputs that can track a reference input vector, y_r , cannot be more than the number of control inputs to maintain controllability [6]. Consequently, the output equation for the open-loop system shown by (1) can be rewritten as

$$y(k) = Cx(k) = \begin{bmatrix} C_1 \\ C_2 \end{bmatrix} x(k) = \begin{bmatrix} y_1(k) \\ y_2(k) \end{bmatrix} \quad (2)$$

where $y_1 \in R^h, h \leq l$ denotes the vector of the outputs required to follow the reference input vector y_r .

A. DECENTRALIZED ROBUST FTC TRACKING AND ACTUATOR FAULT REPRESENTATION

A decentralized approach is preferable to be used for controlling large systems. This is because it avoids using a communication network to send the states to the computer (as in centralized control), delays, packet loss, and failure in the hub computer... etc. The global system (1) with $C = I$

$$x(k + 1) = Ax(k) + Bu(k) \quad (3)$$

can be decomposed into N subsystems. With $A = \{A_{i,j}\}$, and $B = \text{blockdiagonal}\{B_1..B_N\}$ the subsystem # i is given by

$$x_i(k + 1) = A_{ii}x_i(k) + B_iu_i(k) + D_ix(k), D_i \\ = [A_{i1} \dots \quad 0_{ii} \dots A_{iN}], \quad i = 1..N \quad (4)$$

The dimensions of x_i, u_i are respectively $n_i, m_i, n = \sum_{i=1}^N n_i, m = \sum_{i=1}^N m_i$,

Assuming $x(k)$ as a bounded external disturbance $w(k)$,

$$\|w(k)\| \leq 1 \quad (5)$$

Note that if the disturbance norm is >1 , the disturbance matrix D_i can always be scaled such that the constraint (5) is satisfied. (e.g. if $D_{old} w(k), \|w(k)\| = 2$, we can select $D_{new} = 2D_{old}$). When fault occurs in actuator # i , equation (4) which represents subsystem # i becomes

$$x_i(k + 1) = A_{ii}x_i(k) + (B_i + \Delta B_i) u_i(k) + D_iw(k), \\ k = 0, 1, 2, \dots, i = 1..N \quad (6)$$

where

$$\Delta B_i = B_i \cdot \text{diag}(\beta(k)) = B_i \cdot \Delta_B(k)$$

When a fault occurs in actuator # i , at channel $j, j=1..m_i$, then $\beta = [\beta_1.. \beta_j \dots \beta_{m_i}]$, $\beta_j \in]0.. -1]$. Let $\text{diag}(\beta(k))$ be denoted as $\Delta_B(k)$. When $\beta_j = -1$, means complete failure of channel j in actuator # i . For partial actuator fault, $0 < \beta_j < 1$. For example, when an abrupt decrease of 70% in the effectiveness of actuator i , $\beta_i = 0.3$. Note that the uncertainty is norm-bounded given by $\|\Delta_B(k)\| < 1$. There are two models to describe the faults, additive and multiplicative. The last equation describes the actuator fault as an additive uncertainty which tackles easily such type of fault.

To achieve tracking task for subsystem i , a vector comparator and integrator are added z_i which fulfills:

$$z_i(k+1) = z_i(k) + T_s[y_{ri}(k) - y_{li}(k)] \quad (7)$$

where T_s is the sampling period. As a result, the augmented state space representation controls the open-loop system of subsystem i

$$\hat{x}_i(k+1) = \hat{A}_{ii}\hat{x}_i(k) + \hat{B}_i u_i(k) + \hat{D}_i w(k) + \hat{I}_i y_{ri}(k), \quad (8)$$

where

$$\hat{x}_i = \begin{bmatrix} x_i \\ z_i \end{bmatrix}, \quad \hat{A}_{ii} = \begin{bmatrix} A_{ii} & O \\ -T_s C_{1i} & I_i \end{bmatrix}, \quad \hat{B}_i = \begin{bmatrix} B_i \\ O \end{bmatrix},$$

$$\hat{D}_i = \begin{bmatrix} D_i \\ O \end{bmatrix}, \quad \hat{I}_i = \begin{bmatrix} O \\ T_s I_i \end{bmatrix},$$

It is required to design the state feedback control given by

$$u_i(k) = \hat{K}_i(k) \hat{x}_i(k) = [K_{1i} \quad K_{2i}] \hat{x}_i(k) \quad (9)$$

Matrix C is an identity matrix for this application. The state variables are the outputs.

