Cache Pricing Mechanism for ICN on ISP Peering

With the feature of intra-network caching, the information-centric networks (ICN) can reduce the transmission of duplicate traffic, reduce the burden on servers, and solve the problem of today's surging network traffic. With the development of ICN, content-peering has attracted interest, which allows peering internet service providers (ISPs) to access each other's caches for mutual benefit. Solving the cache pricing problem of peering ISPs in ICN can economically motivate the large-scale promotion and deployment of ICN, thus better solving the existing network congestion problem, improving the network service quality, and bringing users a better experience. In this paper, we study and analyze the non-cooperative game relationships between ISPs and content providers (CPs) in ICN, and establish a peering link between access ISPs so that they can collaborate on caching. We analyze and prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium to maximize the benefits of each entity by using a game-theoretic approach. The results of the simulation experiments show that we can reasonably allocate cache based on the demand from the end-users, and each entity can determine the optimal pricing strategy based on its equilibrium point. The model provides incentives for operators to deploy ICN network caching and guidance for optimal resource allocation.