Guarding legal communication with smart jammer: Stackelberg game based power control analysis

This paper investigates a power control problem in a jamming system, where a separate smart jammer is deployed to ensure the communication security of the legal user. However, due to power leakage, the smart jammer may incur unintentional interference to legal users. The key is how to suppress illegal communication while limit the negative impact on legal user. A jamming counter measure Stackelberg game is formulated to model the jamming power control dynamic of the system. The smart jammer acts as a leader to sense and interfere illegal communications of the illegal user, while the illegal user acts as a follower. In the game, the impact of uncertain channel information is taken into account. According to whether illegal user considers the uncertain channel information, we investigate two scenarios, namely, illegal user can obtain statistical distribution and accurate information of interference channel gain and its own cost, respectively. This work not only proposes a jamming counter measure iterative algorithm to update parameters, but also gives two solutions to obtain the Stackelberg equilibrium (SE). The power convergence behaviours under two scenarios are analyzed and compared. Additionally, brute force is used to verify the accuracy of the SE value further.