Debiasing Android Malware Datasets: How Can I Trust Your Results If Your Dataset Is Biased?

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Abstract—Android security has received a lot of attention over the last decade, especially malware investigation. Researchers attempt to highlight applications' security-relevant characteristics to better understand malware and effectively distinguish malware from benign applications. The accuracy and the completeness of their proposals are evaluated experimentally on malware and goodware datasets. Thus, the quality of these datasets is of critical importance: if the datasets are outdated or not representative of the studied population, the conclusions may be flawed. We specify different types of experimental scenarios. Some of them require unlabeled but representative datasets of the entire population. Others require datasets labeled with valuable characteristics that may be difficult to compute, such as malware datasets. We discuss the irregularities of datasets used in experiments, questioning the validity of the performances reported in the literature. This article focuses on providing guidelines for designing debiased datasets. First, we propose guidelines for building representative datasets from unlabeled ones. Second, we propose and experiment a debiasing algorithm that, given a biased labeled dataset and a target representative dataset, builds a representative and labeled dataset. Finally, from the previous debiased datasets, we produce datasets for experiments on Android malware detection or classification with machine learning algorithms. Experiments show that debiased datasets perform better when classifying with machine learning algorithms.

Index Terms-Datasets, malware, experiments.

I. INTRODUCTION

D UE to the growing number of devices equipped with the Android operating system, attackers have developed a large number of malicious applications that may steal personal information, demand ransoms, or make smartphones unavailable. In response to that phenomenon, researchers have tackled the question of determining whether an application is malicious or benign and the question of classifying an application inside malware families. Most of the work in this area follows an experimental approach, and the proposed solutions must be evaluated on datasets mirroring the possible set of Android applications.

Over time, some datasets become extensively used and at some point, become outdated even if they are the lat-

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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS.2022.3180184

est to provide good information [1]-[3]. Results are often impressive, with detection ratios greater than 99% for some articles [4]–[6]. However, for these results to have any practical significance, the evaluation methodology and the nature of the datasets should be thoroughly inspected. In particular, special care should be taken to ensure that the experimental datasets are representative of the overall population of Android applications in the wild. Pendlebury et al. [7] identified the problem of bias in test datasets used to evaluate machine learning classifiers, which leads to overestimating the performance of an algorithm compared to its use in real-life scenarios. To evaluate an algorithm's performance on a population of applications, we need a dataset that is representative of the population and that is labeled with the sought answers. Such answers require manual analysis of each application which is often a non-trivial task.

This article presents four main contributions:

- A methodology for building, by random sampling, a nonlabeled dataset that is representative of the considered population of Android applications;
- A debiasing algorithm that, given an initial labeled and non-representative dataset and a representative target dataset, outputs a labeled and representative dataset;
- An experimental study on different datasets that have been debiased.
- An evaluation of the usefulness of debiased datasets when classifying malware/goodware samples using machine learning algorithms.

The article is structured as follows. Section II provides background information on the various datasets available to the research community and the type of experiments performed with them. Section III describes related work on the mitigation of irregularities that affect datasets. Section IV introduces the notion of representativity we will be using in the rest of this article. Then, Section V gives a methodology to extract a representative dataset from a population, and Section VI proposes a method to evaluate whether a dataset is representative of a population. Section VII introduces an algorithm that starts from a labeled dataset and builds a representative one. Section VIII experiments this algorithm on benign and malware datasets.

II. DATASETS FOR EXPERIMENTS

To perform analyses on Android applications, researchers use published datasets as well as online repositories. To clarify

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Manuscript received June 23, 2021; revised November 22, 2021 and March 15, 2022; accepted May 18, 2022. Date of publication June 3, 2022; date of current version June 15, 2022. The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Dr. Chunyi Peng. (*Corresponding author: Jean-François Lalande.*)

this landscape, we discuss the different datasets and categorize their corresponding experimental scenarios.

A. Sources, Archives and Specific Datasets

Websites called "markets" are the different Android application distribution platforms available to the public, e.g., Google Play, Aptoide, Cafe Bazaar, F-Droid, MiKandi, Appland. Google Play, the first and largest of them, is supposed to be a source of new benign applications (goodware). Indeed, Google uses services such as the bouncer¹ and Google Play Protect,² which analyze applications before publishing them. There are also country-specific markets, particularly several Chinese markets (e.g., Baidu, Tencent, 360, 25PP, HiAPK, Wandoujia), and vendor-specific markets (e.g., Huawei, OPPO, Xiaomi, Lenovo). These markets evolve through time, as new applications get published and old ones are withdrawn.

There are also archives datasets where applications are never removed. AndroZoo [8], APKMirror³ and APKPure,⁴ are examples of archives.

Lastly, specific datasets provide a variety of applications that share a common characteristic, for example, being a malware, being repackaged applications, or being a specific type of malware (ransomware, dropper, etc.). Genome [2], Drebin [1], Andrubis [9], Kharon [10], AMD [3], CICAndMal2017 [11], VirusShare [12], UpDroid [13], Koodous [14], and VirusTotal [15] are examples of specific datasets (and mainly malware datasets). Some datasets are mostly *static*, meaning they are not regularly updated and therefore become rapidly obsolete.

B. Experimental Scenarios

We have identified three types of scenarios typically experienced by security researchers. Each of these scenarios has different issues and therefore requires the use of datasets with different expected properties.

1) Markets Profiling: Researchers may want to estimate a statistical characteristic of a market [8], [16], [17], e.g., "What proportion of Google Play applications have an API version lower than some threshold?." For this case, one needs to obtain a dataset which is *representative* of the market, where results of analysis on this dataset can be extrapolated to the whole market. Section V gives more details on how such a representative dataset should be extracted.

2) Algorithm Evaluation: Some experiments aim to compute a characteristic of interest from an application. Examples of interesting characteristics include detecting malicious behavior in an application [18], whether the sample is repackaged [19], identifying its malware family [20], detecting similar applications [21], whether it leaks personal information to the network [22]. To answer these questions, researchers implement algorithms using various analysis techniques, and run them on a dataset to estimate their precision. This dataset should be representative and *labeled*, i.e., the characteristic of interest for each application should be known beforehand.

⁴https://apkpure.com

3) Machine Learning: In supervised learning methods, researchers learn a model that classifies inputs into a set of classes. Two datasets are used in this setting: a training dataset and a test dataset. The training set is used during the *learning* phase, and the test set is used to evaluate the learned model on new data. Both datasets should be labeled. The training set needs to be selected carefully to avoid biases, as discussed in more detail in Section III. The test set should be representative, as for the *Algorithm evaluation* scenario.

For any of the three kinds of experiments above, building an appropriate dataset is a non-trivial task. In the rest of the paper we take as hypothesis that a researcher needs a dataset for evaluating a detection algorithm.

III. RELATED WORK

The main irregularities in experimental datasets have already been studied [7], [23]–[25] and are listed below. We reviewed the recent literature related to Android malware experiments and confirm that these irregularities are still present. Detailed results are reported in Appendix C.

A. Class Imbalance

Class imbalance occurs when a dataset contains significantly more units of one class than of others [23]. An overrepresented class may push a learning algorithm towards preferring this class. For malware detection, if there are more samples of goodware, this has the effect of decreasing the recall but improving the precision [7].

This problem has been addressed in the machine learning community [24]: the overrepresented class is undersampled, i.e., some elements are removed while the underrepresented class is oversampled. The undersampling can be random or rely on a more sophisticated method, such as removing elements in dense clusters [26]. The most popular oversampling technique is SMOTE [27] that creates new instances from the interpolation of close samples. This technique cannot be used for malware datasets, as one cannot forge a new malware sample with specific characteristics automatically. Besides, class balancing is mostly restricted to binary classes [24], while we are interested in balancing more diverse classes.

B. Presence of Clones

Another irregularity is the presence of clones, where the abundance of several very similar apps in the training set prevents the algorithm from learning unique units [25]. Because experiments do not usually share the list of used applications, it is not possible to check the presence of clones in their datasets. Pan *et al.* [28] show a method to reduce redundancy in a dataset by extracting *representatives* of cloned units using mutual information and relative entropy.

C. Time Incoherence

This irregularity concerns the dates of the samples in the test and learning sets used in machine learning algorithms. It was shown that, when evaluating the accuracy of state-ofthe-art algorithms, using a test set of applications newer than

¹http://googlemobile.blogspot.com/2012/02/android-and-security.html

²https://www.blog.google/products/android/google-play-protect/

³https://www.apkmirror.com/

those in the training set, the performance of these algorithms decreases [7], [29]. In [30], [31] and [32], Cai states that the main reason that existing Android malware detection techniques do not sustain well lies in their failure to account for the evolutionary dynamics of the Android ecosystem. Android malware classifiers may not be sustainable - they would need to be retrained constantly for later use, or their performance could downgrade over time. A regular re-training can mitigate this problem, however, it is not always a solution, as new samples are not always available as quickly as needed or in sufficient diversity. In [33], Zhang et al. observes that malware samples often implement the same functionalities over time but change their implementation because of the evolution of APIs or changes of third-party libraries. These changes allow such malware to avoid detection by older classifiers. One way to limit this problem is to choose more semantic than syntactic features, as stated by Zhang et al. in [33]. Finally, in [34], Xu et al. propose to enhance malware detection over time by making necessary updates to their detection models with evolving feature sets. For that purpose they maintain a pool of different detection models initialized with a set of labeled applications using various online learning algorithms.

The previously cited works cannot solve the problem of researchers having to evaluate their algorithm on an up-todate dataset. Indeed, this problem is different than adapting a classifier to an evolving market - even if this problem is of independent interest. The researcher would primarily focus on getting a dataset that mimics the whole set of applications that he targets. Additionally, the dataset should be labeled, for example with a malware/goodware label if the study concerns a detection algorithm. These labels can be missing in the source from which applications are picked. As a consequence, we propose in the following to define the notion of representativity of a dataset against the population it represents. A representative dataset has to be used to validate an experimental results at the time of the experiment. The representativity property is linked to a population at a period of time. A dataset that is representative at a date will not necessarily be so in the future because the population may change significantly. Such a representative dataset will help the researcher to assess results for real-world scenarios [35].

IV. REPRESENTATIVITY

In this section, we describe the notion of *representativity* of a population that we will be aiming for in the rest of this article.

The notion of population refers to a set of applications that a user would want to consider for his use case. As an example, a user who wants to detect malware in the Google Play store would want to take the Google Play store as population. Nevertheless, it is very difficult to get a snapshot of such a market. Other markets of applications could be considered [17] but the same problem remains. As a consequence we chose in this paper AndroZoo as population. It is *not* an hypothesis that reduces the contributions of this paper: the proposed techniques work more generally beyond a particular reference dataset. From a general perspective, we consider a population \mathcal{P} of N applications. Intuitively, a dataset **D** of n elements is representative of \mathcal{P} if n is significantly smaller than N and if **D** looks like \mathcal{P} for the following purposes: 1) evaluating the proportion \hat{p} of applications exhibiting a specific characteristic on **D** should yield similar results as evaluating the same proportion p on \mathcal{P} ; 2) evaluating an algorithm on **D** should yield similar results as evaluating the same algorithm on \mathcal{P} .