III. PASSIVE FAULT TOLERANT CONTROL

To design PFTC, the invariant ellipsoid set is first introduced in this section.

A. INVARIANT ELLIPSOID SET [21]

The ellipsoid set

$$E = x'(k) P^{-1} x(k) \leq 1, \quad P > 0 \quad (10)$$

centered at the origin is said to be state-invariant for the discrete-time dynamic system

$$x(k+1) = Ax(k) + Bu(k) + Dw(k), \quad \text{subject to } \|w(k)\| \leq 1 \quad (11)$$

if the condition $x_0 \in E$ implies $x(k) \in E$ for all future instants $k = 1, 2, \dots$. In other words, if the state trajectory $x(k)$ lies inside E , it will not leave the ellipsoid in the future time. The pair (A, B) is assumed controllable.

An invariant ellipsoid is also attracting in the sense that any trajectory started from a point outside E will be attracted by this ellipsoid as time evolves.

Theorem 1 ([21]): Let P, Y be a solution to the minimization problem

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{minimize } tr P \\ & \text{subject to } \begin{bmatrix} -\alpha P & * & * \\ AP + BY & -P & * \\ 0 & D' & -(1-\alpha)I \end{bmatrix} \leq 0 \end{aligned} \quad (12)$$

for some $0 < \alpha < 1$. The resultant state feedback controller is given by

$$K = YP^{-1}.$$

Proof: see Appendix.

Based on theorem 1, the next theorem is derived to solve the passive FTC problem.




FIGURE 2. Six DGs islanded DC-microgrid.

Theorem 2: For subsystem i , let P_i, Y_i , scalar α be a solution for

minimize $tr(P_i)$

Subject to

$$\begin{bmatrix} -\alpha P_i & * & * & * \\ \hat{A}_{ii}P_i + \hat{B}_i Y_i & -P_i + \epsilon \hat{B}_i \hat{B}_i' & * & * \\ 0 & \hat{D}_i' & -(1-\alpha)I_i & * \\ Y_i & 0 & 0 & -\epsilon I \end{bmatrix} \leq 0, \quad (13)$$

$$\epsilon > 0, 0 < \alpha < 1$$

Then the FTC is

$$\hat{K}_i = Y_i P_i^{-1}$$

The above matrix inequality is nonlinear due to the term αP_i . It is a bilinear matrix inequality BMI which is difficult to be solved. However, it can be transformed into a linear matrix inequality LMI which is easy to solve by fixing the scalar α . The above optimization problem is done by updating α iteratively on an outer loop to minimize $tr(P_i)$.

Proof:

$$\begin{aligned} & \begin{bmatrix} -\alpha P_i & * & * \\ \hat{A}_{ii}P_i + (\hat{B}_i + \Delta \hat{B}_i)Y_i & -P_i & * \\ 0 & \hat{D}_i' & -(1-\alpha)I_i \end{bmatrix} \leq 0 \\ \therefore & \begin{bmatrix} -\alpha P_i & * & * \\ A_{ii}P_i + B_i Y_i & -P_i & * \\ 0 & \hat{D}_i' & -(1-\alpha)I \end{bmatrix} \\ & + \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ B_i \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \Delta_B [I \quad 0 \quad 0] Y_i + * \leq 0 \text{ or,} \\ & \times \begin{bmatrix} -\alpha P_i & * & * \\ A_{ii}P_i + B_i Y_i & -P_i & * \\ 0 & \hat{D}_i' & -(1-\alpha)I \end{bmatrix} \\ & + \epsilon \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & B_i B_i' & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} + \frac{1}{\epsilon} \begin{bmatrix} Y_i' \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} [Y_i \quad 0 \quad 0] + * \leq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Using Fact 1, we get

$$\begin{bmatrix} -\alpha P_i & * & 0 & * \\ A_{ii}P_i + B_i Y_i & -P_i + \epsilon B_i B_i' & D & * \\ 0 & \hat{D}_i' & -(1-\alpha)I & * \\ Y_i & 0 & 0 & -\epsilon I \end{bmatrix} \leq 0, \epsilon > 0$$

This completes the proof.

