Pricing Strategy in Dual-Channel Supply Chain with Manufacturer's Risk Attitude Under Asymmetry Information on Add-On Services

With the continuous improvement of living standards and consumption awareness, the value of products is greatly influenced by non-price factors. More and more companies are attracting purchasing power by providing additional services to consumers. We use Stackelberg game and CVaR theory to analyze the impact of different risk attitudes of manufacturers on pricing decisions in dual-channel supply chains, while considering competition and retailer deception. The results show that retailers with information advantages will always obtain additional profits through deception, and their deception value will vary with the manufacturer's risk attitude. Furthermore, we compared the optimal pricing and market demand under information symmetry and asymmetry with the changes of the manufacturer's risk attitude. Finally, we verified the changes in supply chain profits with the changes in retailer deception value and manufacturer's risk attitude through numerical simulation, and found that although retailer deception behavior increases its own profits, it weakens the overall utility of the dual-channel supply chain.