Intuitively, we could consider that a dataset **D** is representative of \mathcal{P} according to a single characteristic if the proportion of this characteristic is equal in \mathcal{P} and **D**. However, the exact equality of the proportions in \mathcal{P} and **D** (i.e., $p = \hat{p}$) cannot always be achieved in practice. For example, if p = 1/N (i.e., only one element has this characteristic in \mathcal{P}), then the only way to have exactly the same proportion in **D** is by selecting all N elements from \mathcal{P} . This is in contradiction with the first desired property of a representative dataset. Hence a margin of error δ must be taken into account, which is the maximum difference between p and \hat{p} that we allow considering that **D** is representative of \mathcal{P} . Intuitively, a dataset is representative of a population if it has the same proportions, up to a maximum difference of δ .

This notion can be easily extended to multiple characteristics. Consider a set of *d* characteristics $\{c_1, \ldots, c_d\}$ that can take respectively v_1, \ldots, v_d values. This generates $v_1 \times \ldots \times v_d$ different combinations. In the following, we call these combinations *classes*, and we denote \mathcal{K} this set of classes. Intuitively again, we could consider that a dataset **D** is representative of \mathcal{P} according to a set of classes \mathcal{K} if the proportion of each class $k \in \mathcal{K}$ is equal in \mathcal{P} and **D**.

Definition 1: Let $0 \le \delta \le 1$. A dataset **D** is δ -representative of a population \mathcal{P} for a finite set of classes \mathcal{K} if $\forall k \in \mathcal{K}, |p_{D,k} - p_{\mathcal{P},k}| \le \delta$, where $p_{D,k}$ (resp. $p_{\mathcal{P},k}$) is the proportion of class k in **D** (resp. \mathcal{P}).

Characteristics can represent various properties of an application. For example, file size, number of classes in the code or whether the application reads SMS messages are examples of characteristics. Note that a class is simply a set of applications sharing the same set of low-level characteristics, and is not related with the notion of malware families.

V. SAMPLING REPRESENTATIVE DATASETS

In this article, we consider the population of Android applications to be AndroZoo, because this is one of the largest datasets available, it is regularly updated from other markets and malware databases, and no application is removed from it. At the end of 2020, AndroZoo contained 13 696 936 different APK. In this section, we focus on the construction of a non-labeled δ -representative dataset of AndroZoo by sampling, i.e., random drawing.

The standard way to construct a representative dataset consists of drawing *n* random samples without replacement [36]. Because elements are drawn randomly, a very large fraction of the population would be necessary to ensure, with 100% confidence, an error smaller than δ . In statistics, one is generally more interested in probabilistic guarantees such as "with 95% chance, the error is smaller than δ ." Intuitively, the more certainty one seeks, the more elements should be drawn from \mathcal{P} . This confidence level is usually denoted *C*.

We recall standard statistical equations to estimate the minimal size n to ensure the randomly drawn dataset **D** is representative of the population. We show that the minimum size of a representative dataset depends primarily on the number of characteristics for which the dataset must be representative.

A. Dataset Size for a Single Boolean Characteristic

Once the expected margin of error δ and the expected confidence level *C* are defined (according to the requirements of the experiment), a lower bound on the size *n* of the dataset **D** can be calculated by using Equation (1). This equation is obtained by rearranging the margin of the classical error formula [37] using the finite population correction [36], where z(C) is the standard deviation value at *C* confidence level for the standard normal distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation of 1 (the derivation of this equation is detailed in the appendix).

$$n \ge N \left(\frac{4(N-1)\delta^2}{z(C)^2} + 1\right)^{-1} \tag{1}$$

This computation is based on some light assumptions, notably that n is not too small (at least 30 [38]) and that the proportion p is not very close to 0 or 1. In such cases, other confidence interval formulas can be used, like the Hoeffding inequality [39].

The effect of N is limited when it is large. The minimum size of a random sample for 3 014 560 applications in Google Play with the values $\delta = 0.01$ and C = 99% is n = 16497 while it is n = 16568 for AndroZoo, a dataset four times larger. For arbitrarily large datasets, n = 16588 examples are sufficient. The influence of N is more significant for smaller populations. For example, with a population of N = 15000 elements, one only needs n = 7163 examples.

B. Dataset Size for one or Multiple Characteristics

The calculation of the size of the dataset given in the previous subsection only holds for a single boolean characteristic, so when there are only two classes. If one is interested in several characteristics or in a non-boolean characteristic, then there are more classes for the dataset to be representative of, and intuitively it means that the minimal size of a dataset representative of a population is larger.

As with a single boolean characteristics, the margin of error can be used to get a sample with an error up to δ . The Bonferroni correction [40] states that correctly representing a set of classes \mathcal{K} with a confidence level *C* using random sampling is more likely than correctly representing one boolean characteristic with a confidence level $1 - (1 - C)/(|\mathcal{K}| - 1)$. Therefore, we can modify Equation (1) by replacing z(C) by $z(1 - \frac{1-C}{|\mathcal{K}|-1})$. Hence, the dataset **D** will correctly represent $|\mathcal{K}|$ classes with a margin error δ with a probability higher than *C* if *n* satisfies the following inequation:

$$n \ge N\left(\frac{4(N-1)\delta^2}{z\left(1-\frac{1-C}{|\mathcal{K}|-1}\right)^2}+1\right)^{-1}$$
 (2)

Remark that, in the case of a single boolean characteristic, $|\mathcal{K}| = 2$ and equations (1) and (2) are equal.

In the experiments of Section VI, we will observe 2411 non-empty classes in AZ20_{30k}, the reference dataset. With the values $\delta = 0.015$, C = 99% and $|\mathcal{K}| = 36\,864$, the minimum size of a random sample is $n = 29\,099$ for Google Play, $n = 29\,320$ for AndroZoo and $n = 29\,383$ for datasets with arbitrarily large *N*.

VI. EVALUATION OF EXISTING DATASETS

We now assume that an algorithm or a machine learning model evaluation has to be performed, as described in Section II-B. Such evaluation needs a labeled dataset, i.e., one whose ground truth is known. It should also be representative of the entire population. Otherwise, results could be erroneous due to biases in the dataset. In the case of Android applications, some characteristics like "*being malware*" are not easily computable, and only small datasets or old datasets contain such information.

For a given hard-to-compute characteristic, we separate the infinite number of other characteristics into two groups. In the first group, the characteristics that are likely to be related to the hard-to-compute characteristic. For example, using a cryptographic library could be related to being a ransomware or not. In the second group, the characteristics are not related to this hard-to-compute characteristic. We would like the datasets used to be homogeneous to the population for the characteristics of this second group.

We now propose a homogeneity test to assess if a dataset is homogeneous to a population for a finite set of characteristics. To determine this finite set, we consider the hard-to-compute characteristic "being a malware" and we choose a set of characteristics that *are not* related to it. Then, we test the homogeneity of existing datasets with the population for this set.

A. Choosing Characteristics

The more characteristics are selected, the more combinations there are. Since this number of combinations is exponential in the number of characteristics, it can quickly grow bigger than any dataset size as the number of selected characteristics increases. Therefore, it is necessary to limit the number of characteristics. Besides, numerical characteristics should be reduced to a few values to reduce this combination's number. For example, the APK size can be projected to a few intervals of size to distinguish small, medium, and large applications.

As a consequence, in the following experiments, we choose to rely on the following set of characteristics that **are not** related to security:

- APK size (4 values)
 - 0) 1 MB < size
 - 1) 1 MB \leq size \leq 5 MB
 - 2) 5 MB \leq size \leq 20 MB
 - 3) size > 20 MB
- year (9 values): {< 2011, 2011-2012, 2012-2013, 2013-2014, 2014-2015, 2015-2016, 2016-2017, 2017-2018, > 2018}

- Internet permission (bool)
- External or internal storage access (bool)
- Uses Google play services (bool)
- Generates UUIDs (bool)
- Vibrate phone permission (bool)
- NFC permission (bool)
- Bluetooth permission (bool)
- Performs HTTP request (bool)
- Uses JSON objects (bool)
- Specifies User-Agent (bool)

These characteristics can be easily extracted using Droidlysis [41],⁵ a property extraction tool. With such characteristics, 36864 (4 × 9 × 2¹⁰) classes would be possible, but in practice, we observe 2874 non-empty classes in the three studied datasets (AZ20_{30k}, \mathbf{D}_{mix} and AMD) presented later in Figure 1.

These characteristics are diversified and easy to evaluate statically, limiting the computational cost of our experiment. It would be possible to add some dynamic characteristics, such as the number of executed activities or methods, but it would require executing each application. These characteristics will be used to study the homogeneity of the datasets of the literature against an extract of the population, AndroZoo in 2020.

B. Statistical Test of Homogeneity for Datasets

To evaluate whether a dataset **D** can be considered to be not statistically homogeneous to a population \mathcal{P} for a finite number of characteristics, we propose to use the χ^2 statistical test of homogeneity [42] and compare **D** with a second dataset **D**_r, a large dataset randomly drawn from \mathcal{P} (see Section V). The null hypothesis of the test is H_0 : **D** and **D**_r are drawn from the same population \mathcal{P} (with replacement). As other statistical tests, the χ^2 test can only reject this null hypothesis but not confirm it. If the null hypothesis is rejected, we will admit that the dataset **D** is not homogeneous to **D**_r, and therefore dissimilar from the population \mathcal{P} for the characteristics under consideration.

To apply this test, we consider a finite set of classes \mathcal{K} . We denote $m_{\mathbf{D},k}$ (respectively $m_{\mathbf{D}_r,k}$) the number of samples in **D** (respectively in \mathbf{D}_r) of class $k \in \mathcal{K}$ and $p_{\mathcal{P},k}$ (respectively $p_{\mathbf{D},k}$ and $p_{\mathbf{D}_r,k}$) the proportion of class k in \mathcal{P} (respectively in **D**, in \mathbf{D}_r).

