A Defensive Mechanism Against Load Redistribution Attacks with Sequential Outage Potential Using Encrypted PMUs

False data injection attacks (FDIA) in power systems involve intentionally injecting fabricated data to compromise system integrity, reliability, and functionality. These attacks have devastating consequences for power systems, particularly when they have the potential for sequential outages. To defend against these types of attacks, the implementation of an effective defense mechanism is crucial. The defense system should have advanced security measures, like encrypted phasor measurement units (PMU), to protect the integrity and reliability of the power system infrastructure from FDIA-caused outages that happen one after the other. In order to protect against sequential outages brought on by load redistribution attacks (LRA), this paper proposes a PMU placement optimization problem. In this study, we conduct an analysis of the susceptibility of the IEEE 30 bus standard system to LRA, resulting in sequential outages. Additionally, we explore the optimal placement of PMU as a means of improving the system's defense against such vulnerabilities.