Reducing Paging and Exit Overheads in Intel SGX for Oblivious Conjunctive Keyword Search

Paging and exit overheads have been proven to be the performance bottlenecks when adopting Searchable Symmetric Encryption (SSE) with trusted hardware such as Intel SGX for keyword search. This problem becomes more serious when incorporating ORAM and SGX to design oblivious SSE schemes such as POSUP [1] and Oblidb [2] which can defend against inference attacks. The main reason comes from high round communication complexity of ORAM and constrained trusted memory created by SGX. To overcome this performance bottleneck, we propose a set of novel SSE constructions with realistic security/performance trade-offs. Our core idea is to encode the keyword-identifier pairs into a bloom filter to reduce the number of ORAM operations during the search procedure. Specifically, Construction 1 loads the bloom filter into the enclave sequentially, which outperforms about
$1.7\times$
when the dataset is large compared with the performance of the baseline that directly combines ORAM and SGX. To further improve the performance of Construction 1, Construction 2 classifies keywords into groups and stores these groups in different bloom filters. By additionally leaking the keywords in search token belonging to which groups, Construction 2 outperforms Construction 1 by
$16.5\sim 36.8\times$
and provides an improvement of at least one order over state-of-the-art oblivious protocols.