If the operating point of the DC MG changes due to load variations, the linearized model around the operating point




FIGURE 3. Degradation in the control signal of DG1 from 100% to 60%. (a) control signals for DG1, DG2 and DG3. (b) controlled output voltages of DG1, DG2 and DG3. (c) control signals for DG4, DG5 and 6. (d) controlled output voltages of DG4, DG5 and DG6.




FIGURE 4. Degradation in the control signal of DG5 from 100% to 70%. (a) control signals for DG1, DG2 and DG3. (b) controlled output voltages of DG1, DG2 and DG3. (c) control signals for DG4, DG5. (d) controlled output voltages of DG4-6.

also changes. This results in system uncertainties of the form $\Delta \hat{A}_{ii} = F_A \Delta_A H_A$, and $\Delta \hat{D}_i = F_D \Delta_D H_D$. The uncertainties are represented in the norm-bounded form

$$\|\Delta_A\| \leq 1, \|\Delta_D\| \leq 1$$

In this case, the fault-tolerant controller is given by the following theorem.

Theorem 3: For subsystem i , let P_i, Y_i , scalar α be a solution, as shown in the equation at the bottom of the next page.

Then the FTC is $\hat{K}_i = Y_i P_i^{-1}$

Proof: Shown in the equation at the bottom of the next page.

Fact 2 (Schur complement) is used in the above proof.

IV. MICROGRID STUDY SYSTEM

Fig. 2 presents the study system that consists of six DG in an islanded DC microgrid. The contiguous-time state model of the study system [22], is discretized with a sampling time of 0.001s. The DC MG's discrete-time model is as follows, as shown in the equation at the bottom of page 7.

Decomposing the state equation above for the Six DGs islanded DC-MG into 6 sub-grids, and solving Theorem 2 for each, we get the decentralized passive FTC as follows in Table 1.

The Matlab/SimPower Systems Toolbox is used to model the study system. According to the IEEE standards in [23], robust stability, mandatory response, and steady-state

TABLE 1. Proposed decentralized passive FTC.

Sub-grid #	α	Min. Ellipsoid vol.	Controller[K_x, K_i]
1	0.981	8.5899e-05	[-73.136 -29.094 741.49]
2	0.98	0.0073391	[-132.36 -43.005 370.84]
3	0.99	0.0004143	[-183.92 -73.149 1012.4]
4	0.989	0.00032054	[-108.65 -36.08 660.37]
5	0.988	0.00035095	[-143.1 -79.248 938.06]
6	0.978	5.6416e-05	[-76.476 -63.128 960.58]

capability have all been met. During random degradation of the control signal (actuator fault), the designed controllers are evaluated. Two scenarios are run through the study system with the proposed designed controls. The two scenarios are carried out using a random pick of such an actuator with fault

TABLE 2. Random control signal degradation.

Scenario Number	Random Selection			
	DG Number	Time (s)	Control Signal Degradation (%)	
1	Case 1	DG1	at t = 7 s	40 %
	Case 2	DG5	at t = 8 s	30 %
2		DG2 and DG4 simultaneously	at t = 6 s and at t = 11 s simultaneously	20 % (DG2) 40 % (DG4)

level (control signal degradation in percentage) in a certain DG. The random selections are given in Table 2.

Scenario 1 (Random Actuator Fault in one DG):

Case 1: Actuator fault at DG1

The actuator in DG1 was chosen with 40% deterioration at t=7 s as shown in Table 2 by establishing a random selection technique and selecting a fault in one actuator with a random degradation level in a random time. Figure 3

minimize $tr(P_i)$

$$\text{Subject to } \begin{bmatrix} -\alpha P_i & * & * & * & * \\ \hat{A}_{ii}P_i + \hat{B}_iY_i & -P_i + \epsilon\hat{B}_i\hat{B}'_i + \rho F_A F'_A & * & * & * \\ 0 & \hat{D}'_i & -(1-\alpha)I_i + \gamma F_D F'_D & * & * \\ Y_i & 0 & \gamma F_D F'_D & * & * \\ H_A P_i & 0 & 0 & -\epsilon I & * \\ 0 & H_D & 0 & 0 & -\gamma I \end{bmatrix} \leq 0,$$

