Game Theoretic Spoofing Detection for Space Information Networks Using Physical Attributes

Space information networks (SINs) have the potential to overcome the coverage and reliability limitations of cellular networks. As a result, SINs have received considerable attention as an enabling technology for sixth-generation (6G) networks to support global connectivity. SINs often employ a large number of low Earth orbit (LEO) satellites which are vulnerable to spoofing attacks. Thus, game theoretic physical layer authentication (PLA) based on Doppler frequency spread (DS) and received power (RP) attributes is proposed to provide effective authentication for these satellites. Hypothesis testing with a threshold is used to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate (spoofer) satellites. Then, a zero-sum PLA game in which the ground station (GS) chooses the optimal detection threshold (
$\tau ^{*}$
) to maximize its utility and a spoofing satellite (
$s$
) chooses the optimal attack probability (
$k^{*}$
) to maximize its utility. Numerical results are presented to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.