N-Player Cybersecurity Game Theory Model in Power Grids

Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) are a growing source of electricity within the United States. These systems, often found on the rooftops of residential homes or commercial businesses, are a useful way to reduce demand on transmission lines and create additional revenue for the owners, but they can create vulnerabilities in the security of the grid, due to both a lower regulatory threshold, and their more decentralized nature. This paper will analyze the current cybersecurity systems in pace for DERs, as well as potential weaknesses in them that could pose risks to the grid as a whole when compared to attacks upon larger systems that could have more significant impacts on the system. Therefore, the proposed solution of this game is a three-stage game, wherein the first stage of the game requires the DERs to work together to find the ideal rate of change of frequency for the sake of finding the most stability in a short term basis through the forming of coalitions. After that stage is complete, there will be an attacker, who will have the opportunity to disrupt the coalition in the most damaging way possible. Finally, the utility who helped coordinate the coalitions will have the opportunity to find which DERs were compromised by the Attacker, and either remove them from the grid, or recover their benefit to put them back in the coalition. This game theory model is tested on a distribution network, wherein This will include analyses of the simulated results of an attack upon a wide variety of DERs when compared to a single significant target in terms of their impact upon voltage stability, frequency stability, and potential loss of load events.