If the null hypothesis holds true, then the three proportions $p_{\mathcal{P},k}$, $p_{\mathbf{D},k}$ and $p_{\mathbf{D}_r,k}$ of class $k \in \mathcal{K}$ should be close. The proportion $p_{\mathcal{P},k}$ can thus be estimated by $\frac{m_{\mathbf{D}_r,k}+m_{\mathbf{D},k}}{|\mathbf{D}_r|+|\mathbf{D}|}$ and the expected number of occurrences of class k in \mathbf{D} can be estimated by $E_{\mathbf{D},k,\mathbf{D}_r} = |\mathbf{D}| \times \frac{m_{\mathbf{D}_r,k}+m_{\mathbf{D},k}}{|\mathbf{D}_r|+|\mathbf{D}|}$ and in \mathbf{D}_r by $E_{\mathbf{D}_r,k,\mathbf{D}} = |\mathbf{D}_r| \times \frac{m_{\mathbf{D}_r,k}+m_{\mathbf{D},k}}{|\mathbf{D}_r|+|\mathbf{D}|}$. The χ^2 value of two datasets \mathbf{D} and \mathbf{D}_r is defined as:

$$\chi^{2} = \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} \frac{\left(m_{\mathbf{D},k} - E_{\mathbf{D},k,\mathbf{D}_{r}}\right)^{2}}{E_{\mathbf{D},k,\mathbf{D}_{r}}} + \frac{\left(m_{\mathbf{D}_{r},k} - E_{\mathbf{D}_{r},k,\mathbf{D}}\right)^{2}}{E_{\mathbf{D}_{r},k,\mathbf{D}}}$$

A low value for a χ^2 test means the two sets of data **D** and **D**_r have very similar class proportions. On the contrary, a large

value (larger than a critical value that depends on the number of classes and the confidence level) indicates a statistically significant difference. A χ^2 test is associated with a *p*-value. A low *p*-value (usually under 0.05) indicates that one can reject the null hypothesis with a certain confidence. A high *p*-value, however, does not confirm the null hypothesis, but rather produces an inconclusive result.

In the rest of this section, we investigate whether labeled datasets commonly used in the literature can be considered homogeneous to all Android applications according to the χ^2 test and whether they can be considered δ -representative for some low δ .

C. Studied Android Datasets

In this section, we focus on the following datasets:

- 6 malware datasets: Drebin [1], AMD [3], as well as VS 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018, containing all the malware collected by VirusShare for each of these years;
- 2 groups of datasets extracted from AndroZoo [8]:
 - AZ19_{100k}, 100 000 applications randomly drawn in 2019, and the subsets AZ19_{100k} 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018 restricted to applications from each year;
 - AZ20_{10k}, AZ20_{20k}, and AZ20_{30k} three datasets randomly drawn from AndroZoo in 2020, containing respectively 10 000, 20 000 and 30 000 applications.
- 1 mix dataset: D_{mix} composed of 5560 malware from Drebin and 11120 goodware from 2018 extracted from AndroZoo. D_{mix} mimics the datasets used in previous machine learning papers [43], [44].

In this article, we use AndroZoo as the population, because it is the easiest source to draw a large number of applications. Our goal is to determine which datasets commonly used in the literature can be considered as representative of the population. AndroZoo provides 13 696 936 different APKs applications. Due to its size, it is not reasonable to calculate exactly the distribution of AndroZoo. Thus, we represent here AndroZoo through a representative dataset AZ20_{30k} of 30 000 randomly chosen from it (corresponding to $\delta = 0.015$ and C = 99% for all 36 864 theoretical classes, cf. Section V-B).

We performed the comparison of $AZ20_{30k}$ with the datasets of the literature, presented in Section II. As an illustration, Figure 1 shows the proportion of applications in each of the 2874 non-empty classes of three datasets: the reference AZ20_{30k} (in blue), the mix dataset \mathbf{D}_{mix} (in orange) and AMD (in green). The classes are sorted in descending order of size for $AZ20_{30k}$. This figure already suggests that the three datasets are very different. We confirm this intuition by performing a χ^2 test with the AZ20_{30k} dataset. Table I presents the dataset size, the number of classes represented only in AZ20_{30k} (and not in the studied dataset), the number of classes common to AZ20_{30k} and the studied dataset, the number of classes represented only in the studied dataset (and not in AZ20_{30k}), the maximum and average δ of class proportions, the value of the χ^2 test, the associated *p*-value, and the conclusion (or lack of) of the test between the studied dataset and AZ20_{30k}. All datasets, except the last extract of AndroZoo, can be considered as not homogeneous to $AZ20_{30k}$,

⁵https://github.com/cryptax/droidlysis




Fig. 1. Distribution of application classes for the top most 200 over 2874 classes of AZ20_{30k} and compared with D_{mix} and AMD.

TABLE I χ^2 Test for Homogeneity Over AZ2030k for a Finite Set of Non-Security Characteristics

		# of classes	# of classes only	# of classes			0		
Datasets	Dataset size	in common	in the dataset	only in $AZ20_{30k}$	Max δ	Avg δ	χ^2 value	p-value	Conclusion
AZ20 _{30k}	29974	2411	-	-	0	0	0	1	
Drebin	5304	181	141	2230	0.1184	0.0007	27902	0	Reject (C=99%)
AMD	23258	128	16	2283	0.0974	0.0007	39771	0	Reject (C=99%)
VirusShare 2015	28896	250	65	2161	0.1683	0.0007	44537	0	Reject (C=99%)
VirusShare 2016	12651	172	28	2239	0.1595	0.0007	30312	0	Reject (C=99%)
VirusShare 2017	9945	234	39	2177	0.0898	0.0006	22050	0	Reject (C=99%)
VirusShare 2018	28543	728	328	1683	0.5057	0.0006	42617	0	Reject (C=99%)
\mathbf{D}_{mix}	16424	982	447	1429	0.0359	0.0004	17852	0	Reject (C=99%)
AZ19 _{100k}	99999	2086	2062	325	0.0320	0.0001	12662	0	Reject (C=99%)
DroidBench	119	6	0	2405	0.4773	0.0008	14121	0	Reject (C=99%)
AZ19 _{100k} 2015	5794	648	291	1763	0.0574	0.0005	15390	0	Reject (C=99%)
AZ19 _{100k} 2016	27516	1183	921	1228	0.0573	0.0004	30725	0	Reject (C=99%)
AZ19 _{100k} 2017	6524	688	274	1723	0.0381	0.0004	12378	0	Reject (C=99%)
AZ19 _{100k} 2018	24549	1216	547	1195	0.0285	0.0003	14754	0	Reject (C=99%)
$AZ20_{10k}$	9971	1370	423	1041	0.0443	0.0003	6296	0	Reject (C=99%)
$AZ20_{20k}$	19927	1361	397	1050	0.0245	0.0001	3560	1	Non-conclusive

rejecting the null hypothesis with a *p*-value < 0.05. We can also remark that extracts of AndroZoo have a low average δ value, smaller that 0.001, while non-homogeneous datasets have significantly larger average δ values. This observation is consistent with our definition of representativity, as we can see a link between a low average δ value and a high *p*-value where the null hypothesis is not rejected.

VII. DATASET DEBIASING ALGORITHM

The previous section strongly suggests that the datasets regularly used in Android malware scanning experiments are not representative of the entire current population of Android applications. Definitely, they are not for the common characteristics we have studied. Nevertheless, these datasets are valuable because they contain samples for which the characteristic of interest is already computed. We are now interested in producing a representative dataset of a population for a finite set of classes \mathcal{K} from an initial dataset **B**. Our motivation is to not have to recompute computationally expensive characteristics on a randomly drawn dataset but to take maximum advantage of **B**'s labels.

As seen in the previous experiments, the χ^2 test can show that datasets deviate significantly from a population. However, this test cannot conclude that a dataset is representative of a population, only that it is not homogeneous. Besides, the χ^2 value has no intuitive meaning, and the *p*-value is notoriously prone to cause interpretation error while the maximal error δ is easier to interpret. For these reasons, we will use the δ -representativity when debiasing datasets.

We propose here two algorithms to limit the bias of an initial dataset **B**, while minimizing the number of modifications. Algorithm 1 constructs a dataset of the same size as **B**. This can lead to suboptimal solutions because the size of the optimal solution and **B** may differ. Algorithm 2 allows the size of the generated dataset to vary. Besides, we prove that this algorithm is optimal in the number of modifications to **B**. These two algorithms take as input an initial base dataset **B**, a target dataset **T** which we would like **B** to resemble, a source labeled dataset **S** from which we will draw applications, and a positive ratio of tolerated difference δ . The objective of both algorithms is to produce a generated dataset **G** which is δ -representative of **T**. We say that a class *k* is *overrepresented* in **G** if $p_{\mathbf{G},k} - p_{\mathbf{T},k} > \delta$; and a class *k* is *underrepresented* in **G** if $p_{\mathbf{G},k} - p_{\mathbf{T},k} < -\delta$.

A. Constant-Size Debiasing Algorithm

Algorithm 1 produces a dataset G whose size is the same as its input B. Intuitively, this algorithm consists in adding elements from the source **S** to the most underrepresented classes of **B** and to remove elements from **B** for the most overrepresented class. Each time an element is added, another element is removed in order to keep a constant size. With the constraint of constant size, the debiasing may be impossible for one of two reasons: either no element can be added to an underrepresented class (because the source does not contain elements of this class); or it is not possible to obtain for some class *k* a proportion that lies in $[p_{T,k} - \delta; p_{T,k} + \delta]$ because δ is too small.

Al	gorithm 1 Constant Size Debiasing Algorithm.
I	nput: B, T, S, δ
C	Dutput : Generated dataset G
1 S	$' \leftarrow \mathbf{S}; \mathbf{G} \leftarrow \mathbf{B}$
2 W	while $max_{k\in\mathcal{K}} p_{G,k}-p_{T,k} > \delta$ do
3	$k_h \leftarrow \arg \max_{k \in \mathcal{K}} (p_{\mathbf{G},k} - p_{\mathbf{T},k}) $ $\triangleright $ most
	overrepresented class
4	$k_l \leftarrow \arg\min_{k \in \mathcal{K}} (p_{\mathbf{G},k} - p_{\mathbf{T},k}) $ \triangleright most
	underrepresented class
5	if $ S'(k_l) = 0$ then
6	$\mathcal{K}_{\mathbf{S}} = \{k \in \mathcal{K} \mid \mathbf{S}'(k) > 0\}$
7	if $p_{G,k_l} \ge p_{T,k_l} - \delta$ and $\mathcal{K}_S \neq \emptyset$ then
8	$k_l \leftarrow \arg\min_{k \in \mathcal{K}_{\mathbf{S}}} p_{\mathbf{G},k} - p_{\mathbf{T},k}$
9	else return "Impossible";
10	$r \leftarrow$ one element of $\mathbf{S}'(k_l)$ chosen at random
11	Remove r from S' and add it to G
12	Remove one element of $\mathbf{G}(k_h)$ chosen at random
13	if $p_{G,k_h} < p_{T,k_h} - \delta$ or $p_{G,k_l} > p_{T,k_l} + \delta$ then
14	return "Impossible"
15 r	- eturn <i>G</i>

