Pricing between ISPs under Content Sponsoring In ICN

In response to the growing number of requests for video content on the Internet and users' demands for high-quality information delivery services, researchers have proposed the Information-Centric Networking(ICN). As with other networks, a reasonable pricing mechanism can facilitate the deployment of ICN by encouraging operators to participate in the deployment of ICN. On the basis of non-cooperative game theory, we develop a cache pricing model based on content sponsorship between ISPs and CPs by considering two different content sponsorship approaches in ICN. Meanwhile we study the interaction between users, ISPs and CPs, and establish the utility function. The article analyses the caching and pricing strategies of each entity under NASH equilibrium and dissects which content sponsorship model is more able to meet the needs of network entities in the ICN environment. It is found that the model which directly subsidizes the cost of acquiring content is more in line with the needs of operators and subscribers in ICN. We also verify the above conclusions through numerical simulation experiments.