Robust Design for RIS-Assisted Anti-Jamming Communications With Imperfect Angular Information: A Game-Theoretic Perspective

This paper utilizes a reconfigurable intelligent surface (RIS) to enhance the anti-jamming performance of wireless communications, due to its powerful capability of constructing smart and reconfigurable radio environment. In order to establish the practical interactions between the base station (BS) and the jammer, a Bayesian Stackelberg game is formulated, where the BS is the leader and the jammer acts as the follower. Specifically, with the help of a RIS-assisted transmitter, the BS attempts to reliably convey information to users with maximum utilities, whereas the smart jammer tries to interfere the signal reception of users with desired energy efficiency (EE) threshold. Since the BS and the jammer are not cooperative parties, the practical assumption that neither side can obtain the other's strategies is adopted in the proposed game, and the angular information based imperfect channel state information (CSI) is also considered. After tackling the practical assumption by using Cauchy-Schwarz inequality and the imperfect angular information by using the discretization method, the closed-form solution of both sides can be obtained via the duality optimization theory, which constitutes the unique Stackelberg equilibrium (SE). Numerical results demonstrate the superiority and validity of our proposed robust schemes over the existing approaches.