Exploiting Hardware Imperfections for GPS Spoofing Detection Using Clock Variations

The security of location-dependent systems is jeopardized by the act of GPS spoofing, which involves the transmission of deceptive signals to receivers. The detection of such attacks poses a significant challenge in the absence of dedicated hardware or a comprehensive dataset for training purposes. In this study, we present an innovative approach for detecting spoofing attempts by examining distinct clock instability patterns exhibited by electronic devices as a result of manufacturing inconsistencies. The identification of spoofing signals originating from counterfeit GPS transmitters is achieved through fingerprinting timing characteristics. The proposed algorithm utilizes clock fingerprints to quantify temporal fluctuations. Spoofed signals are identified through discrepancies between the observed time measurements and the anticipated satellite characteristics. This solution offers a software-based method for detecting spoofing, eliminating the need for extra hardware or pre-existing data. The proposed technique is assessed in the context of various spoofing strategies, showcasing its ability to reliably detect even low-cost spoofs with unstable clocks. Our research enhances the capabilities of GPS anti-spoofing in comparison to previous studies by offering an implementation that is easily accessible and requires minimal assumptions. By capitalizing on hardware limitations instead of attempting to mitigate them, we transform fabrication variations into deceptive fingerprints. By exploiting inherent hardware limitations, the proposed spoofing detection approach only requires a standard receiver. The experimental results shows that the proposed technique can effectively detect the spoofing attack with 100% accuracy.