Implementation of Cache Timing Attack Based on Present Algorithm

Traditional side-channel attacks have shortcomings such as low efficiency, extremely difficult collection and injection of fault information in real environments, and poor applicability of attacks. The cache timing attack proposed in recent years is a new type of side-channel attack method. This attack method uses the difference in the reading speed of the computer CPU cache to enable the attacker to obtain the confidential information during the execution of the algorithm. The attack efficiency is high, and the cost is relatively low. little. Present algorithm is a lightweight block cipher proposed in 2007. The algorithm has excellent hardware implementation and concise round function design. On this basis, scholars at home and abroad have carried out different side-channel attacks on it, such as differential attacks., multiple differential chain attacks, algebraic attacks, etc. At present, there is no published research on the Cache timing attack against the Present algorithm at home and abroad. In this paper, the output value of the S box in the first and second rounds of the encryption process is obtained through the combination of the Cache timing attack and the side-channel Trojan horse, and Combined with the key recovery algorithm, the master key of the algorithm is finally recovered.

I. Introduction

Cryptographic algorithm is an important part of cryptography and the core system for realizing information confidentiality. Its security analysis has always been a very active topic in cryptographic research. The process of using intermediate state information to analyze a cryptographic algorithm is called side-channel attack. The main attack types include timing attack [1], power attack[2], electromagnetic analysis [3] and fault attack [4]. The advantages of side-channel attacks include many information collection methods, simple analysis methods, and high key recovery efficiency, which bring new challenges to cryptography and information security.