$$0 < \alpha < 1, \epsilon > 0, \rho > 0, \gamma > 0$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} -\alpha P_i & * & * & * \\ \hat{A}_{ii}P_i + \hat{B}_iY_i & -P_i + \epsilon\hat{B}_i\hat{B}'_i & * & * \\ 0 & \hat{D}'_i & -(1-\alpha)I_i & * \\ Y_i & 0 & 0 & -\epsilon I \end{bmatrix} + \left(\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ F_A \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \Delta_A [H_A \ 0 \ 0 \ 0] P_i + * \right) \\ + \left(\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ F_D \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} \Delta_D [0 \ H_D \ 0 \ 0] + * \right) \leq 0 \\ \therefore \begin{bmatrix} -\alpha P_i & * & * & * \\ \hat{A}_{ii}P_i + \hat{B}_iY_i & -P_i + \epsilon\hat{B}_i\hat{B}'_i & * & * \\ 0 & \hat{D}'_i & -(1-\alpha)I_i & * \\ Y_i & 0 & 0 & -\epsilon I \end{bmatrix} \\ + \left(\rho \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ F_A \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} [0 \ F'_A \ 0 \ 0] + \rho^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} P_i H'_A \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} [H_A P_i \ 0 \ 0 \ 0] \right) \\ + \left(\gamma \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \\ F_D \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} [0 \ 0 \ F'_D \ 0] + \gamma^{-1} \begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ H'_D \\ 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix} [0 \ H_D \ 0 \ 0] \right) \leq 0$$

shows a fault in DG1 with a degradation in the control signal from 100% to 60%. The control signals for DG1, DG2, and DG3 before and after the fault occurrence are shown in Figure 3(a). During the fault instant, the fault consequences in DG2 and DG3 are minimal (% overshoot is $\pm 1.74\%$). Moreover, Figure 3(c) provides the fault impacts in DG4, DG5, and DG6. The effects are close to zero. Fig. 3(c, d) shows the controlled output voltages of six DGs. Since the proposed tracker treats the fault as a disturbance, it completely solves the problem for DG1 (40% fault) with exceptional performance (it has 0.8% overshoot, 0.5 s settling time, and zero steady-state error). Furthermore, other trackers in the study system are shown in Figures 3(c, d) with significantly greater performance. Table 3 summarizes the implications of 40 % actuator fault in DG1 on the other five

DGs. The control parameters shown in Table 3 demonstrate the dead-beat, quick, and zero steady-state performance of the designed trackers for the six DGs during the 40% fault in DG1.

Case 2: Actuator fault at DG5

The actuator in DG5 was selected with 30% degradation at $t=8$ s as presented in Table 1 by creating a random selection technique and picking a fault in one actuator with a random degradation level at a random time. Figure 4 displays a fault in DG5 with a fault in the control signal from 100% to 70%. Figure 4(a) depicts the control signals for DG1, DG2, and DG3 before and after the fault occurrence. The fault effects in DG1, DG2 and DG3 are negligible during the fault's occurrence. Furthermore, the largest influence of the fault (30% in DG5) occurs in the nearby DGs (DG4 and DG6)