Algorithm 1 is optimal in terms of number of modifications.⁶ If a class is underrepresented in \mathbf{B} , we need to add elements to increase its proportion and make it correctly represented. If a_k elements are added to this class while the size of **D** remains constant (i.e. $|\mathbf{D}| = |\mathbf{B}|$), the proportion of class k in **D** is $p_{\mathbf{B},k} + \frac{a_k}{|\mathbf{B}|}$. A class is not underrepresented if its proportion is greater than $p_{T,k} - \delta$, so we are looking for the smallest a_k such that $p_{\mathbf{B},k} + \frac{a_k}{|\mathbf{B}|} \ge p_{\mathbf{T},k} - \delta$, hence $a_k \geq |\mathbf{B}|(p_{\mathbf{T},k} - \delta - p_{\mathbf{B},k})$. By definition of the ceil function $\lceil \cdot \rceil$, $\lceil |\mathbf{B}|(p_{\mathbf{T},k} - \delta - p_{\mathbf{B},k}) \rceil$ is the lowest integer that verifies this inequality. So the minimal number of addition for an underrepresented class k is $[|\mathbf{B}|(p_{\mathbf{T},k} - \delta - p_{\mathbf{B},k})]$. If this number is negative, it means that the class is not underrepresented: in that case, no addition should be made. We denote, for any class k, the minimal number of addition as $n_{\mathbf{B}}(k) = \max(0, \lceil |\mathbf{B}|(p_{\mathbf{T},k} - \delta - p_{\mathbf{B},k}) \rceil)$. By the same reasoning, we define the minimal number of deletions as $n_{\mathbf{B}}^+(k) = \max(0, \lceil |\mathbf{B}|(p_{\mathbf{B},k} - p_{\mathbf{T},k} - \delta) \rceil)$. In fact, we prove that Algorithm 1 makes exactly $2 \max(\sum_k n_{\mathbf{B}}^+(k), \sum_k n_{\mathbf{B}}^-(k))$ modifications between its input **B** and its output **G**.

B. Optimal Debiasing Algorithm

Algorithm 1 can lead to suboptimal solutions. Algorithm 2 produces a dataset G without size constraint which is representative of **T**, with minimal modifications to **B**. This algorithm calls Algorithm 1 multiple times with different dataset sizes and maintains two variables: G_{best} is the best dataset found so far, i.e., the one that minimizes the number of modifications to **B**; and d_{min} is this distance between G_{best} and **B**. The algorithm starts with $G_{best} = "Impossible"$ and $d_{min} = \infty$ (line 1). First, it calls Algorithm 1 (line 2) with the initial dataset **B**. If this succeeds, d_{min} is updated with the appropriate number of additions and deletions, and G_{best} becomes the result of Algorithm 1. Then, in lines 6 to 11, it tries to remove applications from the most overrepresented classes from **B**. Finally, in lines 14 to 14, it tries to add applications to the most underrepresented classes to B. For each modification to **B**, Algorithm 1 is called to update d_{min} and \mathbf{G}_{best} .

Algorithm 2 Optimal debiasing Algorithm
Input: B, T, S, δ
Output: Generated dataset
1 $d_{min} \leftarrow \infty$; $\mathbf{G}_{best} \leftarrow$ "Impossible"
2 if $Algo1(B, T, S, \delta) \neq$ "Impossible" then
$3 d_{min} \leftarrow 2 \max(\sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{B}}^{+}(k), \sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{B}}^{-}(k))$
$4 \mathbf{G}_{best} \leftarrow Algo1(\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{T}, \mathbf{S}, \delta)$
$5 G \leftarrow B$
6 for <i>i</i> from 1 to $d_{min} - 1$ do \triangleright Search smaller datasets
7 if $G = \emptyset$ then break;
8 $k_h \leftarrow \arg \max_{k \in \mathcal{K}} (p_{\mathbf{G},k} - p_{\mathbf{T},k})$
9 Remove one random element of class k_h from G
10 $d \leftarrow \mathbf{B} - \mathbf{G} + 2 \max(\sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{G}}^{+}(k), \sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{G}}^{-}(k))$
11 if $d < d_{min}$ and $Algo1(G, T, S, \delta) \neq$ "Impossible"
then
12 $\begin{bmatrix} d_{min} \leftarrow d; \mathbf{G}_{best} \leftarrow Algo1(\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{T}, \mathbf{S}, \delta) \end{bmatrix}$
13 $\mathbf{G} \leftarrow \mathbf{B}$
14 for <i>i</i> from 1 to $d_{min} - 1$ do \triangleright Search larger datasets
15 $k_l \leftarrow \arg\min_{k \in \mathcal{K}} (p_{\mathbf{G},k} - p_{\mathbf{B},k})$
16 if $ S(k_l) = 0$ then
17 $\mathcal{K}_{\mathbf{S}} = \{k \in \mathcal{K} \mid \mathbf{S}(k) > 0\}$
18 if $p_{G,k_l} \ge p_{T,k} - \delta$ and $\mathcal{K}_S \neq \emptyset$ then
19 $k_l \leftarrow \arg\min_{k \in \mathcal{K}_{\mathbf{S}}} p_{\mathbf{G},k} - p_{\mathbf{T},k}$
20 else break;
21 $r \leftarrow$ one element of $\mathbf{S}(k_l)$ chosen at random
22 Remove r from S and add it to G
23 $d \leftarrow \mathbf{B} - \mathbf{G} + 2 \max(\sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{G}}^{+}(k), \sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{G}}^{-}(k))$
24 if $d < d_{min}$ and $Algo1(G, \overline{T}, S, \delta) \neq$ "Impossible"
then
25 $d_{min} \leftarrow d; \mathbf{G}_{best} \leftarrow Algo1(\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{T}, \mathbf{S}, \delta)$
26 return G _{best}

Theorem 1: Let **B**, **S**, **T** be three datasets and $\delta > 0$. If there exists at least one δ -representative dataset of **T** that is composed of elements of **B** and **S**, then Algorithm 2 produces such a dataset **G** such that the number of additions and

deletions from the initial dataset **B** is minimal. If such a dataset doesn't exist, it returns "Impossible."

Its worst-case temporal complexity is $O\left(\left(\frac{1}{\delta} + |\mathbf{B}|\right)^2 |\mathcal{K}|\right)$. While Algorithm 2 computes the closest dataset to the original one, it may happen that the solution found contains only a few applications from the original dataset. This is an indication that the original dataset was very biased.

If **B** has been debiased towards a target dataset **T** randomly drawn from a population \mathcal{P} , with a tolerated difference of $\delta_{debiasing}$, we can estimate its error with the population \mathcal{P} by taking into account the error $\delta_{sampling}$ and confidence interval C used to derive the size of \mathbf{T} with Eq. (2): with confidence level C, the error between the debiased dataset and \mathcal{P} is less than $\delta_{sampling} + \delta_{debiasing}$.

VIII. EXPERIMENTS

In this last section, we are interested in producing datasets for experiments concerning Android malware detection or classification.⁷ As identified in Section II-B three types of experimental scenarios can occur. The first scenario (market profiling) requires only unlabeled representative data sets that can be drawn randomly without requiring debiasing (Section V). The two other cases, Algorithm evaluation and Machine learning, require labeled datasets with different proportions of malware/goodware samples. Therefore, we propose in Section VIII-A to debias datasets containing only malware or only goodware and mix them, in Section VIII-B, to obtain mixed datasets directly usable for machine learning algorithms.

A. Debiasing Datasets

The following details the use of our algorithm to produce representative datasets and in particular the choice of the base, reference and source datasets. Through these objectives, we discuss three main questions:

- Is it always possible to debias a strongly biased dataset such as Drebin or VirusShare?
- How many modifications (del/add) are required?
- Is a debiased malware dataset stable over time?

1) Debiasing 100% Goodware Datasets: We have randomly drawn a New AndrooZoo Extract (NAZE-18-G) and filtered it by relying on Virus Total to keep only goodware with a date no greater than 2018. This dataset should be close to a representative dataset of the Android app population in 2020. Indeed, by taking as reference dataset $AZ20_{30k}$ and as source dataset AZ19100kG, we successfully build a representative goodware dataset when δ reaches 0.001, as shown in Table II. Indeed, for $\delta = 0.04$ the dataset is already homogeneous: no addition/deletion is required, but the p-value is 0. Then, we decrease δ until the p-value becomes close to 1. For $\delta =$ 0.001, 19.53% of the resulting dataset are new applications and more than 50% of applications have been removed from the original one. Remark that these values of δ are far lower than the maximum δ observed in Table I.

2) Debiasing 100% Malware Datasets: We were first interested in investigating whether it is possible to debias a small and old dataset (Drebin) on the one hand and a more recent and larger dataset on the other hand (malware from VirusShare between 2015 and 2018). We want the produced datasets to resemble the population of AndroZoo, extracted in 2020.

The debiasing results show us that Drebin is strongly biased as we need to add from 1.8% to 12.7% of new samples, because a lot of classes of the population are underrepresented or missing in Drebin. Even with these modifications, the resulting dataset is not homogeneous to the population. On the contrary, VirusShare can be debiased with few additions (less than 2.9%) but requires removing more than 90% of the dataset. In that case, the resulting dataset obtains a *p*-value of 1. We conclude that the VirusShare dataset already contains enough material to be representative of AndroZoo for certain classes but that a lot of these classes are overrepresented.

3) Discussion: As seen in the results, Algorithm 2 can generate a new dataset statistically indistinguishable from the target dataset with a margin of error δ . However, the algorithm may fail (cf. grey cells in Table II) when some classes are underrepresented in the source, as discussed in Section VII-A. This limitation can be overcome by providing a large and diverse enough source dataset.

On the other hand, when the algorithm succeeds, the generated datasets' size tends to be much smaller than the base dataset. This is due to a lot of overrepresented classes, from which the algorithm removes elements at line 9. This is especially the case for historical malware datasets.

The number of classes to consider may also limit the debiasing: intuitively, more characteristics would help to resemble the target dataset better, but it spreads the elements into more classes and makes it more difficult to find elements for certain classes.

B. Building Mixed Datasets for Machine Learning

We finally produced two mixed datasets (goodware/malware) usable for training and testing machine learning algorithms. These datasets are built on top of the debiased malware datasets previously discussed. The goodware are taken from NAZE_{Debiased}18-G dataset. These two datasets are:

- **DR-AG**_{Deb} (standing for Drebin+AndroZoo Goodware), that mixes the debiased version of Drebin with $\delta =$ 0.01 and the goodware.
- VS-AG_{Deb} (standing for VirusShare+AndroZoo Goodware), that mixes the debiased version of VS_{Debiased}15-18 when $\delta = 0.1$ and the goodware.