$$A = \begin{bmatrix} 0.9951 & 0.03797 & 0.004429 & 6.703 e - 05 & 5.77 e - 06 & 7.51 e - 08 \\ -0.01315 & 0.9046 & -2.971 e - 05 & -3.045 e - 07 & -2.601 e - 08 & -2.563 e - 10 \\ 0.004429 & 8.58 e - 05 & 0.998 & 0.0297 & 0.002599 & 5.032 e - 05 \\ -1.49 e - 05 & -1.954 e - 07 & -0.006601 & 0.9045 & -8.736 e - 06 & -1.146 e - 07 \\ 5.77 e - 06 & 7.511 e - 08 & 0.002599 & 3.931 e - 05 & 0.998 & 0.03802 \\ -1.738 e - 08 & -1.713 e - 10 & -1.165 e - 05 & -1.194 e - 07 & -0.008802 & 0.9044 \\ 5.131 e - 09 & 5.033 e - 11 & 3.466 e - 06 & 3.523 e - 08 & 0.002662 & 5.153 e - 05 \\ -1.743 e - 11 & -1.376 e - 13 & -1.562 e - 08 & -1.202 e - 10 & -1.785 e - 05 & -2.341 e - 07 \\ 3.563 e - 12 & 2.805 e - 14 & 3.208 e - 09 & 2.458 e - 11 & 3.696 e - 06 & 4.809 e - 08 \\ -4.869 e - 15 & -3.209 e - 17 & -5.463 e - 12 & -3.37 e - 14 & -8.35 e - 09 & -8.228 e - 11 \\ 2.998 e - 15 & 1.971 e - 17 & 3.374 e - 12 & 2.075 e - 14 & 5.181 e - 09 & 5.082 e - 11 \\ -4.563 e - 18 & -2.581 e - 20 & -6.148 e - 15 & -3.165 e - 17 & -1.176 e - 11 & -9.29 e - 14 \\ 5.131 e - 09 & 4.194 e - 11 & 3.563 e - 12 & 3.896 e - 14 & 2.998 e - 15 & 4.107 e - 17 \\ -1.743 e - 11 & -1.147 e - 13 & -9.712 e - 15 & -8.889 e - 17 & -6.826 e - 18 & -8.042 e - 20 \\ 3.466 e - 06 & 3.758 e - 08 & 3.208 e - 09 & 4.37 e - 11 & 3.374 e - 12 & 5.533 e - 14 \\ -7.83 e - 09 & -6.429 e - 11 & -5.463 e - 12 & -5.991 e - 14 & -4.611 e - 15 & -6.33 e - 17 \\ 0.002662 & 4.295 e - 05 & 3.696 e - 06 & 6.68 e - 08 & 5.181 e - 09 & 1.059 e - 10 \\ -1.193 e - 05 & -1.304 e - 07 & -1.113 e - 08 & -1.524 e - 10 & -1.176 e - 11 & -1.935 e - 13 \\ 0.9983 & 0.0317 & 0.002772 & 7.454 e - 05 & 5.827 e - 06 & 1.58 e - 07 \\ -0.0131 & 0.9046 & -1.858 e - 05 & -3.386 e - 07 & -2.626 e - 08 & -5.393 e - 10 \\ 0.002772 & 4.472 e - 05 & 0.9971 & 0.05279 & 0.004192 & 0.0001692 \\ -9.318 e - 06 & -1.019 e - 07 & -0.006599 & 0.9047 & -1.41 e - 05 & -3.854 e - 07 \\ 5.827 e - 06 & 6.321 e - 08 & 0.004192 & 0.0001128 & 0.9947 & 0.07908 \\ -1.756 e - 08 & -1.442 e - 10 & -1.88 e - 05 & -3.426 e - 07 & -0.008787 & 0.9042 \end{bmatrix}$$

$$B = \begin{bmatrix} 0.0002676 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 \\ 0.01318 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 \\ 0.0 & 0.0001049 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 \\ 0.0 & 0.006607 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 \\ 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.000179 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 \\ 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.00881 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 \\ 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0002232 & 0.0 & 0.0 \\ 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.01318 & 0.0 & 0.0 \\ 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0001865 & 0.0 \\ 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.006608 & 0.0 \\ 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0003726 \\ 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.0 & 0.008809 \end{bmatrix}$$

C = unit matrix




FIGURE 5. Degradation in the control signal of DG2 from 100% to 80% at $t = 6$ s and degradation on the control signal of DG4 from 100% to 60% at $t = 11$ s. (a) control signals for DG1, DG2 and DG3. (b, c).

TABLE 3. Control response parameters for the control signal and the trackers output voltages during fault 40 % in DG1.

		Control Response Parameters		
		% Overshoot (%)	Settling Time (s)	Steady State error (%)
Control Signal	DG1	NA	NA	NA
	DG2	1.74	0.221	≈ 0.0
	DG3	-0.6	0.1081	≈ 0.0
	DG4	0.005	0.1021	≈ 0.0
	DG5	0.001	0.0783	≈ 0.0
	DG6	0.00063	0.0734	≈ 0.0
Trackers Output Voltage	DG1	0.7881	0.497	≈ 0.0
	DG2	0.075	0.178	≈ 0.0
	DG3	0.00043	0.162	≈ 0.0
	DG4	0.000029	0.153	≈ 0.0
	DG5	0.000064	0.137	≈ 0.0
	DG6	0.000032	0.109	≈ 0.0