Because the goal is to use mixed datasets for machine learning algorithms, we have to follow additional recommendations from Pendlebury *et al.* [7]. We build our mixed sets by extracting random samples from goodware and malware and by following the recommendations C1 (APK of the training set should be older than the ones of the test set) and C3 (realistic malware-to-goodware ratio i.e. 5% or 10%). In Table III we call "Pivot year" the year that delimitates the train and test sets. Note also that a consequence of C1 is that applications

⁷All materials used in the experiments (SHA256 hashes of samples composing the datasets and the code) are published in the Dada dataset [45].

TABLE II Results After Debiasing Datasets

Base Dataset		Reference	Source	Diff	Del	Add	Debiased dataset G D				
$ \mathbf{B} $		$ \mathbf{T} $	$ \mathbf{S} $	δ			G	Add ratio	χ^2	p-value	validity
			Debiasi	ng Goodwa	re dataset	ts					
NAZE-18-G	\rightarrow	AZ2030k	$AZ19_{100k}G$					NAZE _{Det}	niased 18-G		
11120		29974	72 131	0.04	0	0	11120	0.00	12 589	0	
				0.02	438	50	10732	0.47	12058	0	
				0.01	1 0 2 6	223	10317	2.16	11291	0	
				0.005	1 885	632	9867	6.41	9726	0	
				0.0025	2 685 3	1280	9715	13.18	7998	0	
				0.001	5 808		6601	19.53	5104	0.99944	
			Debiasi	ing Malwar	e datasets	5					
Drebin	\rightarrow	$AZ20_{30k}$	VS 15-18, AMD					Drebin ₁	Debiased		
5304		29974	103 293	0.04	892	81	4493	1.80	25781	0	
				0.02	3 6 3 4	116	1786	6.49	20178	0	
			0.01	4 5 9 6	103	811	12.70	15833	0		
				0.005			1				
VS 15-18	\rightarrow	AZ2030k	Drebin, AMD, AZ-17-18-M					VS _{Debias}	ed 15-18		
80035		29974	32562	0.04	66 475	21	13581	0.15	16 709	0	
				0.02	75 825	31	4241	0.73	7406	0	
				0.01	78 074	43	2004	2.15	4349	1	
				0.005	79 063	29	1 0 0 1	2.90	915	1	
				0.0025							
			Debiasing the	VirusShare	dataset o	ver time					
VS 15	\rightarrow	AZ19 _{100k} 15	Drebin					VS _{Deb}	iased 15		
28896		5792	5304	0.04	13877	4	15023	$0.0\bar{3}$	29475	0	0
				0.02	19832	90	9154	0.98	21828	0	0
				0.01							
VS 16	\rightarrow	AZ19 _{100k} 16	Drebin, VS 15					VS_{Deb}	$_{iased}16$		
12651		27516	34200	0.04	4 5 4 9	1	8103	0.01^{-1}	23204	0	0
				0.02			1				
VS 17	\rightarrow	AZ19 _{100k} 17	Drebin, VS 15-16, AMD					VS_{Deb}	$_{iased} 17$		
9945		6524	70109	0.04	580	0	9365	0.00	21073	0	0
				0.02							
VS 18	\rightarrow	AZ19 _{100k} 18	Drebin, VS 15-17, AMD					VS_{Deb}	iased 18		
28543		24549	80 054	0.04	27 644	7	906	0.77^{-10}	4 997	0.35652	1
				0.02	28 189	7	361	1.94	1809	1	1
				0.01	-		1		-		

in the training and test sets are disjoint (which correspond to an added C4*: Train \cap Test = \emptyset). For C2 (temporal window consistency) we do not enforce the constraint as we already balanced the classes on the year when performing the debiasing algorithms. Nevertheless, we can enforce them if needed, at the cost of reducing the output size of the training/tests sets. For example, the set VS-AG-C2_{Deb} has fewer samples than VS-AG_{Deb}. In the rest of the paper we only use the set that does not enforce C2 to decrease the quantity of results to discuss.

We recomputed the average δ of these mixed datasets: it is still quite low (worst case of 0.0012 for VS-AG_{*Deb*}). The *p*-value falls to zero for some sets because applying the constraints of Pendlebury *et al.* drives the datasets away from the population. Nevertheless, we believe that respecting the time consistency for machine learning algorithms is of higher importance.

Finally, for evaluating these datasets when used for machine learning purposes, Table III includes additional datasets:

- VS-AG_{Deb, $\delta=0.4$} a relaxed version of the debiasing of VS_{Debiased}15-18 with $\delta = 0.4$. This dataset as a p-value of 0 but contains more samples in the training set.
- DR-AG: a mixed version of Drebin and goodware.
- VS-AG: a mixed version of VS 15-18 and goodware.

- ACT14 and ACT17: a mixed version of AndroCT [46] with pivot year 2014 and 2017 respectively.
- AZL14 and AZL17: a mixed version of random samples extracted from AZ20_{30k} for which we took the good-ware/malware label of AndroZoo as an oracle.

All these datasets will be used to compare the efficiency of machine learning algorithms when using our debiased datasets. In particular, AZL14 and AZL17 are the biggest extract of the population. AndroCT [46] is a new recent datasets that cover ten years of applications: it will be used to observe its performances when learning with it and testing on AZL14/17.

C. Classifying With Machine Learning

We evaluate the performance of various machine learning classifiers depending on their training datasets to assess the contribution of debiased datasets. The datasets used in this experiments are those computed in the previous section, cf. Table III. The machine learning classifiers rely on a total of 262 characteristics. The first 12 characteristics are those used to debiased the datasets that are not related to security. Additionally, we included the characteristics related to security computed from two sources:

Malware	Goodware	Pivot	Set	Mal	Good	(Constr	aints	[7]	Mixed dataset			
		year		prop.	prop.	C1	C2	C3	C4*	Name	Size	Avg δ	<i>p</i> -value
			Training	50%	50%	✓	×	\checkmark	\checkmark	DR-AG _{Deb}	1614	0.017	0
Drebin _{Debiased}	NAZE _{Debiased} 18-G	2014	Training	30%	30%	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	DR-AG-C2 _{Deb}	572	0.054	0
$(\delta = 0.01)$	$(\delta = 0.001)$	2014	Test	10%	90%	 ✓ 	×	\checkmark	\checkmark	DR-AG _{Deb}	40	0.071	1
			rest	10 %	90 %	✓	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	DR-AG-C2 _{Deb}	40	0.089	1
			Training	50%	50%	 ✓ 	×	\checkmark	\checkmark	VS-AG _{Deb}	3492	0.012	1
VS _{Debiased} 15-18	$NAZE_{Debiased} 18-G$ $(\delta = 0.001)$	2017		50%	50%	√	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	VS-AG-C2 _{Deb}	2858	0.013	1
$(\delta = 0.01)$		2017	Test	10%	90%	\checkmark	×	\checkmark	\checkmark	VS-AG _{Deb}	1333	0.057	0
				10 //		\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	\checkmark	VS-AG-C2 _{Deb}	1333	0.057	0
VS _{Debiased} 15-18	NAZE _{Debiased} 18-G	2017	Training	50%	50%	 ✓ 	Х	\checkmark	\checkmark	VS-AG _{Deb,$\delta=0.4$}	16862	0.018	0
$(\delta = 0.04)$	$(\delta = 0.01)$	2017	Test	10%	90%	✓	×	\checkmark	\checkmark	VS-AG _{Deb,$\delta=0.4$}	2095	0.057	0
Drebin	AZ19 _{100k} G	2014	Training	50%	50%	🗸	×	\checkmark	√	DR-AG	10608	-	-
VS 15-18	A710 C	2017	Training	50%	50%	\checkmark	Х	√	√	VS-AG	133244	-	-
v5 15-18	$AZ19_{100k}G$	2017	Test	10%	90%	↓	×	\checkmark	\checkmark	VS-AG	6113	-	-
		2014	Training	50%	50%	✓	×	~	~	ACT14	19351	0.065	0
A	CT [46]	2014	Test	10%	90%	\checkmark	×	~	~	ACT14	$\begin{array}{c ccccc} & 2095 & 0.057 \\ \hline 10608 & - \\ \hline 133244 & - \\ \hline 6113 & - \\ \hline 19351 & 0.065 \\ \hline 12241 & 0.057 \\ \hline 26389 & 0.054 \\ \hline \end{array}$	0	
Andro	oct [46]	2017	Training	50%	50%	 ✓ 	\times	\checkmark	\checkmark	ACT17	26389	0.054	0
		2017	Test	10%	90%	√	×	\checkmark	\checkmark	ACT17	4580	0.093	0
		2014	Training	50%	50%	√	×	~	~	AZL14	4890	0.015	0
1720		2014	Test	10%	90%	\checkmark	×	\checkmark	~	AZL14	8785	0.057	0
AZ20 _{30k}	with labels	2017	Training	50%	50%	√	×	\checkmark	\checkmark	AZL17	9474	0.019	0.894
000		2017	Test	10%	90%		×		(AZL17	2033	0.059	0

 TABLE III

 Mixed Datasets for Machine Learning Training and Evaluation

TABLE IV

MEAN AND MAX AUC OF MACHINE LEARNING CLASSIFIERS DEPENDING ON THEIR TRAINING SET AND THEIR TEST SET WHEN THE PIVOT YEAR IS 2017. IN BOLD FACE: BEST AUC ON A TEST SET

Test	AC	ACT17		L17	VS-	AG	$VS-AG_{Deb}$		
Train	Mean	Max	Mean	Max	Mean	Max	Mean	Max	
ACT17	0.62	0.65	0.67	0.71	0.76	0.85	0.74	0.78	
AZL17	0.72	0.81	0.78	0.86	0.71	0.89	0.75	0.80	
VS-AG	0.62	0.68	0.66	0.73	0.96	0.97	0.74	0.84	
$VS-AG_{Deb}$	0.70	0.74	0.71	0.75	0.86	0.89	0.83	0.87	
DR-AG	0.54	0.57	0.53	0.60	0.57	0.63	0.54	0.58	

Test		ACT	Г14	AZI	.14	DR-AG _{Deb}		
Train		Mean	Max	Mean	Max	Mean	Max	
ACT14		0.69	0.73	0.71	0.74	0.69*	0.83*	
AZL14		0.75	0.81	0.76	0.82	0.72*	0.99*	
DR-AG		0.57	0.58	0.56	0.58	0.48*	0.50*	
\mathbf{DR} - \mathbf{AG}_{Deb}		0.62	0.66	0.61	0.66	0.72*	0.80*	

TABLE V

MEAN AND MAX AUC OF MACHINE LEARNING CLASSIFIERS DEPENDING ON THEIR TRAINING SET AND THEIR TEST SET WHEN THE PIVOT YEAR IS 2014. IN BOLD FACE: BEST AUC ON A TEST SET

* due to the very limited size of the test set of DR-AG_{Deb}, these results are unreliable

- Droidlysis that computes 214 Booleans about the use of some APIs or behaviors (loading a DEX file, using cryptography, etc.);
- FalDroid [47] that computes 48 characteristics representing score values related to graph-based features (with parameters $\epsilon = 0.8, \theta = 0.1$ [47]). As FalDroid is intended to classify families, we configured the software with only two families (goodware/malware) and we extracted features related to control flow graph that manipulates sensitive APIs.

We base this evaluation on the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve (AUC), a classical metric in machine learning. This metric can be interpreted as the probability that a classifier considers a randomly chosen goodware to be more probably benign than a randomly chosen malware. A perfect classifier has an AUC of 1 (every goodware is ranked higher than all malware), meaning that there exists a threshold to separate exactly goodware and malware. A random classifier has an AUC of 0.5. Besides, this metric does not depend on some threshold selection.

We evaluate various machine learning techniques: k-nearest neighbors [48] (neighborhood-based technique), decision trees [49], random forest [50] (bagging ensemble technique with decision trees), Gaussian naive Bayes [51] (statistical

model), and AdaBoost [52] (boosting ensemble models with decision trees). We used the scikit-learn [53] implementation with default parameters. Since the decision trees, random forest and AdaBoost learning algorithms are stochastic, we took the average AUC over 25 seeds.

Average and max AUC are presented in Tables IV (pivot year of 2017) and V (pivot year of 2014) where each line corresponds to a different training set and each column to a different test set. The mean AUC over the various classifiers helps to estimate the global quality of a training dataset for machine learning. The max AUC reflects what performances could be obtained with the best classifiers.

The datasets go by pair: there is one training set and one test set (cf. Table III). In Table IV, we can see that generally learning on one training set yields the best results on the associated test set (i.e., the diagonal is in bold). The unique exception is that learning on AZL17 yields better results than learning on ACT17 when testing with ACT17. In fact, we can see that the AZL17 training set allows learning the best classifiers on ACT17 (max AUC: 0.77) and AZL17 (max AUC: 0.84), probably because it is a real randomly sampled dataset, and therefore it is less prone to bias. However, this training set was built using VirusTotal as an oracle, so it is, in general, not available for training.

Moreover, the most interesting results are the comparison of the performances of VS-AG and VS-AG_{Deb} on ACT17 and AZL17 test sets. We see that **the debiased dataset always performs better than the original one**. Another important result is that **it is notably better to train on the debiased dataset VS-AG**_{Deb} **than on ACT17 (AndroCT [46])**, which is the most recent dataset we have. Finally, **the debiased test dataset VS-AG**_{Deb} **is more difficult to predict than the test set VS-AG**. It is a sign that the bias in the test set of VS-AG makes it easier for a model to correctly classify it, probably because some difficult cases are absent.

Finally, we can remark that the DR-AG training set yields poor results on all test sets, which is an expected result, as no applications in this dataset after 2015. We tried to confirm this result with an additional experiment with the pivot year of 2014, in Table V. In this experiment, we evaluate if the debiased version of Drebin can obtain good results, even if it is old and quite small. The row in Table V concerning DR-AG_{Deb} shows that this dataset is far from being effective compared to ACT14. This is due to its size and the failing of debiasing when δ reaches 0.05 (cf. Table II).

D. Discussion

This section discusses the validity of the datasets through time. We also compare these results with related works [32], [54], [55] that have studied this question and the relation with Android history.

First, Cai *et al.* [54] focus on the evolution of usage of the system's API over time, using a dedicated analysis framework [32]. They conclude three main points: the decrease of usage of callbacks for methods of the app activities' lifecycle, a stable and small usage of inter-component communication, and a stable distribution of source/sink categories of callbacks.

Second, Cai *et al.* [55] characterize this evolution for goodware and malware applications. Newer malware tend to access system APIs more often through third-party libraries than older malware. The use of activities and services has increased over time, while the use of ICC components has decreased. The diversity of callback categories has also increased.

Our experiments confirm this evolution at a higher level. We study the evolution of representativeness of our debiased dataset over the years. More precisely, we debiased several extracts of VirusShare 2015, 2016, 2017 and 2018, and checked whether these debiased datasets stay representative of an evolving population over time. The target datasets are extracts of applications from AndroZoo 2019 ($AZ19_{100k}$) filtered on the corresponding period of time ($\mathbf{T} = AZ19_{100k} i$, with i = 15, 16, 17, 18). The source datasets are known datasets of malware such as Drebin and AMD, available at date i.

When the *p*-value confirms that the dataset is not statistically different, we tested the produced debiased version $VS_{Debiased}$ *i* with the next years' population, i.e., $AZ19_{100k}$ *i* + 1, *i* + 2, The last column indicates contains 0 if the p-value is 0: no discussion can be done for such debiased datasets. The only debiased dataset of the parts of VirusShare is VS 18. As it is the last set of applications we have, we only conclude that this set can be used during 1 year.

IX. CONCLUSION

In this article, we presented the different types of Android datasets used by researchers to evaluate their experiments. We argued that these datasets have problems with their construction depending on the type of experiment. For surveys on bigger datasets, we proposed the use of a margin of error to obtain a lower bound on the size of the sample to be drawn. We also proposed a methodology based on the χ^2 test to evaluate the homogeneity of a dataset with respect to a given population for a finite set of characteristics. When starting from a dataset that does not resemble the population, we introduced a debiasing algorithm to push this biased dataset towards the population's characteristics.

The choice of characteristics for which the dataset is debiased is of high importance. We propose here to debias datasets for a finite set of computable characteristics unrelated to the characteristic under study in order to keep only the relevant differences with the population.

Finally, using this algorithm, we proposed directly usable datasets for the evaluation of machine learning algorithms. We evaluated these debiased datasets using machine learning algorithms and we show that they outperform biased ones and in particular one recent dataset of the literature. Additionally, our debiased dataset, VS-AG_{*Deb*}, would be usable for further works as a difficult test set for classification experiments.

Future works concern the study of the influence of the considered characteristics over the performances of detection algorithms. In particular, limiting the study to a small number of characteristics when debiasing, prevents combinations from exploding. As any characteristic could introduce a bias in the dataset, it would be unrealistic to enumerate and balance them when building a dataset. An additional study about the influence of the characteristic over the bias is needed. It would help to understand what are the characteristics that are important when evaluating an algorithm. Additionally, studying more characteristics, especially the ones that can be extracted from dynamic analysis, is of independent interest.

Appendix

A. Equation (1) Proof

The margin of error with finite population correction [37] for a boolean characteristic of estimated probability \hat{p} is:

$$\delta \le z(C)\sqrt{\frac{\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})}{n}}\sqrt{\frac{N-n}{N-1}}$$

The term $\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})$ is maximized when $\hat{p} = 0.5$, so we can bound this value by $0.5(1-0.5) = \frac{1}{4}$, i.e.:

$$\delta \le z(C)\sqrt{\frac{\hat{p}(1-\hat{p})}{n}}\sqrt{\frac{N-n}{N-1}} \le z(C)\sqrt{\frac{N-n}{4n(N-1)}}$$

Rearranging this inequality brings Equation (1).

B. Algorithm Proofs

For the sake of brevity and clarity, we introduce the notation $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k} = p_{\mathbf{G},k} - p_{\mathbf{T},k}$. So a class k is overrepresented w.r.t. **T** if $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k} > \delta$ and underrepresented if $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k} < -\delta$.

Theorem 2: Algorithm 1 always halts.

Proof: First, remark that if a class k is correctly represented at some iteration, i.e., if $|\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k}| \leq \delta$, then it will be correctly represented in the next iteration. Besides, a class that is overrepresented in **G** cannot become underrepresented in the following iteration (and vice versa) without the algorithm halting. Both remarks are ensured by the "If" block on line 13 that halts the program by verifying whether a class with an added element is overrepresented.

Let's assume that this case never happens. At each iteration of the algorithm, there is at least one class k such that $|\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k}| > \delta$ that is modified in **G**: one element is added if k is underrepresented and one element is removed if k is overrepresented in **G**. So $\sum_{k} |\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k}|$ is reduced by at least $\frac{1}{|\mathbf{B}|}$ in the updated value of **G**. With enough iterations, $\sum_{k} |\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k}|$ will so low that every class will be correctly represented. At that point, the algorithm halts.

Besides, a representative dataset always exists. This is necessary to prove the termination and the complexity of Algorithm 2.

Theorem 3: Let **T** be a dataset, $\delta > 0$ and n > 0 such as $n \ge \frac{1}{\delta}$. There exists a dataset **D** of size n such as **D** is δ -representative of **T**.

Proof: To prove the existence of such dataset of size n, we construct it. More precisely, we associate to each class k a number of element b_k such as this class is δ -representative of **T**, i.e., $\frac{b_k}{n} \in [p_{\mathbf{T},k} - \delta; p_{\mathbf{T},k} + \delta]$. For each class k, define a_k such as $\frac{a_k}{n} < p_{\mathbf{T},k} \le \frac{a_k+1}{n}$. Remark that $p_{\mathbf{T},k} - \delta \le \frac{a_k}{n} < p_{\mathbf{T},k} \le \frac{a_k+1}{n} \le p_{\mathbf{T},k} + \delta$ since $\delta \ge \frac{1}{n}$. As $\sum_k p_{\mathbf{T},k} = 1$,

 $\sum_k a_k < n$ and $\sum_k (a_k + 1) \ge n$. So there exist b_k such as for all class k either $b_k = a_k$ or $b_k = a_k + 1$ and that verify $\sum_k b_k = n$.

Denote the dataset **D** such as $p_{\mathbf{D},k} = \frac{b_k}{n}$. The size of **D** is $\sum_k b_k = n$ and **D** is δ -representative of **T** since $\frac{b_k}{n} \in [p_{\mathbf{T},k} - \delta; p_{\mathbf{T},k} + \delta]$ for every class k. It proves the existence of such a dataset.

Theorem 4: If there exists a dataset **D** consisting of elements of **B** and **S** (i.e., $\mathbf{D} \subseteq \mathbf{B} \cup \mathbf{S}$) such as **D** is representative of **T** and $|\mathbf{D}| = |\mathbf{B}|$, then Algorithm 1 returns a representative dataset. If no such dataset exists, the algorithm returns "Impossible."

Proof: Assume such dataset **D** exists. Let us first prove that the **return** on line 9 cannot be reached. This line is reached if **S** is empty or if $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k_l} < -\delta$.

Consider the case where $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k_l} < -\delta$: we will prove by contradiction that this case is impossible when **D** exists. Since the algorithm never removes an element of an underrepresented class, at each iteration $p_{\mathbf{G},k_l} = \frac{\mathbf{B}(k_l)+m}{n}$ where *m* is the number of elements added to the class from **S**. If $\mathbf{S}(k_l) = 0$, then $p_{\mathbf{G},k_l}$ is maximized, i.e., $p_{\mathbf{G},k_l} \ge p_{\mathbf{D},k_l}$. So $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{D},k_l} \le \Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k_l} < -\delta$ which means that **D** is not representative of **T**. This is a contradiction: therefore this case is not possible.