reflecting on their effect to have less than 0.123% overshoot, as shown in Figure 4(c). The regulated output voltages of six DGs are shown in Figures 4 (c, d). Because of the suggested tracker handles the fault problem as a disturbance, it solves the problem with superior performance for DG5 (30% fault) (it has 0.275% overshoot, 0.596 s settling time, and zero steady-state error). In addition, other trackers in the study model with noticeably better performance are displayed in Figures 4 (c, d). The effects of 30% actuator fault in DG5 on the other five DGs are provided in Table 4. Table 4 shows the dead-beat, fast, and zero steady-state performance of the designed trackers for the six DGs during the 30% fault in DG.

Scenario 2 (Random Simultaneous Actuator Fault in Two DGs):

By developing a random selection technique and choosing a fault in two actuators simultaneous with a random

TABLE 4. Control response parameters for the control signal and the trackers output voltages during 30 % fault in DG5.

		Control Response Parameters		
		% Overshoot (%)	Settling Time (s)	Steady State error (%)
Control Signal	DG1	0	NA	$0.000005 \approx 0.0$
	DG2	0.000002	0.672	$0.000003 \approx 0.0$
	DG3	0.00789	0.681	≈ 0.0
	DG4	0.1223	0.692	≈ 0.0
	DG5	NA	NA	NA
	DG6	0.0124	0.676	≈ 0.0
Trackers Output Voltage	DG1	0.00000021	0.0856	≈ 0.0
	DG2	0.00000035	0.117	≈ 0.0
	DG3	0.00000786	0.1781	≈ 0.0
	DG4	0.000265	0.276	≈ 0.0
	DG5	0.275	0.596	≈ 0.0
	DG6	0.000277	0.269	≈ 0.0

deterioration level in a random time, the actuator in DG2 was selected with 20% degradation at $t = 6$ s and the actuator in DG4 was chosen with 40% at $t = 11$ s, as shown in Table 2. Figures 5 (a, b, c) show the first fault in DG2 with a control signal fault degradation from 100% to 80%, and Figures 5(d, e, f) show the second simultaneous fault in DG4 with a control signal fault from 100% to 60%. The control signals for DG1, DG2, and DG3 are shown in Figure 5(a) before and after the first fault occurrence. During the first fault occurrence in DG2, the fault effects appearing in neighboring DG1 and DG3 are minimal as given in Figure 6. Figures 5 (b, c) depict the controlled output voltages of six DGs. Since the proposed tracker treats the fault problem as a disturbance, it completely solves the problem while providing higher performance for DG2 (20% fault) (it has 0.232%




FIGURE 6. Control signals for six DGs during fault in two actuators simultaneously (DG2 with 20%, and DG4 with 40%).

TABLE 5. Controlled output voltages response parameters in six DGs during fault in two actuators simultaneously (DG2 with 20%, and DG4 with 40%).

		Control Response Parameters					
		First Fault in DG2 (20%)			Second Fault in DG4 (40%)		
		% Overshoot (%)	Settling Time (s)	Steady State Error (%)	% Overshoot (%)	Settling Time (s)	Steady State Error (%)
Trackers Output Voltage	DG1	0.00182	0.631	≈ 0.0	0.000002531	0.8847	≈ 0.0
	DG2	0.232	0.8032	≈ 0.0	0.00006315	0.8321	≈ 0.0
	DG3	0.001134	0.6445	≈ 0.0	0.01973	0.7562	≈ 0.0
	DG4	0.0000725	0.6726	≈ 0.0	0.837	0.5641	≈ 0.0
	DG5	0.00000278	0.7036	≈ 0.0	0.00214	0.7383	≈ 0.0
	DG6	0.000000368	0.7218	≈ 0.0	0.0000769	0.8173	≈ 0.0

overshoot, 0.8032 s settling time, and no steady state error). Six DGs control response parameters during the first fault in DG2 is given in Table 5. The control signals for DG4, DG5, and DG6 are shown in Figure 5(d) before and after the second simultaneous fault occurrence. As shown in Fig. 6, during the second simultaneous fault in DG4, the fault impacts in neighboring DG3 and DG5 are negligible. The controlled output voltages of six DGs are shown in Figures 5(e, f). The recommended tracker totally solves the fault problem while giving higher performance for DG4 (40% fault). It has 0.837 % overshoot, 0.5641 s settling time, and no steady state error. Six DGs control response parameters during the second simultaneous fault in DG4 is given in Table 5. Table 5

depicts the extraordinary dead beat, swift, and zero steady state performance of the designed trackers for the six DGs when fault occurs in two actuators (DG2 with 20% and DG4 with 40%) simultaneously.