Consider the case where **S** is empty and $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k_l} \geq -\delta$. Once again, we will prove by contradiction that this case is impossible when **D** exists. The fact that $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k_l} \geq -\delta$ implies that $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k_h} \geq \delta$, otherwise the "While" condition would not have been true. Denote *m* the number of completed iterations so far. Since one element of **S** is removed at each iteration, we conclude that initially $|\mathbf{S}| = m$. Denote $\mathbf{B}_{\mathbf{D}} \subseteq \mathbf{B}$ and $\mathbf{S}_{\mathbf{D}} \subseteq$ **S** such as $\mathbf{D} = \mathbf{B}_{\mathbf{D}} \cup \mathbf{S}_{\mathbf{D}}$. Due to the definition of k_h and the fact that $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k_h} \geq \delta$, it means that for each previous iterations one element has been removed from an overrepresented class. So there are at least m+1 elements of **B** that are absent in $\mathbf{B}_{\mathbf{D}}$, i.e., $|\mathbf{B}_{\mathbf{D}}| \leq |\mathbf{B}| - m$. However, since $|\mathbf{B}| = |\mathbf{D}| = |\mathbf{B}_{\mathbf{D}}| + |\mathbf{S}_{\mathbf{D}}|$, it means that $|\mathbf{S}| \geq m + 1$. This is in contradiction with the fact that $|\mathbf{S}| = m$. So **S** cannot be empty. Finally, the **return** on line 9 cannot be reached when **D** exists.

We now prove that the "If" condition on line 13 cannot be true in Algorithm 1 when **D** exists. For algorithm 1 to return an error on line 14, the condition $max_{k\in\mathcal{K}}|\Delta_{\mathbf{T}}p_{\mathbf{G},k}| > \delta$ must be true. Let us assume (without loss of generality) that there exists k' such as $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}}p_{\mathbf{G},k'} > \delta$ (the case $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}}p_{\mathbf{G},k'} < -\delta$ is similar).

Consider now the value of k_h . Since $k_h \leftarrow$ arg max_{$k \in \mathcal{K}$} $\Delta_T p_{\mathbf{G},k}$, we can conclude that $\Delta_T p_{\mathbf{G},k_h} \geq$ $\Delta_T p_{\mathbf{G},k'} > \delta$. Denote $n = |\mathbf{B}|$ and \mathbf{G}' the dataset obtained from \mathbf{G} by removing one element from k_h and adding one element to k_l . The proportions of the classes of \mathbf{G}' are:

$$p_{\mathbf{G}',k} = \begin{cases} p_{\mathbf{G},k} - \frac{1}{n} \text{ if } k = k_h \\ p_{\mathbf{G},k} + \frac{1}{n} \text{ if } k = k_l \\ p_{\mathbf{G},k} \text{ otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Our goal is to prove that the "If" condition will never be true, i.e., that $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G}',k_h} \geq -\delta$ and $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G}',k_l} \leq \delta$.

Let a_1 and a_2 be two naturals such as $p_{\mathbf{G},k_h} = \frac{a_1}{n}$ and $p_{\mathbf{D},k_h} = \frac{a_2}{n}$. Since $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k_h} > \delta$ and $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{D},k_h} \leq \delta$ (due to \mathbf{D} being representative), we can conclude that $p_{\mathbf{G},k_h} > p_{\mathbf{D},k_h}$, i.e., $a_1 > a_2$. Since $p_{\mathbf{G}',k_h} = p_{\mathbf{G},k_h} - \frac{1}{n} = \frac{a_1 - 1}{n}$ and $a_1 - 1 \ge a_2$, we conclude that $p_{\mathbf{G}',k_h} \geq p_{\mathbf{D},k_h}$ and $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G}',k_h} \geq \Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{D},k_h}$. Since **D** is itself representative of **T**, we know that $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{D},k_h} \geq$ $-\delta$ and therefore that $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G}',k_h} \geq -\delta$.

Let us show that there exists k'_l such as $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k_l} < \mathbf{C}$ $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{D},k'_{l}} \leq \delta$. Since $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k_{h}} > \Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{D},k_{h}}$ and $\sum_{k} \Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k} =$ $\sum_k \Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{D},k}$, we can conclude that there exists k'_l such as $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k'_l} < \Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{D},k'_l}$. Furthermore, $k'_l \in \mathcal{K}_S$ because if **S** were empty it would not be possible for **D** to have more elements than **G** for this class.

Due to the definition of k_l , $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k_l} \leq \Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G},k_l'} <$ $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{D},k'_l} \leq \delta$. Let b_1, b_2, b_3, b_4 four naturals such as $p_{\mathbf{G},k_l} =$ $\frac{b_1}{n}$, $p_{\mathbf{T},k_l} = \frac{b_2}{n}$, $p_{\mathbf{D},k'_l} = \frac{b_3}{n}$ and $p_{\mathbf{T},k'_l} = \frac{b_4}{n}$. We can conclude of the previous inequalities that $b_1 - b_2 < b_3 - b_4$. Therefore $b_1 - b_2 + 1 \le b_3 - b_4$ and $\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{G}', k_l} = p_{\mathbf{G}, k_l} + \frac{1}{n} - p_{\mathbf{D}, k_l} \le \delta$. This proves that the "If" condition is never true if **D** exists.

Finally, if **D** exists, then Algorithm 1 returns a dataset. This dataset is representative because the "While" condition is true for the last iteration. When the algorithm outputs a dataset, it is representative and its size is the same as **B**. If such dataset does not exist, the algorithm cannot output one. Since the algorithm always halts, it must return "Impossible."

We denote $d_H(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B})$ the number of modifications between A and **B**. More precisely, we extend the Hamming distance to a distance between two sets by defining $d_H(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B})$ as $d_H(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}) = |(\mathbf{A} \setminus \mathbf{B}) \cup (\mathbf{B} \setminus \mathbf{A})|$. $d_H(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B})$ is the number of elements present in only one dataset, A or B. In other words, it is the minimal number of addition and deletions to transform **A** into **B** (and vice-versa).

Theorem 5: Let **B** be a biased dataset, **D** a dataset representative of P such as $\mathbf{D} \subseteq \mathbf{B} \cup \mathbf{S}$ and $\mathbf{G} =$ Algo1(**B**). If $|\mathbf{B}| = |\mathbf{D}|$, then $d_H(\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{D}) \geq d_H(\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{G}) =$ $2 \max(\sum_k n_B^+(k), \sum_k n_B^-(k))$. So Algorithm 1 outputs a representative dataset with minimal distance to **B**.

Proof: Let $\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{D} \setminus \mathbf{B}$ be the set of elements added to **B** and $\mathbf{R} = \mathbf{B} \setminus \mathbf{D}$ be the set of elements removed from **B**. So $\mathbf{D} = (\mathbf{B} \setminus \mathbf{R}) \cup \mathbf{A}$ and $d_H(\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{D}) = |\mathbf{A}| + |\mathbf{R}|$. Due to the hypothesis $|\mathbf{B}| = |\mathbf{D}|$, we know that $|\mathbf{A}| = |\mathbf{R}|$ (there are as many additions as removals).

For any class k that is overrepresented in **B**, $n_{\mathbf{B}}^+(k)$ is the minimal number of removal of elements of class k such as k is not overrepresented anymore. $n_{\mathbf{B}}(k) =$ $\max(0, \lceil -|\mathbf{B}|(\Delta_{\mathbf{T}} p_{\mathbf{B},k} + \delta) \rceil)$ is similar for underrepresented classes.

To make a representative dataset from \mathbf{B} , one must remove at least $\sum_k n_{\mathbf{B}}^+(k)$ elements and add $\sum_k n_{\mathbf{B}}^-(k)$, i.e., $|\mathbf{A}| \geq 1$ $\sum_k n_{\mathbf{B}}^+(k)$ and $|\mathbf{R}| \ge \sum_k n_{\mathbf{B}}^-(k)$. However, since $|\mathbf{A}| = |\mathbf{R}|$, we conclude that $|\mathbf{A}| = |\mathbf{\tilde{R}}| \ge \max(\sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{B}}^{+}(k), \sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{B}}^{-}(k)).$ It means that $d_H(\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{D}) \ge 2 \max(\sum_k n_{\mathbf{B}}^+(k), \sum_k n_{\mathbf{B}}^-(k)).$ that $d_H(\mathbf{B},\mathbf{G})$ Let now show

 $2 \max(\sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{B}}^{+}(k), \sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{B}}^{-}(k))$. At each iteration of the algorithm, if $\sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{G}}^{+}(k) > 0$, then an overrepresented class has one of its elements removed, so $\sum_k n_{\mathbf{G}'}^+(k) < \sum_k n_{\mathbf{G}}^+(k)$. For the same reason, at each iteration, $\sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{G}'}(k) < \sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{G}}(k)$. When $\sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{G}}^{+}(k) = \sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{G}}(k) = 0$, then the algorithm halts. So there are $\max(\sum_k n_{\mathbf{G}}^+(k) = \sum_k n_{\mathbf{G}}^-(k))$ iterations. Since each iteration makes two modifications of the dataset, we can conclude that $d_H(\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{G}) = 2 \max(\sum_k n_{\mathbf{B}}^+(k), \sum_k n_{\mathbf{B}}^-(k)).$

So $d_H(\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{G}) \leq d_H(\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{D})$.

Proof of theorem 1: Let us first prove that at each step of the algorithm, d is equal to the number of additions and deletions between **B** and Algo1(G). This number can be decomposed as the sum of the number of additions and deletions between B and **G** and between **G** and Algo1(G). The number of modifications between G and B is simply the difference of their size, i.e., $||\mathbf{B}| - |\mathbf{G}||$. The number of modification between **G** and Algo1(G) is $2 \max(\sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{G}}^+(k), \sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{G}}^-(k))$ (cf. the previous proof algorithm). So the number of modifications between **B** and $Algo1(\mathbf{G})$ is $||\mathbf{B}| - |\mathbf{G}|| + 2 \max(\sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{G}}^{+}(k), \sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{G}}^{-}(k)).$

First, let us show that the algorithm always halts. This algorithm halts either if $d_{min} \neq \infty$ (so both loops have a finite number of iterations) or if the source dataset lacks some element (lines 16 to 16). If a solution G exists, then at some point Algorithm 2 will call Algorithm 1 with a dataset whose size is the same as **G** (either at line 2 if $|\mathbf{G}| = |\mathbf{B}|$, at line 10 if $|\mathbf{G}| < |\mathbf{B}|$ or at line 26 if $|\mathbf{G}| > |\mathbf{B}|$) and Algorithm 1 will find a solution (due to Theorem 5). If at some point it is not possible to add an element to a underrepresented class because there is no such element in the source dataset, then the algorithm halts (lines 5 to 9).