V. CONCLUSION

This paper introduced a novel approach for incorporating actuators faults into the design of passive FTC. The actuator faults are treated as uncertainties modelled in the norm-bounded form in the control input matrix. To address decentralization constraints, we decompose the global MG into multiple sub-grids, where each sub-grid controller minimizes the effects of the remaining system as an external

disturbance. The new derived theorem for tackling these conditions is obtained for PFTC. Those conditions are derived in terms of LMIs. In addition, a theorem is also derived to extend the previous results of microgrids which are subject to changing loads, modelled with norm-bounded parameter uncertainties. The proposed PFTC control is successful to stabilize the system even in the case of simultaneous occurrence of faults which is a very rare case to happen in practice. Moreover, the simulation results are obtained by randomly selecting an actuator/actuators with a fault-tolerant level (or, equivalently control signal degradation) in a specific DG. According to the IEEE standard, the proposed PFTC ensures robust stability, mandatory response, and steady-state capability. This work represents a significant step towards more robust and fault-tolerant control strategies for modern energy systems, with promising applications in various real-world scenarios.

APPENDIX: PROOF OF THEOREM 1 [21]

Consider the discrete-time dynamical system given by

$$x_{k+1} = Ax_k + Dw_k, z_k = Cx_k \quad (\text{A1})$$

where the vectors x_k, w_k, z_k are the state, external disturbance, output to optimize of dimensions n, m, l respectively. The external disturbance w_k is l_∞ -bounded satisfying the constraint

$$\|w_k\| \leq 1, \quad k = 0, 1, 2, \dots \quad (\text{A2})$$

System (A1) is assumed stable, (A, D) is controllable, and C is full-rank.

The ellipsoid

$$E_x = x_k' P^{-1} x_k \leq 1, \quad P > 0 \quad (\text{A3})$$

centered at the origin is termed state-invariant if for an initial condition x_0 inside E_x implies x_k will not leave the ellipsoid for the future time $k=0, 1, 2, \dots$. Also, for trajectories starting outside E_x will be attracted to this ellipsoid as time evolves (ellipsoid is also attracting). We have the following.

Theorem [21]: The ellipsoid E_x is state-invariant, and attracting, for (A1) if and only if the following LMI is satisfied

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} \frac{1}{\alpha} APA' - P + \frac{1}{1-\alpha} DD' \leq 0, \text{ subject to} \\ P > 0, \quad \text{scalar } 0 > \alpha > 1 \end{array} \right\} \quad (\text{A4})$$

Proof: Consider the Lyapunov function

$$V_k = x_k' Q x_k, Q > 0, \quad Q = P^{-1} \quad (\text{A5})$$

The trajectories x_k will not leave the ellipsoid, $E_x = V_k \leq 1$ if and only if

$$V_{k+1} \leq 1, \text{ subject to } V_k \leq 1, w_k' w_k \leq 1 \quad (\text{A6})$$

Condition (A6) along with (A1) can be re-written as

$$\left. \begin{array}{l} (Ax_k + Dw_k)' A (Ax_k + Dw_k) \leq 1 \text{ subject to} \\ x_k' Q x_k \leq 1, \quad w_k' w_k \leq 1 \end{array} \right\} \quad (\text{A7})$$

(A7) can be combined into a single matrix inequality, using the S-procedure, as

$$\begin{bmatrix} A'QA - \alpha Q & * \\ D'QA & D'AD - \beta I \end{bmatrix} \leq 0, \quad \alpha + \beta \leq 1 \quad (\text{A8})$$

Without loss of generality, $\beta = 1 - \alpha$.

Using the state feedback $u = Kx$, and replacing A with $A+BK$ in (A8) results in theorem 1. (Q.E.D)

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