Second, we show that doing $d_{min} - 1$ iterations per loop is sufficient (lines 6 and 15). Let G_{best} be the best dataset found so far, associated to a distance d_{min} , and a better solution G' associated to a distance d' such as $d' < d_{min}$. Remark that at each step, $i = ||\mathbf{B}| - |\mathbf{G}||$ as one element is modified per iteration. Denote j the iteration at which **G**' could be found. Since $d' = ||\mathbf{B}| - |\mathbf{G}|| + 2 \max(\sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{G}}^{+}(k), \sum_{k} n_{\mathbf{G}}^{-}(k)) \ge j$ and $d' < d_{min}$, we conclude that $j \leq d_{min}$ and therefore that **G**' will be found by the algorithm.

Theorem 6: The worst-case temporal complexity of Algorithm 2 is $O\left(\left(\frac{1}{\delta}+|\boldsymbol{B}|\right)^2|\mathcal{K}|\right)$.

Proof: Remark that for all datasets A and B, the number of additions and deletions required to obtain B from A is lower than or equal to $|\mathbf{A}| + |\mathbf{B}|$. Theorem 3 shows that there exists a representative dataset **D** of size $\lceil \frac{1}{\delta} \rceil$. So the minimal distance d_{min} to reach a representative dataset **D** from the initial base dataset **B** is bounded by $\lceil \frac{1}{\delta} \rceil + |\mathbf{B}|$. So Algo. 2 will do at most $2(\lceil \frac{1}{\delta} \rceil + |\mathbf{B}|)$ iterations. Each iteration calls Algo. 1, whose temporal complexity is $O(|\mathbf{G}| \cdot |\mathcal{K}|)$ where the size of **G** is at most $|\mathbf{B}| + d_{min} \leq \lceil \frac{1}{\delta} \rceil + 2|\mathbf{B}|$. So the worst-case temporal complexity of Algo. 2 is $O\left(\frac{1}{\delta} + |\mathbf{B}|\right)^2 |\mathcal{K}|$.

C. Datasets Used in the Literature

Table VI evaluates the dataset usages of 28 articles on Android malware detection using machine learning techniques. Column "Paper" gives the name of the tool or the authors' names. Next, column "Goodware source" contains the datasets used in the experiment. Sometimes, several sets are used in a paper: we note these subsets D_i and we give their size in other columns accordingly. Next, columns "GS year" and "Nb Goodware" are the year range and number of goodware according to the article, if available. The next three colmuns give the same information for the used malware.

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TABLE VI

DETAILS ON THE DATASET USAGE IN DETECTION EXPERIMENTS. GP = GOOGLE PLAY, VT = VIRUSTOTAL, GM = GM, DB = DREBIN, AZ = ANDROZOO, CT = CONTAGIO, VS = VIRUSSHARE, PD = PLAYDRONE, MSL = MOBISEC LAB, TZ = THEZOO, MS = MALSHARE, N/A = NOT APPLICABLE

Paper	Goodware source	Goodware source year	Goodware size	Malware source	Malware source year	Malware Size	Training set (M/G) Test set (M	1/G)	Class Imbalance	Time Incoherence
MADAME [56]				GM CT	2010-2011 2016	1 242	2,784/0 (Total)		Х	
DroidDetector [57]	GP	2016	20 000	VS CT	2012-2015 2016	1 923 500	880/800 880/880			x
	GP	2010	12 026	GM DB	2010-2011	1 260	15 561 (mixed) 1 203/52		x	X
ICCDetector [44] Androdialysis [43]	GP	2014	12 026	DB	2010-2012 2010-2012	5 264 5 560	10-fold 5 560/1 9	1	x	X
Androdiarysis [45]	Or	2010	1 840				cross-validation DB/PD		Λ	^
MaMaDroid [58]	PD GP	2013-2014 2016	8 447 2 843	DB VS "	2010-2012 2013 2014 2015 2016	5 560 6 228 15 417 5 314 2 974	10-fold 2013/PI cross-validation 2014/PI 2014/G 2015/G 2015/G)) P P	х	
StormDroid [59]	GP	2015	4 350	MSL GM CT	2015 2010-2011 2012-2015	2 000 1 260 360	$\frac{(900+500+100)}{1500} \qquad \frac{(600+300+100)}{1000}$			Х
PIndroid [4]	GP AppBrain F-Droid Getjar Aptoid Mobango	up to 2016	445	CT DB GM VT TZ[60] MS[61]	2012-2015 2010-2012 2010-2011 ? 2016 ?	60 100 1 000 70 70 25	80% (from 20% (from 13 1300/445 total) total)	900/445	х	Х
Vinod et al. [5]	$\begin{array}{c} {\rm GP} \ ({\bf D}_1, {\bf D}_2, {\bf D}_3, {\bf D}_4, {\bf D}_5) \\ {\rm Baidu} \ ({\bf D}_1, {\bf D}_2) \\ {\rm Koodous}({\bf D}_1, {\bf D}_2)(1,514) \\ {\rm 1Mobile} \ ({\bf D}_1, {\bf D}_2) \\ {\rm 9apps} \ ({\bf D}_1, {\bf D}_2) \end{array}$	2016	3 130	$\begin{tabular}{ c c c c } \hline VS \\ \hline DB (\mathbf{D}_1, \mathbf{D}_2) \\ \hline Koodous (\mathbf{D}_2) \\ \hline [62] (\mathbf{D}_4) \\ \hline GM (\mathbf{D}_5) \end{tabular}$	2016 2010-2012 ? 2011-2015 2010-2011	25 1 514 1 000 1 206	$\begin{array}{c} 10\mbox{-fold} \\ \mbox{cross-validation} \\ \mbox{J} \\ \mbox$	/3 130 /2 474 14 000	Х	Х
MalDozer [6]	GP	2016	38 000	GM DB Own "Merged"	2010-2011 2010-2012	1 000 5 500 20 000 33 000	Each malware dataset individually		X	Х
IntelliAV [63]	VT "	2011-2016 2017	10 058 2 898	VT	2011-2016 2017	9 664 2 311	9 664/10 058 2 311/2 898		Х	
Martín et al. [64]	GP	2017	~ 49 000	GP	2015	69 000	10-fold cross validation with 9 subsets of 50 000 samples, varying malware concentration from 2%, 25%, 50% of the whole subset, and the number of antivirus alerts: 1-AV, 2-AV, 4-AV (4-AV, 50% subset only contains 36 000)		x	
HinDroid [65]	Comodo Cloud Security Center	2017	920 (D ₁ Tr) 198 (D ₁ Te) 15 000 (D ₂)	Comodo Cloud Security Center	2017	914 (D ₁ Tr) 302 (D ₁ Te) 15 000 (D ₂)	914/920 (D ₁) 15 000/15 000 (D ₂) 500 (D ₁) 10-fold CV	(D ₂)		
RevealDroid [66]	GP (AZ)	2016	24 600	VS DB	2016 2010-2012	22 592 5 538	10-fold CV Training-Test with separation (Training date < Test		х	х
Demontis et al. [67]	DB	2010-2012	121 329	DB Mod DB and CT	2010-2012 2010-2012, 2016	5 615 10 500	10 runs, where 30 000 for training rest for test	, and the	х	Too Old
McLaughlin et al. [68]	GM (GP) McAfee Labs	2010-2011 2016 ? 2016 ?	863 3 627 9 268	GM McAfee Labs "	2010-2011 2016 ? 2016 ?	1 260 2 475 9 902	10-fold CV, with same GW/MW training and test	ratio In		Х
Alzaylaee et al. [69]	Intel Security (McAfee Labs)	2016 ?	1 222	GM	2010-2011	1 222	2/3 of GW/MW 1/3 of GW/	MW		Х
Melis et al. [70]	DB	2010-2012	121 329	DB	2010-2012	5 615	5 runs, where 60 000 units are ra selected for training, And the rest for		х	Too Old
MKLDroid [71]	GP1 GP2 AndroidDrawer (AD) AnZhi (AZ) AppsApk (AA) F-Droid (FD) SlideMe (SM)	2012-2014 2012-2014 2013-2016 2013-2016 2013-2016 2013-2016 2013-2016	5 000 10 000 2 399 3 027 2 481 1 007 5 770	DR VS MYST	2010-2012 2013-2014 2015	5 560 24 317 3 000	CE1: 70% of DR CE1: 30% + GP1 CE2: 70% of VS CE2: 30%	of DR + GP1 of VS + GP2 + GP2 + AZ + SM : ½ of	Х	Х
Li et al. [72]	apkpure 360 HKUST	2019	16 753	DB AMD	2010-2011 2010-2016	5 560 16 753	5-fold CV		Х	Х
SMART [73] Xiao et al. [74]	GP GP	2015 2016 ?	5 600 3 536	DB DB	2010-2012 2010-2013	5 560 3 567	10-fold CV 10-fold CV			X X
DroidCat [75]	GP (AZ) "	2016-2017 2014-2015 2012-2013 2009-2011	5 346 6 545 5 035 439	VS, AZ VS, AZ VS, AZ, GM, DB VS, AZ, GM, DB	2016-2017 2014-2015 2012-2013 2009-2011	3 450 3 190 9 084 1 254	70% of older 30% of newe apps	r apps	х	
Rana et al. [76]	DB	2010-2012	5 560	DB	2010-2012	5 560	80% training and 20% testir Everything divided in 10 parts, The			Too Old
Ma et al. [77]	AZ	?	10 010	AMD	2010-2016	10 683	for each part	a 10-C V	?	?
Huang et al. [78] Liu et al. [79]	GP DB	2018 ? 2010-2012	3 312 123 453	VS DB	? 2010-2012	3 312 5 560	10-fold CV		Х	N/A Too Old
HG-Learning [80]	Tencent Security Lab (Tr) " (Te)	2010-2012 2018 ? 2018 ?	83 784 13 313	Tencent Security Lab (Tr) " (Te)	2010-2012 2018 ? 2018 ?	106 912 4 433	83 784/106 912 13 313/4	433	X	100 014
BRIDEMAID [81]	GP	2016	9 804	DB GM CT	2010-2012 2010-2011 2016	2 794	2 974 applications tested		х	х

Next, columns "Training set" and "Test set" correspond to the number of applications used in the respective sets. The notation "(M/G)" reports the Malware/Goodware for each experiment. The use of "*k*-fold cross validation" will be specified in these columns. Any other special cases are reported in these two columns. Finally, columns "Class imbalance" and "Time Incoherence" indicate whether the datasets used in the experiments suffer from these irregularities, introduced in Section III.

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